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2026:JHHC:16990-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No.231 of 2024
-----------1.
Pramod Kumar, Aged about 40 years, S/O-Late Keshaw Prasad, R/OBinod Nagar, Near Trimurti Mandir, Gali No.10, P.O+P.S-Dhanbad,
District-Dhanbad.
… … Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
2.
3.
1. Anjana Devi, Aged about 35 years, W/O-Pramod Kumar, R/O-Laheria
Tola, Krishna Engg. Workshop Gaya, P.O + P.S-Gaya, District-Gaya
(Bihar).
2. Union of India represented through Eastern Central Railway
represented by D.R.M.
… … Respondent/Respondent
------CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY
------For the Appellant
: Mr. Pratiush Lala, Advocate
For Res. No.1
: Mr. Abhijeet Kumar Singh, Advocate
For Res. No.2
: Mr. Prashant Pallav, A.S.G.I.
Mr. Bajrang Kumar, AC to A.S.G.I.
---------------------------CAV on 08.05.2026
Pronounced on 11/06/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984
is directed against the Judgment dated 03.09.2024 and Decree dated
10.09.2024 passed by the learned Addl. Principal Judge, Family Court
No.II, Dhanbad in Original Suit No.569 of 2019, whereby and whereunder,
the petition filed against the respondent-wife under Section 13(1)(1-b) of
the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of marriage on the ground of
desertion, has been dismissed.
Facts
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2. The brief facts of the case, as per the plaint, required to be referred
herein, as under:
3. It is the case of the plaintiff/petitioner, appellant herein that he is legally
married with the respondent-wife and their marriage was solemnized on
28.11.2004 at Dhanbad, according to Hindu Rites and Customs. After the
marriage both the petitioner and respondent had been living together as
husband and wife at Dhanbad. Out of the said wedlock the couple was
blessed with two children.
4. It has further been stated that after marriage the behaviour of
respondent/wife was much rude and abnormal and she always ill-treated
with the petitioner. It is further stated that the petitioner always tried to
pacify to lead normal life with his wife and tried to consult the several
doctors but she refused to visit any doctor.
5.
It has also been stated that the petitioner has filed original suit before
the learned Family court and the same was dismissed by the court thereafter
he has filed appeal before this Court but the same was dismissed on the
ground of 484 days delay in filing the appeal. It has further been stated that
the respondent is residing separately with her husband and there is no any
relation between both parties as husband and wife and she has deserted the
petitioner from 06-02-2010. The cause of action for the present petition
arose on 28-11-2004 and 06-02-2010 when she deserted her husband and it
also arose on several occasion when the respondent committed ill behaviour
with him.
6. After service of summon, respondent/wife had appeared and contested
the suit by filing a written statement and stated that the suit filed by the
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plaintiff/husband/petitioner is not maintainable either in facts or in law. It
has further been stated that the suit as has been filed by the
petitioner/plaintiff only to harass and humiliated the respondent. The
admitted
fact
that
the
marriage
of
the
respondent/wife
and
petitioner/husband was solemnized on 28.11.2004 according to Hindu Rites
and Customs.
7. It has further been stated that the allegation made by the
petitioner/plaintiff/husband was totally denied by the respondent/wife. It
has further been stated that just after few days of marriage, the
petitioner/husband and his family members started torturing the respondent
for non-fulfillment of demand of dowry and lastly ousted her from her
matrimonial home. Thereafter, she has filed a criminal case against the
petitioner/plaintiff and his family members which got ended on the basis of
compromise and they were ready to live together as husband and wife at
Railway Quarter. But after sometime, the petitioner/husband again started
torturing her and the matter was reported before the Mahila Thana on
05.12.2013. It has further been stated that the petitioner/husband refused to
maintain the respondent/wife and her two minor daughters for which the
respondent/wife had filed MP Case No.269/14 for maintenance under
Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
8. It has further been stated that earlier the petitioner/husband has filed
divorce case bearing case no.526/14 and the same was dismissed vide order
dated 04.04.2016 on merit. On the aforesaid grounds the respondent-wife
has prayed to dismiss the suit.
