The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
37. We would consequently answer the questions posed for our consideration in the negative and against the appellants. The appeals shall stand dismissed.
6. The other issue which is involved in ITA 274/2026 is as to whether the proportionate foreign travel expenses which the AO had disallowed has been justifiably allowed by the Tribunal.
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$~44 to 47 and 67
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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ITA 273/2026 CM APPL. 20820/2026
ITA 274/2026 CM APPL. 20824/2026
ITA 275/2026 CM APPL. 20829/2026
ITA 276/2026 CM APPL. 20830/2026
ITA 285/2026 CM APPL. 21113/2026
PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX 12
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Indruj Singh Rai, SSC, Mr.
Sanjeev Menon and Mr. Rahul Singh,
JSCs and Mr. Gaurav Kumar, Adv.
versus
M/S REMFRY AND SAGAR & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Aditya Vohra and Mr. Tanmay
Dhakras, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD KUMAR
%
1.
ORDER
02.04.2026
The primary issue in all these appeals is as to whether the amount of
goodwill which the respondent-firm had paid to a company M/s Remfry and
Sagar Consultants Private Limited, is an expenditure allowable under
Section 37 of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
2.
Mr. Indruj Singh Rai, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the
appellant-Income Tax Department argued that any payment made to a
person other than the member of the profession is barred by law under the
Bar Counsel of India Rules and the Advocate Act, 1961. Because such
payment amounts to sharing of the profits and hence it cannot be considered
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an expense or even if taken to be an expense, it is an illegal expense.
3.
Mr. Aditya Vohra, learned counsel for the assessee at the outset
submitted that this very issue has been decided against the Department by a
coordinate Bench of this Court vide a judgment dated 31.01.2025 titled as
PCIT v. M/s Remfry & Sagar in ITA 199/2017, NC: 2025:DHC:563-DB
and other connected matters for the Assessment Years (AYs) 2009-10 and
2011-12. He added that for more than sixteen years (since AY 2003-04
onwards), such practice is being uniformly followed by the respondent-firm
and the same has either been accepted by the Assessing officer (AO) or has
been affirmed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to
as ‘the Tribunal’).
4.
Heard.
5.
The relevant part of the judgments dated 31.01.2025 in Remfry &
Sagar (Supra) is reproduced hereinfra :
26. We at the outset note that the disallowance which is
contemplated under Section 37 is expenditure incurred for
any purpose which is an offense or a purpose prohibited by
law. It is thus manifest that it is principally the purpose for
which the expenditure is incurred which would be decisive of
whether it is liable to be disallowed. Regard must also be had
to the fact that the expression “prohibited by law” is coupled
to the commission of an offense. It is, therefore, apparent that
the expenditure which the provision intends to be ignored
and disallowed is that which may be expended for
commission of an offense or like motive. We would, therefore,
have to consider whether consideration parted for use of
goodwill would fall within the scope of that expression as
well as whether the asserted violation of the Bar Council of
India Rules would have justified the disallowance.
27. We at the outset note that it is not the case of the
appellants that an offense, as generally understood, was
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committed. According to them, a violation of the Bar Council
of India rules amounted to the respondent acting in violation
of a statutory prohibition and thus the expenditure liable to
be disallowed.
28. We find ourselves unable to sustain that contention since,
in our considered opinion, it is the principal purpose test
which would be determinative of whether the expenditure
was one which could have been disallowed. As noticed in the
previous parts of this judgment, while examining the reach of
the Explanation to Section 37, it would have to be found as a
matter of fact that the expenditure was incurred for the
commission of an offense as known in law or for a purpose
prohibited. A breach of the Bar Council of India Rules is
admittedly not classified as an offense. That then leaves us to
examine whether the purpose underlying the expenditure was
for a purpose prohibited by law.
29. As was rightly contended by Mr. Vohra, the primary, nay,
sole purpose for incurring expenditure towards license fee
was to use the words “Remfry & Sagar” and derive benefit of
the goodwill attached to it. The appellant do not dispute that
Dr. Sagar had validly acquired the goodwill and that the
same constituted a valuable asset which was transferable.
The execution of the gift deed is also not questioned. What
the appellant seeks to contend is that the gift to RSCPL was a
ruse.
30. We at the outset note that the validity of the gift deed was
clearly an unwarranted digression since the primary question
which arose for consideration was the validity of the
expenditure incurred. The solitary transaction which arose
for scrutiny was the payment of license fee. We fail to
appreciate how the appellants could have meandered down
the path of questioning the validity of the gift or doubting the
motive, purpose and intent underlying the same. Whether the
same was a measure adopted for the purpose of monetising
the goodwill or a part of legacy planning were clearly not
issues germane to the question whether the expenditure was
liable to be disallowed. We, in this regard, also bear in
consideration the undisputed fact that four unrelated parties
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joined the partnership and unanimously decided to make use
of the goodwill and the name of the firm which had earned a
considerable reputation. The appellants thus, and in our
considered opinion, clearly committed an error in seeking to
question the motive underlying the gift made by Dr. Sagar.
