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2024:MLHC:609-DB
Serial No.08
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
ITA No.2/2024
Reserved on: 15.05.2024
Pronounced on: 08.07.2024
Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax, Shillong,
Aayakar Bhawan, M.G. Road,
Shillong - 793 001.
... Appellant
-vsM/s North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited,
Brookland Compound,
Lower New Colony,
Shillong – 793 003.
... Respondent
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Vaidyanathan, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
: Mr. S.C. Keyal, Adv with
Mr. S. Pandey, Adv
For the Respondent
: Mr. Ved Jain, Adv with
Mr. Nischay Kantoor, Adv
Mr. S. Dodeja, Adv
Mr. S. Jindal, Adv
i)Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes
ii)Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes
JUDGMENT
(Made by Hon’ble, the Chief Justice)
This Income Tax Appeal has been filed by the Department,
challenging the order dated 12.12.2022 passed by the Income Tax
Appellate
Tribunal,
Kolkata-Guwahati
‗e-Court‘,
Kolkata
in
2024:MLHC:609-DB
I.T.A.No.45/(Gau)/2019 and in I.T.A.No.418/(Gau)/2019 for the
assessment
year
2014-2015,
in
and
by
which,
while
I.T.A.No.418/(Gau)/2019 was allowed, the other one, namely,
I.T.A.No.45/(Gau)/2019 was dismissed as infructuous.
2. For the sake of brevity, the parties would be referred as ‗the
Department‘ and ‗the Company‘.
3. The case put forth by the Company before the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal was that it was established in the year 1976,
which is operating a largest hydro power plant in North Eastern
Region. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Shillong
observed that Mercantile System had been followed by the Company,
as per which, transactions are recorded, when they arise and the
incomes are recorded in the books of the accounts, when it is earned,
irrespective of the fact that it is received or accrued and therefore,
Hybrid System of accounting, which is a mixture of Cash Basis and
the Accrual Basis of Accounting, cannot be adopted by the Company
as per the provisions of Section 145(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961
(in short ‗the Act, 1961‘).
3.1. The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Shillong set
aside the order of assessment under Section 263 of the Act, 1961 on
12.12.2018 for the year 2014-2015 for re-computing the income of
the Company, as per which, the income was reassessed vide order
2024:MLHC:609-DB
dated 31.01.2019 after making an addition of Rs.84,82,34.839/- and
assessed under Section 154 of the Act, 1961 as Rs.383,77,29,947/-.
Aggrieved by the same, the Company filed an appeal before the
Commissioner of Income Tax (A), Shillong, in which the order of reassessment was upheld by an order dated 26.07.2019. Again two
appeals in I.T.A.No.45/(Gau)/2019 and in I.T.A.No.418/(Gau)/2019,
have been preferred by the Company against the orders dated
12.12.2018 and 31.01.2019, in and by which, the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal, quashed the revisionary proceedings carried out
under Section 263 of the Act, 1961 dated 12.12.2018 and closed the
other appeal as infructuous. Dissatisfied with the order of the
Tribunal, the Department is before this Court.
4. Learned counsel for the Department submitted that in this
appeal, though four substantial questions of law had been raised, the
Department has been canvassing this appeal in respect of Issue No.3
alone and for the sake of convenience, the four substantial questions
of law are extracted below:
―1. ―Whether the Hon‘ble Tribunal has erred in law and
facts in quashing the revisionary proceedings carried out u/s
263 of the Act by the Ld.PCIT, Shillong in concluding that
the order of the A.O. is neither erroneous nor prejudicial to
the interest of revenue?
2. Whether the Hon‘ble Tribunal has erred ignoring the
fact that the assessee company followed mercantile system of
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accounting and Rs.791.90 crores were shown as trade
receivables?
3. Whether the Hon‘ble Tribunal has erred in law and facts
in allowing the appeal of the assessee which is following
hybrid system of accounting with respect to ―interest on
debtors on cash basis‖ in contravention of the provisions of
Section 145 of the IT Act, 1961?
4. Whether the Hon‘ble Tribunal has erred in law and facts
in taking a view that the assesse was bound to adhere to the
direction of the Ministry of Power to account for interest on
cash basis?
5. Learned counsel for the Department further submitted that the
method of Late Payment Surcharge (LPS) on cash basis had all along
been followed by the Company from the year 2003-2004 and similar
views of accepting such method of LPS on cash basis even when the
books of account are maintained on Mercantile System have been
recognized through various judicial pronouncements. Therefore, the
order of re-assessment made by the Assessing Officer is neither
erroneous nor prejudicial to the interest of the Department and the
order of the Tribunal warrants interference by this Court, as it was
obligatory on the part of the Company to adhere to the directions
issued by the Ministry of Power then and there to account for interest
on cash basis.
