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2026:HHC:48259
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO Nos. : 672 & 711 of 2025
Decided on : 29th October, 2026
1.
CMPMO No.672 of 2025
Pratap Singh (deceased) through LR
…Petitioner
Versus
Lekh Raj & Others
2.
…Respondents
CMPMO No.711 of 2025
Pratap Singh (deceased) through LR
…Petitioner
Versus
Sohan Lal & Another
…Respondents
Coram
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
1.
CMPMO No. 672 of 2025
For the petitioner
: Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate.
For the respondent
: Mr.
Gurinder
Singh
Parmar,
Advocate, for respondents No.1, 3 & 4.
Ms. Shrutika Chauhan, Advocate, for
respondent No.2.
Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2.
2026:HHC:48259
CMPMO No.711 of 2025
For the petitioner
: Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate.
For the respondent
: Mr.
Gurinder
Singh
Parmar,
Advocate, for respondent No.1.
Ms. Shrutika Chauhan, Advocate for
respondent No.2.
Virender Singh, Judge (Oral)
The abovetitled petitions, which have been filed
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, are being
decided by this common judgment.
2.
CMPMO No.672 of 2025, has arisen out of the
order dated 25.09.2025, passed in CMA No. 2983 of 2025, filed
in Execution Petition No. 506 of 2013, titled ‘Pratap Singh v.
Lekh Raj and Others’, by Senior Civil Judge, Court No.1, Una,
District Una, H.P., and CMPMO No.711 of 2025, has arisen
out of the order dated 11.11.2025 passed in CMA No.3212 of
2015, filed in Execuiton Petition No.71 of 2014, titled as
Pratap Singh (deceased) through LR versus Sohan Lal &
Another, by the Court of learned Civil Judge, Court No.3, Una,
2026:HHC:48259
District Una, H.P. (hereinafter referred to as ‘the executing
Court’).
3.
By way of the orders dated 25.09.2025 and
11.11.2025, the learned executing Court has dismissed the
applications, under Order 21 Rule 9 of the CPC, for
appointment of a local commissioner.
4.
Both these execution petitions have been filed in
Civil Suit No.86 of 2006, titled "Pratap Singh v. Surinder &
Others."
5.
Parties to the lis are hereinafter referred to, in the
same manner, in which, they were referred to, by the learned
executing Court.
6.
Brief facts, leading to the filing of these petitions
before this Court, as emerged from the record, may be summed
up as under:
7.
The decree holder/plaintiff Pratap Singh has filed
a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction against the
defendants, restraining them from causing any interference in
the land situated in village Dangoli, Tehsil and District Una,
comprising khewat No. 32 min, khatoni No.109, min, khasra
2026:HHC:48259
Nos.1585/1, 1585/2, 1590, measuring 03563 square meters
(hereinafter referred to as the suit land), with a prayer to
restrain them from changing the nature thereof, making any
encroachment thereupon, and in the alternative, for possession
by way of demolition of superstructure, if raised, during the
pendency of the suit.
8.
The said suit was decreed vide judgment dated
20.11.2009, by granting the following relief to the plaintiff:
18.
In view of the my findings returned on the
aforesaid point No.1, the suit of the plaintiff
succeeds and is hereby decreed with cost and
defendants are restrained from causing any
interference in the land sitaute at Village Dangoli
Tehsil & District Una and comprising of Khewat
No. 32 min, Khatoni No. 109min, Khasra No.
1585/1(00144), 1585/2100220), 1590(03199)
measuring 03563, changing nature and character
thereof, making any encroachment thereupon or
raising any construction thereon. Decree sheet be
drawn accordingly. File after due competition be
consigned to record room.
9.
Thereafter, the plaintiff has filed the abovetitled
two execution petitions. The opportunity to file the objections
has been given in the execution petitions, upon which the
execution petitions have been contested, and thereafter, the
issues were framed.
10.
2026:HHC:48259
When the lis was pending for evidence of the
decreeholder, then, the applications, under Order 21 Rule 9 of
the CPC, have been moved, with a prayer to appoint the local
commissioner to demarcate the suit land and to report as to
whether the JDs have encroached the site marked as ABCD.
11.
It is the further case of the decreeholder that the
respondents/JDs have encroached upon the site marked with
letters ABCD, shown in red colour in the site plan, by raising
new construction over khasra No.1585/1 and 1585/2, which is
part and parcel of the suit land, whereas, the JDs in their
reply have denied the said fact.
12.
It is the further case of the decreeholder that
additional issue No. 1A has been framed, which is reproduced
as under:
"Whether the site mark with letter ABCD, as
shown in the site plan, has been encroached by the
JDs, which is part of the suit land,that is Khasra
No.1585/1 and 1585/2, as alleged?"
13.
According to the JDs, there is no other alternate to
prove the said issue, except to appoint the revenue expert, as
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local commissioner, to ascertain the fact whether the JDs have
encroached upon the site marked as ABCD or not.
14.