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9. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the following issues have
been framed by the learned Family Judge for adjudication of the suit, which
are as follows: (i)
Whether the suit is maintainable in it’s present form?
(ii)
Whether the petition has got valid cause of action for the suit?
(iii)
Whether the respondent has deserted the petitioner?
(iv)
Whether the petitioner is entitled for any other relief?
10. The evidences have been made on behalf of both the parties. Thereafter,
the judgment has been passed dismissing the suit filed under Section
13(1)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for a decree of divorce by the
petitioner, appellant herein, which is the subject matter of the present
appeal.
Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant-husband:
11. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant/petitioner that the
factual aspect which was available before the learned Family Judge
supported by the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant/petitioner
has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is
perverse, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
12. It has been submitted that after marriage, the behaviour of the
respondent/wife was much rude and abnormal and she always ill-treated
with the petitioner/husband. The petitioner always tried to pacify to lead
normal life with his wife and tried to consult the several doctors but she
refused to visit any doctor.
13. It has further been submitted that the respondent-wife has deserted the
appellant/husband for a continuous period of more than ten years and living
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separately at her parental house and she refused to co-habit with the
appellant since the year 2010.
14. It has also been contended that the respondent-wife is not leading the
conjugal life with the petitioner since the year 2010 and now there is no any
possibility to reunite in near future.
15. It has further been submitted that the issue of desertion has not been
taken into consideration in right perspective by the learned Family Court,
hence, the judgment impugned suffers from an error.
16. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner, based upon the aforesaid
grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from perversity,
as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-wife
17. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-wife, while defending
the impugned judgment, has submitted that there is no error in the impugned
judgement. The learned Family Judge has considered the issue of desertion
and has come to the conclusion that no evidence has been adduced to
establish the issue of desertion, hence, has dismissed the suit.
18. It has been contended that just after few days of marriage, the petitioner
and his family members started torturing the respondent-wife for nonfulfillment of demand of dowry and lastly ousted her from her matrimonial
home.
19. It has also been contended that her husband is having illicit relationship
with another lady, namely, Gudiya Devi and there is child also, therefore,
he has filed the suit for divorce.
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20. It has further been contended that the suit was filed by the
appellant/petitioner, is only to harass and humiliate the respondent-wife.
21. It has also been submitted that she was ready to live together as husband
and wife but after sometime, the appellant again started torturing her and
the matter was reported before the Mahila Thana on 05.12.2013.
22. It has also been contended that the appellant/petitioner has refused to
maintain the respondent-wife and her two minor daughters for which the
respondent filed M.P. Case No.269/14 for maintenance under Section 125
Cr.P.C.
23. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that
if on that pretext, the factum of desertion has not been found to be
established, hence, the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer from an
error.
Analysis:
24. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned
judgment.
25. Before entering into the merits of the case, it is necessary to advert to
the import of the order dated 8th May, 2026, from which it is evident that
this Court made an earnest attempt to reconcile the parties. However, as no
substantial outcome emerged and the parties did not agree to reconciliation,
this Court has thought it appropriate to proceed to adjudicate the matter on
merits. For ready reference, the order dated 8th May, 2026 is being quoted
as under:
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“Order No.07/Dated: 8th May, 2026
1. Although we have referred in the order dated 06.04.2026 that there
is chance of settlement in terms of money as has been referred by the
learned counsel appearing for the appellant-husband by pointing out
para-9 as referred in the order dated 06.04.2026.
2. The respondent-wife is present in the Court and when she has heard
the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the appellant-husband, then
she has seriously opposed that she is not concerned with the settlement
in terms of money, rather she wants the matter to be decided on merit.
3. This Court, therefore, is of the view that when one of the parties is
not agreeing to the settlement in terms of money, then the Court is
having no option but to decide the matter on its own merit.
