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( 2026:HHC:39389 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CMPMO No. 421 of 2026
Date of Decision: 11.09.2026
____________________________________________________
Prakash Chand
...Petitioner.
Versus
Sh. Rajneesh Awasthi
...Respondent.
Coram
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the petitioner:
Mr. R.K.Sharma, Senior Advocate
with Mr. Arun Kumar, Advocate.
For the respondent:
Mr. Abhinav Ghabroo, Advocate.
__________________________________________________
Romesh Verma, Judge (oral)
The instant petition arises out of the order as passed by the
learned Civil Judge, Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P., dated
21.07.2026, whereby the learned trial Court has issued necessary
reference to the revenue authorities as well as to the SHO, Police
Station, Baijnath, for providing police assistance to the Bailiff for the
execution of the warrant of possession in terms of the decree
passed by the learned trial Court dated 24th July, 2024.
2.
The facts as emerge in the present case are that the
respondent/plaintiff, Rajneesh Awasthi, filed a suit for permanent
prohibitory injunction against the present petitioner/judgment debtor,
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
( 2026:HHC:39389 )
Prakash Chand, in the Court of learned Civil Judge, Baijnath,
District Kangra, on 10th June, 2019.
3.
As per the case asserted by the plaintiff, he is exclusive
owner-in-possession of the suit land, having purchased the same by
way of a sale deed dated 11th June, 2015, registered vide
Registration No. 614/2015, from the previous owner of the suit land.
The defendant is a complete stranger to the suit land and has no
right, title, or interest over the same. It was averred that the plaintiff
remains out of station in connection with his business work and,
taking advantage of his absence, the defendant interfered with the
suit land by removing/cutting trees and digging the suit land in order
to raise a permanent structure. It was further stated that on 8 th
June, 2019, when the plaintiff visited his native village, he came to
know about the unlawful act of the defendant and confronted him,
whereupon the defendant admitted the construction work carried out
by him on 5th June, 2019.
4.
The
said
suit
was
contested
by
the
present
petitioner/judgment debtor on various grounds. It was denied that he
interfered with the suit land by cutting bushes and digging the same
in order to raise a permanent structure. It was submitted that he had
carried construction of his own house, for which he had received a
grant from the Government under the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana
to the tune of ₹1,65,000/-.
5.
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The learned trial Court framed the issues in the matter on
20th February, 2020, and vide its judgment and decree dated 24 th
July, 2024, passed a decree for permanent prohibitory injunction
restraining the defendant/judgment debtor from raising any
construction, digging, or excavating upon the suit land of the plaintiff
comprised in Khata No. 277, Khatauni No. 488, Khasra No. 363,
measuring 00-04-04 hectares, situated in Mohal Kothi, Mauza
Paprola, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, H.P.
6.
The learned trial Court further granted the relief of
mandatory injunction directing the defendant to remove the
encroachment found on the suit land as shown in the demarcation
report (Exhibit PW-5/B), and the same was ordered to form part of
the decree.
7.
The said judgment was put to enforcement by the decree
holder/respondent by filing an application for the execution of the
decree under the provisions of Order 21 Rules 10 and 32 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
8.
On 7th
March, 2026, after consideration, the learned
Executing Court issued warrant of possession against the present
petitioner/judgment debtor for delivering possession of the suit land
comprised in Khata No. 277, Khatauni No. 488, Khasra No. 363,
measuring 00-04-04 hectares, situated at Mohal Kothi, Mauza
Paprola, Tehsil Baijnath, District Kangra, HP and the encroachment,
( 2026:HHC:39389 )
if any found, was ordered and directed to be removed from the suit
land. Further, the report of demarcation (Exhibit PW-5/B) was also
annexed with the warrant for the assistance of the bailiff.
9.
Thereafter, the warrant of possession could not be
executed, and finally on 21st
July, 2026, it was ordered by the
learned Civil Judge, Baijnath, District Kangra, HP that the warrant of
possession issued by the Court was received back unexecuted as
the warrant could not be executed due to the obstruction caused by
the judgment debtor, Prakash Chand. The learned trial Court
accordingly issued directions for providing assistance to the bailiff
for the execution of the warrant of possession.
10.
Feeling dissatisfied, the judgment debtor/petitioner has
approached this Court assailing the said impugned order.
11.
It is contended by Shri R.K. Sharma, learned Senior
Counsel assisted by Mr. Arun Kumar, Advocate, for the petitioner
that the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court is
erroneous and liable to be set aside. He further submits that the
learned trial Court has not appreciated the point in controversy and
has wrongly passed the said order.
