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2026:HHC:40675
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 594 of 2026
Reserved on: 15.9.2026
Date of Decision: 23.9.2026.
Phool Singh
...Petitioner
Versus
State of HP
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
Yes.
For the Petitioners
:
Mr Sudhir Thakur, Senior
Advocate with Mr Karun Negi,
Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr
Jitender
Sharma,
Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present revision is directed against the order
dated 3.8.2026 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which
charges were framed against the petitioner and the co-accused
for the commission of offences punishable under Sections
191(2), 191(3), 115(2), 117(2), and 109 read with Section 190 of
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:40675
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS). (The parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience).
2.
Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
revision are that the police presented a challan before the Court
for the commission of offences punishable under Sections
191(2), 191(3), 115(2), 190, 109, and 117(2) of BNS. It was asserted
that the police had received information on 22nd October, 2025,
that some persons were brought to the hospital for treatment in
a case of beating. The police went to the hospital and found Lekh
Raj, Rupinder Singh, Chuna Devi, Sudesh, Somti Devi, and Nisha
Kumari to be injured. Rekha Devi made a complaint that Somti
Devi was cleaning her courtyard at about 6:30 AM. Chhoti Devi,
Sanju Ram, Phool Singh, Ravi Kumar, Bala Devi, Pawan Kumar,
and Kamlesh Devi attacked Somti Devi, Lekh Raj, Rupinder
Singh,
and
Chuna
Devi
with
sticks,
bricks,
and
Kassi
(pickaxes/spades). Lekh Raj sustained serious injury to his head.
The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The
police seized the recording of the CCTV camera and found that
Phool Singh had hit Chuna Devi, Lekh Raj, and Rupinder Singh
with a Kassi (pickaxe/spade) 8–10 times. The Medical Officer
2026:HHC:40675
found the injuries sustained by Lekh Raj, Rupinder Singh, and
Chuna Devi to be grievous. The police recovered the Kassi
(pickaxe/spade), blood-stained clothes, and other material
objects. Blood was not found on the Kassi (pickaxe/spade)
recovered by the police after analysis. The police filed the
charge-sheet before the Court after the completion of the
investigation.
3.
The learned Trial Court charged the accused with the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 191(2),
191(3), 115(2), 117(2), and 109 read with Section 190 of BNS
against all the persons.
4.
Being aggrieved by the charges framed by the learned
Trial Court, the petitioner/accused Phool Singh has filed the
present petition asserting that the injuries were not lifethreatening, and no case for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 109 of the BNS was made out. The MLC
only mentioned that the nature of the injury was grievous and
did not mention that there was any danger to life. The weapon of
offence was the Kassi (pickaxe/spade), and no blood was found
on it. The statements of the witnesses that the petitioner had
2026:HHC:40675
inflicted 8-10 blows with the pickaxe are contrary to the MLC.
There was nothing on record to show that the petitioner had
abused the complainant or passed any caste-based remarks.
Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and
the order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
5.
I have heard Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior
Advocate, assisted by Mr Karun Negi, learned counsel for the
petitioner/accused, and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional
Advocate General, for the respondent-State.
6.
Mr Sudhir Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred
in framing the charges for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 109 of the BNS. The MLCs of the
victims do not show that any serious injury was caused to them.
Thus, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the
order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.
7.
Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent-State, submitted that the Kassi
(pickaxe/spade) was used to inflict injuries on the head, which is
a vital part of the body. Had the death been caused, the
2026:HHC:40675
petitioner would have been guilty of murder. The learned Trial
Court had rightly framed the charges for the commission of an
offence punishable under Section 109 of the BNS, and no
interference is required with the order passed by the learned
Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
8.
I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
9.
It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Vishnu Kumar Shukla v. State of U.P., (2023) 15 SCC 502: 2023 SCC
OnLine SC 1582, that the Court framing the charges has to see a
prima facie case. It is impermissible to examine the material
threadbare to determine whether the accused is likely to be
convicted or not. It was observed: “12. The primary consideration at the stage of framing of
charge is the test of the existence of a prima facie case,
and at this stage, the probative value of materials on
record need not be gone into. This Court, by referring to
its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som
Nath Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659 and the State of MP v. Mohan
Lal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, has held that the nature of
evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing
of the charge is to test the existence of the prima facie
case. It is also held that, at the stage of framing of charge,
the court has to form a presumptive opinion on the
2026:HHC:40675
existence of factual ingredients constituting the offence
alleged, and it is not expected to go deep into the
probative value of the material on record and to check
whether the material on record would certainly lead to a
conviction at the conclusion of the trial.
