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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+
W.P.(C) 4788/2017
PARVEEN KUMAR
Through:
.....Petitioner
Petitioner (in-Person).
versus
EXPORT INSPECTION COUNCIL & ORS
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. L.R. Khatana, Advocate for R-1
to 4.
Mr. Nirvikar Verma, SPC with Mr.
Varun Kumar, Advocate for UOI.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
%
1.
ORDER
10.03.2026
This writ petition arises out of a service dispute which, beneath the
volume of accusation and counter-accusation, turns on a much narrower
question: whether the Petitioner’s dismissal from service for failing to join at
Tuticorin after a temporary posting order dated 11th April, 2014 can be
sustained in law, having regard to the sequence of leave requests, the charge
memorandum dated 5th June, 2014, the departmental inquiry that followed,
and the appellate order affirming the penalty. The challenge is to the order
dated 5th April, 2016 by which the Petitioner was dismissed from service and
the order dated 21st February, 2017 by which his appeal was rejected.
Facts in brief
2.
The Petitioner joined service with the Respondent on 8th November,
1989. At the relevant time, he was serving as a Technical Officer in the
Export Inspection Agency, Delhi. By order dated 11th April, 2014, he was
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relieved from EIA Delhi and directed to join at EIA Chennai, Sub-Office
Tuticorin, on what the employer described as a temporary basis owing to
administrative exigencies.
3.
The Petitioner did not join at Tuticorin. The record shows that letters
dated 6th May, 2014, 13th May, 2014, 23rd May, 2014, 27th May, 2014 and
30th May, 2014 were thereafter issued calling upon him to report for duty. In
the meantime, the Petitioner submitted a notice seeking voluntary retirement
on 16th May, 2014. He also submitted leave applications and representations,
first on 16th May, 2014 and then on 27th May, 2014, referring to his wife’s
illness, his LL.B. examinations, and the pendency of court proceedings in
Delhi. The leave application dated 16th May, 2014 was rejected on 23rd May,
2014. The request for voluntary retirement was rejected on 27 th May, 2014.
By letter dated 30th May, 2014, the Petitioner was once again directed to
report at Tuticorin, this time latest by 5th June, 2014.
4.
On 5th June, 2014, the Respondents issued a memorandum proposing
disciplinary inquiry against the Petitioner. Two articles of charge were
framed. Broadly stated, the first alleged wilful disobedience of the office
order dated 11th April, 2014 and continued failure to report at Tuticorin
despite reminders. The second alleged that the Petitioner’s communication
dated 27th May, 2014 seeking leave till 14th June, 2014 did not disclose the
nature and particulars of leave in proper form and that, despite clear notice
that action would follow if he did not report by 30 th May, 2014, he remained
absent in an unauthorised manner. The memorandum of charges reads as
under:
“Annexure I
STATEMENT OF ARTICLES OF CHARGES FRAMED AGAINST
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SHRI PRAVEEN KUMAR
Article I
Shri Praveen Kumar while functioning as Technical Officer, Export
Inspection Agency Delhi was directed by Export Inspection Council of
India vide their order bearing no EIC/D(Q/C)/8/2013-14/268/195 dated
11 April 2014 of him being temporarily transferred from EIA Delhi Head
office to EIA Chennai SO Tuticorin and thereafter vide office order of
Export Inspection Agency Delhi bearing no EIA/DEL/ADMN(8)/201415/202 dated 11 April 2014 that he shall be relieved from the services of
EIA Delhi on 11 April 2014 in the afternoon and shall join duties at EIA
Chennai SO Tuticorin in pursuance with the instructions of Export
Inspection Council. Shri Praveen Kumar was issued reminder letters by
Joint Director EIA Delhi on 6 May 2014; 13 May 2014; 23 May 2014; 27
May 2014 and 30 May 2014 to report for duties as per instructions of the
letters of EIC and EIA Delhi. Shri Praveen Kumar did not report for duties
at EIA Chennai SO Tuticorin. Shri Praveen Kumar disobeyed the said
office order (s) wilfully but also despite reminders continued to do so by
not proceeding to EIA Chennai SO Tuticorin. This act of willful
disobedience on part of Shri Praveen Kumar is violation Rule 3(1) (ii) (iii)
of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964 and amounts to grave misconduct on his
