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2025:MLHC:1090
Serial No.01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Date of Hearing :26.09.2025
CRP No.7 of 2025
Date of Decision:14.11.2025
____________________________________________________________
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd.
A Government of IndiaUndertaking,
having registered Office at B-9,
Qutab Institutional Area, Katwaria
Sarai, New Delhi, 110016 and
Regional Headquarter at Lapalang,
Dongtieh, Lower Nongrah, Shillong,
East Khasi HillsDistrict, Meghalaya –
793006.
Represented by Shri. Ashim Kumar
Paul, S/o Shri Ahindra Kumar Paul,
Aged about 41 years, Deputy
General Manager, Power Grid
Corporation of India Limited.
R/o Quaillong Quarter No.C4,
Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd.,
Lapalang, East Khasi Hills District,
Meghalaya.
…..PETITIONER.
-VERSUS-
M/s Mega Electricals having registered office at
Raj apartment, 3 J.B. Road, Silpukhri,
Guwahati, Assam-781003.
…..RESPONDENT
2025:MLHC:1090
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice B. Bhattacharjee, Judge
Appearance:
For the Petitioners/Appellant(s) : Mr. A. Kumar, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. N. Khera, Adv.
Ms. A. Syiem, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
: Mr. V. K. Jindal, Sr. Adv.with
Mr. S. Goenka, Adv.
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
The order dated 05-02-2025 passed in Commercial Arbitration
Execution No. 2/2024 by the Judge, Commercial Court, Shillong
is called in question by the petitioner in this revision petition. By
the order dated 05-02-2025, the learned Commercial Court
rejected the objection filed by the petitioner/award debtor to the
calculation sheet submitted by the respondent/award holder in the
executing proceeding.
1.
On 01-03-2012, the respondent was awarded a contract by
the petitioner under Agreement No.NESH/CSM/O&M/1500145/CA/3325 for work of construction of Pile Foundation at
location 42 of 400KV D/C Ranganadi Balipara Line. Due to the
existing dispute between the parties, the matter was referred to
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arbitration and an Arbitral Tribunal was constituted. The Arbitral
Tribunal after thorough adjudication passed an award on 30-122016 in favour of the respondent. The petitioner challenged the
award by preferring an application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which was dismissed vide
judgment dated 22-12-2023 passed in Commercial Arbitration
Case No.14 of 2018. The petitioner made no further challenge to
the said arbitral award by preferring any appeal under Section 37
of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Thereafter, the
respondent instituted Commercial Arbitration Execution No.
2/2024 for execution of the arbitral award dated 30-12-2016
before the Judge, Commercial Court, Shillong (hereinafter
referred
to
as
the
Executing
Court)
to
recover
Rs.
3,87,46,270.18/- (rupees three crores eighty-seven lakhs forty-six
thousand two hundred seventy and eighteen paise) as on 29-022024 plus daily interest of Rs. 9171.68 till the date of payment.
The petitioner deposited a sum of Rs. 2,98,94,010 on 16-07-2024
by a demand draft which was handed over to the respondent. The
petitioner also filed objection to the calculation made by the
respondent and submitted a separate calculation sheet. According
to the petitioner, the total amount payable by the petitioner as on
16-07-2024 was Rs. 2,98,94,010 and after the deposit of the
demand draft, the arbitral award stood satisfied. The Executing
Court after hearing the parties, by impugned order dated 05-02Page 3 of 16
2025:MLHC:1090
2025 rejected the objection filed by the petitioner and directed for
payment of the remaining amount within a period of one month.
Being aggrieved, the petitioner has preferred this revision petition
before this Court.
2.
Assailing the impugned order, Mr. A. Kumar, learned
Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. N. Khera, learned Counsel
appearing for the petitioner submits that the learned Executing
Court has travelled beyond its jurisdiction by granting interest on
a sum distinct from what has been awarded by the Arbitral
Tribunal. He submits that the Arbitral Tribunal in the award
dated 30-10-2016 specifically directed that simple interest be paid
on the awarded amounts of Rs.1,26,55,793/- and Rs.5,32,096/w.e.f. 05-07-2013 and 21-03-2015 respectively till the date of
payment, but the Executing Court has effectively modified the
award and converted simple interest into compound interest by
accepting the method of calculation of the respondent. Relying
on the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarup Singh v. Union of
India, (2011) 11 SCC 198 and in Meenakshi Sxena v. ECGC Ltd.,
(2018) 7 SCC 479, he submits that the Executing Court is bound
by the arbitral award and has no power to modify or interpret it.
