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R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 2529 of 2024
With
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2530 of 2024
With
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2531 of 2024
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK Sd/================================================================
Approved for Reporting
Yes
No
୰
================================================================
PRAVIN MOHANLAL RANA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
================================================================
Appearance: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2529 OF 2024
MR BHUVNESH GAHLOT(10286) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR. AAMIR S PATHAN(7142) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MR. NAYAN N BARAIYA(15858) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
===========================================================
Appearance: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2530 OF 2024
MR BHUVNESH GAHLOT(10286) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR. UVESH M SHAIKH for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
===========================================================
Appearance: CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2531 OF 2024
MR BHUVNESH GAHLOT(10286) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
MR. MALAY S PATEL for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
MS JIRGA JHAVERI ADDL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1
================================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK
Date : 08/09/2026
COMMON ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Since identical issues of law and fact are involved in all
three appeals, and the appeals arise out of substantially
similar circumstances and common judgment and order, they
are being heard together and are accordingly disposed of by
this common judgment.
2.
Present
appeals
are
filed
by
the
appellant-original
complainant under Section 14-A of the Scheduled Caste and
Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocity) Act against the
judgment and order dated 02.09.2024 passed by the learned
Special
Judge
(Atrocity),
City
Sessions
Court
No.14,
Ahmedabad (hereinafter be referred to as “the Trial Court”),
in Special (Atrocity) Case No.1 of 2023, 108 of 2019 and 97 of
2019 whereby the Trial Court had acquitted the respondents accused from the charges under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(5-a) of
the Atrocity Act Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe
(Prevention of Atrocity) Act (hereinafter be referred to as ‘the
Atrocity Act’ for short) r/w Section 294-B, 506(2) and 114 of
the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter be referred to as the
“IPC”).
3. The facts giving rise to present appeals are that the
complainant who is common in all the three appeals had been
working as a driver under a contract with Akbar Travels
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
through K. R. Enterprise for the last ten years. On 24.01.2017,
due to the death of a close relative in Rajasthan, he was
required to leave suddenly. He informed the company that he
was travelling to Rajasthan and returned to Ahmedabad on
27.01.2017. On the same day, when the complainant went to
the office situated at Hansol, Ahmedabad, the respondents
were
present
and
upon
seeing
the
complainant,
the
respondents used abusive and offensive language against the
complainant.
3.1
The complainant thereafter went to the airport office
where the respondents arrived and hey continued to insult
and humiliate the complainant by making derogatory remarks
concerning his caste, as a result of which the complainant left
the place in fear.
3.2 Thereafter, the complainant sent a reply to the notice by
post on 30.01.2017. On the same day, when he personally
visited
the
office,
the
respondents
again
abused
him.
Thereafter they issued another notice on behalf of the
company, to which the complainant replied through his
advocate on 04.02.2017.
3.3 Thereafter, on 04.02.2017 at about 5:00 p.m., the
complainant was called to the office the respondents mocking
and using offensive and abusive language against him. The
complainant demanded payment of his outstanding dues;
however, they refused to settle his account and continued to
insult and humiliate him.
3.4
Consequently, the complainant approached the police
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
and on 12.05.2017, the complainant lodged the complaint
against the respondents alleging that they had withheld his
lawful dues and had continuously insulted and humiliated him
on the ground of his caste.
3.5 It is the case of the complainant that thereafter he lodged
an FIR dated 12.05.2017 being II Cr. No.3060 of 2017 at
Sardarnagar Police Station, Ahmedabad. Pursuant thereto,
Special Atrocity Case No.1 of 2023, 108 of 2019 and 97 of
2019 came to be registered before the Trial Court.
3.6
To prove his case before the Trial Court, the complainant
has examined 8 witnesses and led 10 documentary evidence.
Upon completion of the trial, the Trial Court vide judgment
and order dated 2.9.2024 acquitted all the three respondents.
4. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid
judgment and order of acquittal, the appellant preferred
present appeals.
5. Heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties.
Mr. Malay S. Patel, learned counsel for the respondent
accused in Criminal Appeal No.2531 of 2024 has filed sick
note. However, as per Rule 129 of the Gujarat High Court
Rules, a sick note or leave note shall not be considered in old
criminal matters, therefore, the appeals are proceeded with
today.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is
contrary to law and the evidence on record and, therefore,
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
deserves to be quashed and set aside. He has submitted that
the judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is illegal,
unjust, improper and contrary to the facts and circumstances
of the case. He has submitted that the impugned judgment
and order passed by the Trial Court is contrary to the settled
principles of law and, therefore, deserves to be quashed and
set aside.