10.
It was held in Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of U.P.,
(2024) 10 SCC 651: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 253: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1709
that the Court can sift and weigh the evidence to determine if a
prima facie case exists against the accused. It was observed at
page 661:
“24. In the light of the decisions referred supra, it is thus
obvious that it will be within the jurisdiction of the Court
concerned to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited
purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case
against the accused concerned has been made out. We are
of the considered view that a caution has to be sounded
for the reason that the chances of going beyond the
permissible jurisdiction under Section 227CrPC, and
entering into the scope of power under Section 232CrPC,
cannot be ruled out, as such instances are aplenty. In this
context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of this Court in
Om Parkash Sharma v. CBI, (2000) 5 SCC 679: 2000 SCC
(Cri) 1014. Taking note of the language of Section
227CrPC, which is in negative terminology and that the
language in Section 232 CrPC is in positive terminology
and considering this distinction between the two, this
Court held that it would not be open to the Court, while
considering an application under Section 227CrPC, to
weigh the pros and cons of the evidence, alleged
improbability and then proceed to discharge the accused,
holding that the statements existing in the case therein
are unreliable. It is held that doing so would be practically
acting under Section 232 CrPC, even though the said stage
has not been reached. In short, though it is permissible to
2026:HHC:40675
sift and weigh the materials for the limited purpose of
finding out whether or not a prima facie case is made out
against the accused, on appreciation of the admissibility
and the evidentiary value, such materials brought on
record by the prosecution are impermissible as it would
amount to denial of opportunity to the prosecution to
prove them appropriately at the appropriate stage,
besides amounting to exercise of the power coupled with
obligation under Section 232 CrPC, available only after
taking the evidence for the prosecution and examining
the accused.
11.
It was held in Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther v. State of
Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 520, that the Court is not to
undertake a threadbare analysis of the material but to see if
there is sufficient material to frame charges. It was observed:
“16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section
227 CrPC contemplates is that if, upon consideration of
the record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith and after hearing the submissions of the
accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge
considers that there are no sufficient grounds for
proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the
accused and record his reasons for doing so. At the stage
of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to
undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered
by the prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this
stage is that there are sufficient grounds to proceed
against the accused. In other words, the materials should
be sufficient to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial
against the accused. It may be so that at the end of the
trial, the accused may still be acquitted. At the stage of
discharge, the court is only required to consider whether
there are sufficient materials that can justify the launch
of a criminal trial against the accused. By its very nature,
a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal.
2026:HHC:40675
Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a
technicality or on the benefit of doubt, or the prosecution
could not prove the charge against the accused; but when
an accused is discharged, it means that there are no
materials to justify the launch of a criminal trial against
the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer an
accused.”
12.
The present petition has to be adjudicated as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
13.
Section 109 of the BNS corresponds to Section 307 of
the IPC. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in Surender Kumar v.
State of Haryana, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 191, that grievousness of
the injury or the possibility of injury which could have led to
death is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307 of the
IPC. It was observed:
7. We are of the opinion that the grievousness of the
injuries or the possibility of injury which could have led to
death is not a necessary ingredient to attract Section 307.
Section 307 reads thus: —
‘S. 307 Whoever does any act with such intention or
knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by
that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such
act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for
life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned.’
8. It has two limbs, insofar as the punishment is
concerned, but only one regarding the culpability. The
culpability being found if there is commission of any act
2026:HHC:40675
with such intention or knowledge that the act could result
in death, making the perpetrator guilty of murder. As
regards punishment, the accused shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to a fine; which
is the first limb. The second limb provides that if such act,
caused with intention or knowledge, results in hurt to any
person, then the offender shall be liable either to
imprisonment for life or to such punishment as provided
in the first limb. Hurt, grievous or simple, is not a
precondition to attract Section 307, but if there is hurt, be
it simple or grievous, and the act causing such hurt is
with the intention or knowledge that such act could have
caused death, making the perpetrator guilty of murder,
then a graver punishment is provided.