When put to notice, th applications have been
contested on the ground that the applications are not
maintainable, as the JDs have not encroached upon any
portion of the suit land. The said applications have been
dismissed by the learned executing Court vide orders, which
have been assailed by way of these petitions, mainly; on the
ground that the local commissioner cannot be appointed to
collect the evidence or to substantiate the claim, as made, by
the parties.
15.
Those findings have now been assailed by way of
the abovetitled petitions.
16.
The decree, in the present case, has attained
finality, whereas, in the execution petition, which has been
filed, under Order 21 Rule 32 of the CPC, the following prayer
has been made, by the DH :
“
It is therefore prayed that the instant
application be allowed and the respondents be sent
to Civil Imprisonment as per law and their
movable and immovable property may kindly be
attached and be sold and requisite compensation
2026:HHC:48259
including costs of suit to the tune of ₹1 Lacs be
also awarded to the DH ant to restore the
possession of the suit land mark with letters ABCD
as shown red in colour in the site plan in its
original position to DH by way of removal of super
structure from the suit land or any other relief as
this Hon'ble Court deems fits may kindly be passed
in favour of DH and against JDs and present
execution be allowed with costs in the interest of
justice.”
17.
A perusal of the reply shows that the allegations of
encroachment have been controverted by the JDs. In such
situation, the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for
the JDs, qua the fact that the local commissioner cannot be
appointed to collect the evidence is not sustainable in the eyes
of law, as the learned executing Court has failed to exercise
the jurisdiction vested in it, because a specific stand has been
taken by the decreeholder that the encroachment has been
made by the JDs over khasra No. 1585/1 and 1585/2.
18.
Moreover, a prayer has been made to restore the
possession of the suit land marked with letters ABCD to the
decreeholder.
19.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Appel
No.2248 of 2025, titled as Bhudev Mallick Allias
Bhudeb
Mallick
2026:HHC:48259
&
Another
versus
Ranahit
Ghoshal & Others, 2025 INSC 175, has held that where the
decree for permanent prohibitory injunction has been passed,
then, under the provisions of Order XXI Rule 32 of the CPC,
possession can be delivered. Relevant paragraphs 32 to 36 are
reproduced as under:
36.
It is well settled that a decree of permanent
injunction is executable with the aid of the
provisions contained in Order XXI Rule 32 of the
Code referred to above, and any act in violation or
breach of decree of permanent injunction is a
continuing
disobedience
entailing
penal
consequences.
37.
In Jai Dayal And Others v. Krishan Lal
Garg and Another reported in (1996) 11 SCC 588,
this Court considered the effect of decree of
permanent injunction as well as the scope of
provisions of Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code and
held as under:
“6. It is contended that the High Court has
proceeded on the premise that the rights of parties
are required to be adjudicated under Section 22 of
the Easements Act. The view of the High Court is
clearly in error. It is seen that once the decree of
perpetual injunction and mandatory injunction
has become final, the judgmentdebtor is required
to obey the decree. In whatever form he obstructs, it
is liable to removal for violation and the natural
consequence is the execution proceedings under
Order XXI, Rule 32, CPC which reads as under:
"32.(3) Where any attachment under sub
rule (1) or subrule (2) has remained in
force for six months if the judgmentdebtor
2026:HHC:48259
has not obeyed the decree, if the decree
holder has applied to have the attached
property sold, such property may be sold;
out of the proceeds the Court may award to
the decreeholder such compensation as it
thinks fit, and shall pay the balance, if
any, to the judgment debtor on his
application.
(4) Where the judgmentdebtor has obeyed the
decree and paid all costs of executing the same
which he is bound to pay, or where, at the end of
six months from the date of the attachment, no
application to have the property sold has been
made, or if made has been refused, the attachment
shall cease."
7. In this case, since the attachment was made for
enforcement of the perpetual injunction and
mandatory injunction, the decree is required to be
complied with. In case he did not obey the
injunction under Clause (1) of Order 32, the
judgmentdebtor is liable to detention in the civil
prison and also to proceed against the property
under attachment.”
(Emphasis supplied)
38. The High Court of Rajasthan in Maga Ram
And Another v. Kana Ram And Others reported in
AIR 1993 Rajasthan 208, held as under :
“3. A perusal of the decree under execution
shows that it was for mandatory as well as
for prohibitory injunction. It stood satisfied
so far it concerned with mandatory part of
the injunction by the removal of the
encroachment existing on the disputed
land on the date on which it was passed.
The decree in respect of prohibitory
injunction was subsisting even after the
disposal of first and second execution
applications.
The
third
execution
application has been moved for the
2026:HHC:48259
execution of the decree in respect of the
prohibitory injunction. It is perfectly
executable under O. XXI, R. 32, CPC.
4. There is also no substance in the second
objection relating to limitation. Article 136,
Limitation Act, deals with the limitation
for execution of decrees other than a decree
granting mandatory injunction. The
limitation is 12 years from the date the
decree becomes enforceable. The decree for
prohibitory injunction become enforceable
when the judgement debtors made fresh
encroachment on the disputed land. The
decree under execution itself was passed on
September 20, 1983. As such the third
execution application was well within
limitation.”
