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2026:HHC:3324
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP(M) No. 2383 of 2025
Reserved on: 16.01.2026
Date of Decision: 23.01.2026.
Pradeep Kumar
….Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. & Anr
…. Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr N.S. Chandel, Senior Advocate
with Mr K.S. Gill, Advocate.
For the Respondents
:
Mr Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Vacation Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking
regular bail in FIR No. 41 of 2025, dated 17.02.2025, registered at
Police Station, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, H.P., for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 20 of the
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS
Act).
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:3324
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
police received secret information on 17.02.2025 that the
petitioner, who was working as a Chowkidar in the Forest
Corporation Sales Depot at Taruwala, was indulging in the sale
of narcotics. The police reached the Forest Corporation Depot,
searched the Almirah and recovered 1.614 kg of charas. The police
arrested the petitioner. These allegations are false. There is no
evidence against the petitioner. The petitioner is a permanent
resident of District Shimla. He has deep roots in society, and
there is no chance of his absconding. The premises from which
the recovery was effected were not allotted to the petitioner;
rather, they were lying abandoned. The petitioner was working in
the Sales Depot at Taruwala and was discharging his duties at the
time of his arrest. The petitioner would abide by the terms and
conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that
the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on
bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the police were on a patrolling duty on 17.02.2025.
They received secret information at 6:30 PM that petitioner
Pradeep Kumar was selling charas, and in case of search of his
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room, a huge quantity of charas could be recovered. The
information was credible, and any delay in procuring the search
warrant would have led to the destruction of the case property.
Hence, the information was reduced into writing and was sent to
the Sub Divisional Police Officer (SDPO), Paonta Sahib. The police
joined Suprabhat Thakur and went to the petitioner’s room,
where he was present. The police searched the room and
recovered a carry bag containing 1.614 kg of charas. The police
arrested the petitioner and seized the charas. The charas was
sent to the State Forensic Science Laboratory (SFSL) Junga, and
as per the result of analysis, it was confirmed to be an extract of
cannabis and a sample of charas. The chargesheet has been filed
before the Court. The petitioner filed an application for his
discharge, which was dismissed on 11.06.2025. Hence, the status
report.
4.
I have heard Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel
assisted by Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr
Ajit
Sharma,
learned
respondents/State.
Deputy
Advocate
General
for
the
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5.
Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he
was falsely implicated. The room from where the recovery was
effected was not allotted to the petitioner, and this fact was
asserted in a reply to the writ petition filed by the petitioner. The
mere presence of the petitioner on the spot is not sufficient to
connect him to the commission of a crime. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be
released on bail.
6.
Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondents/State, submitted that the petitioner was
residing in the room as per the statement of Suprabhat Thakur.
The mere fact that the room was not allotted to him is not
sufficient to prove that he was not in possession. The quantity of
charas stated to have been recovered by the police is a
commercial quantity, and the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS
Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has not satisfied the
twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
2026:HHC:3324
7.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380:
(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under
trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant
interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise
polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional
but rational, in this context, to enquire into the
antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which
suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while
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on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes
on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of
evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is
therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis
supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the
basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment which
conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means
and standing of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the
larger interests of the public or State and similar other
considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the
purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a
genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution
will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of
the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh,
(2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking through
Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion
in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In
highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of
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course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as
follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but,
however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a
judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order
for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained.
Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being
dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from
case to case. While placement of the accused in the
society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a
guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same
should always be coupled with other circumstances
warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is
one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the
more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of
rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the
factual matrix of the matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that although
it is established that a court considering a bail application
cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and
an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the
court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons
justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said
order would suffer from the vice of non-application of
mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting
or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally
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incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion
judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of
this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other
circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted
by grant of bail.” (emphasis supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this
Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order
(Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856
and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857)
of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as
follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 :
(2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p. 511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while
2026:HHC:3324
considering an application for bail courts cannot lose
sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an
accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case,
particularly, when the accusations may not be false,
frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as to enable a
court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must
be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be given
to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal
antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the
offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (emphasis
supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
The status report mentions that the petitioner was
found present in the room from which the recovery of the charas
was effected. The police recorded the statement of Suprabhat
Thakur, Manager of Forest Corporation, Sales Depot, Taruwala,
who stated that no written order was issued to allot the room to
the petitioner because the building was a residence of the DM;
however, the petitioner was residing in the room and had kept
his articles in the room. Therefore, prima facie, there is sufficient
material to conclude that the petitioner was occupying the room
from where the recovery was effected.
