The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
23. For the reasons aforestated, after careful consideration the instant case does not merit further consideration on the ground of inordinate delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. Being situated thus, this Court declines to examine the matter on its other merits and as such, the writ petition is dismissed and disposed of.” The learned advocate representing the appellant before us has referred to various medical reports and prescriptions annexed to the appeal papers in order to make out a case in favour of the appellant to the effect that the delay in approaching the writ Court was primarily due to his medical condition. Learned advocate submitted that the delay and/or laches on the part of the appellant to approach the writ Court was not deliberate and it was a culmination of a series of medical ailments which the appellant/writ petitioner was suffering from all the while, till filing of the writ petition on 11th May, 2018. We, however, are not inclined to accept the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant/writ petitioner for the following reasons:The records reveal that the subject-matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge was an order dated 12th September, 2011, passed by the appellate authority. The writ petition was filed on 11th May, 2018. The medical documents which are annexed in the appeal papers reveal that the appellant/writ petitioner was suffe…
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Serial No.01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WA No.30/2020
Date of Order: 03.09.2021
Dr. Prasanna Kumar Agarwal
Coram:
Vs.
State Bank of India & ors
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Biswanath Somadder, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
: Mr. KN Choudhury, Sr.Adv with
Mr. R Dubey, Adv
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. K Khan, Sr.Adv with
Mr. SK Hassan, Adv
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The instant writ appeal arises in respect of a judgment and order dated
16th November, 2020, passed by a learned Single Judge in WP (C) No.113 of
2018 (Dr. Prasanna Kumar Agarwal v. State Bank of India & 5 ors).
By the impugned judgment and order, the learned Single Judge has
refused to entertain the writ petition primarily on the ground of inordinate delay
and/or laches on the part of the writ petitioner.
The appellant before us is the writ petitioner.
Upon perusing the impugned judgment and order, we note that the
learned Single Judge has taken pains to elaborately consider the issue with
regard to inordinate delay and/or laches on the part of the writ petitioner (being
appellant before us). Relevant portion of the impugned judgment and order is
reproduced hereinbelow:“19. On the question of delay and laches, the writ petitioner has
sought to explain the delay in approaching this Court in para- 12 of
the writ petition by maintaining that the delay was unintentional and
was caused due to illness. A perusal of the medical certificates which
has been annexed to support his contention which has staggered over
the period from 2008 to 2017, however, do not adequately make out
sufficient cause, inasmuch as, though a writ court in exercise of its
extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution
undoubtedly, has a power to condone delay if the same is
satisfactorily explained, will however not do so, if the person has
slept over his rights before taking further legal action. The petitioner
it is noted, had immediately on passing of the impugned order dated
01.02.2011, filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority which had
rejected the same vide order dated 12.09.2011, but thereafter, did not
take any steps to seek further legal remedy and it was only after
approximately seven years that he came knocking on the doors of
this Court again.
20. The doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity cannot be said to be a
technical doctrine and has to be examined on the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case. Delay cannot be taken to be an absolute
bar in such cases but the validity of the defence for the delay must be
examined and if not satisfactorily explained a Court can decline to
interfere and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. As
discussed, the rule of laches of delay cannot be given a rigid
definition, and interference would be called upon only if compelling
circumstances exist to warrant the same. In the case at hand, a factor
that starkly stands out is the implied waiver, and acceptance of the
penalty as imposed, by the petitioner, who chose to not pursue
further remedy after the Appellate Authority had rejected his appeal
by order dated 12.09.2011, and instead waited for seven long years
before filing the instant writ application. Even, if delay is occasioned,
the same should be within reasonable limit or time and justified as
such. In the case of Veerayee Ammal vs. Seeni Ammal reported in
(2002) 1 SCC 134, the Supreme Court at para-13 held as follows:
“13. The word “reasonable” has in law prima facie
meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances
of which the person concerned is called upon to act
reasonably knows or ought to know as to what was
reasonable. It may be unreasonable to give an exact
definition of the word “reasonable”. The reason varies in
its conclusion according to idiosyncrasy of the individual
and the time and circumstances in which he thinks. The
dictionary meaning of the “reasonable time” is to be so
much time as is necessary, under the circumstances, to do
conveniently what the contract or duty requires should be
done in a particular case. In other words it means, as
soon as circumstances permit. In P. Ramanatha Aiyar‟s
The Law Lexicon it is defined to mean:
“A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of
the case; a reasonable time under ordinary
circumstances; as soon as circumstances will permit; so
much time as is necessary under the circumstances,
conveniently to do what the contract requires should be
done; some more protracted space than „directly‟; such
length of time as may fairly, and properly, and reasonably
be allowed or required, having regard to the nature of the
act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these
convey more or less the same idea.”