12.
On the other hand, Mr. Abhinav Ghabroo, learned counsel
appearing for the respondent, has defended the impugned order
passed by the learned trial Court. He submits that this Court, while
exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, will
( 2026:HHC:39389 )
not act as an appellate court and will not disturb the well-reasoned
order passed by the learned trial Court.
13.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties.
14.
Admittedly, in the present case, a suit for permanent
prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction was filed by the
plaintiff/respondent against the defendant/judgment debtor. The
said suit came to be decreed on 24 th July, 2024, whereby a decree
for permanent prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction was
passed by directing the defendant to remove the encroachment as
shown in demarcation report Exhibit PW-5/B. It has been fairly
conceded by learned counsel for the parties that initially the said
judgment was not assailed by the judgment debtor/petitioner.
However, now, after the issuance of the warrant of possession, the
defendant has preferred an appeal against the said judgment along
with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
15.
The learned trial Court had passed the judgment and
decree on 24th July, 2024, and the said decree was put to execution
by the decree holder/plaintiff. The learned trial Court, while
enforcing the said decree, issued warrant of possession, and when
the same could not be executed, the SHO, Police Station, Baijnath,
was directed to provide police assistance to the Bailiff for the
execution of the warrant of possession.
16.
( 2026:HHC:39389 )
This Court is of the considered opinion that once a decree
has been passed by the learned trial Court and there is no stay
order granted by a superior Court, the only order which could have
been passed by the learned executing Court is the impugned order
which has been passed. This Court does not find any infirmity in the
impugned order, and the same has been passed strictly in
accordance with law. Once the decree has not been set aside and
there is no interim protection granted to the judgment debtor, the
learned executing Court was well within its right to pass the
impugned order. The decree holder is well within his right to execute
the decree. The executing Court in the absence of any interim order
is bound to enforce the judgment and decree.
17.
The Hon’ble Apex Court has repeatedly held that the
scope of interference in a petition filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is very limited. The Hon’ble Apex in Civil
Appeal No(s).13801 of 2025, titled as Shri Digant vs M/s
P.D.T. Trading Co. & others, has discussed the scope of
interference while exercising the power under Article 227 of
Constitution of India. The relevant paragraphs thereof read as
under:“22. The scope of High Court’s jurisdiction under Articles
226/227 fell for consideration before a threeJudge Bench of
this Court in Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath &
Ors. 1 This Court held that judicial orders of civil courts are
( 2026:HHC:39389 )
not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226, though
they may be questioned in the supervisory jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The power
under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only
in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the
subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their
authority and not for correcting mere errors. The power may
be exercised in cases occasioning grave injustice or failure
of justice such as when (i) the court or tribunal has assumed
a jurisdiction which it does not have, (ii) has failed to
exercise a jurisdiction which it does have, such failure
occasioning a failure of justice, and (iii) the jurisdiction
though available is being exercised in a manner which
tantamounts to overstepping the limits of jurisdiction.”
23. In the case on hand, the appellate court had considered
whether the proceeding in detail the issue as to court was
justified in trial with the case, without further notice to the
defendants, after submission of pursis (Exh.42) by
defendants’ counsel, claiming no instructions. After a
threadbare analysis and taking into consideration
surrounding circumstances, the appellate court held that the
trial court had committed no wrong proceeding with the
matter court representing with noticed the the that
defendants matter. The appellate Court noticed tht the
advocate representing the defndants had claimed no
instructions but not sought withdrawal of his Vakalatnama
and the matter thereafter remained pending for over three
months till it was decided in March 2015. In between no
effort was made by the defendants to engage another
lawyer. Moreover, the defendants did not come up with a
case that their lawyer’s notice was not served on them
therefore, they could not engage another counsel Besides
that, the record also indicated that the intention of the
defendants was to delay the proceedings because earlier
also the suit had proceeded ex parte against them though,
later, those orders were recalled. Therefore, in our view,
once the appellate court took into consideration all relevant
aspects including the fact that pursis (Exh.42) did not seek
withdrawal of the Vakalatnama, and withdrawal was not
even permitted, there was no such jurisdictional error which
warranted exercise of powers under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. The High Court without any justification
procedure went consider the procedure prescribed for
withdrawal Vakalatnama when neither withdrawal of
Vakalatnama was permitted by the Trial Court nor the pursis
prayed for its withdrawal. In such circumstances, the entire
exercise of the High Court was misconceived. More so,
when the view taken by the appellate Court that defendant
cannot take advantage of his own wrong was a plausible
view based on materials available on record. Hence, in our
( 2026:HHC:39389 )
view, appellate court’s order was not amenable to
interference in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226/227
of the Constitution of India. The High Court clearly exceeded
its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in
interfering with well reasoned order of the appellate Court.”