6. Learned counsel for the Company contended that there is no
substantial question of law raised in this appeal, as the Issue No.3
pertains to a question of fact, which had already been decided by the
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Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of The Commissioner of
Income Tax, Hisar Vs. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.,
Hisar [ITA-209-2014 (O&M)] decided on 01.10.2014, by holding
that as and when the assessee receives payment of surcharge, it
would be obliged to pay tax on such amount and dismissed the appeal
of the revenue and the Supreme Court also confirmed the order dated
01.10.2014 in Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.18187 of
2015 dated 17.07.2019. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of
the Punjab and Haryana High Court are extracted below:
―We have duly considered the arguments but are unable to
accept the contentions advanced by counsel for the appellant.
Admittedly, Rs.2,25,18,23,535/- was added by the assessing
officer as reflecting levy of surcharge on delayed payment of
bills.
Admittedly, this amount has neither been paid nor
recovered by the assessee. Admittedly, the surcharge is a
disputable item and may at any time be reduced or waived and,
therefore, despite the fact that the assessee maintains a
mercantile system of accounting, the ITAT and the CIT
(Appeals) have rightly set aside the order passed by the
assessing officer adding surcharge to the income of the
assessee. It would be appropriate to point out that income tax is
fundamentally a levy on income and though the Act may
prescribe different points in time at which liability to taxation
enures still remains a tax on receipt of income. A hypothetical
income that may or may not materalise should not be made
subject matter of tax merely because of an entry in the
accounts books maintained by an assessee. A reference in this
regard may be made to a judgment of the Hon‘ble Supreme
Court in “Commissioner of Income-tax Vs. Shoorji
Vallabhdas and Co.” [1962] 046 ITR 0144, wherein it has
held as follows:-
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―Income-tax is a levy on income. Though the
Income-tax Act takes into account two points of time at
which the liability to tax is attracted, viz., the accrual of
the income or its receipt, yet the substance of the matter
is the income. If income does not result at all, there
cannot be a tax, even though in book-keeping, an entry is
made about a ―hypothetical income‖, which does not
materialize. Where income has, in fact, been received and
is subsequently given up in such circumstances that it
remains the income of the recipient, even though given
up, the tax may be payable. Where, however, the income
can be said not to have resulted at all, there is obviously
neither accrual nor receipt of income, even though an
entry to that effect might, in certain circumstances, have
been made in the books of account.‖
In view of what has been recorded hereinabove, we find no
error in the impugned orders and while dismissing the appeal
record that as and when the assessee receives payment of
surcharge, it would be obliged to pay tax on such amount.‖
7. Learned counsel for the Company referred to a judgment of
the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs.
M/s Excel Industries Ltd., and Mafatlal Industries P.Ltd., reported
in 2013 (10) TMI 324, wherein it was held as under by referring to
the judgment of the Supreme Court in [1962] 46 ITR 144 (supra):
―27. Applying the three tests laid down by various
decisions of this Court, namely, whether the income accrued
to the assessee is real or hypothetical; whether there is a
corresponding liability of the other party to pass on the
benefits of duty free import to the assessee even without any
imports having been made; and the probability or
improbability of realisation of the benefits by the Assessee
considered from a realistic and practical point of view (the
assessee may not have made imports), it is quite clear that in
fact no real income but only hypothetical income had accrued
to the assessee and Section 28(iv) of the Act would be
inapplicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.
2024:MLHC:609-DB
Essentially, the Assessing Officer is required to be pragmatic
and not pedantic.
28. Secondly, as noted by the Tribunal, a consistent view
has been taken in favour of the assessee on the questions
raised, starting with the assessment year 1992-93, that the
benefits under the advance licences or under the duty
entitlement pass book do not represent the real income of the
assessee. Consequently, there is no reason for us to take a
different view unless there are very convincing reasons, none
of which have been pointed out by the learned counsel for the
Revenue.