part
Article II
Shri Praveen Kumar while functioning as Technical Officer, Export
Inspection Agency Delhi was directed by Export Inspection Council of
India vide their order bearing no EIC/D(Q/C)/8/2013-14/268/195 dated
11 April 2014 of him being temporarily transferred from EIA Delhi Head
office to EIA Chennai SO Tuticorin and thereafter vide office order of
Export Inspection Agency Delhi bearing no EIA/DEL/ADMN(8)/201415/202 dated 11 April 2014 that he shall be relieved from the services of
EIA Delhi on 11 April 2014 in the afternoon and shall join duties at EIA
Chennai SO Tuticorin in pursuance with the instructions of Export
Inspection Council. Shri Praveen Kumar was issued reminder letters by
Joint Director. EIA Delhi on 6 May 2014; 13 May 2014; 23 May 2014; 27
May 2014 and 30 May 2014 to report for duties as per instructions of the
letters of EIC and EIA Delhi. Shri Praveen Kumar submitted one
intimation dated 27 May 2014 (received on 29 May 2014) in the office of
Deputy Director EIA Delhi intimating that he be granted leave till 14 June
2014. Shri Praveen Kumar neither indicated the nature of leave or the
exact details of his leave and nor was the application for leave filed in a
prescribed format, this action of Shri Praveen Kumar demonstrates that
Shri Praveen Kumar had willfully disobeyed the instructions contained in
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letter dated 11 April 2014, on trivial and extraneous grounds. It was made
amply clear to Shri Praveen Kumar in letter dated 23 May 2014; 27 May
2014 and 30 May 2014 that in case Shri Praveen Kumar does not report
for duty by 30 May 2014 suitable action would be initiated against him
under the rules. Despite clear notices Shri Kumar preferred to be absent
in an unauthorized manner and disobeyed the instructions of Office (EIC
and EIA)
This act of willful disobedience despite reminders on part of Shri Praveen
Kumar is violation Rule 3(1) (ii)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964 and
amounts to grave misconduct on his part”
5.
The Petitioner submitted a detailed reply on 14th June, 2014. In that
reply, he disputed the factual and legal foundation of the charges, referred to
the letter dated 30th May, 2014, and specifically requested that he be heard in
person. He reiterated his stand in subsequent communications as well.
6.
Eventually, by office order dated 10th February, 2015, an Inquiry
Officer and Presenting Officer were appointed. The inquiry culminated in a
report dated 1st October, 2015 holding both charges proved. The disciplinary
authority, by order dated 5th April, 2016, concurred with the report and
imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with immediate effect. The
statutory appeal preferred by the Petitioner was dismissed on 21st February,
2017.
7.
Before turning to the rival submissions, one further fact requires
notice. The posting order dated 11th April, 2014 was separately challenged
by the Petitioner in W.P.(C) 3873/2014. Dismissing that petition on 14th
January, 2015, this Court held the order was a valid “temporary posting”
issued for administrative exigencies. The Court rejected the plea of mala
fides, observing that the alleged link between the transfer and the notice
issued under Section 91 Cr.P.C. was factually unfounded. It further held that
under SR 114, a duration of less than 180 days is presumed even if the order
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is silent. These findings were affirmed in LPA 66/2015 on 31st July, 2015,
where the Division Bench noted that a “temporary transfer” is a recognized
species of transfer under S.R. 2(18). Crucially, the Division Bench observed
that since no stay was granted and the Petitioner had admittedly not joined
his post, departmental proceedings for unauthorized absence were validly
initiated.
Petitioner’s submissions
8.
The Petitioner, who appears in person, has advanced an extensive set
of submissions. Stripped of repetition and surplus allegations, his
contentions are summarised as follows:
8.1.
The Petitioner first raises a jurisdictional challenge, contending that
the proceedings were conducted under the authority of the “Export
Inspection Council of India,” an entity unrecognized by the Export (Quality
Control and Inspection) Act, 1963. He submits that the statutory body is the
“Export Inspection Council” and that the use of a non-statutory title is a
fundamental defect that renders the entire disciplinary action a legal nullity.
