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2026:HHC:28020
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
RSA No. 04 of 2025
Date of decision: 03.07.2026.
Poonam
...Appellant.
Versus
Sagli Ram & another
...Respondents.
Coram:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
For the appellant
For the respondents
:
Mr. T.S. Chauhan, Sr. Advocate
with
Mr.
Surya
Chauhan,
Advocate.
:
Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Advocate, for
respondent No.1.
Mr. Ashwani Kaundal, Advocate,
for respondent No.2.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral):
The instant appeal arises out of judgment and
decree, as passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II,
Una, District Una, H.P. dated 31.05.2024, whereby the appeal
as filed by the appellant/defendant No.2 came to be dismissed
and the judgment and decree, as passed by the learned Civil
Judge, Court No. (III), Una, District Una, H.P. dated 07.09.2022
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the
judgment?
-2was affirmed whereby, the suit as filed by the plaintiff for
specific performance of contract was decreed.
2.
The facts as emerge in the present case are that
the plaintiff filed a suit for possession through specific
performance of contract for execution and registration of sale
deed of land measuring 00-07-20 hectares being ½ share out of
land measuring 00-14-40 hectares, comprised in Khewat No.
434, Khatauni No. 497, Khasra No. 379, as entered in
jamabandi for the year 2008-09, situated in Mohal Jhalera,
Tehsil and District Una, H.P. on the basis of agreement to sell
dated 17.08.2009 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of the
plaintiff.
3.
As per the case, as set up by the plaintiff, defendant
No.1 being owner in possession of land measuring 00-07-20
hectares, being ½ share out of land measuring 00-14-40
hectares comprised in Khewat No. 434, Khatauni No. 497,
Khasra No. 379, as entered in jamabandi for the year 2008-09,
situated in Mohal Jhalera, Tehsil and District Una, H.P.
entered into a written agreement to sell the suit land with the
plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs. 67,500/-.
Defendant No.1 also executed a registered General Power of
Attorney dated 17.08.2009, in favour of the plaintiff on the
-3same day regarding the suit land. The agreement to sell as well
as power of attorney was written by one Dinesh Kumar at the
instance and in the presence of defendant No.1 as well as
plaintiff, which was duly read over and explained to her in local
vernacular dialect and after admitting the same to be true and
correct, defendant No.1 had put her right thumb impression on
the agreement and power of attorney and also in the register of
deed writer.
Thereafter plaintiff also appended his signatures
on the agreement to sell as well as power of attorney and
thereafter the marginal witnesses signed the same. As per case
of the plaintiff, it was agreed that defendant No.1 will not cancel
the GPA in any manner and in case she refused to execute the
sale deed in favour of the plaintiff as per agreement, in that
event, the plaintiff shall have every right to enforce the
agreement through the Court.
4.
As per plaintiff, after the execution of the agreement,
he had been requesting defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed
in his favour, however, defendant No. I had been putting off the
request of the plaintiff either on one pretext or the other.
Thereafter, the plaintiff was constrained to serve a legal notice
upon defendant No.1 dated 16.08.2012, requesting her to pay
obeisance to the agreement in question and to perform her part
-4of contract. As per case of the plaintiff, he collected the latest
revenue record of the suit land from village Patwari. However,
the plaintiff got stunned to find out that the suit land had
already been alienated by defendant No. 1 in favour of
defendant No. 2 through registered sale deed dated 05.06.2012
and mutation No. 556 had also been sanctioned in the revenue
record in his favour.
It is the case of the plaintiff that the
alleged sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of
defendant No.2 as well as subsequent revenue entries are
collusive, without consideration being a sham-transaction,
illegal, unwarranted, null and void, ineffective having no
adverse effect upon the rights of plaintiff qua the suit land.
5.
As per plaintiff, he was always ready and willing to
perform his part of agreement and to bear the costs of
registration of sale deed. However, on coming to know about
the alleged sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of
defendant No. 2, the plaintiff approached them to get cancel the
said sale deed and further to admit his claim but the
defendants did not give any weight to the request of the
plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff requested defendant No. 2 not to
pose unwarranted threats of further alienation of the suit land
to some other person but defendant No. 2 refused to do so.
-5Therefore, it was prayed that a decree for possession through
specific performance of contract and execution of registered sale
deed of land measuring 00-07-20 hectares being ½ share out of
land measuring 00-14-40 hectares, comprised in Khewat No.
434, Khatauni No. 497, bearing Khasra No. 379, as entered in
Jamabandi for the year 2008-09, situated in Mahal Jhalera,
Tehsil Una, Distt Una, H.P. on the basis of agreement to sell
dated 17-08-2009 executed by the defendant No. 1 in favour of
the plaintiff be passed in his favour and against the defendants.