He further submits that the Executing Court while passing the
impugned order failed to appreciate the fact that the Arbitral
Tribunal granted pre-award and post-award interest only on the
specific sum and not on any aggregate amount and thereby came
2025:MLHC:1090
to a wrong conclusion. The learned Senior Counsel contends that
the Executing Court wrongly applied the proposition of the
decision of Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015)
2 SCC 189 regarding the interpretation of ‘sum’ as the pre-award
interest would not necessarily become part of the principal
amount for the purpose of calculating post-award interest. He
submits that in the absence of any specific direction in the arbitral
award, the sum awarded could not have been interpreted to
include pre-award interest by the Execution Court. This aspect of
the matter, according to him, stands clarified by the judgement of
the Apex Court in Morgan Securities and Credits Private Limited
v. Videocon Industries Limited, (2023) 1 SCC 602 wherein it was
held that the arbitrator has the discretion to award post-award
interest on a part of the sum. Further, by placing reliance on the
decision of D. Khosla and Company v. Union of India, (2024) 9
SCC 476, the learned Senior Counsel submits that when the
amount awarded refers to the principal amount, the Executing
Court could not have considered the awarded amount to mean a
distinct amount for calculating post-award interest as the award
nowhere specifically contemplate for awarding interest on the
aggregate of principal amount and interest for pre-award period;
there cannot be two distinct amounts for calculating interest.
3.
It is next contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the
Executing Court erred in allowing the respondent to charge
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interest on the entire portion of the principal amount by ignoring
the fact that the petitioner has made deposit of 25% of the
awarded amount in pursuance of the order dated 20-05-2019 in
Commercial Arbitration Case No. 14 of 2018 which was
withdrawn by the respondent.
He submits that when simple
interest is awarded, such interest ought to accrue exclusively on
the unpaid portion of the principal amount, interest must
necessarily cease to accrue on the satisfied principal portion. In
support of the contention, he places reliance on the decision of
Nepa Limited v. Manoj Kumar Agarwal, (2023) 17 SCC 659. The
learned Senior Counsel submits that the arbitral award did not
contemplate nor directed payment of post award interest on
aggregate of awarded amount and pre-award interest and by
accepting the calculation sheet of the respondent, the Executing
Court has granted what has not been awarded by the Arbitral
Tribunal. He further submits that the respondent has not disputed
that the Arbitral Tribunal has granted interest for the pre-award
and post award period only on the principal amount and that the
arbitrator has discretion to grant post award interest on part sum
also. He, therefore, submits that the impugned order dated 05-022025 cannot be sustained in law and is liable to be set aside and
quashed.
4.
Mr. V. K. Jindal, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. S.
Goenka, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, on the
2025:MLHC:1090
other hand, submits that the Executing Court has not exceeded its
jurisdiction by granting interest on a sum distinct from what has
been awarded by the Arbitral Tribunal.
He submits that the
Executing Court has not modified the Arbitral Award by granting
post award interest on a sum of Rs. 1,86,02,067.42/-.
By
referring to the calculation sheets submitted by the petitioner and
the respondent, he submits there is no dispute between the parties
as regard the quantum of the award amount as on the date of
award i.e. 30-12-2016.
He contends that the term ‘amount
awarded’ or ‘sum awarded’ means the aggregate of the principal
and the interest, if so awarded.
To elaborate further, the learned
Senior Counsel submits that the decision of State of Haryana &
Ors. Vs. S.L. Arora & Company, (2010) 3 SCC 690 which held
that a sum directed to be paid by an arbitral award refers only to
the award of sums on substantive claims and that in absence of
any provision for interest upon interest in the contract, Arbitral
Tribunal is not empowered to award interest upon interest or
compound interest, has been overruled in the Hyder Consulting
(supra) case wherein it was held that under Section 31(7)(a) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Arbitral Tribunal is
empowered to include pre-award interest in sum for which award
is made. Once so included, pre-award interest loses its character
of interest and becomes part and parcel of sum awarded. Hence,
sum for the purpose of Section 31(7)(b) comprises principal
2025:MLHC:1090
amount and such pre-award interest, as Arbitral Tribunal may
award. He submits that the Apex Court in UHL Power Company
Limited Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2022) 4 SCC 116 has
reaffirmed the proposition laid down in Hyder Consulting
(supra). The learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submits that the
word ‘amount awarded’ shall mean the aggregate of the principal
amount and the interest accrued thereon and the interest
component loses his characteristics and becomes part of ‘amount
awarded’. Thus, it is submitted that the Executing Court did not
commit any illegality or irregularity in passing the impugned
order dated 05-02-2025.
5.
The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent further
submits that the cases of Morgan Securities (supra), D. Khosla
(supra) and Manoj Kumar Agarwal relied on behalf of the
petitioner have no application in the instant case as the facts and
situation involved in those cases were entirely different. It is also
submitted that the deposit of 25% of the principal amount will not
absolve the petitioner from paying interest on the entire part of the
awarded amount as the deposit was a conditional deposit made
pursuant to the passing of the interim order for the purpose of
obtaining stay of the award. He submits that the petitioner in their
calculation sheet has not included the interest for the period of 0507-2013 to 20-05-2019 on the amount of Rs. 32,96,972/- (25% of
the awarded amount) which the petitioner is legally bound to pay.
