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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
APHC010527922011
Bench Sr.No:-67
[3584]
WRIT PETITION NOs: 12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
Hope Integrated Rural Development Society
...Petitioners
and others
Vs.
Principal Secretary and Others
...Respondent(s)
**********
CORAM :THE CHIEF JUSTICE LISA GILL
SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN
DATE
: 3rd September 2026
Present:
Advocate for Petitioner:
SRINIVAS CHITTURU, rep. by SRI
D.UMA MAHESWARA RAO
Advocate(s) for Respondent(s): GP FOR PANCHAYAT RAJ &
RURAL DEV,
N V SUMANTH
COMMON ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Challa Gunaranjan)
Since the issue raised in all these writ petitions being
common, are heard together and disposed by present common
order.
2.
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
For sake of convenience, the facts in W.P. No.12928 of 2011
are set out as under:
(a)
The prayer made in all these writ petition is as under:
“to issue a Writ Order or Direction, more particularly one
in the nature of Writ of Mandamus or any other
appropriate Writ Order or Direction of the like nature to
direct the Respondents 1 to 3 to establish Fast Track
Court as provided under Sec 15 of A.P. Micro Finance
Institutions Regulation of Money Lending Act, 2011 and
to pass such other orders.”
(b)
Petitioner in W.P. No.12928 of 2011 is a registered society
stated to be established with the object to disseminate knowledge
and know how useful to the rural/urban poor and disadvantaged
sections of society without emphasis on women population in
diverse activities and thereby achieving economic growth of
rural/urban poor families with particular attention to provide
adequate employment opportunities to women, to promote
productivity and thereby income through Micro Finance and to
achieve appreciable raise in the standard of living of the poorest
section of the population. It is carrying on activities in and around
areas of Kurnool District in Andhra Pradesh.
(c)
Petitioner is stated to have mobilised funds from various
sources including other NGOs for the purpose of achieving its
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
objects. As on 31.03.2011, petitioner has accepted loans to the
tune of 258.12 lakhs from various lenders. Of which, it has
advanced loans ranging from ₹8,000/- to ₹20,000/- to almost 3,700
members/borrowers, in total amounting to 193.25 lakhs. The
individuals who have borrowed aforesaid amounts were not
required to provide any collateral security, except for personal
guarantee from group members.
(c)
At that juncture, the State had come up with legislation,
initially by way of an ordinance namely A.P. Micro Finance
Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Ordinance, 2010 and
later translated into Act No.1 of 2011. After coming into force of the
said enactment, the activities undertaken by petitioner were
governed and regulated by the provisions of said enactment. Thus,
thereafter, the loan repayments started diminishing and almost
reached a dismal point. The petitioner initially got registered as
Micro Finance institution as envisaged under the said Act vide
certificates dated 02.11.2010 valid till 01.11.2011.
(d)
The scheme of the Act provided that in case there are any
outstanding loans to be recovered, in terms of Section 15, remedy
has been provided to approach Fast Track Court. As there are no
designated Fast Track Courts in terms of Section 15, petitioner
approached this Court seeking writ of mandamus to the
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
respondents for establishment of such Fast Track Courts, enabling
them to avail legal remedies wherever there are defaults of loans
by the member borrowers.
3.
Heard Sri D.Uma Maheswara Rao, learned counsel,
representing Sri Srinivas Chitturu, learned counsel for petitioners
on record and learned Government for Panchayat Raj appearing
for respondents 1 to 3 and Sri N.V.Sumanth, learned standing
counsel appearing for 4th respondent.
4.
Learned counsel for petitioners, while reiterating the
pleadings made in the affidavit filed in support of writ petitions,
would contend that when there is a specific legislative mandate in
terms of Section 15 of the Act, the respondents are bound to
establish Fast Track Courts, as otherwise the petitioners would be
deprived of its right to remedies, as it is as on 31.03.2011, 193.25
lakhs, 207 lakhs and 780.34 lakhs respectively are outstanding and
unrecovered, therefore, until and unless the Fast Track Courts are
established, petitioners would not be in a position to initiate
appropriate legal action for recovering the same.
5.
(a)
Per contra, learned Government Pleader as well as
learned standing counsel for 4th respondent submitted that as of
now there are no cases as such filed raising any dispute under the
provisions
of
Andhra
Pradesh
Micro
Finance
Institutions
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
(Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011 (herein after, for short
‘the Act’) and pending before any of the courts in the State from
the promulgation of the Act till date. Further, it is also submitted
that Section 15 merely makes a provision for establishment of Fast
Track Courts, however, there is no provision in the Act ousting the
jurisdiction of Civil Court, therefore, the right to recover loans is in
no way affected. In support of said submission, reliance is placed
on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in South Delhi Municipal
Corporation and another v. Today Homes and Infrastructure
Private Limited and others.