8.2.
The posting order dated 11th April, 2014, was not a bona fide
administrative measure but a retaliatory step taken because he had
questioned the qualifications of Respondent No. 2 and set the criminal law
in motion. The immediate issue of the posting order on the same day as a
police inquiry into the Director’s credentials discloses a design to victimize
him.
8.3.
The matter could not be treated as a case of simple wilful defiance
because he had placed his personal difficulties, including his wife’s illness
and his own LL.B. examinations, before the authorities. He contends that his
leave applications and representations dated 16 th May and 27th May, 2014,
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were bona fide requests for short accommodation necessitated by practical
shifting difficulties and not acts of indiscipline.
8.4.
Particular emphasis is placed on the office letter dated 30 th May,
2014, by which the Respondents granted him until 5 th June, 2014, to report
for duty. He submits that once this extension was granted, no disciplinary
action could be founded on a failure to report by 30 th May. The charge
memorandum nevertheless proceeded on the footing that he missed a 30 th
May deadline, which constitutes a deliberate distortion of the record that
vitiates the charge.
8.5.
The charge memorandum was unsustainable because it treated his
absence as “unauthorised” without deciding his leave requests or
considering that he had sufficient leave to his credit. His case is that the
authorities chose to convert a request for regularization into a major penalty
proceeding directed toward dismissal.
8.6.
The disciplinary process violated Rule 11(4) of the Export Inspection
Agency Employees (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1978. The
charge memorandum itself required him to indicate whether he desired a
personal hearing. In his reply dated 14th June 2014, and again thereafter, he
expressly sought such a hearing. This request was ignored, thereby
depriving him of an opportunity to explain the matter before the formal
inquiry process was initiated.
8.7.
The Petitioner then assails the appointment of the Inquiry Officer. He
contends that Rule 11(2) contemplated inquiry either by the disciplinary
authority itself or by a “public servant” appointed for that purpose. The
officer appointed in the present case was a retired officer and, therefore,
outside the scope of the rule. He also relies on contemporaneous objections
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raised by him during the inquiry and submits that the inquiry was conducted
by an authority lacking competence in law.
8.8.
The Petitioner complains of procedural unfairness, alleging that the
Inquiry Officer lacked neutrality, dictated replies for prosecution witnesses,
and failed to properly consider material defence documents. He further
points to an impermissible shifting of stand regarding the character of the
order dated 11th April, 2014, which was variously described as a temporary
posting or a temporary transfer to suit administrative convenience.
8.9.
A substantial portion of his argument rests on the communication
dated 22nd July, 2014, from the Chairman. He submits that the Chairman
reviewed the matter and recorded that his joining at Tuticorin could be
deferred for ten months so he could finish his LL.B. This development
struck at the very basis of the proceedings and should have been considered
by the Disciplinary Authority.
8.10. The Petitioner further alleges bias, submitting that the Disciplinary
Authority, the very officer whose credentials the Petitioner had challenged,
could not have acted with the detachment required by law. He contends the
proceedings were tainted by a closed mind from the outset.
8.11. On the question of punishment, he submits that dismissal from service
was wholly excessive and out of proportion to the alleged misconduct,
particularly given the pending leave requests and family difficulties. In
support, he places reliance on the principles laid down in Raghubir Singh v.
General Manager, Haryana Roadways.1
Respondents’ submissions
9.
Respondents No. 1 to 4 oppose the writ petition both on preliminary
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grounds and on merits. Their submission, in essence are as follows:
9.1.
The Petitioner is attempting to reagitate issues that stand concluded by
multiple rounds of prior litigation. The legality of the posting order dated
11th April 2014, the plea of mala fides, and the arguments regarding SR 114
were rejected by this Court in W.P.(C) 3873/2014 and affirmed in LPA
66/2015. Furthermore, the Petitioner’s challenge to the appointment of a
retired officer as the Inquiry Officer, a central pillar of the present petition,
is no longer res integra. In the Petitioner’s own case concerning a parallel
disciplinary proceeding, this Court in LPA 313/2024 (judgment dated 22nd
January, 2026) has categorically held that the appointment of a retired public
servant as an Inquiry Authority under the EIA Rules, 1978 is legally
permissible and that such an officer falls within the definition of a “public
servant.”