2025:MLHC:1090
He submits that since the post-award interest is mandate of law,
the same cannot be curtailed by the petitioner and the objection of
the petitioner in this regard has been dealt with by the Executing
Court adequately and found to be not legally sustainable. The
learned Senior Counsel, therefore, submits that there is no error in
the passing of the impugned order dated 05-02-2025 and the same
requires no interference by this Court.
6.
Having heard the learned Senior counsels for the parties, it
appears that the main controversy involved in the matter is with
regard to the question as to whether the interest awarded in the
arbitral award dated 30-10-2016 for the pre-award period shall
merge with the principal amount for the purpose of calculation of
post-award interest. The law in this regard has been explained in
Hyder Consulting (supra) case wherein it was held: “13. Thus, it is apparent that vide clause (a) of subsection (7) of Section 31 of the Act, Parliament intended that
an award for payment of money may be inclusive of interest,
and the “sum” of the principal amount plus interest may be
directed to be paid by the Arbitral Tribunal for the pre-award
period. Thereupon, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct interest to
be paid on such “sum” for the post-award period vide clause
(b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 of the act, at which stage
the amount would be the sum arrived at after the merging of
interest with the principal; the two components having lost
their separate identities.”
2025:MLHC:1090
7.
The propositions laid down in Hyder Consulting (supra)
was reaffirmed by the Apex Court in UHL Power Company
Limited (supra).
8.
Further, the Apex Court in Morgan Securities (supra) case,
after extensive analysis of the decision of Hyder Consulting
(supra), came to a finding that the arbitrator has the discretion to
award post-award interest on a part of the sum. The relevant
paragraphs are extracted below: “25. Section 31 (7)(a) confers a wide discretion upon the
arbitrator in regard to the grant of pre-award interest. The
arbitrator has the discretion to determine the rate of
reasonable interest, the sum on which the interest is to be paid,
that is whether on the whole or any part of the principal
amount, and the period for which the payment of interest is to
be made – whether it should be for the whole or any part if the
period between the date on which the cause of action arose
and the date of the award. When a discretion has been
conferred on the arbitrator in regard to the grant of pre-award
interest, it would be against the grain of statutory
interpretation to presuppose that the legislative intent was to
reduce the discretionary power of the arbitrator for the grant
of post-award interest under clause (b). Clause (b) only
contemplates a situation where the arbitration award is silent
on post-award interest, in which event the award holder is
entitled to a post-award interest of eighteen per cent.
26. The arbitrator has the discretion to grant post-award
interest. Clause (b) does not fetter the discretion of the
2025:MLHC:1090
arbitrator to grant post-award interest. It only contemplates a
situation in which the discretion is not exercised by the
arbitrator. Therefore, the observations in Hyder Consulting on
the meaning of “sum” will not restrict the discretion of the
arbitrator to grant post-award interest. There is nothing in the
provision which restricts the discretion of the arbitrator for
grant of post-award interest which the arbitrator otherwise
holds inherent to their authority.
28.5. Section 31 (7) (b) does not fetter or restrict the discretion
that the arbitrator holds in granting post-award interest. The
arbitrator has the discretion to award post-award interest on a
part of the sum.”
9.
It follows from the above that the Arbitral Tribunal has the
discretion within overall framework of section 31(7) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, to provide interest till the
date of payment. Once such discretion is exercised by the Arbitral
Tribunal in granting interest, question of additional or compound
interest under clause (b) of sub-section (7) of Section 31 would
not arise. The principle of Hyder Consulting (supra) would apply
when the Arbitral Tribunal leaves a matter unqualified or silent.
In an arbitral award, the phrase “part of the sum” refers to a
specific portion of the total monetary amount awarded by the
Arbitral Tribunal. This phrase is primarily used when an arbitrator
grants pre-award interest and post-award interest. The Arbitral
Tribunal has discretion to award interest on the whole amount or
2025:MLHC:1090
on a part of it. Pre-award interest, once awarded, typically merges
with the principal amount for post-award interest unless the award
specifies otherwise.