(Emphasis supplied)
39. The High Court of Bombay in the case of Shri
Benedito (Betty) Dias v. Armando Benedita
Fernandes reported in 2017(4) AIR Bom. R 381,
held as under:
“12. The decision of the Kerala High Court,
in the case of M.G. Simon (supra), cannot
take the case of the petitioners any further
and in fact, would assist the respondents.
In that case also, it has been held that an
application for enforcement of the decree
granting prohibitory injunction shall not
be subject to any period of limitation and
where there is a composite decree, granting
mandatory and prohibitory injunction, one
part is subjected to limitation period of
three years, whereas the other is not
subjected to any period of limitation. The
petitioner can enforce the prohibitory
injunction, whenever violation of that part
takes place.
2026:HHC:48259
13. In the case of Jai Dayal (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that once
the decree of perpetual and mandatory
injunction has become final, the judgment
debtor is required to obey the decree and a
party cannot and should not, by his action
be permitted to drive the decree holder to
file a second suit. It has been interalia
held that noncompliance is a continuing
disobedience in respect of which a
separate/fresh suit is barred under Section
47 of the CPC. Thus, in my considered
view, the contention based on the execution
being barred by limitation, cannot be
accepted.”
(Emphasis supplied)
40. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the
case of Dilbagh Singh and Others v. Harpal Singh
Alias Harpal Singh Chela and Others reported in
2020 Supreme (P&H) 944, has held as under:
“6. Although learned counsel for the
petitioners has laid much stress on the fact
that to seek execution of the decree, qua the
restoration of the possession in his favour,
the decree holder was supposed to plead
specifically as to when and in what
manner he has been dispossessed. This
Court finds this argument to be noted only
to be rejected. The provisions of sub Rule
(5) Rule 32 of Order 21 CPC do not
prescribe any such condition. Rather,
Order 21 Rule 32 CPC prescribes that for
execution of a decree if any act is required
to be done by the judgment debtor, the
Executing Court can order that such an act
be done by the judgment debtor; as
claimed. Sub Rule (5) Rule 32 of Order 21
CPC has been interpreted by the Supreme
Court in various judgments viz. "Samee
Khan vs. Bindu Khan, 1998(4) RCR(Civil)
2026:HHC:48259
125 (SC)" to mean that in an execution
proceedings of a decree for injunction, if it
is found that the decree holder has been
dispossessed after the date of decree, the
restoration of possession can also be
ordered by the Executing Court. Hence, it is
no more resintegra that in execution of a
decree for injunction, even restoration of
possession can be ordered by the Executing
Court. This view has also been taken by
this court in 'Kapoor Singh vs. Om
Parkash, 2009(4) PLR 178'. Hence, no
fault can be found, perse, with the action
of the Executing Court in issuing warrants
of possession in the execution proceedings.”
(Emphasis supplied)
41. Having regard to the dictum of law as laid in
the aforesaid decisions, there is no force in the
argument of the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants that the execution case could not have
been instituted by the respondents herein after a
period of 40 years from the date of passing of the
decree in the original Title Suit. The decree for
permanent injunction can be enforced or becomes
enforceable when the judgment debtor tries to
disturb the peaceful possession of the decree holder
or tries to dispossess the decree holder in some
manner or the other or creates obstruction in the
peaceful enjoyment of the property over which he
has a declaration of title from the civil court in the
form of a decree.”
20.
If the facts and circumstances of the present case
are seen in the light of the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court
supra, the approach of the learned executing Court, falls
within the definition of jurisdictional error.
21.
2026:HHC:48259
A futile attempt has also been made by the learned
counsel for the JDs., by arguing that the alleged encroachment
should have been proved by the decreeholder, by leading the
independent evidence.
22.
The allegations, qua the encroachment, over the
portion marked with letters ABCD and restoration of the
possession of the same, can only be ascertained, if a revenue
expert will demarcate the suit land.
23.
Consequently, this Court has no hesitation to hold
that the learned executing Court has failed to exercise the
jurisdiction vested in it, to appoint the local commissioner to
ascertain the encroachment, if any, made by the JDs., as
alleged, in the execution petitions.
24.
Resultently, the present petitions are allowed and
the order dated 25.09.2025, passed in CMA No. 2983 of 2025,
filed in Execution Petition No.506 of 2013, titled ‘Pratap Singh
v. Lekh Raj and Others’, and order dated 11.11.2025 passed in
CMA No.3212 of 2015, filed in Execuiton Petition No.71 of
2014, titled as Pratap Singh (deceased) through LR versus
Sohan Lal & Another, by learned executing Court, are set
2026:HHC:48259
aside, by allowing the applications, under Order XXI Rule 9 of
the CPC.
25.
The parties to the lis are directed to appear before
the learned respective executing Court on 10th December,
2026, on which date, after securing the presence of both the
parties, the learned executing Court is at liberty to appoint
any revenue expert to demarcate the suit land.
26.
Pending applications, if any, shall also stand
disposed of.
Record be sent back immediately.
October 29, 2026 (ps)
( Virender Singh )
Judge
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