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[34e1]
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDERABAD
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
WEDNESDAY, THE SIXTH DAY OF MAY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
WRIT PETITION NO: 29371 OF 202s
Between:
Perelli Jyothi, W/o Praveen, aged about 38 years, Occ ; House wife, R/o H.No. 3-135/4, lndira Nagar, Khanapuram Haveli (Rural), Khammam.
....,PETITIONER
AND
1. The State of Telangana, rep. by its Principal Secretary, General
Administration (Spl. (Law and Order ) Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad.
2. The Commissioner Of Police, Khammam.
3. The Superintendent, Central Prison, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad.
.....RESPONDENTS
Petition Under Arlicle 226 of the Constitution of lndia praying that in the
circumstances stated in the affidavit filed therewith, the High Court may be pleased
to issue an appropriate Writ, Order or Direction, more particularly one in the nature of
Writ of Habeas Corpus, directing the 3rd respondent to produce the detenue viz.,
Perelli Praveen Kumar now detained in Central Prison, Chanchalguda, before this
Honble Court and order for his release after declaring the detention order passed by
the 2nd respondent dI. 26-5-2025 vide Procs. SB.lD.No. 099/S1/PD-KMM/2025
under sub section (2) of section 3 of The Telangana Prevention of Dangerous
Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, lmmoral Traffic
Offenders and Land Grabbers Act, 1986 (Act No.1 of 1986) as confirmed by the 1st
respondent Vide G.O.RI. No. 901 General Administration (Spl. (Law and Order)
Department dated 7-7 -2025, as being illegal, arbitrary, unilateral and unconstitutional
and violative of Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of lndia.
Counsel for the Petitioner: SRI AMARAGANI MALSOOR GOUD, COUNSEL
REPRESENTING SRI KARUNAKAR REDDY
Counsel for the Respondents : SRI S.PRADEEP KUMAR, THE ADVOCATE
GENERAL
The Court made the following ORDER
(6
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
AT HYDI]RABAD
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR
W.P.No.2937l of 2025
DATE :06.05.2026
Between :
Perelli Jyothi.
Petitioner
And
The State of Telangana,
Rep. by its Principal Secretary.
General Adrninistration (Sp[. Lar,v & Order)
Departmcnt, Hyderabad and Two others
Respondents
ORDER: Qter Hon'ble Justice Gadi Praveen Kumar)
Heard Mr.Amaragani Malsoor Goud, leamed counsel representing
Mr.Karunakar Reddy, leamed counsel appearing for the petitioner and
Mr.S.Pradeep Kumar, leamed Govemment Pleader attached to the Office
of the Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents.
2.
The present Writ Petition is filed to direct respondent No.3 to
produce the alleged detenu and order for his release after declaring the
impugned detention order dated 26.05.2025 passed by respondent No.2
classifying the alleged detenu as a 'land grabber' as defined under Section
2() of the Telangana Prevention Ol Dangerous Activities of Boot-Leggers,
Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders LandGrabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser
Offenders, Food Adu lteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders,
Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders,
Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders,
Cyber Crime Olfendels And White Collar Or Financial Offenders Act,
1986 (for short 'the nct, 1986) as confirmed by respondent No.l vide
G.O.Rt.No.9O1 General Administration (Spl. (Law and Order)
Department) dated 07.07.2025 as arbitrary
3.
'fhe brief facts of the case are that the husband of the
petitioner/alleged detenu was engaged in a real estate business mediating
transactions between land owners and prospective purchasers, eaming
commission, and at times entering into agreements and registered sale
deeds for subsequent sale. During the course of such business, several
disputes arose and gradually the persons, who are inimical towards the
alleged detenu foisted lalse cases against him with an intention to gain
advantage in land disputes
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4.
It is further the case of the petitioner that the detenu was earlier
implicated in a false murder case in Crime No.90 of 2005 of Khammam II-
Town Police Station, wherein he was sentenced to undergo life
imprisonment but was subsequently acquitted frtim the said case, on
merits. After his release in 2016, the same inimical persons, under the
apprehension of retaliation, again foisted false cases, including six offences
in the year 2024, in which the detenu was granted bail and released on
07.02.202s.