6.1 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Trial Court has committed a material error in appreciating
evidence which was not on record. He has submitted that the
Trial Court has committed a material error in not properly
appreciating the oral as well as documentary evidence
available on record.
6.2 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted the Trial
Court has failed to properly appreciate the prima facie merits
of the case and the evidence available on record and has
thereby committed a grave error of law and fact, resulting in
miscarriage of justice.
6.3 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Trial Court acquitted the respondents-accused primarily on
the ground of delay in filing the complaint and erroneously
concluded that the dispute pertained to service or financial
matters rather than constituting an offence under the
Atrocities Act. The Trial Court failed to properly appreciate
the nature and gravity of the allegations made in the
complaint and the material available on record.
6.4 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
Trial Court has erred in law in concluding that the delay in
registration of the complaint or FIR was sufficient to doubt
the occurrence of the offence or to acquit the accused. It is a
settled principle of law that mere delay in lodging an FIR does
not, by itself, render the prosecution case false or entitle the
accused to an acquittal. He has submitted that the delay
ought to have been considered in the light of the facts and
circumstances of the case and the circumstances of the
complainant.
6.5 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the testimony of
PW-4, whose statement was recorded at Exhibit 18. PW-4 is
stated to be the only eyewitness to the incident, and his/her
testimony is material and relevant for establishing the
prosecution case. The Trial Court has discarded or failed to
properly consider such material evidence without assigning
cogent and sufficient reasons and has thereby committed a
serious error in appreciation of evidence.
6.6 Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the
Trial Court has failed to properly consider and appreciate the
submissions advanced on behalf of the complainant/appellant
and the oral as well as documentary evidence produced on
record. He has submitted that the documentary evidence
having material bearing upon the alleged offence has not been
properly appreciated in its true and correct perspective.
6.7 Learned counsel for the appellant urges before the Court
that the impugned judgment and order may be quashed and
set aside and present appeals may be allowed.
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
7. Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned APP for the State has submitted
that the State is not going to prefer any appeal against the
impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Trial
Court and therefore, she has adopted the arguments advanced
by the learned counsel for the appellant-complainant.
8. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents
accused have supported the judgment and order of acquittal.
8.1 Learned counsel for the respondents have submitted that
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the
Trial Court is legal, just, and proper and has been passed after
thorough appreciation of the oral as well as documentary
evidence available on record. The Trial Court has assigned
cogent,
convincing,
and
well-reasoned
findings
while
acquitting the respondents–accused, and the same does not
warrant any interference by this Court.
8.2 It is submitted that the prosecution has failed to prove the
charges levelled against the respondents beyond reasonable
doubt. The evidence led by the prosecution suffers from
material contradictions, omissions, and inconsistencies, which
create serious doubt about the veracity of the prosecution
case. The prosecution has failed to establish the essential
ingredients of the alleged offences and has not produced
reliable, trustworthy, and corroborative evidence connecting
the respondents with the commission of the alleged offence.
8.3 It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
presumption of innocence in favour of an accused is further
strengthened by an order of acquittal. Unless the findings
recorded by the Trial Court are shown to be perverse, illegal,
or contrary to the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should be slow in interfering with an order of acquittal.
8.4 It is submitted that the appellant has failed to point out
any infirmity, illegality, perversity, or misreading of evidence
in the impugned judgment and order. The findings recorded
by the Trial Court are based upon proper appreciation of the
evidence and settled legal principles. The Trial Court has
rightly extended the benefit of doubt to the respondents–
accused, which is a substantive right flowing from the
fundamental principles of criminal law.
8.5 In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is
submitted that the present appeals are devoid of merits and
deserve to be dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the Trial Court therefore deserves to be
confirmed in all the appeals.
9. Upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order of
acquittal passed by the Trial Court and the submissions
advanced by learned counsel for both the sides, the issues
that arise for consideration before this Court are as under:Whether the Trial Court committed any error in passing
the impugned judgment and order of acquittal?
Whether the Trial Court, while appreciating the evidence
of the prosecution witnesses, has committed any error of
law or fact?
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
Whether the impugned judgment and order of acquittal
suffers from any illegality or perversity?