4. Accordingly, the learned counsel for both the parties have invited to
argue the matter on merit.
5. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties at length.
6. Argument concluded.
7. Judgment reserved.”
26. The case has been heard at length. The admitted fact herein is that the
suit for divorce has been filed on the ground of desertion, i.e., by filing an
application under Section 13(1) (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and
accordingly, issues have been framed wherein primarily issue no. III which
pertains to desertion.
27. The evidence has been led on behalf of both the parties. For ready
reference, the evidences led on behalf of the parties are being referred as
under:
List of petitioner(s) witness(s)
P.W.1, Pramod Kumar
P.W.2, Raj Kumar Vishwakarma
The petitioner/appellant herein has not produced documentary evidence
on his behalf.
P.W.1, Pramod Kumar (petitioner himself), has deposed in his
examination-in-chief that he has filed this divorce case against his wife Anjana
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Devi, with whom, he was married dt. 28-11-2004. Out of the wedlock two
children were born. Since the beginning of the marriage his wife refused to
lead conjugal life peacefully with him. He always tried to maintain good
relationship with his wife but she does not want to live with him. Since after
marriage his wife lives in her maika at district Gaya Bihar. He has tried several
times for mediation but could not succeeded. His wife has filed maintenance
case in which as per order of learned Family Court he is paying maintenance
Rs.9000/- per month to his wife. He always tried to lead conjugal life with his
wife but she has filed criminal case against him u/s 498A IPC bearing case
no-2793/14. His wife has filed another criminal case against him and his
brother no-2382/18. Both the cases are still pending. Due to continuous
harassing by his wife to him he also has filed complaint case no-1579/17 and
also, he has filed divorce case against his wife. For last few months she used
to abuse him while he was on his duty and due to which he got mentally
puzzled and as a result of which as Loco Pilot in rail Engine he crossed the
red signal for which he was punished by railway department and department
proceeding is still going on against him. He and his family were being tortured
physically mentally and economically by the respondent.
He has further stated in his evidence that his wife and children are residing
separately with him from dt. 26-11-2014 and during this period there is no any
relation and he heard that she is residing in live in relationship with another
person. He has been totally deserted by the respondent. Both parties are
residing separately for many years and he was tortured physically and
mentally by his wife so he has filed this divorce case.
In his cross-examination, he has deposed that he has two children who are
residing with his wife who took them forcibly. He has not filed any case for
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the guardianship of children. He is doing job as Loco Pilot in railway
department. It is not true that he has molested his sister-in-law (Sali) in civil
court and for that GR case no-2382/18 was filed by his wife. His wife has filed
a case no-2793/14 for demand of dowry and cruelty against him and thereafter
another case no 2382/18 was also filed against him. He also has filed CP case
no-1579/18 against his wife and her family members.
He has further deposed that in her evidence that earlier he had filed
divorce case no-526/14 which stood dismissed by the then Family court and
he has filed revision before the Hon'ble high court which also stood dismissed
by the Hon'ble High Court. He has not challenged the order of Hon'ble high
court before the Hon'ble Apex court. The statement made in para-5 & 7, 10,
11 & 12 of affidavit has not been mentioned in his plaint. He is suffering from
skin disease. On her instigation to the children by his wife, they abused him.
He has made complaint in Thana after the aforesaid incident. The copy of
complaint s not been filed in court. He has not made any Dhanbad complaint
in Thana regarding the allegation as mentioned in para-13 of the affidavit. He
does not have remember that in plaint he has mentioned the date of separation
as dt. 06-02-2010 whereas in affidavit for evidence he has mentioned the date
of separation as dt. 26-11-2014. He has not witnessed that his wife is living in
living relationship. But he heard about the same with other people. He cannot
say the name of those people. He does not have remember that aforesaid fact
of living relationship has been mentioned in his plaint or not. It is not true that
he himself had beaten to his wife and after being tortured he ousted her from
his house.
