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Serial No.01
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MC (WA) No.38/2023 in
WA No.37/2023
Date of order: 26.09.2023
Pranesh Biswas
vs.
Union of India & ors
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
: Mr. S. Chakrawarty, Sr.Adv with
Ms. E. Slong, Adv
Mr. E. Laloo, Adv
For the Respondents : Mr. R. Debnath, CGC
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
There is inordinate delay in seeking to prefer an appeal late in
the year 2023 against an order of June 6, 2017.
2.
However, considering the pandemic in the interregnum and the
fact that the appellant feels deprived of the dues that he claims are owed
to him by his erstwhile employer, the grounds for delay are found to be
sufficient for the delay to be condoned and the appeal to be taken up for
consideration on merits.
3.
The appellant was an employee of the State Bank of India.
During the period that the appellant was posted as the branch manager
at Songsak Branch of State Bank between June 11, 2004 and March 19,
2005, it was alleged that he had committed gross irregularities in the
issue and payment of deposits and in allowing advances. The employer
instituted
disciplinary
proceedings
on
account
of
defalcation,
irregularities and non-adherence to the bank‟s rules. It is not necessary
to go into the specific charges or the findings rendered by the inquiry
officer. All that needs to be noticed is that by an order dated August 8,
2007, the appellant was dismissed from service in terms of Rule 67(j) of
the SBIOSR, which appears to be a set of rules applicable to senior
officers of the bank. During the period of the disciplinary proceedings,
the appellant was under suspension.
4.
The order passed in the disciplinary proceedings has attained
finality and, indeed, the appellant has made no attempt to reopen the
case. Several years after the appellant stood dismissed from the bank‟s
service in the circumstances indicated above, he made a claim for the
employer‟s part of contribution towards the provident fund and the
gratuity to be released to him.
5.
As to the employer‟s part of the contribution to the provident
fund, the bank denied the claim by referring to Rule 24 of the SBI
Employees‟ Provident Fund Rules which provides as follows:
“If any member shall be dismissed from the service of the Bank
for any fault or other cause justifying dismissal, he shall not be
entitled to receive, unless permitted to do so by the Trustees, the
sums contributed by the Bank to his Provident Fund account, or
any interest credited to the account on the sums so contributed.
Provided that when any member is so dismissed, any amount
due under a liability incurred by the member to the Bank (not
exceeding in any case the sums so contributed by the Bank and
interest thereon) shall be paid by the „Trustees‟ to the Bank out
of the sum standing to the credit of the member‟s account.”
6.
In respect of the gratuity, the bank issued a letter on March 27,
2012 for the appellant herein to show cause why the gratuity otherwise
due to the appellant should not be forfeited. The appellant responded to
such notice and indicated that nothing in the inquiry report on which the
appellant‟s order of dismissal was based indicated that any pecuniary
loss had been occasioned to the bank by reason of the appellant‟s acts
complained of. However, by a terse order of May 2, 2012, the
appellant‟s plea for gratuity was rejected and the entirety of the gratuity
was directed to stand forfeited.
7.
The writ petition came to be instituted in the year 2013 with the
two principal reliefs being for the employer to pay the gratuity due to
the appellant and also for the employer‟s contribution towards provident
fund to be released to the appellant. In the judgment and order
impugned of June 6, 2017, the second paragraph captured, in essence,
what was claimed in the petition before the third to the sixth paragraphs
narrated the circumstances in which the appellant came to the dismissed
from service. After noticing the extent of the appellant‟s claim on
account of gratuity and the provident fund contribution of the employer,
Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Payment of Gratuity Act is quoted at the foot
of paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment and Rule 24 of the aforesaid
Provident Fund Rules of the State Bank is quoted at the foot of
paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment with the following as the
concluding paragraph thereof:
“12. With this observation and direction the writ petition is
dismissed and stands disposed of.”
8.
The appellant is understandably aggrieved since, according to the
appellant, the relevant provisions had only been quoted and no reasons
indicated in the impugned judgment as to why the appellant herein was
disentitled from receiving the gratuity or why the entirety of the
provident fund contributed by the employer could have been forfeited.
9.
Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act of 1972 provides as follows:
“(b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or
partially forfeited –
(ii) if the services of such employee have been
terminated for any act which constitutes an offence
involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is
committed by him in the course of his employment.”