21. In this context, it would be also apposite to refer to another
judgment which is extracted herein below on the aspect of delay and
laches, in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. vs. K.
Thangappan & Anr. reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322, wherein in para-6
it has been laid down as follows:
“6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be
borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may
refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such
negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to
assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of
time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the
opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved
the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as
pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of
Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be
exercised judicially and reasonably.”
22. Though, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner has urged
that the delay and laches should be considered in a liberal manner in
favour of substantive justice and also the fact that no third party
rights are involved, the waiver of the petitioner and his acquiescence
to the penalty imposed after seven long years, after review of the
quantum of punishment cannot be ignored by this Court. The
judgments on which reliance has been placed also do not come to the
aid of the petitioner and the explanation afforded cannot adequately
justify the long delay.
23. For the reasons aforestated, after careful consideration the instant
case does not merit further consideration on the ground of inordinate
delay and laches on the part of the petitioner. Being situated thus, this
Court declines to examine the matter on its other merits and as such,
the writ petition is dismissed and disposed of.”
The learned advocate representing the appellant before us has referred
to various medical reports and prescriptions annexed to the appeal papers in
order to make out a case in favour of the appellant to the effect that the delay in
approaching the writ Court was primarily due to his medical condition. Learned
advocate submitted that the delay and/or laches on the part of the appellant to
approach the writ Court was not deliberate and it was a culmination of a series
of medical ailments which the appellant/writ petitioner was suffering from all
the while, till filing of the writ petition on 11th May, 2018.
We, however, are not inclined to accept the arguments advanced on
behalf of the appellant/writ petitioner for the following reasons:The records reveal that the subject-matter of challenge before the
learned Single Judge was an order dated 12th September, 2011, passed
by the appellate authority. The writ petition was filed on 11th May,
2018. The medical documents which are annexed in the appeal papers
reveal that the appellant/writ petitioner was suffering from various
ailments starting from the year, 2008. The first prescription annexed
is that of an orthopedic surgeon by the name of Dr. Tulsi
Bhatacharyya, which is dated 17th April, 2008. The next medical
document is a CT Scan and Angiography report dated 17th September,
2012, which was done at Woodland Hospital, Shillong, under
reference of one Dr. D.S. Sethi, MBBS, MD. The prescription of Dr.
D.S. Sethi, MBBS, MD, however, has not been annexed along with
the medical report. Be that as it may, if the subject-matter of
challenge before the learned Single Judge was an order dated 12th
September, 2011, passed by the appellate authority, what could
possibly have been a plausible reason to justify the appellant/writ
petitioner not approaching the writ Court between 12th September,
2011 and 17th September, 2012, being the date when a CT Scan and
Angiography was conducted; the period being slightly more than one
year.
It is not the case of the appellant/writ petitioner that he was
permanently incapacitated at any material point of time so as to be
physically prevented from knocking at the door of the writ Court.
Indeed, he could be suffering from various ailments but it cannot be
held to be a logical conclusion that those ailments alone would have
prevented him from approaching the high prerogative Constitutional
writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India within a reasonable period of time.
Delay defeats equity, as rightly pointed out by the learned advocate
representing the State Bank of India. Although there is no period of
limitation provided in respect of initiation of proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Court while examining
the question of delay is required to do it in the backdrop of the age old
principles of equity. In the facts of the instant case, the learned Single
Judge while proceeding to dismiss the writ petition has done just that
and refused to grant any discretion in favour of the writ petitioner by
either entertaining or trying or determining the writ petition.
That apart and in any event, the impugned judgment and order dated
16th November, 2020 is supported with cogent and justifiable reasons. In an
Intra-Court Mandamus appeal, interference is usually warranted only when
palpable infirmities or perversities are noticed on a plain reading of the
impugned judgment and order. In the facts of the instant case, on a plain
reading of the impugned judgment and order, we do not notice any such
palpable infirmity or perversity, which would warrant an interference.
For reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in the instant
appeal which is liable to be dismissed and stands dismissed accordingly.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Biswanath Somadder)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
03.09.2021
“Lam AR-PS”
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