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2026:HHC:6245
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MP (M) No. 2657 of 2025
Reserved on: 26.02.2026
Date of Decision: 09.03.2026.
Penba Lama
...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh
...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
No
For the Petitioner
:
Mr
Parkshit
Advocate.
For the Respondent/State
:
Mr Lokender Kutlehria,
Additional Advocate General.
Rathour,
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 4 of 2025, dated 04.01.2025,
registered at Police Station, Baddi, District Solan, H.P., for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 109 and 333
of Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
2.
It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the
victim was running a jewellery shop. The petitioner visited his
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
2026:HHC:6245
shop on 03.01.2025 at about 8:30 PM armed with a Khukhari and
asked the victim to hand over silver, gold and other valuable
articles. The victim refused, and the petitioner attacked him
with a Khukhri. The victim sustained injuries to his hand. The
victim shouted for help. The neighbours came to the spot after
hearing the victim’s cries and rescued him from the petitioner.
The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. The
charge sheet was filed before the learned Trial Court on
06.01.2025 after the completion of the investigation. No
recovery is to be made from the petitioner. The investigation is
complete, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining
the petitioner in custody. The petitioner has been behind bars
for 11 months, and the trial has not yet commenced, which is
violative of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. The petitioner
would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may
impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be
allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.
3.
The petition is opposed by filing a status report
asserting that the victim was running a jewellery shop at Chakka
road Baddi. He was present in his shop on 03.01.2025 at about
8:30 PM. The petitioner went to his shop armed with a Khukhri
2026:HHC:6245
and asked the victim to hand over gold, silver and other valuable
articles. The victim refused, and the petitioner attacked him
with a Khukhri. The victim tried to save himself and sustained
injuries on his left hand. The petitioner again attacked the
victim, and the victim sustained injury on his right hand. The
victim shouted for help, after which the neighbours came to the
spot and rescued him from the petitioner. The police registered
the FIR and arrested the petitioner. The material objects were
seized and sent to SFSL. The petitioner and the victim were
medically examined. The DNA of the victim was found in the
pants, hood of the petitioner and the Khukhri recovered from the
petitioner. The Medical Officer stated that the nature of the
injury was grievous and could have been caused by sharp edged
weapon. The injury was dangerous to life. The police filed the
charge sheet before the Court. The matter was listed for
consideration of the charge on 21.11.2025. Hence, the status
report.
4.
I have heard Mr Prikshit Rathour, learned counsel for
the petitioner and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional
Advocate General for the respondent/State.
5.
Mr
Prikshit Rathour,
2026:HHC:6245
learned
counsel
for
the
petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he
was falsely implicated. The petitioner had sustained grievous
injuries that have not been explained by the prosecution. The
copy of his MLC was also not annexed to the chargesheet. The
non-explanation of the injuries sustained by the petitioner
shows that the prosecution has suppressed the genesis of the
incident. The petitioner was arrested on 04.01.2025, and the trial
has not yet commenced. The investigation is complete, and the
charge sheet has been filed before the Court. No fruitful purpose
would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence,
he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner
be released on bail.
6.
Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner
went to the victim’s shop and attacked him with a Khukhri after
the victim had refused to hand over gold, silver and other
valuable articles to the petitioner. The victim sustained injuries
that were dangerous to life. The offence committed by the
petitioner is heinous, and he is not entitled to bail. Hence, he
prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
7.
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I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8.
The parameters for granting bail were considered by
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC
314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page
380:(i) Broad principles for the grant of bail
56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1
SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115, Krishna Iyer, J., while
elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution
of India in the context of personal liberty of a person
under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be
considered while granting bail, which are extracted as
under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice
would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant
jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being.
[Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England”
(Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 —
Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]
9. Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant
interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only
traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into
the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which
2026:HHC:6245
suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while
on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes
on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of
evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is
therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (emphasis
supplied)
57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4
SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674, this Court highlighted various
aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing
with an application seeking bail. The same may be
extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)
“8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on
the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the
circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary
manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in
mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment which
conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means
and standing of the accused, circumstances which are
peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing
the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the
larger interests of the public or State and similar other
considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the
purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the
evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant
of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is
a genuine case against the accused and that the
prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence
in support of the charge.” (emphasis supplied)
58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan
Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688, speaking
through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising
discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same
judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be
2026:HHC:6245
granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning,
this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)
“3. Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order,
but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in
a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An
order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be
sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of
bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter
being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary
from case to case. While placement of the accused in the
society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be
a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the
same should always be coupled with other
circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature
of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the
grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the
greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though,
however, dependent on the factual matrix of the
matter.” (emphasis supplied)
59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7
SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977, this Court held that
although it is established that a court considering a bail
application cannot undertake a detailed examination of
evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the
case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail.