5.
Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned
detention order dated 26.05.2025 has been initiated alleging that the
activities olthe detenu are prejudicial to the public order and tranquility in
the locality, referring to the six (6) incidents wherein the detenu was shown
as accused, which are alleged to have taken place in the year, 2024. It is
contended that there ls absolutely no material evidence to establish the
direct involvement of the alleged detenu in the said crimes and the
detaining authority lailed to veriff the records which may be construed that
the detaining authorities have not applied the mind while passing the
impugned detention order.
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6.
[,eamed counsel lor the petitioner referred to the grounds of
detention are still under investigation, no charge sheets have been filed,
and reliance is placed on alleged confessions, which are inadmissible in
law. It is lurther contended that the detention order was passed without any
real incident aflecting public order, and merely to invoke preventive
detention, thereby infringing the lundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution.
7.
It is further submitted that there is no proximity or live nexus
between the alleged incidents of 2024 and the impugned order of
detention, and that the authorities lailed to pursue ordinary legal remedies
such as opposing or seeking cancellation ol bail. It was contended that the
cases, at best, pertain to law and order issues and not public order,
therefore, the cornpetent criminal courts are su fficient to deal with the
same The allegations that the alleged detenu's release caused panic in
societv are denied as baseless
8.
Leamed counsel for the petitioner contended that detention order is
based on vague, stale and remote incidents and was passed mechanically
without proper scrutiny ol records. Relevant material was neither placed
beforc the detaining authority nor fumished to the alleged detenu,
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impairing his right to make an effective representation. The classiltcation
of the alleged detenu as a "land grabber" under Section 2() of the Act is
without basis, and the reliance on police confessions further evidences
non-application of mind. The cases which are referied under the grounds
can be curable by way of regular mechanism and not under the special
enactments.
9.
Leamed counsel for the petitioner further states that Section 3(2) of
the Act, 1986 empowers the Gov€mment to pass a detention order in
respect of boorlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic
offender or land grabber with a view to prevent him from acting in any
manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
10. It is contended that even if the Govemment intends to detain a
person for the maximum permissible period of twelve (12) months, the
statutory scheme mandates an initiat detention order for three (3) months
fottowed by successive extension orders, each not exceeding three (3)
months. Such requirement of periodic review and extension has a clear
legistative purpose and cannot be dispensed with'
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Ihcrefore, it is argued that the Government cannot, in one stroke,
direct or extend the detention up to the maximum period of twelve (12)
months, ignoring the mandatory procedural safeguard embedded' in the
statute. on this ground alone, the impugned detention order is Iiable to be
set aside.
12. Leamed counsel for the petitioner further contends that the alleged
detenu has been releascd on bail in all four (4) crimes referred to by
respondent No.2 in the impugned detention order and no applications for
cancellation of bail have been filed. Therefore, it is contended that the
release of the alleged detenu does not affect public order in a manner that
warrants detention under the impugned order.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner, regarding the period of detention,
relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon,bte Supreme Court in
Cherukuri Mani v. Chief Secretary Governmenr of A./ wherein it was
held that the Legislature has specifically provided rhe mechanism
"Advisory Board" to review the detention ofa person. passing a detention
order for a period of twelve months at a stretch, without proper review, is
deterrent to the rights of the detenue.
'l0l4rirAt t(( Rt)iSC)257 (D.8.)
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14. On the other hand, Sri S.Pradeep Kumar, leamed Government
Pleader appearing lor responden6 submitted that the Act, 1986 empowers
the detaining authority to pass an order of detention upon subjective
satisfaction that such person is acting in a manher prcjudicial to the
maintenance of public order. The impugned detention order was duly
confirmed by the Govemment under Section l2 of the Act after obtaining
the opinion of the Advisory Board, thereby complying with atl statutory
requirements. Therefore, unless declared iltegal by a competent Court, the
action of the 2nd respondent cannot be lound fautt with.
