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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment pronounced on: 18.02.2026
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W.P.(C) 41/2026 and CM APPL.93/2026
PRECISION SCIENTIFIC AND TESTING EQUIPEMNT PVT LTD
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Ishan Sachdeva, Advocate.
versus
BRAHMANAND GAUTAM
Through: None.
.....Respondent
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN DATTA
JUDGMENT
CM APPl.94/2026 (Exemption)
1.
Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2.
Application stands disposed of.
W.P.(C) 41/2026
3.
The present petition has been filed by the petitioner assailing an
award dated 14.11.2025 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court-IV,
Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi in L.I.R No. 112/2024.
4.
The Labour Court adjudicated the reference made under Section
10(1)(c) and 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred
as “the IDA”) by the Deputy Labour Commissioner, New Delhi, in view of a
complaint filed by the respondent/workman against the petitioner and
directed the petitioner to pay a lumpsum compensation of Rs. 1,50,000/- to
respondent/workman on account of violation of Section 25F of the IDA.
5.
The petitioner in the present petition is a company which formerly
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W.P.(C) 41/2026
manufactured testing machines and laboratory equipments. It is stated that
the said company ceased its operations w.e.f. from 01.04.2023. The
respondent/workman is stated to be a former employee of the petitioner.
6.
The learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner submits that
conclusion drawn upon in the impugned award is contrary to the evidence
on record and based on mere conjectures and surmises. Therefore, the
impugned decision is perverse and passed in violation of Section 11 of the
IDA.
7.
It is further submitted that the lumpsum compensation amounting to
Rs. 1,50,000/- awarded in favour of the respondent/workman is arbitrary and
without any basis inasmuch as: i.
the same was allegedly awarded by the Court without any cogent
rationale or computation merely in lieu of relief of reinstatement;
ii.
the respondent/workman was not terminated by the petitioner instead
he himself abandoned the employment of the petitioner;
iii.
during cross examination the respondent/workman allegedly admitted
that he was earning daily wages pursuant to his termination and also
failed to specify any timeline during which he remained unemployed
after the alleged termination;
iv.
although the petitioner’s unit had discontinued its operation, the
management of the petitioner offered
reinstatement to the
respondent/workman at a different unit (owned by the mother of one
of the directors of the petitioner) situated at Manesar, Haryana which
the respondent/workman did not avail.
8.
It is noticed that although the petitioner contends that the
respondent/workman abandoned the employment, a bare perusal of the
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cross-examination of the petitioner’s director (MW1 before the Labour
Court) reveals a categorical admission that the
employment of
respondent/workman was, in fact, terminated by the petitioner. The same has
been noticed by the Court in the impugned award as under: “44) On the issue of illegal termination, it is important to note that MW1
Nitin Tully has categorically admitted that management had terminated
the services of the workman and therefore, the onus has shifted on
management to justify its action of termination of the workman in terms
of guidelines laid down in the judgment of Workmen of Firestone Tyre &
Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd v. The Management of Firestone Tyre &
Rubber Co. of India (P)Ltd and Others. (1973) 1 SCC 813.
45) The justification furnished by management witness MW1 in his
evidence affidavit for termination of the workman is that workman had
stopped attending his duties, on his own due to personal and medical
reasons and that management had issued a notice to him before
terminating him. However, admittedly the management has not placed on
record copy of any such showcause notice/notice of termination or any
other relevant document.
46) Now in present case, even if it is presumed for the sake of arguments
that the workman himself had stopped attending his duty in the
management, in that case, it was the duty of management to ask him to
join duty as it is settled position of law that if a workman/workman fails
to report for duty, the management is bound to call upon him to join duty.
It has been held by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in M/s Fateh Chand Vs.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Hari Om Sharma Vs. M/s G.R. Sons
Anr:, 2012 (3) SCT 724 as follows:
"It is also no more res integra that even in a case of unauthorized
absenteeism or to prove abandonment of service on part of the
workman the management must place on record necessary material to
prove that enough efforts were made by it to call upon the workman to
resume back hi duty and the workman has shown his clear reluctance
for the same”
47) But in the instant case, no such material, that is, any notice/ show
cause notice or memo issued to the workman asking him to join the duty,
has been placed on record by the management. Management has not
specifically pleaded in its written statement that it had asked the
workman to join his duty during the period of his alleged absenteeism.