6.
The plaintiff also prayed the consequential relief for
passing of the decree for declaration to the effect that the sale
deed dated 05.06.2012 executed by defendant No. 1 in favour of
defendant No. 2 as well as sanctioning of mutation No. 556 and
subsequent revenue entries qua the suit land in the name
defendant No. 2 being illegal, null and void, ineffective and not
binding on the rights of the plaintiff. Further, decree for
permanent injunction was also sought restraining defendant
No. 2 from interfering in any manner, taking possession forcibly
by ousting the plaintiff, alienating in any manner the suit land
to any third person or encumbering the suit land or changing
the existing nature and character by way of raising any sort of
construction over the suit land in any other manner. In
-6alternative, decree for recovery of Rs. 67,500/- alongwith
interest @ 24% per annum was sought against the defendants
by way of damages and costs.
7.
The suit came to be resisted by the defendants.
Defendant No.1 resisted the suit by raising various preliminary
objections with respect to cause of action, estoppel and
limitation etc.
On merits, para-2 of the plaint was partly
admitted. It was stated that in the first week of August 2009
defendant No.1, who is an illiterate, poor and pardanashi lady,
was in need of money for family function and for that purpose
she requested the plaintiff to arrange a loan amount for her
from somewhere and the plaintiff assured her to do so very
shortly. After about two weeks, the plaintiff came to the house
of the defendant No.1 at about 11:30 am and asked her to
accompany him to Tehsil Office Una for preparation of
documents for taking the loan and accordingly the defendant
No.1 accompanied him to Tehsil Office Una, where the plaintiff
got some papers prepared from the deed writer and on his
asking, the defendant No.1 appended her thumb impressions
on 8 to 10 papers, stamp papers and 2-3 registers. Thereafter
the plaintiff took her in one room where her photographs were
taken along with plaintiff and two other persons, one of them is
-7resident of village Jhalera Tehsil and District Una and
thereafter she was asked to append her finger prints on a
paper. The defendant No.1 appended her thumb impressions
in good faith and belief. However, the same was done at the
instance of plaintiff and her co-villager Surjit Singh under the
belief and impression that these documents are being prepared
for grant of loan. It is the case of defendant No.1 that in April
2012, the plaintiff came to her house and demanded the loan
amount for depositing the same in the bank under the pretext
that he is her surety for the loan and that she has not returned
the same till date.
Defendant No.1 promised to arrange the
amount within two months and accordingly she sold the suit
land to defendant No.2 vide registered sale deed on 05.06.2012
and out of the sale consideration, she paid Rs. 65,000/- to the
plaintiff being principal and interest amount. It was stated that
no question of execution of the agreement to sell or power of
attorney arises as the said documents are wrong, false and
incorrect and are result of fraud and misrepresentation.
8.
Defendant No.1 refuted the averments as made in
the plaint and prayed for dismissal of the suit as filed by the
plaintiff.
He stated that defendant No.1 being the absolute
owner of the suit land was fully competent to execute the sale
-8deed in favour of defendant No.2 and the plaintiff is estopped
by his act and conduct to file the suit.
9.
Defendant No.2 filed her separate written statement
by denying all the averments as made in the plaint.
It was
stated that she is bonafide purchaser of the suit land and she
was not aware about any agreement purported to have been
executed between the plaintiff and defendant No.1.
After the
purchase, the possession of the suit land had been delivered to
defendant No.2 and thereafter she became the owner of the suit
land. Therefore, it was prayed that being a bonafide purchaser
the suit as instituted by the plaintiff is liable to be rejected.
10.
The learned trial Court on 13.12.2013, framed the
issues in the following manner:“1.
Whether the plaintiff and defendant No.1
entered into agreement to sell dated
17.08.2009?
OPP
2.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled for
possession through specific performance
of
the
agreement
to
sell
dated
17.08.2009, as prayed for? OPP
3.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled for
consequential relief of declaration, as
prayed for?
OPP
4.
Whether the plaintiff is entitled for
permanent injunction against defendant
No.2, as prayed for?
OPP
-9-
11.
5.
Whether in the alternative plaintiff is
entitled for recovery of Rs.67,500/- along
with interest @ 24% per annum as well as
damages and cost of litigation, as prayed
for?
OPP
6.
Whether the agreement to sell dated
17.08.2019
is
result
of
fraud,
misrepresentation, misleading and having
no binding effect on the rights of the
defendant No.1?