P.W.2,
Raj
Kumar
Vishwakarma
(brother
of
the
petitioner/appellant herein) who has supported the evidence of P.W.1 and
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has deposed that he is the brother of Pramod Kumar and residing in District
Gaya. The marriage of his brother was solemnized in the year 2004. He cannot
say the date when quarrel took place between both the parties. Anjana had
filed the case for dowry and cruelty against her husband and others in which
the petitioner/appellant Pramod was convicted. Pramod has deserted Anjana
since 2014.
List of Respondent(s) witness(s)
R.W.-1, Anjana Devi
R.W.-2, Sister of the respondent-wife
The documentary evidence has been produced on behalf of the respondentwife which are as follows:Exhibit No
Ext.-A to C
Description of documents
C.C. of order-sheet, Plaint, Judgment of TMS Case
no.526/14
Ext.-D to F
C.C. of FIR, order-sheet, compromise petition of
Dhanbad PS 115/10
Mark-Y & Y/1
Two coloured photographs
Mark-2
Copy of RTI letter with medical report
Mark-Y/3 to Y/7
Copy of order sheet, plaint, show cause, petition
dt.04.08.2018, order dt. 10.11.2022 in Misc. Case
no.48/18 of Family Court Gaya.
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Mark-Y/8 to Y/9
Copy of order sheet, judgment of CP Case
No.2793/14
Mark-Y/10 & Y/11
Copy of after charge cross examination of Atul
Kumar and Anjana Devi in CP Case No.2793/14
R.W.-1 Anjana Devi (respondent herself) has deposed in her
examination-in-chief that she was married with Pramod Kumar on dt. 28-112014 with Hindu Rites and customs. After marriage she came to her sasural
at District Gaya where she resided in joint family. After six months of
marriage her in laws started torturing her due to demand of dowry. While
living in Dhanbad with her husband she was demanded Rs. 25,000/- as dowry
which increased gradually and on nonfulfillment of demand of dowry he was
beaten with belt. The age of the children are 17 years and 11 years.
She has further deposed that while living in Dhanbad in year 2011 she
was ablezed by pouring kerosine oil over her body and he tried to kill her and
she was admitted by the other people of the quarter in railway hospital
Dhanbad. She has not filed any case regarding the incident as because she was
forbidden considering the future of the children. Her husband has filed divorce
case in year 2014 which was dismissed. In year 2015 she was driven out along
with the children and since then she is residing in her maika. In maintenance
case an order was passed to pay Rs. 9000/ by the petitioner to her and again
in alteration case filed by her and the said maintenance amount was enhanced
Rs. 22,000/-per month but in spite of order of court no maintenance is being
provided to her. Her husband is bad having illicit relationship with another
lady namely Gudiya Devi and there is child also and so he has filed this
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divorce case. He is ready to reside with her husband provided he will keep her
with full dignity and honour. In course of pending of this case also her
husband had established sexual relationship with her.
Further, in her cross-examination, this witness has deposed that she has
stated that she has filed three cases against him and her husband has filed two
cases against her. He is residing separately with her husband when she was
driven out from her matrimonial home. After being disposed off of the divorce
case in year 2015 she was kicked out from her matrimonial home. She resided
in Dhanbad till year 2015. In year 2023 her husband had come to her house
but she cannot say the date and time when he visited to her maika. It is not
true that she is residing separately with her husband since the date of filing of
the case in year 2010.
R.W.-2 (sister of respondent-wife) has supported the evidence of
R.W.1 in examination in chief and in cross-examination. She has deposed that
her sister is residing in her maika since 2016 and since thereafter, she did not
meet with her husband. Her jija provides maintenance to her sister. Pramod
Kumar has performed second marriage and there is child also with second
marriage.
28.
The learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner has emphatically
argued that the evidence of desertion has not properly been considered and as
such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes
of law.
29.
While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the
respondent-wife that the judgment has well been considered and merely by
committing fraud, the suit for divorce has been filed.
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30.
This Court, while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the
parties on the issue of perversity, needs to refer herein the interpretation of
the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which
means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence.