10. In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal
of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as
the evidence recorded by the Trial Court, it is appropriate to
first examine the facts of the case. On 24.1.2017 the
complainant, PW-3, serving in one KR Enterprises as a
contract driver, and since last more than 10 years he was
working as a driver. But he was unauthorizedly remained
absent from his duty. Therefore, it was alleged that on
24.1.2017 some near relative of the complainant was passed
away,
therefore
without
informing
and
intimating,
he
proceeded to go to his native and he returned on 27.1.2017.
At that time, the alleged incident was taken place and in the
said offence all the three accused, their participation and role
were described by the complainant in his deposition.
11.
Then in second part, he further described that for the
alleged incident, he lodged an FIR on 12.5.2017 and the same
was registered at Sardarnagar Police Station being C.R. No.II3060 of 2017 for the offence punishable under Section
Sections 3(1)(r), 3(2)(5-a) of the Atrocity Act r/w Sections
294-B, 506(2) and 114 of the IPC and on completion of
investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the present
respondents in each of the Appeal.
12. Now, if we consider the deposition of PW-4, who is an
eyewitness to the incident, it appears that he has not
supported the case of the prosecution. In his deposition, he
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
has
stated
that
his
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
statement
was
recorded
by
the
Investigating Officer on 14.05.2017 and that thereafter, he
was not called by the Investigating Officer. He has further
deposed that it is true that he had not stated before the police
that the complainant had given a phone for repair about one
week prior to the incident.
13. Even the case of the complainant is not supported by any
of the prosecution witnesses. From the depositions of the
Investigating
Officers,
i.e.
PW-7
and
PW-8,
and
more
particularly, from the deposition of PW-7, it emerges that,
during the course of investigation, the complainant had not
referred to the incidents dated 24.01.2017, 30.01.2017 and
04.02.2017 in the complaint, and no such case was made out
against the present respondents.
14. On the contrary, on 27.01.2017, the respondents, on
behalf of the company, issued a notice to the complainant
stating that, due to his unauthorized absence, the company
had incurred substantial losses and that there was serious
mismanagement on account of his non-availability for duty.
Thereafter, on 30.01.2017, while submitting his written
explanation, the complainant did not make any reference to
any incident having taken place. He also did not provide any
explanation for the delay in filing the complaint.
15.
Even
in
his
deposition,
PW-7
admitted
that
the
complainant had not mentioned in the FIR that any incident
had taken place on 24.01.2017, 30.01.2017, or 04.02.2017. On
the contrary, he deposed that the incident had occurred on
27.01.2017, whereas the FIR was registered on 12.05.2017.
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
He further deposed that there was no reason stated, nor was
any explanation given by the complainant (PW-3) in his
complaint as to why the FIR had not been lodged immediately
after the alleged incident.
16. Therefore, after considering the submissions made by both
sides, the Trial Court recorded its findings on the issues
framed by it in paragraphs 13 to 18 and also discussed the
depositions of each of the witnesses. Thereafter, in paragraph
19, the Trial Court recorded a finding that the prosecution
had miserably failed to establish the charges against the
present
respondents,
as
the
evidence
adduced
by
the
prosecution witnesses did not support the prosecution case,
nor had the allegations been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
16.1 The Trial Court further observed that, from the entire
evidence adduced by the prosecution, it had not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused persons had
abused the complainant in filthy language or had threatened
to break his hands and legs. Accordingly, the Trial Court
answered Issues Nos. 2 and 3 in the negative and passed the
impugned order of acquittal. In my view, the said order is just,
proper, and legal, and does not warrant any interference by
this Court.
17.
Now, So far as basic ingredients of the Atrocity Act is
concerned, it is relevant to refer the decision of Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of Shajan Skaria Versus State Of Kerala
reported in 2024-AIR(SC)-0-4557 more particularly head
notes (d) to (h) which reads as under:-
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
“(d) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u) - decline to grant anticipatory bail - when can it be said
that a prima facie case is made out in a given FIR/complaint - held,
'prima facie' is a Latin term that translates to "at first sight" or
"based on first impression" - expression "where no prima facie
materials exist warranting arrest in a complaint or FIR" should be
understood as "when based on first impression, no offence is made
out as shown in FIR or complaint" - this means that when
necessary ingredients to constitute offence under the Act, 1989 are
not made out upon reading of complaint, no case can be said to
exist prima facie.