29. In Radhasoami Satsang Saomi Bagh v. Commissioner
of Income Tax, (1992) 193 ITR 321 (SC) this Court did not
think it appropriate to allow the reconsideration of an issue for
a subsequent assessment year if the same "fundamental
aspect" permeates in different assessment years. In arriving at
this conclusion, this Court referred to an interesting passage
from Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation 1926 AC 155
(PC) wherein it was said:
―Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigation because
of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new
versions which they present as to what should be a proper
apprehension by the court of the legal result either of the
construction of the documents or the weight of certain
circumstances. If this were permitted, litigation would have no
end, except when legal ingenuity is exhausted. It is a principle
of law that this cannot be permitted and there is abundant
authority reiterating that principle. Thirdly, the same
principle, namely, that of setting to rest rights of litigants,
applies to the case where a point, fundamental to the decision,
taken or assumed by the plaintiff and traversable by the
defendant, has not been traversed. In that case also a
defendant is bound by the judgment, although it may be true
enough that subsequent light or ingenuity might suggest some
traverse which had not been taken.‖
30. Reference was also made to Parashuram Pottery
Works Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, (1977) 106 ITR 1 (SC)
and then it was held:
2024:MLHC:609-DB
We are aware of the fact that strictly speaking res judicata
does not apply to income-tax proceedings. Again, each
assessment year being a unit, what is decided in one year may
not apply in the following year but where a fundamental
aspect permeating through the different assessment years has
been found as a fact one way or the other and parties have
allowed that position to be sustained by not challenging the
order, it would not be at all appropriate to allow the position
to be changed in a subsequent year.
―On these reasonings in the absence of any material
change justifying the Revenue to take a different view of the
matter – and if there was no change it was in support of the
assessee – we do not think the question should have been
reopened and contrary to what had been decided by the
Commissioner of Income Tax in the earlier proceedings, a
different and contradictory stand should have been taken.
31. It appears from the record that in several assessment
years, the Revenue accepted the order of the Tribunal in
favour of the assessee and did not pursue the matter any
further but in respect of some assessment years the matter was
taken up in appeal before the Bombay High Court but without
any success. That being so, the Revenue cannot be allowed to
flip-flop on the issue and it ought let the matter rest rather
than spend the tax payers' money in pursuing litigation for the
sake of it.
32. Thirdly, the real question concerning us is the year in
which the assessee is required to pay tax. There is no dispute
that in the subsequent accounting year, the assessee did make
imports and did derive benefits under the advance licence and
the duty entitlement pass book and paid tax thereon.
Therefore, it is not as if the Revenue has been deprived of any
tax. We are told that the rate of tax remained the same in the
present assessment year as well as in the subsequent
assessment year. Therefore, the dispute raised by the Revenue
is entirely academic or at best may have a minor tax effect.
There was, therefore, no need for the Revenue to continue
with this litigation when it was quite clear that not only was it
fruitless (on merits) but also that it may not have added
anything much to the public coffers.
2024:MLHC:609-DB
33. For the aforesaid reasons, we dismiss the civil appeals
with no order as to costs, but with the hope that the Revenue
implements its litigation policy a little more practically and a
little more seriously.‖
Thus, it was prayed by the learned counsel for the Company that the
order of the Tribunal is perfectly justified and the present appeal is
liable to be dismissed.
8. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
documents, including various judgments produced by the parties.
9. It was the case of the Company that there was no real
income accrued to the Company and in fact, the income accrued was
only hypothetical, as the transaction recorded under the advance
licences or under the duty entitlement passbook do not represent the
real income of the assessee and as such, the re-assessment order of
the Authority concerned on the basis of Hybrid System of accounting
has no legs to stand.
10. In this case, the Assessing Officer had passed an order
under Section 263 of the Act, 1961, which was admittedly set aside
by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax, Shillong and
thereafter, the order of reassessment was passed by the Assessing
Officer under Section 263 r/w 143(3) of the Act, 1961. Once the
order under Section 263 of the Act, 1961 has become final and stood
quashed, no question of passing another order will arise in view of
2024:MLHC:609-DB
the fact that the subsequent order passed by the Assessing Officer is
invalid in the eye of law, as the opinion formed by the Assessing
Officer is not sustained on the reasoning that revision under Section
263 is not permissible. When the order of assessment is found to be
erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of Revenue, the right vests
with the Principal Commissioner to review the order and since the
said stipulation has not been satisfied, the order passed under Section
263 cannot stand on its leg. For the sake of clarity, Sections 263 and
143(3) of the Act, 1961 are reproduced hereunder:
“263. Revision of orders prejudicial to revenue.– (1) The Principal
Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner
or Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceeding
under this Act, and if he considers that any order passed therein by the
Assessing Officer or the Transfer Pricing Officer, as the case may be, is
erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, he
may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after
making or causing to be made such inquiry as he deems necessary, pass
such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including,—
(i) an order enhancing or modifying the assessment or cancelling
the assessment and directing a fresh assessment; or
(ii) an order modifying the order under section 92CA; or
(iii) an order cancelling the order under section 92CA and
directing a fresh order under the said section].