OPD-1
7.
Whether the plaintiff has no cause of
action?
OPD-1
8.
Whether the plaintiff is estopped by his
own act and conduct?
OPD-1
9.
Whether the plaintiff has concealed
material facts, as alleged? OPD-1
10.
Whether defendant Non.2 is bonafide
purchaser?
OPD-2
11.
Relief?
The learned trial Court directed the respective
parties to adduce evidence in support of their contentions and
vide its judgment and decree dated 07.09.2022 decreed the suit
as filed by the plaintiff by passing a decree for specific
performance of contract in favour of the plaintiff and against
defendant No.1 for execution and registration of sale deed of
land measuring 00-07-20 hectares being ½ share out of land
measuring 00-14-40 hectares, comprised in Khewat No. 434,
Khatauni No. 497, Khasra No. 379, as entered in jamabandi for
-10the year 2008-09, situated in Mohal Jhalera, Tehsil and District
Una, H.P. on the basis of agreement to sell dated 17.08.2009.
Further, by passing a decree for declaration to the effect that
the sale deed having been executed by defendant No.1 in favour
of defendant No.2 as well as mutation No. 556 and subsequent
revenue entries in the name of defendant No.2 as owner are
illegal, null and void. Further, the learned trial Court passed
decree for permanent injunction, restraining defendant No.2
from interfering in any manner, taking possession forcibly, by
ousting the plaintiff and alienating the suit property in any
manner to any third person.
12.
Feeling dissatisfied, defendant No.2 Poonam filed an
appeal under Section 96 of CPC before the learned Additional
District
Judge-II,
Una
on
12.12.2022
and
the
learned
Additional District Judge-II, Una vide its judgment and decree
dated 31.05.2024 dismissed the appeal as filed by defendant
No.2 and affirmed the findings as returned by the learned trial
Court.
13.
Still
feeling
aggrieved,
defendant
No.2
has
approached this Court by filing the instant regular second
appeal under Section 100 of the CPC.
-1114.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the impugned judgments and decrees as passed
by the learned courts below are erroneous and liable to be
quashed and set aside. He submits that the learned courts
below have not adjudicated the real point of controversy and
have not discussed and appreciated the oral as well as
documentary evidence placed on record by the parties.
He
would submit that after accepting the present appeal, the suit
as filed by the plaintiff deserves to be rejected.
15.
On the other hand, learned counsels for the
defendants have defended the impugned judgments and
decrees as passed by the learned courts below. They submit
that the
learned courts below have
rightly passed the
judgments and decrees and there is no illegality, perversity and
jurisdictional error.
They submit that while invoking the
provisions of Section 100 of the CPC, this Court will not
interfere in the concurrent findings of fact and the present
appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be rejected.
16.
With the consent of the parties, the present appeal
is finally heard on admission stage on the following substantial
question of law:“Whether the judgments and decrees as passed by
the learned courts below are erroneous and liable to
-12be
quashed
and
set
aside
on
account
of
misconstruction and misappreciation of the oral as
well as documentary evidence placed on record?
17.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
have also gone through the record carefully.
18.
Plaintiff approached the learned trial Court for grant
of decree of possession through specific performance of the
contract and for execution of registered sale deed qua the suit
land on the basis of agreement to sell dated 17.08.2009.
Further, decree for declaration was sought that the sale deed
executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2 be
declared as null and void and not binding on the rights of the
plaintiff. It is the case of the plaintiff that defendant No.1 being
owner in possession of the suit land entered into a written
agreement to sell with the plaintiff for a total sale consideration
of Rs. 67,500/-. Defendant No.1 received the entire sale
consideration and she also executed a registered power of
attorney in favour of the plaintiff on the same day i.e.
17.08.2009 and received the full and final amount of the sale
consideration.
19.
In pursuance to agreement to sell, the plaintiff
requested defendant No.1 to execute the sale deed on various
occasions but she failed to accede to the request of the plaintiff.
-13Thereafter, the plaintiff served a legal notice dated 16.08.2012
upon defendant No.1 and requested her to pay obeisance to the
agreement in question and fulfill the terms and conditions of
the agreement to sell and execute sale deed.
The plaintiff
collected the latest revenue record from village Patwari and it is
only then he came to know that the suit land has already been
alienated by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.2,
through registered sale deed dated 05.06.2012 and mutation
No. 556 was also sanctioned on the basis of the sale deed.
Therefore, the plaintiff sought decree of specific performance of
the contract and for registration and execution of the sale deed
as per agreement to sell dated 17.08.2009 as executed by
defendant No. 1 in favour of plaintiff and decree of permanent
prohibitory injunction.