31. We then revert to the fundamental issue of whether the
payment of license fee could be regarded as an expenditure
incurred for a purpose prohibited by law. A payment made
for use of goodwill cannot possibly be viewed as being an
illegal purpose or one prohibited by law. A person would be
obliged to part with consideration for the use of goodwill if it
seeks to derive benefit and advantage therefrom.
Undisputedly, Remfry & Sagar had acquired a reputation
and goodwill in the field of legal services. What the
respondent assessee thus sought to do was to derive
advantage and benefit of association as also the use of a
name which carried a reputation in the legal arena. The
agreement to utilise and derive benefits of goodwill cannot
therefore be viewed as a ruse or one aimed at tax avoidance.
32. We have already found that it was permissible for Dr.
Sagar to monetise the goodwill acquired and earned. The
goodwill thus represented an asset held by Dr. Sagar and
which could have been validly gifted to his children. It was
the resultant firm which sought to derive benefit from the
goodwill attached to that name. The consideration paid for
the use of the same, thus, can neither be said to be for an
unlawful purpose or one motivated by the intent to overcome
a prohibition raised by law.
33. Insofar as the Bar Council of India Rules are concerned,
they are concerned with a sharing of revenue and fee. What
those rules proscribe is the sharing of remuneration earned
by a firm of lawyers with one who is not a member of the
legal profession. The use of the word “sharing” in that Rule
is clearly intended to deal with a situation where a lawyer
intends to part with or enter into an arrangement with
another to claim a part or portion of the fee that may be
earned. What the said Rule envisages is an arrangement
where a lawyer agrees to share the fee earned from a
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practise with someone who is not a lawyer. It prohibits a
split, divide, dividend or equity in the revenue that may be
generated by a law practise.
34. However in the facts of the present case, we find that the
reference to a percentage of the revenue earned by the law
practise was intended to principally provide for a basis to
compute the consideration liable to be paid for use of
goodwill and the utilisation of the name. The primary
purpose of referring to the total billing of the law firm was to
provide a firm, definite and fixed basis to compute the
consideration liable to be paid for use of goodwill. The
consideration so paid is thus clearly not liable to be
characterised as a sharing of revenue derived from the
practise but fundamentally for the exercise of the right to
exploit and derive advantage from goodwill.
35. The linking of the consideration for the aforesaid purpose
to the revenue earned by the firm only constituted a basis and
a measure to determine the consideration that was to be paid.
The arrangement was clearly not driven by a motive to share
revenues earned by the legal firm. It was purely
consideration paid for use of the goodwill attached to the
name “Remfry & Sagar”. We thus find ourselves unable to
accept the argument of the appellant that the Bar Council of
India Rules were violated.
36. The sheet anchor of the submissions advanced by Mr. Rai
was the judgment of the Supreme Court in Apex Laboratories
and where the “freebies” provided to legal practitioners was
found to be an expenditure incurred for a purpose prohibited
by law. In our considered opinion, the reliance placed on
Apex Laboratories is clearly misplaced since the said
judgment turned upon Regulation 6.8 of the Indian Medical
Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics)
Regulations, 2002 and which clearly prohibited a medical
practitioner from receiving gifts, travel expenses, hospitality
as well as cash or other monetary grants. It was that
prohibition in law which was found to have been violated. In
view of all of the above, we find ourselves unconvinced of the
challenge that stands raised in these appeals.
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37. We would consequently answer the questions posed for
our consideration in the negative and against the appellants.
The appeals shall stand dismissed.
6.
The other issue which is involved in ITA 274/2026 is as to whether
the proportionate foreign travel expenses which the AO had disallowed has
been justifiably allowed by the Tribunal.
7.
So far as the question relating to disallowance of proportionate
foreign travel expenses is concerned, the same is essentially based on
appreciation of evidence and amount to finding of facts, the same hardly
gives rise to any question of law, much less substantial question of law.
8.
With regard to the first issue, maybe there is a scope of argument, but
since the same has been decided against the Department by a judgment of
this Court dated 31.01.2025 in ITA 199/2017, we follow the same in order
to maintain the consistency.
9.
All these appeals, therefore, fail.
DINESH MEHTA, J
VINOD KUMAR, J
APRIL 2, 2026/ss
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