15. The leamed counsel submits that the detenu was in fact convicted in
a murder case ln S.C. No.20912006 arising out of Crime No. 90/2005 and
sentenced to life imprisonment, and was later released in20l6 on amnesty,
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and not acquitted as alleged. It is further contended that the detenu has a
long criminal history, having been involved in 25 offences prior to 2024
and convicted in more than one case, and thereafter continued to indulge in
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unlawful activities including extortion of money from landowners by
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intimidation.
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16. It is submitted that during the year 2024, the alleged detenu
committed a series of six (06) offences involving criminal trespass, land
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encroachment. causing grievous hurt, criminal intimidation, and property
damage. Out of these, four cases were taken as grounds for detention and
two as antecedents. 'I'he leamed counsel has placed reliance on FIRs,
witness statements, conlession statements, remand case diary, bail
proceedings, and official records including municipal notices, to establish
the involvement of the detenu
17. l'he leamed counsel further submits that in each of the four (04)
ground cases, which r.r.ere committed in a gap of approximately 3 and half
months, the detenu indulged in acts of iltegal land grabbing, violent
attacks. intimidation, and obstruction of lawfuI activities. His conduct
included assaulting public servants with iron rods, threatening landowners
with dcath, forcibly encroaching lands, damaging property, and acting in
an organized manner with accomplices, thereby creating fear, insecurity,
and disturbance to public peace and tranquility in the locality.
18. It is further contended that the detenu is a habitual offender whose
activities falt within the definition of "land grabber" under the Act, 1986
and his actions are not mere law and order issues but have a direct bearing
on public order, affecting the community at large. The leamed counsel
asserts that ordinary criminal law proved ineffective in deterring his
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conduct, and despite bait being opposed by the prosecution, the detenu was
released, restoring the detenu's operational freedom and capacity to act
upon the well-established pattern of coercive land control through
organized violence, creating an imminent possibility of repetition of
offences, thereby necessitating preventive detention.
19. Learned Govemment Pleader submits that all procedural safeguards
were duly followed, relevant material was placed before and considered by
the detaining authority, and the detenu was fumished with the grounds of
detention and informed of his right to representation. It is contended that
the detention is based on proximate and relevant incidents of 2024' with a
clear nexus to the order, and is neither vague nor stale.
20. Leamed Govemment Pleader relying upon the judgments passed by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kamarunnissa v. Union of India and others2
and Banka Sneha Sheela v. State of Telangana and others3, contended
that preventive detention is a precautionary measure distinct from
prosecution, and can be invoked even during pendency of criminal cases' It
is thus submitted that the detention order is tegal, valid, and passed with
iffi
due application of mind, and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed'
I ( l99l
l scc 128
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9 SCC 415
r (202
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We have given our eamest consideration to the pleaders submifted
on either side.
22. Upon careful consideration of the material placed on record' this
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courtfindsthatthoughtherespondentscontendthatthedetentionorderhas
been passed upon due subjective satisfaction under the Act' 1986
and
confirmed by the Govemment after obtaining the opinion of the Advisory
Board, such satisfaction must necessarily be founded upon cogent material
demonstrating that the activities of the alleged detenu are prejudicial
maintenance of
to the
.,public order". The mere existence of criminal cases, by
itself, would not justiry invocation of preventive detention unless the
threshold of public order is clearly met.
23. Insot-ar as the contention of the respondents regarding the criminal
antecedents of the alleged detenu and his involvement in multiple
cases is
concemed,itistobenotedthattheatlegeddetenuwasalreadyenlargedon
bail in the said cases and are pending before the concemed courts. Further,
no material is placed l.o show that the prosecution sought cancellation of
bail or that the ordinary criminal law remedies were found inadequate after
being duty exhausted. The failure to pursue such remedies assumes
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significance, as preventive detention is not intended to supplant the
ordinary criminal process butto be invoked only when such process proves
ineffective,
24. The distinction between "law and order" and "public order" assumes
crucial importance in the present case. The Hon'ble Apex Court in
Nenavathi Buiji and othersa while referring to the case in Pushkar
Mukherjee v. Stale of llesl Bengal held as under:
"The ,conlrovention o[ any law dfu'(tys dfecls order but belore it cdn be sqid to oilecl
public order, it nusl ofecl lhe co muniryn ot lhe Public ol large. In this conneclion we
must drow a line of demarcalion beileen serious and dgl:rdvoled Jorms of disorder
which drrectly affecr the community or rnjure the public interest and lhe relalitely minot
breoches ol peace of a purely local signifcance which primarily injure specrfc
individuals and only in a secondary serue Public interest- A mere disluhunce o/ low ond
order leading lo disorder is lhus not necessarily sufrcienl for action under the
Prel,entive Delenlion Act bul a dislurbance which will ofect public order comes within
the scope oflhe Acl. '
Therefore, mere contravention of taw affecting specific individuals
does not ipso facto amount to disturbance of public order unless it
affects the community or Public at large- The incidents relied upon by
the respondents, even if accepted, predominantly arise out of land
disputes and individual grievances, and do not convincingly
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demonstrate a pervasive impact on society so as to warrant
classifi cation under "public order".