48) Even though, MW1 Sh. Nitin Tully had deposed in his cross-
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examination that management had sent notice to the workman before
termination of his service and also a show cause notice regarding his
absenteeism to the workman. However copy of aforesaid notice
regarding termination as well as show-cause notice regarding
absenteeism, has not been placed on record. Moreover, there is no
reference of show-cause notice regarding absenteeism of workman, in
pleadings of management.
49) Therefore, in absence of any cogent credible evidence on record, this
Court cannot presume that the workman had left the services of
management and reliance in this regard is placed in the judgment of M/s
Fateh Chand Vs. Presiding Officer Labour Court & Am: 2012 LLR 468
Delhi wherein the the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has observed that the
management has to bring on record sufficient material to show that the
employee has abandoned the service and abandonment cannot be
attributed to the employee without there being-sufficient evidence and
that on failure to report for duty, the management has to call upon the
employee and if he refuses to report, then an enquiry is required to be
ordered against him and accordingly action taken. In the absence of
anything placed on record by the petitioner management, no presumption
against the workman can be drawn and in the aforesaid case, it was held
to be a case of violation of Section 25F of the Act.
50) Since, management has failed to show any reasonable justification
for termination of workman by management, therefore, this Court holds
that termination of workman by the management is illegal as it is in
violation of section 25F of Industrial Disputes Act.”
9.
The Labour Court has rightly held that categorical admission by the
petitioner’s director, shifted the burden of proof upon the petitioner.
Evidently, the petitioner was unable to establish the legality of the
termination
and/or
that
the
respondent/workman
abandoned
the
employment.
10.
As regard the contention that the respondent/workman chose not to
avail offer of reinstatement made by the petitioner at one of its functioning
units, the same has been dealt in the impugned award by observing as
follows: “58. During final arguments, AR of the management has contended that
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workman is not entitled to back wages, as management had offered him
reinstatement at every step of proceeding, but the workman had not
accepted the offer and to buttress his submission, he has relied on
deposition of MW 1 Sh. Nitin Tully, in his cross-examination wherein, he
had deposed that management was ready and willing to offer job to the
workman in another unit of management at Manesar, Haryana, as the
Delhi unit of management had shut-down w.e.f. 01.04.2023.
59) Now perusal of written statement of management as well as evidence
affidavit Ex. MW1/A of MW1 Sh. Nitin Tully, clearly shows that
management had clearly stated therein that it can not reinstate the
workman as its operations at B-143/1 Mayapuri Industrial Area Phase-1,
New Delhi 110064 had shut down and there was absolutely no disclosure
by management regarding its Manesar, Haryana Unit either in its
pleadings on evidence affidavit of MW1. Moreover, it has been clarified
by AR of the management that the Manesar, Haryana unit is the
proprietorship firm of mother of Director of erstwhile management (M/s
Precision Scientific and Testing Equipment (P) Ltd.)
60) Therefore, in light of above-said facts and circumstances, the
contention of the management that it had offered reinstate to workman at
every step of proceedings has remained uncorroborated and thus from its
pleading and evidence, baseless and unreliable.”
11.
The legal position is well settled that in these proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court cannot interfere with
finding/s of facts rendered by a labour court unless the same are wholly
unsupported by evidence, arbitrary or perverse in nature. A Division Bench
of this Court in Dinesh Kumar and Ors. vs. Central Public Works
Department and Ors., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 6518 took note of the legal
position enunciated by the Supreme Court in this regard as under: “11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 17 of the judgment in
Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers' Union, (2000) 4
SCC 245, has held as under:
“17. The learned Single Judge seems to have undertaken an exercise,
impermissible for him in exercising writ jurisdiction, by liberally
reappreciating the evidence and drawing conclusions of his own on
pure questions of fact, unmindful, though aware fully, that he is not
exercising any appellate jurisdiction over the awards passed by a
tribunal, presided over by a judicial officer. The findings of fact
recorded by a fact-finding authority duly constituted for the purpose
and which ordinarily should be considered to have become final,
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W.P.(C) 41/2026
cannot be disturbed for the mere reason of having been based on
materials or evidence not sufficient or credible in the opinion of the
writ court to warrant those findings, at any rate, as long as they are
based upon some material which are relevant for the purpose or even
on the ground that there is yet another view which can reasonably and
possibly be taken… … The only course, therefore, open to the writ
Judge was to find out the satisfaction or otherwise of the relevant
criteria laid down by this Court, before sustaining the claim of the
canteen workmen, on the facts found and recorded by the fact-finding
authority and not embark upon an exercise of reassessing the evidence
and arriving at findings of one's own, altogether giving a complete goby even to the facts specifically found by the Tribunal below.”