(b)
Further, it is also stated that as the registrations in favour of
petitioners were not renewed after November 2011, the petitioners
cannot seek either implementation of provisions of the Act or avail
remedy under the Act.
6.
Learned counsel for the petitioners, in reply, while referring
to Rule 12 of Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions
(Regulation of Money Lending) Rules, 2011 (herein after, for short
‘the Rules’), submitted that even in the absence of renewal of
registration, still petitioners are entitled to recover the dues from
the defaulters, therefore, they have subsisting right to invoke legal
remedies envisaged under Section 15 of the Act.
7.
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
We have given due and careful consideration to the
submissions of learned counsel and perused the record.
8.
In order to appreciate the contentions raised, it is apt to refer
Section 15 of the Act and Rule 12 of the Rules:
“Section 15: Settlement of Disputes: (1) For the protection
of debtors and for the settlement of disputes of civil nature
between the SHG or its members on the one hand and the
MFI on the other hand or between the members of the SHG
and the SHG, in relation to the loans granted under this Act
to the SHG or its members, the State Government after
consultation with the High Court, and by notification,(a) shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of
this Act, establish for every district in the State a FastTrack Court;
(b) may establish Fast-Track Court for such other areas in
the State, as it may deem necessary.
(2) The Government shall, after consultation with the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh specify, by notification, the local
limits of the area to which the jurisdiction of a FastTrack Court
shall extend and may, at any time, increase, reduce or alter
such limits.
(3) The cases that may be filed before the Fast-Track Court
shall be disposed of within a period of three months.
(4) The decree of the Fast Track Courts shall be liable to be
executed in accordance with the procedure under the Code
of the Civil Procedure 1908.
Rule 12: Effect of cancellation or non-renewal of
Registration: In case of cancellation of registration as per
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
rule 10 or non-renewal of registration as per rule 8(4), such
Micro Finance Institution shall not extend any fresh loans to
the borrowers, but will be entitled to recover the dues of the
subsisting loans subject to following the provisions of section
16 of the Act.”
9.
The State, in its endeavour to protect the interests of self-
help groups (SHGs) and relieve them from the undue hardship by
regulating money lending transactions by the money lending Micro
Finance Institutions (MFIs), who are providing loans to SHGs with
usurious interest rates and resorting to coercive means of recovery
resulting in impoverishment and at times leading to suicides of the
borrowers, brought in Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions
(Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011.
10.
Section 3 of the said Act contemplates that all MFIs in the
state shall get registered before the Registering Authority of
concerned district, specifying their area of operation, rate of
interest being charged and system of conducting due diligence and
manner of recovery and persons authorized for conducting the said
activity. Section 7 further stipulated that MFIs shall not seek any
security from borrowers by way of bond, pledge or other security
for the loan to be extended. Sections 8 and 9 also regulate rates of
interest. Section 15 deals with settlement of disputes and Section
16 envisages penalty for coercive actions of MFIs. The said section
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
specifically mandates that MFIs shall not resort to any type of
coercive measures against SHGs or its members or their family
members and illustrates the possible actions which would fall within
the meaning of coercive action.
11.
In exercise of rule-making power under sub-section (1) of
Section 23 of Andhra Pradesh Micro Finance Institutions
(Regulation of Money Lending) Act, 2011, Andhra Pradesh Micro
Finance Institutions (Regulation of Money Lending) Rules, 2011
have been issued. Rule 3 deals with the manner in which
application for registration has to be made and further Rule 8 deals
with renewal of registration. Rule 12 deals with effect of
cancellation or non-renewal of registration, which clearly mentions
that even in case of non-renewal, still MFIs are entitled to recover
the dues of subsisting loans subject to the provisions of Section 16
of the Act. A conspectus analysis of the scheme of the Act and
Rules makes it clear that MFIs are entitled to recover the
outstanding loans from the borrowers or members of SHGs.
12.
Section 15 envisage Government to establish Fast Track
Court for every district to deal with settlement of disputes of civil
nature between the SHG or its members on one hand and the MFIs
on the other hand, or between members of SHG and the SHG, in
relation to the loans granted under this Act to the SHG or its
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
members. The fact remains that the government has not
established Fast Track Courts so far.
13.
Be that as it may, there is no other provision in the Act which
specifically bar Civil Court's jurisdiction to deal with the disputes
mentioned above. Therefore, even in the absence of Fast Track
Courts being established as contemplated under Section 15, there
is no bar for one to approach competent civil court and raise
dispute or initiate proceedings for recovery of outstanding loans.
14.