9.2.
The petition is an exercise in hyperbole, substituting cogent evidence
with “shocking” allegations of fraud and conspiracy. The Respondents argue
that the Petitioner has sought to personalize a straightforward disciplinary
matter by impleading officers by name and imputing malicious motives
without an iota of proof.
9.3.
The posting was an administrative necessity in public interest. The
Petitioner adopted a defiant stance from the outset, failing to report at
Tuticorin despite five written reminders issued between 6 th May, and 30th
May, 2014.
9.4.
As regards the leave applications, the Respondents submit that the
Petitioner never acquired any right to remain away from duty merely
because he made representations seeking leave. According to them, the
(2014) 10 SCC 301.
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leave request dated 16th May, 2014 was considered and rejected on 23rd
May, 2014. His request for voluntary retirement was also rejected on 27 th
May, 2014. Once leave had not been sanctioned, and the Petitioner had been
repeatedly directed to report for duty, his continued absence could
legitimately be treated as unauthorised.
9.5.
The Petitioner’s argument based on the letter dated 30th May, 2014 is
overstated. The Petitioner was given a final opportunity to join by 5 th June,
2014 and that he still did not report for duty. The core misconduct was not
confined to a single date, but consisted of continuing wilful disobedience of
the order dated 11th April, 2014 and persistent failure to report despite
repeated directions.
9.6.
On the departmental process, it is asserted that the inquiry was
conducted in strict adherence to the 1978 Rules. The Petitioner crossexamined witnesses, produced his own evidence, and submitted detailed
representations against both the inquiry report and the penalty. It is also
pointed out that the Petitioner availed the appellate remedy and was given a
personal hearing in appeal on 27th September, 2016.
9.7.
Addressing Rule 11(4), the Respondents contend that the requirement
for a personal hearing at the initial stage is not mandatory. The principles of
natural justice were satisfied as the Petitioner was granted a full opportunity
to present his case during the inquiry and was subsequently heard at length
by the Appellate Authority.
9.8.
The Chairman’s note dated 22nd July 2014 is of no assistance to the
Petitioner. The note was conditional, was not part of the inquiry record, and
could not retroactively wipe out the misconduct of failing to report for duty
since April 2014.
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9.9.
Finally, the Respondents submit that dismissal is a proportionate
penalty for a sustained and wilful refusal to serve at a designated post. They
argue that such a recalcitrant attitude by a public servant warrants the
highest degree of disciplinary action and does not call for interference in
writ jurisdiction.
Analysis and Findings
10.
In view of the prior litigation and the subsequent developments during
the pendency of this petition, the field of controversy now stands
considerably narrowed. To assess the remaining challenge on the settled
principles of judicial scrutiny, the Court must first separate the foundational
issues that have attained finality from the grounds that have been expressly
abandoned by the Petitioner.
I. Finality of the Posting Order dated 11th April, 2014
11.
A significant portion of the present petition seeks to re-litigate the
legality of the initial posting order dated 11 th April, 2014, and the alleged
mala fides behind it. However, that order was already the subject of an
exhaustive challenge in W.P.(C) 3873/2014. In dismissing that petition, this
Court explicitly rejected the Petitioner’s pleas founded on transfer policy,
the arguments based on SR 114, and the allegations of mala fides.
12.
The Division Bench, in LPA 66/2015, affirmed this reasoning and
observed that the technical debate over whether the order constituted a
“temporary posting” or “temporary transfer” had become academic, given
the Petitioner’s admitted failure to join.
13.
These decisions conclude the foundational challenge to the validity of
the 11th April, 2014 order. The Petitioner cannot be permitted to reopen
these issues indirectly by attacking the subsequent disciplinary proceedings
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on the same grounds. This Court must, therefore, proceed on the footing that
the posting order was a lawful administrative directive issued for exigency,
the challenge to which has attained absolute finality.