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case has held that the
findings of fact recorded by a fact finding authority (Tribunal) duly
constituted for the purpose becomes final unless the findings are perverse
or based upon no evidence. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such
matters is quite limited.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken a similar view in Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque, AIR 1955 SC 233, inter alia held as under:
“21. … On these authorities, the following propositions may be taken
as established : (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without
jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Certiorari will
also be issued when the court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise
of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an
opportunity to the parties to be heard or violates the principles of
natural justice. (3) The court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in
exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the court will not review findings of fact
reached by the inferior court or tribunal, even if they be erroneous.
This is on the principle that a court which has jurisdiction over a
subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and
when the legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal
against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy if a
superior court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute
its own findings in certiorari. These propositions are well-settled and
are not in dispute.
23. It may therefore be taken as settled that a writ of certiorari could
be issued to correct an error of law. But it is essential that it should be
something more than a mere error; it must be one which must be
manifest on the face of the record. … The fact is that what is an error
apparent on the face of the record cannot be defined precisely or
exhaustively, there being an element of indefiniteness inherent in its
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very nature, and it must be left to be determined judicially on the facts
of each case.”
14. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, 1957
SCR 152, the Supreme Court, once again observed that where the Tribunal
having jurisdiction to decide a question comes to a finding of fact, such a
finding is not open to question under Article 226, unless it could be shown
to be wholly unsupported by evidence.
15. In Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Limited v. S.
Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193, the Apex Court, held that the Labour
Courts/Industrial Tribunals as the case be is the final court of facts, unless
the same is perverse or not based on legal evidence, which is when the High
Courts can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the
Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is imperative that the
High Court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of
fact. In the absence of any such defect, the writ court will not enter the
realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon.
16. In a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob
v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477, the Apex Court has inter alia held
as under:
“7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in
issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently
considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is
no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these
are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals
without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to
exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise
of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or
properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the
procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles
of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This
limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the
inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence
cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law
which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ,
but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard
to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can
be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal
had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or
had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced
the impugned finding.
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W.P.(C) 41/2026
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be
regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must
always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the
ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned
finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be
agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits that the
jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a
writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu
Kamath v. Syed Ahmed Ishaque, Nagendra Nath Bora v.
Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam, and Kaushalya
Devi v. Bachittar Singh.
8. It is, of course, not easy to define or adequately describe what an
error of law apparent on the face of the record means. What can be
corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an
error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face
of the record. Where it is manliest or clear that the conclusion of law
recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious
misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in
ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly
rounded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can
be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned
conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant
statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court
in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the
record. It may also be that in some cases. the impugned error of law
may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and
the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there
can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is
an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a
character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent
on the face of the record. If a statutory provision is reasonably
capable of two constructions and one construction has been adopted
by the inferior Court or Tribunal, its conclusion may not necessarily
or always be open to correction by a writ of certiorari.
In our opinion, it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either
to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be
appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the
record. Whether or not an impugned error is an error of law and an
error of law which is apparent on the face of the record, must always
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the
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W.P.(C) 41/2026
nature and scope of the legal provision which is alleged to have been
misconstrued or contravened.”
17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has in the aforesaid case again dealt with
scope of interference by High Court in respect of finding of fact arrived at
by Tribunals and in light of the aforesaid judgment, the question of
interference by this Court does not arise.