31.
The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State [Represented
by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately
discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding
of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking
into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies
logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being
perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs,
i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:
“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of
cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court
observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the
subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on
record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural
irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR
1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a
finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994
Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is
not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are
based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable
person would have arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading
and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331]
the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from
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the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct,
etc.
27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries
in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th
Edn.
“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way
that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International
Edn.
Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the
direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.””
32. Thus, a perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. Further
“perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not
supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or
suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
33. Herein, the desertion has been taken as a ground for divorce by the
appellant/petitioner, therefore it would be apt to refer herein the meaning of
the desertion.
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34. Therefore, the definition of “desertion” is required to be referred herein as
defined under explanation part of Section 13 which means the desertion of the
petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and
without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful
neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.
35. Rayden on Divorce which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th
Edn.) has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:
“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an
intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation
permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the
consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one
spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.”
The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453
and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol.
12, in the following words:
“In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent
forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that
other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation
of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of
circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged
attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle
applicable to all cases.
Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things,
for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the
common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be
termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous
cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been
consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not
2026:JHHC:16990-DB
necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance
to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion.
36. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently
of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least
two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the
offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of
divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the
offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is
inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence.
37. It needs to refer herein that the "Desertion", for the purpose of seeking
divorce under the Act, means the intentional permanent forsaking and
abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent and
without reasonable cause. In other words, it is a total repudiation of the
obligations of marriage. Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from
a state of things. Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the
matrimonial obligations, i.e., not permitting or allowing and facilitating the
cohabitation between the parties.
38. The proof of desertion has to be considered by taking into consideration the
concept of marriage which in law legalises the sexual relationship between
man and woman in the society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful
indulgence in passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of
children. Desertion is not a single act complete in itself; it is a continuous
course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances of each
case.
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39. After referring to host of authorities and the views of various authors, the
Hon’ble Apex Court in Bipinchandra Jaisinghbhai Shah v. Prabhavati [AIR
1957 SC 176] held that if a spouse abandons the other in a state of temporary
passions, for example, anger or disgust without intending permanently to
cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion.
40. For the act of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two
essential conditions must be there, namely (1) the factum of separation, and
(2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus
deserendi). Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse
is concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving
reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the
necessary intention aforesaid. Desertion is a matter of inference to be drawn
from the facts and circumstances of each case. The inference may be drawn
from certain facts which may not in another case be capable of leading to the
same inference; that is to say, the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose
which is revealed by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both
anterior and subsequent to the actual acts of separation. If, in fact, there has
been a separation, the essential question always is whether that act could be
attributable to an animus deserendi.
41. The act of desertion commences when the fact of separation and the animus
deserendi co-exist. But it is not necessary that they should commence at the
same time. The de facto separation may have commenced without the
necessary animus ort it may be that the separation and the animus deserendi
coincide in point of time; for example, when the separating spouse abandons
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the marital home with the intention, express or implied, of bringing
cohabitation permanently to a close.
42. It is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove
the offence of desertion, like and other matrimonial offence, beyond all
reasonable doubt. Hence, though corroboration is not required as an absolute
rule of law the courts insist upon corroborative evidence, unless its absence is
accounted for to the satisfaction of the court.
43. Following the decision in Bipinchandra's case (supra) the Hon’ble Apex
Court again reiterated the legal position in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani
v. Meena alias Mota [AIR 1964 SC 40] by holding that in its essence
desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one
spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause.
For holding desertion proved the inference may be drawn from certain facts
which may not in another case be capable of leading to the same inference;
that is to say the facts have to be viewed as to the purpose which is revealed
by those acts or by conduct and expression of intention, both anterior and
subsequent to the actual acts of separation.