II. Grounds expressly not pressed (LPA 313/2024)
14.
Moreover, during the course of oral submissions, the Petitioner
expressly stated that Grounds Y, Z, and AA, which assailed the appointment
and eligibility of Shri Inder Singh as Inquiry Officer, were not being
pressed.
15.
This abandonment was a direct consequence of the judgment dated
22nd January, 2026, rendered by the Division Bench in LPA 313/2024. In
that case, which involved this very Petitioner, the Court categorically held
that the appointment of a retired public servant as an Inquiry Authority
under Rule 11(2) of the EIA Rules, 1978, is legally permissible.
16.
In light of that settled position, the challenge to the inquiry, insofar as
it rests on the alleged ineligibility of the Inquiry Officer, is treated as
abandoned and requires no further adjudication.
III. The Surviving Issues
17.
With the legality of the posting order settled and the challenge to the
Inquiry Officer withdrawn, the controversy is narrowed to the procedural
and substantive validity of the disciplinary proceedings themselves. The
issues that survive for adjudication are:
(i)
Whether the use of the nomenclature “Export Inspection Council of
India” instead of the statutory “Export Inspection Council” renders the
proceedings a nullity.
(ii)
Whether the alleged denial of a personal hearing at the pre-inquiry
stage, as contemplated under Rule 11(4), vitiates the process.
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(iii)
Whether the Charge Memorandum is defective for citing a 30th May
deadline despite the Respondents’ own letter granting an extension until 5th
June.
(iv)
Whether the communication dated 22nd July, 2014, suggesting a ten-
month deferment of the posting, effectively superseded the disciplinary
proceedings.
(v)
Whether the Petitioner’s pending leave requests and available leave
credit prevent his absence from being categorized as “unauthorized.”
(vi)
Whether the ultimate penalty of dismissal is so disproportionate to the
alleged misconduct as to warrant interference.
IV. Whether the proceedings are vitiated because they were taken in the
name of “Export Inspection Council of India”
18.
The Petitioner has sought to build a jurisdictional challenge around
the use of the expression “Export Inspection Council of India” in the charge
memorandum, the disciplinary order and the appellate order, whereas,
according to him, the statutory body recognised under the governing
enactment is “Export Inspection Council”.
19.
This submission, in the facts of the present case, cannot be accepted.
The material on record shows that the Petitioner’s service lay within the
EIC/EIA structure and that the impugned steps were taken by officers acting
under that service framework. The Petitioner was throughout dealing with
the very establishment under which he served. No real case is made out that
the charge memorandum, the inquiry, the disciplinary decision or the
appellate decision were taken by a stranger to the service relationship or by
an authority lacking disciplinary competence in substance.
20.
Mere variation in nomenclature, absent demonstrated failure of
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competence or prejudice, cannot by itself vitiate proceedings of this nature.
The matter is one of description, not of jurisdictional nullity. This ground
must, therefore, fail.
V. Whether denial of a separate personal hearing before inquiry vitiates the
proceedings
21.
The Petitioner relies on Rule 11(4) and on the fact that the
memorandum dated 5th June, 2014 called upon him to state whether he
desired to be heard in person. He submits that he expressly sought such
hearing in his reply dated 14th June, 2014 and again thereafter, yet no
personal hearing was granted before the inquiry was set in motion.
22.
The submission does not carry the matter far enough to warrant
interference. The Petitioner submitted a detailed written defence on 14th
June, 2014. He later submitted a further reply dated 27th July, 2014. A
regular inquiry was then held. He participated in that inquiry. He crossexamined the management witnesses. He examined himself as a defence
witness. He filed a response to the Presenting Officer’s brief. After the
inquiry report, he submitted a further representation. He thereafter filed a
statutory appeal and was also heard in person at the appellate stage on 27 th
September, 2016.
23.
In these circumstances, even assuming that the Petitioner desired a
separate oral hearing at the initial stage, the record does not disclose such
prejudice as would justify setting aside the entire proceedings on that
account. The rule no doubt required the employee to be given opportunity to
state whether he wished to be heard in person. But the present case did not
stop at that stage. A full inquiry followed, and the Petitioner availed the
opportunities provided therein. The principles of natural justice are
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concerned with fairness in substance. On the record of this case, it cannot be
said that the Petitioner was denied a fair opportunity to defend himself.