20.
Defendant No.1 filed detailed written statement and
denied all the averments as made in the plaint. As per defence
set up by defendant No.1, it was her case that in the first week
of August 2009, she being an illiterate, poor and pardanashi
lady was in need of money for family function and for that
purpose, she requested the plaintiff, who is their family friend,
to arrange the loan amount for her and the plaintiff assured her
to do so very shortly. After two weeks, the plaintiff came to the
-14house of defendant No.1 and asked her to accompany him to
the Tehsil Office, Una for preparation of documents for taking
loan and accordingly defendant No.1 accompanied him to
Tehsil Office Una, where the plaintiff got some papers prepared
from the deed writer and on the asking of plaintiff, defendant
No.1 appended her thumb impressions on 8 to 10 papers,
stamp papers and two three registers. Thereafter, the plaintiff
took her in one room, where her photographs were taken along
with the plaintiff and two other persons, one of them is resident
of village Jhalera Tehsil and District Una. Thereafter, she was
asked to append her finger prints on papers and she did all this
and appended her thumb impressions in good faith and
bonafide manner.
The plaintiff told defendant No.1 that these
documents have been prepared as per the bank instructions
and
loan
amount
would
be
sanctioned
in
her
favour.
Thereafter, defendant No.1 was made to sit outside the Tehsil
Office for about two hours and the plaintiff came and handed
over Rs. 65,000/- being principal and interest.
21.
In April, 2012, the plaintiff came to the house of
defendant No.1 and demanded the loan amount for depositing
the same in the bank under the pretext that he is her surety for
the loan and that she has not returned the same till date.
-15Therefore, on that account, defendant No.1 promised to arrange
the same within two months and accordingly, she sold the suit
land to defendant No.2 on 05.06.2012 vide registered sale deed
and out of the sale consideration, she paid Rs. 65,000/- to the
plaintiff being principal and interest amount. She denied that
the agreement to sell and power of attorney was executed by
her in favour of the plaintiff. She stated that the documents
are wrong and false and are the result of fraud and
misrepresentation and have no binding effect upon the rights of
the plaintiff.
22.
Defendant No.2 denied the case as set up by the
plaintiff. She submits that she is bonafide purchaser of the suit
land and she was not aware of any such agreement and she is
not bound by the agreement to sell as entered between the
plaintiff and defendant No.1. It was stated by defendant No.2
that in pursuance to the sale deed, the possession of the suit
land has been handed over to her and she became the owner of
the suit land.
23.
In order to substantiate his case, plaintiff examined
PW-1, Dinesh Kumar, who in his deposition has stated that he
was working as deed writer in Tehsil Complex Una.
On
17.08.2009, Ext. PW-1/A was written by him and the same was
-16prepared at the instance of the parties.
After accepting the
same to be correct, the same was duly signed by Sagli Ram
plaintiff and defendant No.1 appended her thumb impression
on the same.
He stated that the same was also duly signed by
all the witnesses.
He stated that Ext. PW-1/B power of
attorney was also executed on the very same day and was
signed by Sagli Ram plaintiff and Poonam, defendant No.1,
appended
her
thumb
impression
on
the
same
after
acknowledging the same to be correct.
24.
PW-2 is the statement of Lakhvinder Singh. He
brought the record pertaining to Ext. PW-1/B.
25.
PW-3 is the statement of Tirath Ram.
In his
deposition he has stated that the agreement to sell Ext. PW-1/A
and GPA Ext. PW-1/B were prepared in his presence and he is
witness to the same.
He stated that Ext. PW-1/A was duly
signed by him in red encircle mark ‘A’ and in Ext. PW-1/B his
signatures are at mark ‘B’.
He stated that Ext. PW-1/A and
Ext. PW-1/B were prepared on the asking of the parties. Sagli
Ram plaintiff appended his signatures on the same and
Poonam appended her thumb impression on the same.
He
stated that he along with another person Surjit Singh also
appended their signatures over the same.
-1726.
PW-4 Surjit Singh in his deposition has stated that
the suit land is owned by defendant No.1.
Since she was in
need of money, she requested PW-4 to get the deal done for
selling of the suit land. He got the deal done for selling the suit
land for a total sale consideration of Rs. 67,500/-.
She had
received the entire sale consideration amount on 17.08.2009
and agreement to sell and power of attorney was executed by
her in favour of the plaintiff.
The deed writer prepared the
documents and the same were duly read over to the parties and
after accepting the same to be correct and after understanding
its contents by the parties, they appended their signatures on
the same and Poonam after admitting the contents of the same
to be correct appended her thumb impression over the same.