44. In the case of Adhyatma Bhattar Alwar v. Adhyatma Bhattar Sri Devi,
reported in AIR 2002 SC 88 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed which
reads as under :
"The clause lays down the rule that desertion to amount to a
matrimonial offence must be for a continuous period of not less than
two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition. This
clause has to be read with the Explanation. The Explanation has
widened the definition of desertion to include 'wilful neglect' of the
petitioning spouse by the respondent. It states that to amount to a
matrimonial offence desertion must be without reasonable cause and
without the consent or against the wish of the petitioner. From the
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Explanation it is abundantly clear that the legislature intended to give
to the expression a wide import which includes wilful neglect of the
petitioner by the other party to the marriage, therefore, for the offence
of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2)
the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus
deserendi). Similarly, no elements are essential so far as the deserted
spouse is concerned; (1) absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct
giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to
form the necessary intention aforesaid. The petitioner for divorce bears
the burden of proving those elements in the two spouses respectively
and their continuance throughout the statutory period."
45. In the case of Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, reported in 2002
AIR SCW 182, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in has observed as under :
"Desertion", for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act, means
the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by
the other without that other's consent and without reasonable cause. In
other words, it is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage.
Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things.
Desertion, therefore, means withdrawing from the matrimonial
obligations, i.e., not permitting or allowing and facilitating the
cohabitation between the parties. The proof of desertion has to be
considered by taking into consideration the concept of marriage which
in law legalises the sexual relationship between man and woman in the
society for the perpetuation of race, permitting lawful indulgence in
passion to prevent licentiousness and for procreation of children.
Desertion is not a single act complete in itself, it is a continuous
course of conduct to be determined under the facts and circumstances
of each case "
46. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that
the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which
differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the
other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust,
without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to
desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is
concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum
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of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an
end.
47. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is
concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving
reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the
necessary intention aforesaid. In such a situation, the party who is filing for
divorce will have the burden of proving those elements.
48. Recently also, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.
Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of
‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40
which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The
law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the
intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of
the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove
that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of
deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other
words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting
spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted
spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable
cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view
taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court has been incorporated in the Explanation
added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said
Explanation reads thus:
“13. Divorce.—(1)
…
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Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means
the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without
reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such
party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party
to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly.”
49. This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word “desertion” has
considered the evidences of the witnesses as has been incorporated by the
learned Court in the impugned judgment.
50. Herein, the ground of desertion has been taken by the appellant/petitioner
that the respondent-wife has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period
of more than ten years and living separately at her parental house and she
refused to co-habit with the petitioner since the year 2010.
51. It is evident from impugned judgment that in order to substantiate the
aforesaid fact, no material or cogent evidence has been put-forth before the
learned Family Court.
52. It needs to refer herein that from perusal of impugned order it is evident that
that the respondent-wife while living in her sasural had been harassed and
tortured in various ways by the petitioner, appellant herein. Further, he has
not made any complaint against his wife of torturing him either in Thana or
any other form whereas the respondent has deposed that she herself was
tortured by the appellant-husband and only to save himself he has filed
divorce case as because he has illicit relationship with another lady namely,
Gudiya Devi.
53.
It further appears from the order impugned that prior to filing of suit, the
appellant had earlier filed divorce case in the year 2014 bearing case
no.526/14 which stood dismissed on the ground that the appellant could not
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prove that he was subjected to cruelty by the respondent while living in
sasural and the allegation made by the petitioner/husband against the
respondent-wife was found to be false. Thereafter, the appellant again filed
the divorce case on the ground of desertion against his wife by alleging that
he was deserted by his wife since the year 2014.
54. In this regard, he has given contradictory statement. In his plaint he has
mentioned at para-7 of the plaint that the respondent is residing separately
with him from 06.02.2010 whereas in his evidence he has stated that his wife
is residing separately with him since the year 2014.
55. Further, the brother of the appellant has also deposed in his crossexamination that Anjana (respondent) has filed a case for dowry and cruelty
against her husband and in the aforesaid case, the petitioner has been
convicted and further he has deposed in para-21 that the appellant Pramod
himself has deserted to his wife since the year 2014.