18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Devi Dutt, (2006) 13
SCC 32, has held that the writ Court can interfere with the factual findings
of fact only if in case the Award is perverse; the Labour Court has applied
wrong legal principles; the Labour Court has posed wrong questions; the
Labour Court has not taken into consideration all the relevant facts; or the
Labour Court has arrived at findings based upon irrelevant facts or on
extraneous considerations.
(emphasis supplied)
12.
Evidently, the findings/observations in the impugned award are based
upon appreciation of the attendant facts and circumstances, and based upon
the evidence on record. In the circumstances, there is no occasion for this
Court to interfere with the same.
13.
Learned counsel on behalf of the petitioner has strenuously opposed
awarding of a lumpsum compensation to the respondent/workman on the
ground that (as recorded in paragraph 61 of the impugned award), the
respondent/workman admitted to having earned ‘off and on’ as a ‘daily
wager’, pursuant to the alleged termination. It is contended that the
respondent/workman having failed to provide any time-period/particulars as
regard the said employment, is disentitled for a lumpsum compensation in
lieu of reinstatement and back wages.
14.
A perusal of the impugned award reveals that the Court, after
considering the factual position, took the view that the respondent/workman
was ineligible for full back wages in lieu of reinstatement. This was done
despite the fact that the alleged employment of the respondent/workman was
(even as the version relied upon by the petitioner), quite intermittent. In the
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backdrop of finding/s regarding illegal termination, and in the given factual
conspectus, the award of lumpsum compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- cannot be
said to be perverse or disproportionate.
15.
It is trite law that termination which is neither preceded by a show
cause notice nor a termination letter to the concerned employee is violative
of Section 25F of the IDA and renders termination void ab initio. In such
circumstances, since the said violation constitutes illegal retrenchment, the
concerned employee/workman, is entitled to either reinstatement and /or
back wages/lumpsum compensation, as deemed appropriate by the
concerned court, based on facts and circumstances.
16.
The Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Road and Transport
Corporation vs. Mahadeo Krishna Naik (2025) 4 SCC 321 has held that
where a workman pleads unemployment on account of illegal termination,
and even where, the employer proves gainful employment, quantum of
compensation or back wages lies within the Court’s discretion. The
discretion must be guided by twin considerations viz. that the workman was
displaced by the illegal termination, and may have been compelled to seek
alternate employment for bare survival. The relevant portion of the said
judgment reads as under: “45. We cannot but endorse our wholehearted concurrence with the
views expressed in the aforesaid decisions. Taking a cue therefrom, it can
safely be concluded that ordering back wages to be paid to a dismissed
employee — upon his dismissal being set aside by a court of law — is not
an automatic relief; grant of full or partial back wages has to be
preceded by a minor fact-finding exercise by the industrial
adjudicator/court seized of the proceedings. Such exercise would require
the relevant industrial court or the jurisdictional High Court or even this
Court to ascertain whether in the interregnum, that is, between the dates
of termination and proposed reinstatement, the employee has been
gainfully employed. If the employee admits of any gainful employment
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and gives particulars of the employment together with details of the
emoluments received, or, if the employee asserts by pleading that he was
not gainfully employed but the employer pleads and proves otherwise to
the satisfaction of the court, the quantum of back wages that ought to
be awarded on reinstatement is really in the realm of discretion of the
court. Such discretion would generally necessitate bearing in mind two
circumstances : the first is, the employee, because of the order
terminating his service, could not work for a certain period under the
employer and secondly, for his bare survival, he might not have had
any option but to take up alternative employment.
xxx
xxx
xxx
49. We hasten to add that the courts may be confronted with cases where
grant of lump sum compensation, instead of reinstatement with back
wages, could be the more appropriate remedy. The courts may, in such
cases, providing justification for its approach direct such lump sum
compensation to be paid keeping in mind the interest of the employee as
well as the employer.”
(emphasis supplied)
17.
In the aforesaid conspectus, this Court finds no ground to interfere
with the impugned award. The present petition is accordingly, dismissed.
The pending application also stands disposed of.
SACHIN DATTA, J
FEBRUARY 18, 2026/sl
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