9. In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kashiram (2009) 4 SCC 26 :
(2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 40, this Court held that to justify the
conviction under Section 307, it would be sufficient if
there is intent coupled with some overt act in execution
thereof. It is not essential that there should be a bodily
injury capable of causing death or even an injury in the
nature of simple hurt. Relying on a number of decisions,
it was held that the intention to kill or knowledge that
death will occur is a question of fact depending on a given
case to find culpability under Section 307. The mere fact
that the injury inflicted was simple or minor will not by
itself rule out the application of Section 307, since the
determining question is the intention or knowledge.
10. Chimanbhai Jagabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat(2009) 11
SCC 273 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1323 found the ingredients
under Section 307 to be; (i) the overt act of the accused,
(ii) the intention or knowledge; to cause a bodily injury,
which he knew would likely cause death, or such bodily
injury which in the ordinary course of nature would lead
to death, or that act is so imminently dangerous that in all
probability death would be occasioned and (iii) that the
accused had no excuse for incurring the risk of causing
2026:HHC:40675
such death or injury. Pasupuleti Siva Ramakrishna Rao v.
State of Andhra Pradesh(2014) 5 SCC 369; (2014) 2 SCC (Cri)
584 differentiated the punishments, as we found in the
first and second limbs. One, the intention alone leads to a
punishment of 10 years, and if it is accompanied by hurt,
then extending to life imprisonment. State of M.P. v.
Saleem alias Chamaru (2005) 5 SCC 554: 2005 SCC (Cri)
1329 categorically held that to sustain a conviction under
Section 307, there is no necessity for a bodily injury
capable of causing death. A simple injury caused would
not, as a corollary, mean absence of intention to cause
death, which intention or knowledge has to be discerned
from the circumstances surrounding the crime. State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Kanha alias Omprakash (2019) 3 SCC
605 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 247 and Jage Ram v. State of
Haryana (2015) 11 SCC 366: (2015) 4 SCC (Cri) 425 held that
the absence of a fatal injury would not dislodge Section
307, but the nature or gravity of the injury and the nature
of the weapon used could lead to an inference of intent
and knowledge.
14.
In the present case, it was specifically mentioned in
the statements recorded by the police that the petitioner Phool
Singh was armed with a Kassi (pickaxe/spade) and inflicted a
blow on Lekh Raj’s head. Lekh Raj fell, but the petitioner
continued hitting him. Rupinder Singh also stated that accused
Phool Singh had used a Kassi (pickaxe/spade) to cause injury.
Lekh Raj had sustained an injury on his head. The report of
Indus Super Speciality Hospital mentions a depressed fracture
on the parietal region with extradural haemorrhage. Therefore,
the injury was caused to the head, a vital part of the body, by
2026:HHC:40675
means of a Kassi (pickaxe/spade), a deadly weapon; and had
death taken place, the accused would have been guilty of
committing murder, because causing injury to a vital part of the
body by means of a deadly weapon can prima facie lead to an
inference that the injury was caused with an intention to cause
death2. Therefore, there is no infirmity in the order passed by the
learned Trial Court that the material on record justified framing
of charge for the commission of an offence punishable under
Section 109 read with Section 190 of the BNS.
15.
It was submitted that the injury would have been
graver had the Kassi (pickaxe/spade) been used, and no blood
was found on the pickaxe, showing that it was not used for the
commission of the offence. These submissions cannot be
appreciated at this stage because the Court has to see a prima
facie case while framing the charges and is not expected to
appreciate the evidence at this stage. Hence, it would be open for
the petitioner/accused to make these submissions at the time of
the conclusion of the trial, which will be appreciated based on
the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. However, prima
facie, the statements are to be accepted as correct, and even if
It was held in Singapagu Anjaiah v. State of A.P., (2010) 9 SCC 799 that causing a single injury by crowbar on
the head amounts to murder.
2026:HHC:40675
the pickaxe used by the accused was not recovered, it would be a
case of defective investigation, which will not result in the
acquittal of the accused3.
16.
It was also stated in the revision petition that charges
were wrongly framed under the SC and ST Act, which is factually
incorrect because no charge has been framed under the SC and
ST Act.
17.
No other point was urged.
18.
In view of the above, there is no error in the order
passed by the learned Trial Court; hence, the present revision
fails and is dismissed.
19.
The observations made hereinbefore shall remain
confined to the disposal of the present petition and shall have no
bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.
20.
A copy of this judgment, along with records of the
learned Courts below, be transmitted forthwith.
23rd September, 2026
(Chander)
Edakkandi Dineshan v. State of Kerala, (2025) 3 SCC 273
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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