60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14
SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765, this Court observed that
where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the
said order would suffer from the vice of non-application
of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with
regard to the circumstances under which an order
granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors
which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant
bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High Court
granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is
2026:HHC:6245
equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its
discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a
plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to
be borne in mind while considering an application for
bail are:
(i) whether there is any prima facie or
reasonable ground to believe that the accused
had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing,
if released on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
(vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses
being influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being
thwarted by grant of bail.” (emphasis
supplied)
xxxxxxx
62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC
497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170, wherein a three-Judge Bench
of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and
casual order (Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC
OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021
SCC OnLine Pat 2857) of the High Court granting bail to the
accused, observed as follows: (Brijmani Devi v. Pappu
Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170]), SCC p.
511, para 35)
“35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an
individual is an invaluable right, at the same time
2026:HHC:6245
while considering an application for bail courts cannot
lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations
against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in
the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be
false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported
by adequate material brought on record so as to enable
a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While
considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima
facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must
be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the
case brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the
criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the
nature of punishment that would follow a conviction
vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
9.
The present petition has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
10.
The status report specifically mentions that the
petitioner had attacked the victim on his neck with a Khukhri.
The victim tried to avert the blow with his left hand, and three
fingers were cut. The petitioner again attacked him, and the
victim sustained injuries on his right hand. The copy of the MLC
(Annexure A3) shows that the Medical Officer had found
lacerated wounds over the left-hand thumb, index finger and
the middle finger, which were severely bleeding, and the distal
phalanx and bone were visible. The report of the analysis shows
that the petitioners’ hood and pants contained the blood stains
2026:HHC:6245
with the DNA of the victim. A Khukhri was also snatched from the
petitioner, which was containing the blood of the victim. All
these circumstances prima facie corroborated the victim’s
version that the petitioner had attacked him with a Khukhri and
caused injuries to him.
11.
The petitioner had entered the victim’s shop and
asked him to hand over gold, silver and valuable articles. The
victim refused, and the petitioner attacked him with a Khukhri.
This shows the scant regard for human life. The manner in
which the petitioner had attacked the victim makes the offence
grievous.
12.
The Medical Officer found that the nature of injuries
sustained by the victim was grievous and dangerous to life. This
report prima facie shows the involvement of the petitioner in the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 109 of BNS,
which is punishable with imprisonment for life. It was laid down
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public
Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115:
1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the
person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244:
2026:HHC:6245
“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true
principle around which other relevant factors must
revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person
is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different
footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage,
and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to
secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be
liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the
event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In
this perspective, the relevance of considerations is
regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the
applicant for fear of a severe sentence, if such be plausible
in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime
charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of
the highest magnitude and the punishment for it
assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may
reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no
amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at
the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law
Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J.,
concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J.
set down the order of priorities as follows: [Mod. Law Rev.
ibid., pp. 50-51]
“I do not think that an accused party is detained in
custody because of his guilt, but because there are
sufficient probable grounds for the charge against
him as to make it proper that he should be tried,
and because the detention is necessary to ensure
his appearance at trial .... It is a very important
element in considering whether the party, if
admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and
I think that in coming to a determination on that
point three elements will generally be found the
most important: the charge, the nature of the
evidence by which it is supported, and the
punishment to which the party would be liable if
convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of
wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission
2026:HHC:6245
by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the
punishment of the offence is, by law, death.”
7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the
vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be
liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears
upon the issue.
13.
Considering the nature of the offence and the
severity of the punishment, the petitioner is not entitled to bail.
14.
No other point was urged.
15.
In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it
is dismissed.
16.
The observations made hereinabove are regarding the
disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever,
on the case's merits.
9th March, 2026
(Nikita)
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
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