56. In view of the testimony of the aforesaid witnesses, the allegation of
desertion against the respondent-wife stands wholly discredited and cannot
be sustained.
57. Thus, on the factual aspect aforesaid, it is evident that appellant/husband
has failed to produce any material evidence in order to substantiate his claim
of desertion against the respondent wife.
58. This Court has interpreted the word ‘desertion’ and the desertion has been
defined and interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the desertion will
be said to be desertion if either of the party, on his/her own wish, has left
the matrimonial house. But no such evidence has been produced by the
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appellant/petitioner to prove the element of desertion showing that the
respondent-wife has left her matrimonial house without any reasonable
cause.
59. Reference of Section 23(1)(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act needs to be
referred herein wherein it has been provided that one cannot be allowed to
take advantage of its own wrong. For ready reference, Section 23(1) reads
as under:
“23. Decree in proceedings.—(1) In any proceeding under this Act,
whether defended or not, if the court is satisfied that
(a) any of the grounds for granting relief exists and the petitioner
[except in cases where the relief is sought by him on the ground
specified in sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) or sub-clause (c) of clause
(ii) of section 5] is not in any way taking advantage of his or her own
wrong or disability for the purpose of such relief, and
(b) where the ground of the petition is the ground specified in clause (i)
of sub-section (1) of section 13, the petitioner has not in any manner
been accessory to or connived at or condoned the act or acts
complained of, or where the ground of the petition is cruelty the
petitioner has not in any manner condoned the cruelty, and
[(bb) when a divorce is sought on the ground of mutual consent, such
consent has not been obtained by force, fraud or undue influence,
and]
(c) 4 [the petition (not being a petition presented under section 11)] is
not presented or prosecuted in collusion with the respondent, and
(d) there has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting
the proceeding, and
(e) there is no other legal ground why relief should not be granted, then,
and in such a case, but not otherwise, the court shall decree such relief
accordingly.
(2) Before proceeding to grant any relief under this Act, it shall be the
duty of the court in the first instance, in every case where it is possible
so to do consistently with the nature and circumstances of the case, to
make every endeavour to bring about reconciliation between the
parties: 5
[Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall apply to any
proceeding wherein relief is sought on any of the grounds specified in
clause (ii), clause (iii), clause (iv), clause (v), clause (vi) or clause (vii)
of sub-section (1) of section 13.]
[(3) For the purpose of aiding the court in bringing about such
reconciliation, the court may, if the parties so desire or if the court
thinks it just and proper so to do, adjourn the proceedings for a
reasonable period not exceeding fifteen days and refer the matter to any
person named by the parties in this behalf or to any person nominated
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by the court if the parties fail to name any person, with directions to
report to the court as to whether reconciliation can be and has been,
effected and the court shall in disposing of the proceeding have due
regard to the report.
(4) In every case where a marriage is dissolved by a decree of divorce,
the court passing the decree shall give a copy thereof free of cost to
each of the parties.]”
60. For proving desertion, it is onus upon the party who is taking the ground for
seeking dissolution of marriage is to substantiate that the party has left the
house on her own. Contrary to that, if the party has been compelled to leave
the house on the basis of cruelty which has been meted out to her then the
same will not come under the fold of desertion and in that view of the
matter, Section 23(1)(a) of Hindu Marriage Act is to be made applicable
that if the husband is at wrong, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of
his own wrong.
61. This Court, on consideration of the impugned judgment as also the material
available on record, has found that no such cogent evidence has been
produced by the husband to prove the ground of desertion.
62. The learned Family Court after due appreciation of all the evidences
available on record has come with the finding that there is non-availability
of the ground for dissolution of marriage and therefore, dismissed the suit.
63. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions, is of the view that the
appellant/petitioner has failed to establish the element of perversity in the
impugned judgment as per the discussions made hereinabove, as such, the
instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.
64. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed.
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65. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)
11/06/2026
/
Rohit A.F.R.
Uploaded on 12.06.2026
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