(e) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 - Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)
(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Constitution of India - Art. 226 - rejection of
application for anticipatory bail - legal bar - duty of Court - in
present case, an accused may argue that although allegations
levelled in FIR or complaint do disclose commission of an offence
under the Act, 1989, yet FIR or complaint being palpably false on
account of political or private vendetta, Court should consider plea
for grant of anticipatory bail despite specific bar of S. 18 of the Act,
1989 - however, if accused puts forward case of malicious
prosecution on account of political or private vendetta then the
same can be considered only by High Court in exercise of its
inherent powers u/S. 482 of CrPC or in exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of Constitution - however, powers
u/S. 438 of CrPC cannot be exercised once contents of
complaint/FIR disclose a prima facie case - thus, if all ingredients
necessary for constituting offence are borne out from complaint,
then remedy of anticipatory bail becomes unavailable to accused duty to determine prima facie existence of case is cast upon courts
with a view to ensure that no unnecessary humiliation is caused to
the accused - Courts should not shy away from conducting a
preliminary inquiry to determine if narration of facts in
complaint/FIR in fact discloses essential ingredients required to
constitute an offence under the Act, 1989 - it is expected of courts
to apply their judicial mind to determine whether allegations
levelled in complaint, on a plain reading, satisfy ingredients
constituting alleged offence application of judicial mind should be
independent and without being influenced by the provisions
figuring in complaint/FIR - words "having committed an offence
under this Act" denote that it is only when accusation in complaint
clearly points towards commission of an offence under the Act,
1989 that bar of S. 18 would apply - minimum threshold for
determining whether an offence under the Act has been committed
or not is to ascertain whether all ingredients which are necessary
to constitute offence are prima facie disclosed in complaint or not accusation which does not disclose necessary ingredients of
offence on a prima facie reading cannot be said to be sufficient to
bring into operation bar envisaged by S. 18 of the Act, 1989 - in
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
cases like the one in hand, Courts should have the discretion to
look into materials based upon which complaint has been
registered, in addition to verifying the averments made in the
complaint - if on a prima facie reading of materials referred to in
complaint and complaint itself, ingredients necessary for
constituting offence are not made out, then bar of S. 18 would not
be applicable - hence, it would be open to Courts to consider plea
for grant pre-arrest bail on its own merits.
(f) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u) - whether averments in
FIR/complaint in question disclose commission of any offence u/S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 held, no - in present case appellant is
alleged to have published a video on YouTube, containing a slew of
reckless statements in the form of allegations levelled against
complainant - there is nothing in transcript of uploaded video to
indicate even prime facie that those allegations were made by
appellant only on account of fact that complainant belongs to a SC
- from nature of allegations made by appellant, it appears that he is
at inimical terms with complainant - his intention may be to malign
or defame him but not on ground or for reason that complainant
belongs to a Scheduled Caste - offence u/S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989
is not established merely on fact that complainant is a member of a
SC or ST, unless there is an intention to humiliate such a member
for reason that he belongs to such community - S. 3(1)(r) of the
Act, 1989 is attracted where reason for intentional insult or
intimidation is that person who is subjected to it belongs to a SC or
ST - object behind the enactment of the Act, 1989 was to provide
stringent provisions for punishment of offences which are targeted
towards persons belonging to the SC/ST communities for the
reason of their caste status.
(g) Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 - S. 3(1)(r) - expression "intent to humiliate" words "with intent to humiliate" as they appear in text of S. 3(1)(r)
of the Act, 1989 are inextricably linked to caste identity of person
who is subjected to intentional insult or intimidation - not every
intentional insult or intimidation of a member of a SC/ST
community will result into a feeling of caste-based humiliation - it
is only in those cases where intentional insult or intimidation takes
place either due to prevailing practice of untouchability or to
reinforce historically entrenched ideas like superiority of the
"upper castes" over the "lower castes/untouchables", notions of
purity and pollution, etc. that it could be said to be an insult or
intimidation of type envisaged by the Act, 1989 - mere fact that
person subjected to insult or intimidation belongs to a SC or ST
would not attract offence u/S. 3(1)(r) unless it was intention of
accused to subject concerned person to caste-based humiliation humiliation is not so much a physical injury but is in the nature of a
psychological injury that leaves a permanent scar on the heart distinction between systemic and regimented humiliation -
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JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
resistance is internal to humiliation - thus, those who are
humiliated also inherently possess capacity to protest against it however, those who protest also run risk of inciting opposition
from those who want to push traditionally humiliated groups to
margins - this apprehension of opposition and push back from
dominant against marginalised is also evident from Statements of
Objects of the Act, 1989 - thus, term humiliation as it appears in S.