18.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in M/S GARMENT CRAFT
Vs. PRAKASH CHAND GOEL, (2022) 4 SCC 181, decided on
11.01.2022, has held that High Court while exercising
Supervisory Jurisdiction will not act as a Court of First Appeal to
reappreciate, reweigh the evidence on facts upon which the
determination under challenge is based. The Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as follows:15. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we are
clearly of the view that the impugned order is contrary
to law and cannot be sustained for several reasons, but
primarily for deviation from the limited jurisdiction
exercised by the High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India. The High Court exercising
supervisory jurisdiction does not act as a court of first
appeal to reappreciate, reweigh the evidence or facts
upon which the determination under challenge is
based. Supervisory jurisdiction is not to correct every
error of fact or even a legal flaw when the final finding
is justified or can be supported. The High Court is not
to substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion,
for that of the inferior court or tribunal.1 The jurisdiction
exercised is in the nature of correctional jurisdiction to
set right grave dereliction of duty or flagrant
abuse,1Celina Coelho Pereira (Ms) and Others v.
Ulhas Mahabaleshwar Kholkar and Others, (2010) 1
SCC violation of fundamental principles of law or
justice. The power under Article 227 is exercised
sparingly in appropriate cases, like when there is no
evidence at all to justify, or the finding is so perverse
that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a
conclusion that the court or tribunal has come to. It is
axiomatic that such discretionary relief must be
exercised to ensure there is no miscarriage of justice.
( 2026:HHC:39389 )
16. Explaining the scope of jurisdiction under Article
227, this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P)
Ltd.2 has observed:“6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and
jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India is examined and explained in a
number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of
power under this article involves a duty on the High
Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the
bounds of their authority and to see that they do the
duty expected or required of them in a legal manner.
The High Court is not vested with any unlimited
prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong
decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of
the subordinate courts or tribunals. Exercise of this
power and interfering with the orders of the courts or
tribunals is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of
duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of
law or justice, where if the High Court does not
interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is
also well settled that the High Court while acting under
this article cannot exercise its power as an appellate
court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of
the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not
apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can
set aside or ignore the findings of facts of an inferior
court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify
or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person
can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the
court or tribunal has come to.”
19. The factum that the counsel for the appellant had
applied for the certified copy would show that the
counsel for the appellant was aware that the ex-parte
decree had been passed on the account of failure to
lead defence evidence. This would not, however, be a
good ground and reason to set aside and substitute the
opinion formed by the trial court that the appellant
being incarcerated was unable to lead evidence and
another chance should be given to the appellant to
lead defence evidence. The discretion exercised by the
trial court in granting relief, did not suffer from an error
apparent on the face of the record or was not a finding
so perverse that it was unsupported by evidence to
justify it. There could be some justification for the
respondent to argue that the appellant was possibly
aware of the ex-parte decree and therefore the
submission that the appellant came to know of the exparte decree only on release from jail on 6th May 2017
( 2026:HHC:39389 )
is incorrect, but this would not affect the factually
correct explanation of the appellant that he was
incarcerated and could not attend the civil suit
proceedings from 6th October 2015 to 6th May 2017. If
it was felt 30 that the application for setting aside the
exparte decree was filed belatedly, the court could
have given an opportunity to the appellant to file an
application for condonation of delay and costs could
have been imposed. The facts as known, equally apply
as grounds for condonation of delay. It is always
important to take a holistic and overall view and not get
influenced by aspects which can be explained. Thus,
the reasoned decision of the trial court on elaborate
consideration of the relevant facts did not warrant
interference in exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction
under Article 227 of the Constitution.”
19.
In view of the observations made here-in-above, this
Court does not find any infirmity in the impugned order passed
by the learned Trial Court. Consequently, the present petition,
being devoid of any merit, is dismissed.
20.
However, it is made clear that observations as made in
the present case are meant only for adjudication of present
petition.
All the pending miscellaneous application(s) if any,
shall also stands disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
September 11, 2026
(Nisha)
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