It is fairly now well settled in law that unless there is a specific
bar or exclusion of civil court's jurisdiction, one would have inherent
right to approach Civil Court for redressal of grievance.
15.
In South Delhi Municipal Corporation case1, the Hon'ble
Apex Court, while dealing with aforesaid jurisdictional aspect, after
considering the earlier judgments, reiterated the law as under:
“7. There is an inherent right to approach a civil court. The bar
on a civil court's jurisdiction is not to be readily or lightly inferred.
The jurisdiction of civil courts can be excluded by an express
provision of law or a clear intendment in such law.
Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford
[Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, (1859) 6
CBNS 336 : 141 ER 486] resolved the dispute pertaining to the
bar on jurisdiction of civil courts, in the following manner: (ER p.
495)
“One is where there was a liability existing at common law,
and that liability is affirmed by a statute which gives a special
and peculiar form of remedy different from the remedy which
existed at common law: there, unless the statute contains
words which expressly or by necessary implication exclude
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
the common law remedy the party suing has his election to
pursue either that or the statutory remedy. The second class
of cases is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely,
but provides no particular form of remedy: there, the party
can only proceed by action at common law. But there is a
third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is
created by a statute which at the same time gives a special
and particular remedy for enforcing it. … The remedy
provided by the statute must be followed and it is not
competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to
cases of the second class.”
8. In a case arising under the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Privy
Council in Secy. of State for India v. Mask & Co. [Secy. of State
for India v. Mask & Co., 1940 SCC OnLine PC 10 : (1939-40)
67 IA 222 : AIR 1940 PC 105] observed as follows: (SCC
OnLine PC)
“… It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the
civil courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such
exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly
implied. It is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so
excluded, the civil courts have jurisdiction to examine into
cases where the provisions of the Act have not been
complied with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in
conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial
procedure.”
9. Section 17 of the Madhya Bharat Sales Tax Act, 1950 barred
the jurisdiction of any court in matters pertaining to
assessments made under the Act. The recovery of sales tax
under the said Act was the subject-matter of civil suits filed by
the assessees. The State objected to the maintainability of the
civil suits on the ground that jurisdiction of civil court was barred.
After taking note of several judgments of this Court on the point
of ouster of jurisdiction of the civil courts, Hidayatullah, J.
in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. [Dhulabhai v. State of M.P.,
(1968) 3 SCR 662 at p. 682: AIR 1969 SC 78] observed as
follows: (AIR pp. 89-90, para 32)
“(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the
special tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to
be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil
courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however,
does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the
particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental
principles of judicial procedure.
(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the
court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to
find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided
may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction
of the civil court.
Where there is no express exclusion the examination
of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find
out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the
inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to
see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and
provides for the determination of the right or liability and
further lays down that all questions about the said right and
liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted,
and whether remedies normally associated with actions in
civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not.
(3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra
vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under
that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question
on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals.
(4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or
the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a
suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for
refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the
Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a
suit.
(5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for
refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or
illegally collected a suit lies.
(6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart
from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities
and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are
declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the
particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act
must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry.
(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not
readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down
apply.”
10. A perusal of the relevant provisions of the Act would show
that there is no express bar on the jurisdiction of courts.
However, Section 169 of the Act provides for an appeal to the
HCJ & CGR, J
W.P. Nos.12928, 12929 &
13743 of 2011
Municipal Taxation Tribunal. Section 171 of the Act provides
that the order of the Municipal Taxation Tribunal in the appeal
filed by the assessee shall be final. According to the
Corporation, the aforementioned sections, read together, create
a bar on the jurisdiction of civil courts.
11. Any person having a grievance that he had been wronged
or his right has been affected can approach a civil court on the
principle of “ubi jus ibi remedium” — where there is a right, there
is a remedy. As no internal remedy had been provided in
different statutes creating rights or liabilities, the ordinary civil
courts had to examine the grievances in the light of those
statutes. With the advent of a “Welfare State”, it was realised
that enactments creating liabilities in respect of payment of
taxes, obligations after vesting of estates and conferring rights
on a class of citizens, should be complete codes by themselves.
With that object in view, forums were created under the Acts
themselves where grievances could be entertained on behalf of
the persons aggrieved [Shiv Kumar Chadha v. MCD, (1993) 3
SCC 161].
16.
In view of aforesaid observations, we are of the view that on
account of mere non-establishment of Fast Track Court in terms of
Section 15 of the Act, petitioners are not remediless, rather could
avail remedies by approaching competent civil court. Therefore, we
see no merit in these cases.
17.
Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed. No costs.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending consideration,
if any, in this case shall stand closed.
LISA GILL, CJ
CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J
SS
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