3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 must be construed, that is, in a way that it
deprecates the infliction of humiliation against members of
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes wherein such humiliation
is intricately associated with the caste identity of such members.
(h) Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 - S. 7(1)(d) - Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 S. 3(1)(r), 3(1)(u), 18 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - S. 438 grant of anticipatory bail - legal bar - it is clear from a plain
reading of provision of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act that any insult
against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe on the
ground of "untouchability" was punishable with imprisonment for a
maximum term of six months under the Civil Rights Act - Civil
Rights Act was not adequately sufficient to tackle caste-based
offences and the practice of "untouchability", leading to enactment
of the Act, 1989 introducing more stringent provisions for
combating such practices - S. 3(1)(r) of the Act, 1989 should, thus,
be seen in the context of S. 7(1)(d) of Civil Rights Act - thus, words
"with an intent to humiliate a member of a SC or ST" become
inseparable from underlying idea of "untouchability" which is
sought to be remedied and punished by the Act, 1989 - having
regard to reprehensible conduct and nature of derogatory
statements made, appellant, at best could be said to have prima
facie committed offence of defamation punishable u/S. 500 of IPC if that be so, it is always open for complainant to prosecute
appellant accordingly - however, complainant could not have
invoked provisions of the Act, 1989 only on premise that he is
member of SC, more so, when a prima facie conjoint reading of
transcript of video and complaint fails to disclose that actions of
appellant were impelled by caste identity of complainant.
18. In the decision in the case of Sohanvir @ Sohanvir
Dhama Versus State Of U.P. reported in 2025 (4) Crimes
375 the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:“9. In order to examine this contention, it is necessary to refer to
Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which reads as under: 3.
Punishments for offences of atrocities. (1) Whoever, not being a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, (s) abuses any
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name
in any place within public view;
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JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
10. The expression any place within public view has been
interpreted by this Court in numerous decisions, most recently in
Karuppudayar v. State represented by the Deputy Superintendent
of Police, Lalgudi, Trichy & Others, 2025 0 INSC 132. Relying on
Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710 this
Court reaffirmed that:
11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place within public
view, the place should be open where the members of the
public can witness or hear the utterance made by the
accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place
within the four corners of the wall where members of the
public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has
taken place at a place within public view.
11. A perusal of the Application filed by the complainant under
Section 156(3) of the CrPC reveals that the alleged casteist abuses
were stated to have been used by the Appellants inside the
premises of the complainant. This circumstance, on its face, does
not satisfy the statutory requirement that the abuses were made in
any place within public view, which is an essential component of
the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. The house of
the complainant cannot be considered to be within public view.
12. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent no. 2 has not
been able to show that the complaint or the statement recorded
under Section 200 CrPC contained any specific averment that the
caste based abuses were hurled at a place within public view.
13. In our considered view, the High Court erred in concluding that
the incident occurred in public view. A careful reading of the
complaint makes it evident that the alleged castebased abuses
were uttered inside the premises, in the presence of the Appellants
and Respondent No. 2. Therefore, the essential requirement of the
offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not satisfied.
14. Upon consideration of the submissions and scrutiny of the
material placed on record, we find merit in the contention raised
on behalf of the Appellants insofar as the applicability of the SC/ST
Act is concerned. On the allegations as they stand, a prima facie
case under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act is not made out against
the Appellants.
15. It is beyond dispute that the appellate powers are to be invoked
with due caution, and only in exceptional circumstances. It is
equally well established that the Court cannot delve into the
truthfulness or credibility of the allegations contained in the FIR or
complaint. The Appellate Court has to examine the contents of the
complaint as they stand. In the facts of the present case, the High
Court ought to have exercised its appellate powers to quash the
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JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
summoning order with respect to offences under the provisions of
the SC/ST Act.
16. In view of the foregoing discussion and having found that the
essential ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are not prima facie satisfied, we deem it appropriate to
interfere to that limited extent. Accordingly, the proceedings
initiated against the Appellants under the Section 3(1)(s) of the
SC/ST Act are hereby quashed. However, the trial insofar as it
pertains to the remaining offences under the IPC shall proceed in
accordance with law.”
19.