In para-3 of his statement, PW-4 has stated that after execution
of agreement to sell, about fifteen days thereafter, Sarvan Singh
and his wife defendant No.2 came to his house and stated that
the land which has been sold by defendant No.1 to Sagli Ram is
adjoining to their land and after asking Sagli Ram the said land
be sold to them. On this, he stated that they may talk to the
plaintiff directly.
In the cross-examination not even a single
suggestion was put to PW-4 by defendant No.2 with respect to
the fact that she along with her husband went to this witness
-18and asked him to sell the land to them. The said deposition of
PW-4
remained
unrebutted
in
the
cross-examination
as
conducted by defendants No. 1 and 2.
27.
PW-5 plaintiff in his statement reiterated all the
averments as made in the plaint. He has stated that defendant
No.1 agreed to sell the suit land to the plaintiff for a total sale
consideration of Rs. 67,500/- and that agreement to sell was
executed inter-se the parties and on the same day, power of
attorney was also executed by defendant No.1 in favour of the
plaintiff.
PW-5 stated that he requested defendant No.1 to
execute the sale deed, however, on one pretext or the other,
defendant No.1 has failed to do the same. Thereafter, the
plaintiff was constrained to issue a legal notice to defendant
No.1 for execution of sale deed but the same was never replied
nor the sale deed was executed in his favour. He stated that he
came to know from the revenue record that defendant No.1 had
fraudulently sold the suit land to defendant No.2.
28.
The learned trial Court passed a decree for specific
performance of agreement in favour of the plaintiff by setting
aside the sale deed which was executed by defendant No.1 in
favour of defendant No.2. Interestingly, defendant No.1 did not
assail the said findings before the learned First Appellate Court
-19and it is only defendant No.2 who had challenged the said
findings before the learned First Appellate Court. Meaning
thereby, defendant No.1 has accepted the judgment and decree
as passed by the learned trial Court and also accepted the
passing of decree for specific performance of contract in favour
of the plaintiff.
In view of the fact that the findings were
accepted by defendant No.1 coupled with the oral as well as
documentary evidence placed on record, the plaintiff has been
able to establish the execution of agreement to sell in his
favour. The deed writer and the witnesses to the agreement to
sell Ext. PW-1/A have categorically stated that the agreement to
sell was duly executed by defendant No.1 in favour of the
plaintiff and she had received the total sale consideration of Rs.
67,500/- from the plaintiff.
29.
The contention has been raised by the learned
counsel for the appellant that the appellant being the bonafide
purchaser, no decree for specific performance could have been
passed against her. The testimony and deposition of PW-4
makes it apparently clear that after execution of the agreement
to sell, thereafter after fifteen days, defendant No.2 along with
her husband went to the house of PW-4 and requested him that
the land which was sold by defendant No.1 to the plaintiff be
-20given to them. On this, PW-4 has stated that they may talk the
plaintiff directly. The statement of PW-4 remained unchallenged
as no suggestion had been put to PW-4 by the counsel of
defendant No.2 with respect to the fact that defendant No.2 and
her husband never went to the house of PW-4. The sum and
substance of the observation is that defendant No.2 was well
aware about the execution of the agreement to sell inter-se the
plaintiff and defendant No.1.
30.
Even otherwise, defendant No.1 in her cross-
examination has stated that she had told to defendant No.2
about the money as given by Sagli Ram which clearly
demonstrates that the fact of execution of agreement to sell was
duly within the knowledge of defendant No.2. Therefore, the
plea which has been taken by defendant No.2 that she is the
bonafide purchaser does not hold good.
Statements of PW-4
and DW-1 falsify the case of defendant No.2.
31.
The provisions of Section 19 (b) of the Specific
Performance Act read as follows:“(b) any other person claiming under him by a title arising
subsequently to the contract, except a transferee for value
who has paid his money in good faith and without notice
of the original contract.”
-2132.
In order to apply Section 19 (b), certain pre-
requisition conditions of the same are that subsequent transfer
must be for consideration and not gratuitous and secondly the
same must be made in good faith without notice to the original
contract. In the present case perusal of written statement as
well as oral evidence clearly shows that defendant No. 2 has
failed to establish, plead and prove that the sale consideration
amount was paid to defendant No.1. Similarly, the admission
as made on the part of PW-4 and defendant No.1 reveals that
defendant No.2 was well aware about the execution of the
agreement to sell in favour of the plaintiff.
Therefore, the
ingredient of Section 19 (b) of the Act has not been made out by
defendant No.2.
33.