Explanation 1.— For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared
that, for the purposes of this sub-section,—
(a) an order passed on or before or after the 1st day of June,
1988] by the Assessing Officer [or the Transfer Pricing Officer, as the
case may be,] shall include—
(i) an order of assessment made by the Assistant Commissioner
or Deputy Commissioner or the Income-tax Officer on the basis of
the directions issued by the Joint Commissioner under section 144A;
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(ii) an order made by the Joint Commissioner in exercise of the
powers or in the performance of the functions of an Assessing Officer
[or the Transfer Pricing Officer, as the case may be,] conferred on, or
assigned to, him under the orders or directions issued by the Board or
by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or
Principal Director General or Director General or Principal
Commissioner or Commissioner authorised by the Board in this
behalf under section 120;
(iii) an order under section 92CA by the Transfer Pricing
Officer;]
(b) "record" shall include and shall be deemed always to have
included all records relating to any proceeding under this Act available
at all the time of examination by the Principal Chief Commissioner or
Chief Commissioner or Principal] Commissioner or Commissioner;
(c) where any order referred to in this sub-section and passed by
the Assessing Officer or the Transfer Pricing Officer, as the case may
be,] had been the subject matter of any appeal filed on or before or after
the 1st day of June, 1988, the powers of Principal Commissioner or
Commissioner under this sub-section shall extend and shall be deemed
always to have extended to such matters as had not been considered and
decided in such appeal.
Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, it is hereby
declared that an order passed by the Assessing Officer or the Transfer
Pricing Officer, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be erroneous in
so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, if, in the opinion
of the Principal [Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or
Principal Commissioner or Commissioner,—
(a) the order is passed without making inquiries or verification
which should have been made;
(b) the order is passed allowing any relief without inquiring into
the claim;
(c) the order has not been made in accordance with any order,
direction or instruction issued by the Board under section 119; or
(d) the order has not been passed in accordance with any decision
which is prejudicial to the assessee, rendered by the jurisdictional High
Court or Supreme Court in the case of the assessee or any other person.
Explanation 3.– For the purposes of this section, ―Transfer
Pricing Officer‖ shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in the
Explanation to section 92CA.
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(2) No order shall be made under sub-section (1) after the expiry
of two years from the end of the financial year in which the order sought
to be revised was passed.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), an
order in revision under this section may be passed at any time in the case
of an order which has been passed in consequence of, or to give effect
to, any finding or direction contained in an order of the Appellate
Tribunal, National Tax Tribunal, the High Court or the Supreme Court.
Explanation - In computing the period of limitation for the
purposes of sub-section (2), the time taken in giving an opportunity to
the assessee to be reheard under the proviso to section 129 and any
period during which any proceeding under this section is stayed by an
order or injunction of any court shall be excluded.‖
―143 (3) - On the day specified in the notice issued under sub-section
(2), or as soon afterwards as may be, after hearing such evidence as the
assessee may produce and such other evidence as the Assessing Officer
may require on specified points, and after taking into account all
relevant material which he has gathered, the Assessing Officer shall, by
an order in writing, make an assessment of the total income or loss of the
assessee, and determine the sum payable by him or refund of any
amount due to him on the basis of such assessment.‖
11. Moreover, learned counsel for the Department canvassed
his argument with regard to Issue No.3 alone (reproduced below once
again), in which question of fact is involved and this Court cannot
interfere with the finding of fact dealt with by the Tribunal at this
moment:
―3. Whether the Hon‘ble Tribunal has erred in law and
facts in allowing the appeal of the assessee, which is
following hybrid system of accounting with respect to
―interest on debtors on cash basis‖ in contravention of the
provisions of Section 145 of the IT Act, 1961?‖
12. It is true that the term ‗res judicata’ cannot be blindly
applied to the income-tax proceedings as held by the Supreme Court
in the case of Parashuram Pottery Works Ltd., Vs. Income Tax
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Officer, reported in (1977) 106 ITR 1 (SC), but at the same time, in
the absence of challenge to the fundamental aspect permeated
through different assessment years, no attempt could be made to alter
the position in the subsequent year. That apart, the Punjab & Haryana
High Court elaborately dealt with this aspect, which got the assent
from the Supreme Court as well. Thus, in the considered opinion of
this Court, the order of the Tribunal is wholly justified, as we do not
find any infirmity or irregularity in the order.
13. In the result, ITA No.2/2024 is dismissed as devoid of merits.
No costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(S.Vaidyanathan)
Chief Justice
PRE-DELIVERY JUDGMENT IN
ITA No.2/2024
LAMPHRANG KHARCHANDY
Date: 2024.07.08 18:10:07 IST
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