10.
It is evident from the relevant clause of the Act of 1972 that a
discretion is conferred on the employer, as would be evident from the
use of the expression “may be wholly or partially forfeited”, and the
circumstances justifying the forfeiture have been indicated thereafter in
the statute. There can be no dispute that this was a case of gross moral
turpitude for a bank manager having wrongfully encashed a deposit
apparently made by a customer of the bank. It was a charge of
defalcation which was conclusively proved. The appellant has accepted
the finding and the decision has attained finality.
11.
Since the bank in this case as the employer was entitled, in terms
of the statute, to partially or fully forfeit the quantum of gratuity, as the
appellant had been found guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude,
an exceptional case had to be made out by the appellant for the bank to
partially or fully release the gratuity that would otherwise have been
payable upon the appellant‟s successful completion of his tenure and
upon the appellant attaining superannuation. No exceptional reasons
were cited by the appellant in making the appeal. On the contrary, the
appellant, despite his shameful conduct as the branch manager,
appeared to assert as a matter of right that he was entitled to the
gratuity.
12.
It is possible in an exceptional case that an employee, in dire
circumstances or in distress, is forced to commit a wrong; whereupon
the employee expresses remorse, cites the circumstances for falling to
temptation, seeks pardon and makes a plea for the financial benefit to be
released by citing some extraordinary financial crisis or dire distress.
This was not such a case. An officer of a bank in the position of a
branch manager had been found guilty of stealing, no less; and he
appeared to stamp his foot and demand what he perceived was his
pound of flesh. Such employees have to be dealt with ruthlessly.
13.
No ground was made out by the appellant for the bank to
exercise any discretion in his favour to release his gratuity or any part
thereof.
14.
As to the provident fund, Rule 24 of the relevant Rules indicate
that upon the dismissal or the like of an employee from service, the
general rule would be that the employer‟s contribution towards the
provident fund of such employee would stand forfeited. But the relevant
trustees are also conferred an element of discretion as to whether the
employer‟s contribution may still be made available to the dismissed
employee.
15.
In the manner that the relevant rule has been framed, where
forfeiture is the rule and payment is the exception, a case has to be made
out for the discretion to be exercised and an exception to be made. It
was open to the appellant, if the circumstances so existed, to make out
an exceptional case of financial hardship or distress in some other form
that may have prompted the bank to exercise its discretion in favour of
the appellant despite his proven guilt and his dismissal from service.
The appellant‟s appeal to the bank was not on such lines. The appellant
asserted a right, which the appellant did not possess.
16.
It is obvious from the tenor of the impugned judgment that the
mere iteration of the applicable rules was deemed sufficient. However,
the writ court may have done well to add a few sentences to justify the
conduct of the bank. As it has been appropriately submitted on behalf of
the appellant, a writ court does not sit in an appeal over the order passed
by an executive functionary which is challenged in proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Ordinarily, the writ court is concerned
not with the correctness of the impugned order, but more with the
decision-making process. Once the writ court finds that a fair procedure
was adopted and the complaining writ petitioner was afforded an
opportunity to make his representation which was, thereupon, taken into
consideration before the impugned order was passed, the writ court
would not interfere. There are obvious exceptions in cases where the
order impugned is found to be grossly disproportionate or so absurd that
not even the meanest mind in the position of the executive functionary
could have passed the same on the set of facts presented before it.
17.
In this case, the discretion of the bank in either case cannot be
said to have been perversely exercised. Here was a disgraced bank
official who was shamelessly pursuing demands for payment as if he
was entitled to receive such perceived dues. There was no such right in
favour of the appellant and the bank, particularly as a nationalised bank,
has done well to exercise its discretion against a recalcitrant erstwhile
employee.
18.
There is no merit in the appeal just as there was no meaning or
good reason for the writ petition to have been carried to this Court. For
all of the appellant‟s efforts, the appellant will pay costs assessed at Rs.
25,000/- to the bank within a fortnight from date, failing which the bank
will be entitled to execute such order in accordance with law.
19.
MC (WA) No. 38 of 2023 is allowed as indicated.
20.
WA No. 37 of 2023 stands dismissed.
(B. Bhattacharjee)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
26.09.2023
“Santosh, P.S.”
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