2026:HHC:3324
11.
A heavy reliance was placed upon the fact that the H.P.
State Forest Development Corporation had sought permission for
the repair and maintenance of the house because it was in a
dilapidated condition and not worth living in. The reliance was
also placed upon the reply filed by Director South HP State Forest
Development Corporation in CWP No. 9502 of 2025, in which it
was asserted that the accommodation meant for the Sub
Divisional Magistrate was lying abandoned. The repair was
subsequently carried out, and the premises were occupied by the
Sub Divisional Magistrate. These documents will not help the
petitioner because Section 20 of the NDPS Act makes the
possession and not the ownership an offence. Therefore, even if
the building was not allotted to the petitioner, but he was
occupying it as per the statement of Suprabhat Thakur, he would
be in possession, and the absence of the allotment would not
make any difference to the prosecution’s case. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz
Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC
1237, that a person is in possession if he is in a position to
exercise control over the article. It was observed at page 111:
2026:HHC:3324
25. We shall deal with each of these circumstances in turn.
The respondent has been accused of an offence under
Section 8 of the NDPS Act, which is punishable under
Sections 21, 27-A, 29, and 60(3) of the said Act. Section 8
of the Act prohibits a person from possessing any narcotic
drug or psychotropic substance. The concept of possession
recurs in Sections 20 to 22, which provide for punishment
for offences under the Act. In Madan Lal v. State of
H.P. [Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC
(Cri) 1664] this Court held that : (SCC p. 472, paras 19-23 &
26)
“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be
determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The
facts which can be culled out from the evidence on
record are that all the accused persons were travelling
in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were
known to each other, and it has not been explained or
shown as to how they travelled together from the same
destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.
20. Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband
articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of
the Act, which relates to offences for possession of
such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the
possession illicit, there must be a conscious possession.
21. It is highlighted that unless the possession was
coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e.
conscious possession and not mere custody without
awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20
is not attracted.
22. The expression “possession” is a polymorphous
term which assumes different colours in different
contexts. It may carry different meanings in
contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as
was observed in Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs,
W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of
Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC
2026:HHC:3324
274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038] to work out a completely
logical and precise definition of “possession”
uniform[ly] applicable to all situations in the context of
all statutes.
23. The word “conscious” means awareness about a
particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate
or intended.
***
26. Once possession is established, the person who
claims that it was not a conscious possession has to
establish it because how he came to be in possession is
within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act
gives a statutory recognition of this position because of
the presumption available in law. Similar is the
position in terms of Section 54, where also a
presumption is available to be drawn from possession
of illicit articles.”
26. What amounts to “conscious possession” was also
considered in Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab
[Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 9 SCC 608 :
(2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1431], where it was held that the
knowledge of possession of contraband has to be gleaned
from the facts and circumstances of a case. The standard
of conscious possession would be different in the case of a
public transport vehicle with several persons as opposed
to a private vehicle with a few persons known to one
another. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Mohan
Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri)
881], this Court also observed that the term “possession”
could mean physical possession with animus; custody
over the prohibited substances with animus; exercise of
dominion and control as a result of concealment; or
personal knowledge as to the existence of the contraband
and the intention based on this knowledge.
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12.
In similar circumstances when heroin was recovered
from the house, this Court held in Champa vs. State of H.P.:
2025:HHC:28899 that the occupants of the house would be
deemed to be in possession of the contraband. This judgment was
unsuccessfully assailed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in SLP
(Criminal) 19120 of 2025 titled Champa Devi vs. State of H.P.,
decided on 27.11.2025.
13.
Thus, prima facie, the petitioner was found in
possession of 1.614 kg of charas, which is a commercial quantity.
Therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the
present case.
14.
Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence
involving a commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied
that the accused is not guilty of the commission of an offence and
is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It reads as
follows:
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. –
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—
(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall
be cognisable.
(b) No person accused of an offence punishable
for offences under section 19, section 24, or
2026:HHC:3324
section 27A and also for offences involving
commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or
his own bond unless–
(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for
such release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he
is not guilty of such an offence and that he is
not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.
(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause
(b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or
any other law for the time being in force, on granting of
bail.”
15.
This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin& Another (2018) 13 SCC
738, and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that
the accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to
commit an offence while on bail, he cannot be released. It was
observed:
“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions
with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain
offences enumerated under the said Section. They are:
(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence
punishable under Section 19,
(2) Under Section 24,
(3) Under Section 27A and
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(4) offences involving a commercial quantity.
8. The accusation in the present case is with regard to the
fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it
may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application
for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences
under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case the court
proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are
to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal
requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any
other enactment.