Even in the decision in case of Karuppudayar Versus
State Rep. By The Deputy Superintendent Of Police, Lalgudi
Trichy reported in 2025 (0) AIR(SC) 705, Gunjan @ Girija
Kumari Versus State (Nct Of Delhi) reported in 2026 (0)
AIJEL-SC 76984 and Talari Naresh Versus State Of Telangana
reported in 2026 (0) AIR(SC) 2499, the Hon’ble Apex Court
has taken a similar view. In the decision of this Court in the
case of State Of Gujarat Versus Laxmanji Sadaji Thakor
reported in 2025 (0) GUJHC 36421 also similar view has been
taken by this Court.
20. In view of the above, the Court has rightly observed that
unless the basic ingredients required to attract the relevant
provisions of the Atrocities Act are proved and established by
the prosecution, the accused cannot be held liable under the
said provision. In the absence of the fulfilment of such basic
ingredients, the Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned
judgment and order in favour of the present respondents.
21. In that circumstance the Trial Court has rightly passed the
impugned judgment in order in favour of the present
respondents and there was no any infirmity found in the
impugned judgment in order.
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
22. Further, on perusal of the record of the appeal, it
transpires that the respondent-accused has established his
innocence
before
the Trial
Court
and
that,
after
due
appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and
other material placed on record, the Trial Court has rightly
passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The
findings recorded by the Trial Court are just, proper and in
accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore,
no interference is warranted by this Court.
23.
It is well settled by catena of decisions that the Appellate
Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider
the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the
accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he
is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the
accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their
innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened
by the trial Court.
24.
Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on
the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court
should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the
trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal
against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not
ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the
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approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at
by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be
characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are
possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which
would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below.
However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by
the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a
manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on
record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such
circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a
just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find
out whether the accused are connected with the commission
of the crime with which he is charged.
25.
The scope and principles are enunciated by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in case of Chandrappa and others Vs. State of
Karnataka reported in (2007) 4 SCC 415, more particularly
paragraph Nos. 42 and 43, which was subsequently reaffirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court Rajesh Prasad Vs. State
of Bihar and another, reported in [2022] 3 SCC 471,
wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has enunciated the general
principles in case of acquittal, more particularly in paragraph
No. 26 the general principles are set out by the Hon’ble Apex
Court based upon various decisions of the Hon’ble Apex
Court. Then in case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar
Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 =
(2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with
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JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to
40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings
recorded by the trial Court.
26.
It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of
Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20
and 21 as under:“20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the general
principles culled out by this Court in Chandrappa and others vs.
State of Karnataka , regarding the power of the appellate Court
while dealing with an appeal against a judgment of acquittal. The
principles read thus:
“42. …. (1) An appellate court has full power to review,
reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation,
restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an
appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling
reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong
circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court
in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasize the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under
the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every
person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved
guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having
secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further
reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
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JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.
21. In Rajendra Prasad v. State of Bihar, a three-Judge Bench of
this Court pointed out that it would be essential for the High
Court, in an appeal against acquittal, to clearly indicate firm and
weighty grounds from the record for discarding the reasons of the
Trial Court in order to be able to reach a contrary conclusion of
guilt of the accused. It was further observed that, in an appeal
against acquittal, it would not be legally sufficient for the High
Court to take a contrary view about the credibility of witnesses
and it is absolutely imperative that the High Court convincingly
finds it well-nigh impossible for the Trial Court to reject their
testimony. This was identified as the quintessence of the
jurisprudential aspect of criminal justice. Viewed in this light, the
brusque approach of the High Court in dealing with the appeal,
resulting in the conviction of Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, reversing
the cogent and well-considered judgment of acquittal by the Trial
Court giving them the benefit of doubt, cannot be sustained.”
27.
Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly
appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the
present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on
record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused has committed the alleged crime. Therefore,
the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record.
28.
On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it
clearly transpires that the trial Court has not committed any
error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record
and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled
against them. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it
clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to
prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and
order of the trial Court is sustainable and all the three appeals
are liable to be dismissed.
R/CR.A/2529/2024(GJHC240724022024)
29.
JUDGMENT DATED: 08/09/2026
In view of the above, the present three appeals filed by
the complainant are devoid of merits and deserve to be
dismissed. Resultantly, all the three appeals are hereby
dismissed. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal
passed by the Trial Court in each of the appeal is hereby
confirmed.
Bail
bond
stands
cancelled.
Record
and
proceedings be sent back to the concerned Trial Court
forthwith.
Sd/-
(HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J)
SURESH SOLANKI
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