25. -I'he reliance placed by the respondents on various materials such as
FIRs, witness statements, and alleged confessional statements does not, in
the considered opinion of this Court, sufhciently establish a live and
proximate link between the alleged acts and disturbance of public order.
The contention ol the petitioner that such materials were either not
properly considered or not ellectively furnished for making a meaningful
representation cannot be brushed aside lightly, as il touches upon the
procedural saf-eguards guaranteed under the Constitution
26. With regard to the contention relating to the period of detention, this
Cou( takes note of the follorving legal position laid down by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case ol Pesala Nookaraju v. The Governmenl of
Andhra Pradesh6, wherein it was held :
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''\htn the Stat! (iovernmcnt passes a conlrmatory ordet under kctton l2 of the 4ct oller
retctpt o./ rhe n'porr /rom lhr lthisory lJoard then. such a conlrmaton onler neeel nor be
restrtctecl to o pettod o_/ thrce fionlhs only lt can be beyond a periotl of threc nonths
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froot thc dare o[ initial ord( ol detent@n. h,( up to o maximum period of twelve months
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fron] the dotc ofdetention'
Therefore, the extension of detention up to twelve months, in itsell; cannot
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be laulted and does not vitiate the impugned order.
" (lo2l ) l4 sc('6.1I
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27. The submission of the respondents that the detenu is a habitual
offender and falls within the dehnition of "land grabber" under the Act
also does not, on the material available, conclusively satisfo the statutory
requirements. The allegations appear to stem froin localized disputes,
which are amenable to adjudication under ordinary [aw. Preventive
detention, being an exceptional measure, cannot be invoked as a substitute
for regular criminal proceedings.
28. This Court also notes that while a counter affidavit and supporting
material have been placed on record by the respondents, the matter does
not appear to have been presented with the degree of clarity and assistance
expected
ln cases involving deprivation of personal liberty. Mere
production ol records, without effectively establishing their nexus to the
statutory requirements, would not suffice to sustain an order of detention.
29. Accordingly, in view of the fact that the detention period is due to
expire on 26.05.2026, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
continued detention o[the alleged detenu carurot be sustained. It is always
open to the respondents to pursue the pending criminal cases before the
competent courts in accordance with [aw. However, it is needless to
observe that the alleged detenu should be vigilant and careful in future.
fur
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30. Accordingly, the impugned detention order is set aside, and the Writ
Petition is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand
//TRUE COPYII
To
closed.
SD/.M. OSMAN ALI BAIG
ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
SECTION OFFICER
1 The Principal Secretary, General Administration (Spl. (Law
and Order )
Department, Secretariat, State of Tetangan,
_
,iilirjuruUuo
-''''"
2. The Commissioner police,
Of
Khamm#_
3. The Superintendent Central prison, Chanchalguda,
4. Two CCs to THE ADV.CATE GiNERAi',irUnHyderabad.
for rhe State of
Telan-gana, at Hyderabad
[OUT]
_
"orn
5. One CC to SRt KARUNAKAR ieOOy, Advocate
tOpUCl
6. Two CD Copies
SA
LS
u-
(
URGENT
HIGH COURT
DATED: 0610512026
Lk
o RTHI S la
)
)
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\.\ -.,
it
ORDER
WP.No.29371 ot 2025
ALLOWING THE W.P
WITHOUT COSTS.
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