As per submission as made by learned counsel for
defendant No.2 that the suit as instituted by the plaintiff
is
time barred on account of the fact that Ext. PW-1/A was
executed between the parties on 17.08.2009 and the legal
notice was issued to defendant No.1 on 16.08.2012 is not
sustainable. From the perusal of Ext. PW1/A, it is clear that
there is no stipulation or time frame was given in the same for
the execution of the sale deed. As per mandate of Section 54 of
the Limitation Act, the period for filing the suit for specific
-22performance shall be from the date when the plaintiff got the
knowledge of notice for the performance has been refused. In
the present case as per agreement to sell, Ext. PW-1/A, no date
had been prescribed for the execution of the sale deed.
The
plaintiff issued legal notice dated 16.08.2012, which was
neither replied nor the sale deed was executed in favour by the
plaintiff.
Therefore, the limitation under the provisions of
Section 54 of the Limitation Act will start from the said date.
Therefore, the contention as made by the learned counsel for
the appellant that the suit was time barred is not sustainable.
34.
As far as the plea of learned counsel for the
appellant that application which was filed by the appellant
under the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 of CPC has been
wrongly rejected is to be dealt with in consonance with the
provisions of Order 41 Rule 27, which read as follows:-
“27 . Production of additional evidence in Appellate
Court— (1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled
to
produce
additional
evidence,
whether
oral
or
documentary, in the Appellate Court, But if—
(a)
the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred
has refused to admit evidence which ought to have
been admitted, or
[(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence,
establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of
due diligence, such evidence was not within his
-23knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due
diligence, be produced by him at the time when the
decree appealed against was passed, or]
(b)
the Appellate Court requires any document to be
produced or any witness to be examined to enable
it
to
pronounce
judgment,
or
for
any
other
substantial cause,
the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document
to be produced, or witness to be examined.
(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be
produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the
reason for its admission”.
35.
In the present case, the application which was filed
by defendant No.2 for placing on record copy of sale deed dated
05.06.2012 of suit land executed by defendant No.1 in her
favour came to be dismissed by the First Appellate Court. It is
not the case of the defendant No.2 that said fact was not within
her knowledge as the said document pertains prior to
institution of the suit and there are no averments qua the same
either in the written statement or in the pleadings. Therefore,
the learned First Appellate Court has rightly came to the
conclusion that the parameters as laid down for allowing the
application filed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC have not been
made out by the appellant.
In order to avail the benefit of
seeking production of additional evidence, the same shall
establish that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence,
-24such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after
the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time
when the decree appealed against was passed. In the present
case, defendant No. 2/appellant has failed to make out her case
within the purview of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.
Therefore, the learned First Appellate Court has rightly rejected
the application for additional evidence.
36.
This Court is of the considered opinion that in view
of the fact that the statements of PW-4 and defendant No.1
(DW1) have been made duly on the basis of record that
defendant No.2 was well aware about the execution of the
agreement to sell, therefore, she cannot be held bonafide
purchaser and the judgment and decree as passed by the
learned trial Court as affirmed by the First Appellate Court by
passing the decree for specific performance and by setting aside
the sale deed in favour of defendant No.2 are legal and valid.
The learned courts below have rightly taken into consideration
the oral as well as documentary evidence placed on record and
this Court does not see any infirmity in the same.
37.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Navaneethammal
vs. Arjuna Chetty AIR 1996 SC 3521, has enumerated the
scope of Section 100 of CPC, which reads as under:
-25“10. This Court, time without number, pointed out
that interference with the concurrent findings of the
courts below by the High Court under Section 100
CPC
must be
avoided
unless
warranted
by
compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is
not expected to re-appreciating the evidence just to
replace the findings for the lower courts.
20.
In our considered view the lower Appellate
Court has fairly appreciated the evidence in the
above background and has reached the conclusion
that the suit was not barred by Limitation. Even
assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not
have been done by the High Court as it cannot be
said that the view taken by the First Appellate
Court was based on no material.”
38.
Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kshitish
Chandra Purkait vs. Santosh Kumar Purkait and others
(1997) 5 SCC 438 has held as under:
“10. We would only add that (a) it is the duty cast
upon the High Court to formulate the substantial
question of law involved in the case even at the
initial stage; and (b) that in (exceptional) cases, at a
later point of time, when the Court exercises its
jurisdiction under the proviso to sub-section (5) of
Section 100 C.P.C in formulating the substantial
question of law, the opposite party should be put
on notice thereon and should be given a fair or
proper opportunity to meet the point. Proceeding to
hear the appeal without formulating the substantial
-26question of law involved in the appeal is illegal and
is an abnegation or abdication of the duty cast on
Court; and even after the formulation of the
substantial question of law, if a fair or proper
opportunity is not afforded to the opposite side, it
will amount to denial of natural justice. The above
parameters within which the High Court has to
exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC
should always be borne in mind. We are sorry to
state that the above aspects are seldom borne in
mind in many cases and second appeals are
entertained and/or disposed of, without conforming
to the above discipline.