10. Thus, it becomes necessary for this Court to analyze the
arbitral award dated 30-10-2016 insofar as it relates to award of
interest for pre-award and post-award period. The operative part
of the award reads as follows: “……. hereby unanimously award a sum of
Rs.1,31,87,889.00 (Rupees one crore thirty-one lakh eighty-seven
thousand eight hundred and eight nine only) in favour of the
Claimants and direct that the Respondents shall pay the same to
the Claimants in full and final settlement of all the disputes and
claims brought before us for adjudication under the present
reference. We also award and direct that the Respondents shall
pay simple interest @12% per annum on the awarded amount of
Rs.1,26,55,793.00 (Rupees one crore twenty-six lakh fifty-five
thousand seven hundred and ninety-three only) against Claim
No.1,2,3,4,5&6 and on the awarded amount of Rs. 5,32,096.00
against the Claim No.7 from 05-01-2013 and from 21-03-2015
respectively being the dates of submission of SOC for Claim No.16 and Claim No.7 till the date of payment of the awarded amount
by the Respondent to the Claimants within 90 (ninety) days of the
receipt of this award. This rate of simple interest @ 12% p.a.,
would however increase @2% p.a. (subject to a maximum of
overall simple interest of 18% p.a.) for every quarter of delay, if
any, made by the Respondent in releasing payment of the awarded
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amount beyond this stipulated period of 90 days mentioned
above.”
11.
A careful perusal of the operative part of the award makes
it clear that the Arbitral Tribunal had not granted compound
interest rather awarded composite interest i.e. simple interest per
annum effective from the dates mentioned in the award till the
date of payment. Although, the Arbitral Tribunal had granted
interest for pre-award and post-award period, the interest was not
dissected into two parts, one for the pre-award period and the
other for the post-award period. The arbitral award specifically
stipulated that simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the
awarded amount should be paid within 90 days of the receipt of
the award and on failure to do so, the rate of simple interest would
increase at the rate of 2% per annum subject to a maximum
overall simple interest of 18% per annum for every quarter of
delay. There is no stipulation made in the award that in case the
total amount of award together with interest for the pre-award
period was not paid within 90 days of the receipt of the award,
future interest should be paid on the total sum due to the claimant
from the date of award upto the actual date of payment. In other
words, there is no indication of grant of any interest upon interest
or compound interest on the principal amount awarded by the
Arbitral Tribunal. The respondent did not challenge this aspect of
the award. The award has since attained finality and now it is not
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open to the respondent to claim either compound interest or postaward interest on the aggregate of the principal amount and preaward interest by applying general principle of law. Therefore, the
calculation sheet of the respondent was not prepared strictly in
accordance with the terms set out in the arbitral award and the
Executing Court was not correct in passing the impugned order by
accepting the calculation.
12.
Coming next to the question as to whether the respondent
is entitled to charge interest on the entire portion of the principal
amount even after deposit of 25% of the awarded amount, it
transpires that pursuant to the order dated 20-05-2019 the
petitioner had deposited an amount of Rs.32,96,972/- on 27-082019 being the 25% of the awarded amount which was withdrawn
by the respondent. The said withdrawal was allowed to be made
only on the stipulation that the withdrawal would be subject to the
outcome of the main case. The Apex Court in Manoj Kumar
Agarwal (supra) while dealing with the issue of liability of
payment of interest on decretal amount in case of partial deposit
and withdrawal of the decretal amount upon stay being granted by
Appellate Court of decree/award, held that there can be no
liability to pay interest on the amount that stands paid/withdrawn.
It was further held that interest is payable only on amount that is
not paid and it will be incongruous to hold that person would be
liable to pay interest even in respect of amount which has been
2025:MLHC:1090
paid and handed over to decree holder. Therefore, the claim of the
respondent with regard to interest on the entire principal amount
after 27-08-2019 is not valid in the eye of law. Such interest ought
to accrue exclusively on the unpaid portion of the principal
amount. Thus, the finding recorded by the Executing Court in this
regard on the basis of the calculation of the respondent cannot
stand scrutiny of law and is liable to be interfered with.
13.
In so far as the calculation sheet submitted by the petitioner
is concerned, it transpires that the interest payable on the amount
of Rs.32,96,972/- (25% of the awarded amount) was excluded for
the period for which the respondent is otherwise entitled to in
terms of the arbitral award dated 30-10-2016. The said calculation
appears to be not in accordance with the stipulation made in the
arbitral award as the respondent is entitled to receive interest on
the entire principal amount till 27-08-2019 i.e. the date on which
the aforesaid amount was deposited. The petitioner is under
obligation to pay interest on the entire principal amount till 27-082019 and can claim no interest liability only on the satisfied
portion of the principal amount with effect from 27-08-2019.
Hence, the calculation sheet of the petitioner also cannot be
accepted.
14.
For what has been discussed above, the impugned order
dated 05-02-2025 cannot be sustained in law and is hereby set
aside. The matter is remitted back to the Executing Court for
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reconsideration of the issue of interest under the arbitral award
dated 30-10-2016. The parties are directed to file their respective
calculation sheets afresh before the Executing Court in the light of
the observations made herein above. The learned Executing
Court, thereafter, shall proceed to dispose of the execution
proceeding in accordance with law.
15.
The revision petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid
terms.
Judge
Meghalaya.
14.11.2025
“Shrity,PS”
CH MOMIN
Date: 2025.11.14 12:33:44 IST
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