16.
(1)
The court must be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds for believing that the
person is not guilty of such an offence;
(2)
that person is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.”
This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus
Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:
“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be
followed while considering the application for bail moved
by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In
Union of India vs Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429, it
has been elaborated as under: "7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid
legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and
followed. It should be borne in mind that in a
murder case, the accused commits the murder of
one or two persons, while those persons who are
dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in
causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a
number of innocent young victims, who are
vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly
impact on the society; they are a hazard to the
society; even if they are released temporarily, in all
probability, they would continue their nefarious
activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants
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clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and
illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the
contention with regard to punishment under the
NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse
effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs Chief
Secy. Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as
under:
24. With deep concern, we may point out that
the organised activities of the underworld and
the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances into this country
and illegal trafficking in such drugs and
substances have led to drug addiction among
a sizeable section of the public, particularly
the adolescents and students of both sexes
and the menace has assumed serious and
alarming proportions in the recent years.
Therefore, in order to effectively control and
eradicate this proliferating and booming
devastating menace, causing deleterious
effects and a deadly impact on society as a
whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made
effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of
specifying
mandatory
minimum
imprisonment and fine.
8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs
flooding the market, Parliament has provided that
the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act
should not be released on bail during trial unless
the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37,
namely,
(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing
that the accused is not guilty of such offence;
and
(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has
not given any justifiable reason for not
2026:HHC:3324
abiding by the aforesaid mandate while
ordering the release of the respondent
accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take
a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic
consequences and health hazards which
would accompany trafficking illegally in
dangerous drugs, the court should implement
the law in the spirit with which Parliament,
after due deliberation, has amended."
20. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of
power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations
contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject
to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences
with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the
said section is in the negative form prescribing the
enlargement of bail to any person accused of the
commission of an offence under the Act unless the two
conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the
application, and the second is that the Court must be
satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing
that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these
two conditions is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail
operates.
21. The expression "reasonable grounds" means
something more than prima facie grounds. It
contemplates substantial probable causes for believing
that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The
reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires
the existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case at
hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked
the underlying object of Section 37 that, in addition to the
limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for
the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its
liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is
indeed uncalled for.”
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17.
A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd.
Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 1237, wherein it was observed at page 110:
“21. Under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), the limitations on the
grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24
or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial
quantity are:
(i) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to
oppose the application for bail; and
(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to
believe” that (a) the person is not guilty of such an
offence, and (b) he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail.
22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is
“reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not
guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of
“reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge Bench of
this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [Union of India v. Shiv
Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505],
held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)
“7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is
“reasonable grounds”. The expression means
something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes
substantial probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this
reasonable belief contemplated, in turn, points to the
existence of such facts and circumstances as are
sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence
charged.
8. The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie
meaning of reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called on to act
2026:HHC:3324
reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to
give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.
‘7. … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 2258
states that it would be unreasonable to expect an
exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason
varies in its conclusions according to the
idiosyncrasies of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning
which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now
like the jingling of a child's toy.’
[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para
7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat)
(P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532]]
***
10. The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance
with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a
question of fact whether a particular act is
reasonable or not, which depends on the
circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal
Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd.
[Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills
Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315]
11. The court, while considering the application for
bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not
called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for
the limited purpose essentially confined to the
question of releasing the accused on bail that the
court is called upon to see if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty
and records its satisfaction about the existence of
such grounds. But the court has not to consider the
matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of
acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”
(emphasis supplied)
2026:HHC:3324
23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High
Court and this Court are required to apply while granting
bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the accused has not committed an offence and
whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail.
Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the
NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug
trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the
grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.”
18.
It was held in Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh, 2023
SCC OnLine SC 346, that bail cannot be granted without complying
with the requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was
observed:
4. This apart, it is noticed that the High Court, in passing
the impugned order of bail, had lost sight of Section 37 of
the NDPS Act, which, inter alia, provides that no person
accused of an offence involving commercial quantity shall
be released on bail unless the twin conditions laid down
therein are satisfied, namely, (i) the public prosecutor has
been given an opportunity to oppose the bail application;
and (ii) the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any such
offence while on bail.
15. For the sake of convenience Section 37(1) is reproduced
hereinbelow:—
“37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (2 of 1974)(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall
be cognisable.