11. The guidelines to determine as to what is a
"substantial question of law" within the meaning of
Section 100 CPC, have been laid down by this
Court in a Constitution Bench decision in Chunilal
V. Mehta and Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. and Mfg.
Co. Ltd There is also a later decision of this Court
in Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India3.
It is unnecessary to deal at length with that aspect
any further.”
39.
In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam vs. Savitribai Sopan
Gujar and others, AIR 1999 SC 2213, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has held as under:“5. It is not within the domain of the High court to
investigate the grounds on which the findings were
arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first
appellate Court. It is true that the lower appellate
Court
should
not
ordinarily
reject
witnesses
-27accepted by the trial court, in respect of credibility
but even where it has rejected the witnesses
accepted by the trial Court, the same is no ground
for interference in second appeal when it is found
that the appellate Court has given satisfactory
reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given
set of circumstances two inferences are possible,
one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding
on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any
other approach is not permissible. The High Court
cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the
first appellate Court unless it is found that the
conclusions drawn by the lower appellate Court
were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory
provisions of law applicable or its settled position
on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex
Court, or was based upon inadmissible evidence or
arrived at without evidence.”
40.
In Naresh and others vs. Hemant and others,
(2022) 18 SCC 802, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as
under:“10.The
High
Court
invoked
the
presumption
without proper consideration and appreciation of
the facts considered and dealt with by two courts
holding
by
reasoned
conclusions
why
the
presumption stood rebutted on the facts. The High
Court also committed an error of record by holding
that there was no evidence that Trimbakrao Ingole
alone had constructed the house, a finding patently
contrary to the admission of PW-1 in his evidence.
-28The fact that mutation also was done in the name of
Trimbakrao
Ingole
alone
which
remain
unchallenged at any time was also not noticed. The
conclusion
of
the
High
Court
that
improper
appreciation of evidence amounted to perversity is
completely unsustainable. No finding has been
arrived at that any evidence had been admitted
contrary to the law or that a finding was based on
no evidence only in which circumstance the High
Court could have interfered in the second appeal.
2. The High Court therefore manifestly erred by
interfering with the concurrent findings on facts by
two courts below in exercise of powers under
Section 100, Civil Procedure Code, a jurisdiction
confined to substantial questions of law only.
Merely because the High Court may have been of
the opinion that the inferences and conclusions on
the evidence were erroneous, and that another
conclusion to its satisfaction could be drawn,
cannot be justification for the High Court to have
interfered.
12.In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojappa,
(1964) 2 SCR 673, this court with regard to the
scope for interference in a second appeal with facts
under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code
observed as follows:
“12. ….The admissibility of evidence is no doubt
a point of law, but once it is shown that the
evidence on which courts of fact have acted was
admissible and relevant, it is not open to a party
feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the
courts of fact to contend before the High Court in
-29second appeal that the said evidence is not
sufficient to justify the findings of fact in
question. It has been always recognised that the
sufficiency or adequacy of evidence to support a
finding of fact is a matter for decision of the court
of facts and cannot be agitated in a second
appeal. Sometimes, this position is expressed by
saying that like all questions of fact, sufficiency
or adequacy of evidence in support of a case is
also left to the jury for its verdict. This position
has always been accepted without dissent and it
can be stated
without any doubt
that it
enunciates what can be properly characterised
as
an
elementary
proposition.
Therefore,
whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing
with a second appeal, the High Court has, either
unwittingly
and
in
a
casual
manner,
or
deliberately as in this case, contravened the
limits prescribed by s. 100, it becomes the duty
of this Court to intervene and give effect to the
said provisions. It may be that in some cases,
the High Court dealing with the second appeal is
inclined to take the view that what it regards to
be justice or equity of the case has not been
served by the findings of fact recorded by courts
of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to
remember that what is administered in courts is
justice according to law and considerations of
fair play and equity however important they may
be, must yield to clear and express provisions of
the law. If in reaching its decisions in second
appeals, the High Court contravenes the express
-30provisions of section 100, it would inevitably
introduce in such decisions an element of
disconcerting unpredictability which is usually
associated with gambling; and that is a reproach
which judicial process must constantly and
scrupulously endeavour to avoid.”