VI. Whether the charge memorandum is vitiated by the reference to 30 th
May, 2014 despite the letter dated 30th May, 2014 granting time till 5th June,
24.
This is the point on which the Petitioner emphasised, and it therefore
requires closer examination.
25.
It is correct that by letter dated 30th May, 2014, the Petitioner was
directed to report for duty at EIA Chennai, Sub-Office Tuticorin, latest by
5th June, 2014. It is equally correct that Article II of the charge memorandum
refers to, inter alia, 30th May, 2014 and states that the Petitioner had been
made aware that, if he did not report for duty by 30 th May, 2014, suitable
action would follow. On that basis, the Petitioner submits that the charge is
fundamentally defective.
26.
This submission cannot be accepted in the broad manner in which it is
advanced. The charge memorandum must be read as a whole. Its substance
is not confined to a single date. The gravamen of the charge is the
Petitioner’s continued failure to comply with the order dated 11 th April,
2014 and his continued non-reporting despite repeated reminders. Article I,
in particular, alleges wilful disobedience of the posting order and continued
failure to report for duty despite the reminder letters dated 6 th May, 2014,
13th May, 2014, 23rd May, 2014, 27th May, 2014 and 30th May, 2014. That
article does not rest exclusively on the date of 30th May, 2014.
27.
Article II, though not properly articulated in this regard, cannot be
read in isolation from the rest of the memorandum and the accompanying
material. The Petitioner was fully aware of the case he had to meet. Indeed,
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in his own reply dated 14th June, 2014, he specifically addressed the letter
dated 30th May, 2014, the date of 5th June, 2014, and the grievance he sought
to build upon that circumstance. There was, therefore, no uncertainty as to
the factual basis on which the Respondents were proceeding.
28.
Pertinently, the Petitioner admittedly did not report for duty by 5th
June, 2014 either. Nor did he report thereafter. The alleged misconduct was,
therefore, not a one-day default resting on a stray or isolated date. It was the
Petitioner’s continuing refusal to comply with the posting order and the
repeated directions issued thereafter. In that setting, the reference to 30 th
May, 2014 in Article II does not go to the root of the matter in the manner
suggested by the Petitioner. It neither displaces Article I nor establishes such
prejudice as would vitiate the proceedings.
29.
The Petitioner also contended that no cause of action could arise on
5th June, 2014 itself. That submission cannot be accepted in the context of a
case of continuing non-compliance, which had commenced after the order
dated 11th April, 2014 and continued even beyond 5th June, 2014.
30.
The Court is, therefore, not persuaded that either the charge
memorandum or the findings ultimately returned in the disciplinary
proceedings are liable to be set aside merely because Article II refers to 30 th
May, 2014.
VII. Whether the leave requests prevent the absence from being treated as
unauthorised
31.
The Petitioner next contends that he had genuine personal difficulties,
had leave to his credit, and had sought only short accommodation. On that
basis, he submits that the matter ought not to have been treated as one of
unauthorised absence or grave misconduct.
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32.
The record does show that the Petitioner submitted leave applications
and representations. It also shows that his leave request dated 16 th May,
2014 was rejected on 23rd May, 2014. His request for voluntary retirement
was rejected on 27th May, 2014. Thereafter, by letter dated 30th May, 2014,
he was again directed to join at Tuticorin by 5th June, 2014.
33.
Once leave had not been sanctioned, and once the order of posting
had already survived challenge in the earlier round before this Court, the
Petitioner could not assume unto himself a right to remain away from duty
and yet insist that such absence be treated as regular merely because he had
submitted representations seeking leave. The fact that he referred to family
difficulties, examinations and other personal circumstances may explain the
position he adopted. It does not, however, transmute non-compliance of an
office order into lawful absence.
34.
The Petitioner’s reliance on Raghubir Singh is misplaced. In that
case, the Supreme Court treated unauthorized absence as leave without
wages because the workman faced a “genuine constraint”, i.e., judicial
custody, and had been assured reinstatement upon acquittal. In the present
case, the Petitioner faced no physical or legal impossibility of performance.