(b) no person accused of an offence punishable
for offences under section 19 or section 24 or
2026:HHC:3324
section 27A, and also for offences involving
commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or
on his own bond unless(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
opportunity to oppose the application for such
release, and
(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there
are reasonable grounds for believing that he is
not guilty of such offence and that he is not
likely to commit any offence while on bail.”
16. In view of the above provisions, it is implicit that no
person accused of an offence involving trade in a
commercial quantity of narcotics is liable to be released on
bail unless the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an
offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence
while on bail.
19.
It was held in State of Meghalaya v. Lalrintluanga Sailo,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1751, that the grant of bail without
considering Section 37 of the NDPS Act is impermissible. It was
observed:
“5. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position
that, in cases involving the commercial quantity of
narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances, while
considering the application of bail, the Court is bound to
ensure the satisfaction of conditions under Section 37(1)
(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. The said provision reads thus:—
“37(1)(b)(ii)- where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable
grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence
and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on
bail.”
2026:HHC:3324
6. While considering the cases under the NDPS Act, one
cannot be oblivious of the objects and reasons for bringing
the said enactment after repealing the then-existing laws
relating to Narcotic drugs. The object and reasons given in
the acts themselves read thus:—
“An act to consolidate and amend the law relating to
narcotic drugs, to make stringent provisions for the control
and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances, to provide for the forfeiture of
property derived from, or used in, illicit traffic in narcotic
drugs and psychotropic substances, to implement the
provisions of the International Convention on Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and for matters
connected therewith.”
In the decision in Collector of Customs, New Delhi v.
Ahmadalieva Nodira (2004) 3 SCC 549, the three-judge
bench of this Court considered the provisions under
Section 37(1)(b) as also 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act, with
regard to the expression “reasonable grounds” used
therein. This Court held that it means something more
than the prima facie grounds and that it contemplates
substantial and probable causes for believing that the
accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. Furthermore,
it was held that the reasonable belief contemplated in the
provision would require the existence of such facts and
circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify
satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged
offence.
As relates to the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii)
of the NDPS Act, viz., that, firstly, there are reasonable
grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such
offence and, secondly, he is not likely to commit any
offence while on bail it was held therein that they are
cumulative and not alternative. Satisfaction of the
existence of those twin conditions had to be based on the
‘reasonable grounds’, as referred to above.
2026:HHC:3324
7. In the decision in State of Kerala v. Rajesh (2020) 12 SCC
122, after reiterating the broad parameters laid down by
this Court to be followed while considering an application
for bail moved by an accused involved in offences under
the NDPS Act, in paragraph 18 thereof this Court held that
the scheme of Section 37 of the NDPS Act would reveal that
the exercise of power to grant bail in such cases is not only
subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, but also subject to the
limitation placed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii), NDPS Act.
Further, it was held that in case one of the two conditions
thereunder is not satisfied, the ban on granting bail would
operate.
8. Thus, the provisions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the
NDPS Act and the decisions referred supra reveal the
consistent view of this Court that while considering the
application for bail made by an accused involved in an
offence under the NDPS Act, a liberal approach ignoring
the mandate under Section 37 of the NDPS Act is
impermissible. Recording a finding mandated under
Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which is a sine qua non for
granting bail to an accused under the NDPS Act, cannot be
avoided while passing orders on such applications.”
20.
In the present case, there is sufficient material at this
stage to prima facie conclude that the petitioner was found in
possession of a commercial quantity of charas. There is nothing
on record to show that the petitioner would not commit a similar
offence in case of his release on bail. Therefore, he has not
satisfied the twin condition laid down under section 37 of the
NDPS Act.
2026:HHC:3324
21.
It was submitted that the bail is a Rule and Jail is an
exception, and the petitioner is entitled to bail on this
consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner, as he
is, prima facie, involved in the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 20 of the NDPS Act involving the
commercial quantity. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Kashif, (2024) 11 SCC 372: 2024
SCC OnLine SC 3848 that in cases under the NDPS Act involving
the commercial quantity, the negation of bail is the rule and its
grant an exception. It was observed at page 381:
“Compliance with the mandate under Section 37
9. There has been a consistent and persistent view of
this Court that in the NDPS cases, where the offence is
punishable with a minimum sentence of ten years, the
accused shall generally not be released on bail. Negation of
bail is the rule, and its grant is an exception. While
considering the bail application, the court has to bear in
mind the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which
are mandatory in nature. The recording of findings as
mandated in Section 37 is a sine qua non for granting bail
to the accused involved in the offences under the said
Act.”
22.
No other point was urged.
23.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and
the same is dismissed.
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24.
The observation made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no
bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
23rdJanuary, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Vacation Judge
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