13.Though precedents abound on this settled
principle of law, we do not consider it necessary to
burden our discussion unnecessarily except to rely
further on Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, (2007) 1 SCC 546,
holding as follows:
“71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this Court
was compelled to interfere was because the true
legislative intendment and scope of Section 100
CPC have neither been appreciated nor applied.
A class of judges while administering law
honestly believe that, if they are satisfied that, in
any second appeal brought before them evidence
has been grossly misappreciated either by the
lower appellate court or by both the courts
below, it is their duty to interfere, because they
seem to feel that a decree following upon a gross
misappreciation of evidence involves injustice
and it is the duty of the High Court to redress
such injustice. We would like to reiterate that the
justice has to be administered in accordance
with law.
xxxx
73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
as early as in 1890 stated that there is no
jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the
-31ground of an erroneous finding of fact, however
gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be,
and they added a note of warning that no court
in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the
grounds specified in Section 100.
xxxx
81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the
judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for
over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has
not been correctly appreciated and applied by
the High Courts in a large number of cases. In
the facts and circumstances of this case the High
Court interfered with the pure findings of fact
even after the amendment of Section 100 CPC in
1976. The High Court would not have been
justified
in
interfering
with
the
concurrent
findings of fact in this case even prior to the
amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment of
the High Court is clearly against the provisions
of Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly
violates the legislative intention.
82. In view of the clear legislative mandate
crystallised by a series of judgments of the Privy
Council and this Court ranging from 1890 to
2006, the High Court in law could not have
interfered with pure findings of facts arrived at
by
the
courts
below.
Consequently,
the
impugned judgment is set aside and this appeal
is allowed with costs.”
14.The order of the High Court interfering with
concurrent findings of facts by two courts is,
-32therefore, held to be unsustainable in exercise of
the powers under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure
Code. The order of the High Court is consequently
set aside. The orders dated 06.03.1998 and
13.06.2002 of the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court are restored. The suit of the
plaintiffs is dismissed. The present appeal is
allowed.”
41.
In Brij Narayan Shukla (dead) through legal
representatives vs. Sudesh Kumar Alias Suresh Kumar
(dead) through Legal Representatives and others, (2024) 2
SCC 590, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:“10.2 The High Court was hearing the Second
Appeal
under
section
of
Code
of
Civil
Procedure, 1908 and it having reappreciated the
findings to disturb findings of fact, committed an
error.”
42.
In Civil Apepal No.5131 of 2025, titled as R.
Nagaraj (dead) through LRs and another vs. Rajmani and
others, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:“7. By the impugned judgment and order and
without answering anything on the substantial
questions of law framed/formulated, absolutely in
a casual manner, the High Court has allowed the
Second Appeal and has set aside the concurrent
findings recorded by both the courts below and
thereafter has remanded the matter to the learned
-33trial Court permitting the original plaintiff to amend
the plaint and pray for fixation of the boundary.
9. Having heard learned counsel for the respective
parties and having gone through the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court, we
are constrained to observe that the manner in
which the High Court has dealt with the Second
Appeal under Section 100 of the CPC is not
appreciable at all. From the impugned judgment
and order passed by the High Court, it appears
that the High Court has exercised the powers as if
the High Court was deciding the Writ Petition under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The High
Court has not appreciated at all that the High Court
was deciding the Second Appeal under Section 100
of the CPC and that too against the concurrent
findings of fact by both the courts below, which
were, as such, on appreciation of evidence on
record. Under the circumstances, the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court is
unsustainable.11. At the cost of repetition, it is
observed that the High Court was dealing with the
Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC and the
concurrent findings recorded by both the courts
below which were on appreciation of evidence on
record. Neither at the stage of deciding the suit nor
even before the first Appellate Court even such a
prayer was made to amend the plaint, which is
now permitted by the High Court, despite the fact
that earlier in the suit during the course of trial, the
plaint was amended. Under the circumstances
-34also, the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court is unsustainable.”
43.
The
learned
Courts
below
have
taken
into
consideration the oral as well as documentary evidence placed
on record and rightly decreed the suit as filed by the plaintiff.
The learned Courts below have not committed any error and the
same is not outcome of any illegality or jurisdictional error.
44.
No other point urged by the learned counsel for the
parties.
45.
The
substantial
question
of
law
is
answered
accordingly.
46.
In view of above discussions, the present appeal
being devoid of any merit is dismissed. Pending applications, if
any, also stand disposed of.
(Romesh Verma)
Judge
3rd July, 2026.
(kck)
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