His absence was a choice to withhold compliance with a posting order that
had already attained judicial finality. Raghubir Singh does not mandate
regularization where the conduct in question amounts to deliberate
administrative insubordination. Equitable considerations meant to protect a
falsely implicated workman cannot be invoked to justify wilful defiance of
lawful orders.
VIII. Effect of the Chairman’s note dated 22nd July, 2014
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35.
The Petitioner placed considerable reliance on the communication
dated 22nd July, 2014 made on his representation to the Chairman. The note
records that he may be allowed to draw GPF from EIA Kolkata irrespective
of place of posting and, further, that “based upon undertaking from him that
he will withdraw the court case and that he will join in Tuticorin
immediately after completion of his LLB Course, his joining for posting
may be deferred for next ten months.”
36.
This noting cannot carry the Petitioner to the result he seeks. To begin
with, it is plainly conditional in nature. The contemplated deferment was not
absolute. It was made dependent upon an undertaking from the Petitioner
that he would withdraw the court case and join at Tuticorin immediately
after completion of the LL.B. course. Nothing has been shown on record to
establish that the condition was fulfilled in the manner contemplated or that
the noting thereafter matured into an operative order modifying,
superseding, or recalling the earlier posting order.
37.
There is also a more basic difficulty in the Petitioner’s reliance on this
document. The noting is dated 22nd July, 2014, whereas the charge
memorandum had already been issued on 5th June, 2014. The misconduct
alleged in the memorandum related to the Petitioner’s failure to report
pursuant to the order dated 11th April, 2014 and the repeated reminders
issued thereafter. A subsequent internal noting of the kind in question cannot
retrospectively efface that earlier conduct.
38.
At the highest, the said noting might have been invoked as a
circumstance bearing on mitigation. It does not, however, subvert the legal
foundation of the charge, nor does it render the disciplinary proceedings non
est.
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IX. Whether the findings or punishment warrant interference in writ
jurisdiction
39.
This Court must finally consider the matter in the light of the settled
limitations on judicial review of disciplinary action. The Court is not sitting
in appeal over the disciplinary authority. It is concerned with legality,
procedural fairness, perversity, and punishment so disproportionate as to
shock the conscience.2
40.
In the present case, once the challenge to the Inquiry Officer stands
abandoned, and once the legality of the posting order dated 11th April, 2014
and the plea of mala fides behind it stand concluded against the Petitioner in
the earlier round, the surviving grounds are not sufficient to displace the
disciplinary action.
41.
The Petitioner did not report at Tuticorin despite repeated directions.
His leave request was not sanctioned. His challenge to the posting order
failed before this Court and again in appeal. Yet he continued to withhold
compliance. The inquiry found the charge proved. The disciplinary authority
accepted that finding. The appellate authority declined to interfere. The
Court does not find perversity in the core conclusion that the Petitioner had
wilfully failed to comply with the posting order and remained absent without
authority.
42.
Nor is the Court persuaded that the penalty of dismissal is liable to be
interfered with on proportionality grounds. The misconduct was not treated
by the employer as a mere technical lapse, but as sustained and deliberate
defiance of a lawful office order. Whether another authority might have
imposed a lesser penalty is not the test. The question is whether the penalty
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imposed is so outrageously disproportionate as to justify interference under
Article 226. On the facts of this case, that threshold is not crossed.
X. Conclusion
43.
The petition, in substance, seeks to reopen what already stood decided
against the Petitioner in the earlier round and to convert a case of persistent
non-compliance with a lawful posting order into a case of institutional
illegality. The record does not support that exercise.
44.
The grounds directed against the appointment and eligibility of the
Inquiry Officer having been expressly abandoned, and the remaining
grounds being devoid of merit, no case for interference is made out with
either the disciplinary order dated 5th April, 2016 or the appellate order dated
21st February, 2017.
45.
The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
MARCH 10, 2026
as
UOI & Ors. v. P. Gunashekaran (2015) 2 SCC 610.
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