The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
19. It is directed that status quo shall be maintained until the learned Arbitrator adjudicates upon the present Applications which are, as stated, to be treated as Applications filed under Section 17 of the Act.
20. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with all pending Application(s), if any, are disposed of in aforesaid terms.
Full Judgment Text
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 03.02.2026
+
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025
PAPRIKA KITCHEN THROUGH ITS PROPIETOR
PRAVEEN GANDHI
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Manoj V George, Ms.
Shilpa Liza George, Mr. Nasib
Masih and Mr. Nishant
Mankoo, Advocates.
versus
THE REIYUKAI
Through:
+
.....Respondent
Mr. Varun Sharma, Mr.
Vijender Parmar and Mr. Jayant
Dayal, Advocates.
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 12/2026
THE REIYUKAI
.....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Varun Sharma, Mr.
Vijender Parmar and Mr. Jayant
Dayal, Advocates.
versus
M/S PAPRIKA KITCHEN
Through:
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:34
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025 & connected matters
.....Respondent
Mr. Manoj V George, Ms.
Shilpa Liza George, Mr. Nasib
Masih and Mr. Nishant
Mankoo, Advocates.
+
ARB.P. 223/2026
THE REIYUKAI
.....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Varun Sharma, Mr.
Vijender Parmar and Mr. Jayant
Dayal, Advocates.
versus
M/S PAPRIKA KITCHEN
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Manoj V George, Ms.
Shilpa Liza George, Mr. Nasib
Masih and Mr. Nishant
Mankoo, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
1.
The present Petition bearing ARB.P. 223/2026 has been filed
under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
[“Act”] seeking appointment of a Sole Arbitrator whereas O.M.P.(I)
(COMM.) 510/2025 and O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 12/2026 [“present
Applications”] have been filed by the parties, respectively, under
Section 9(1)(ii) of the Act seeking urgent interim reliefs at the prearbitration stage with ad-interim relief.
2.
Learned counsel for the M/s Paprika Kitchen has also handed
over, in this Court, two cheques for a sum of Rs. 7,50,000/- each,
bearing no. 000256 and 000257 dated 10.12.2025 and 10.01.2026,
respectively, in favour of The Reiyukai, drawn on ICICI bank towards
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:34
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025 & connected matters
the rents of November and December, to the learned counsel.
3.
Learned counsel appearing for the parties are ad idem that the
matter may be referred to adjudication by a learned Sole Arbitrator.
4.
However, learned counsel for the parties request that their
present Applications under Section 9 of the Act may be treated to be
Applications under Section 17 of the Act and adjudicated at the
earliest by the learned Arbitrator.
5.
The material on record indicates that the parties entered into a
Management
Operations
Agreement
dated
28.04.2025
[“Agreement”]. Clause 21(i) of the Agreement envisages the
Arbitration Clause. The same is reproduced herein under for ready
reference:
“21. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
i. Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement
shall be first resolved through mutual discussion. Failing which, it
shall be referred to arbitration by a sole arbitrator appointed
mutually in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. The venue of arbitration shall be Delhi, and the language
shall be English”
6.
The material on record indicates that the Notice for invocation
of the said Arbitration Clause of the Agreement under the provisions
of Section 21 of the Act was duly issued on 25.12.2025 and is
annexed to the present Petition as Document-3.
7.
However, the Respondent did not reply to the said Section 21
Notice.
8.
This Court is cognizant of the scope of interference at the stage
of a Petition under Section 11 of the Act. The law with respect to the
scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act
has been fairly well settled. A Coordinate bench of this Court, in
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:34
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025 & connected matters
Pradhaan Air Express Pvt Ltd v. Air Works India Engineering Pvt
Ltd [2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022], has extensively dealt with the
scope of interference at the stage of Section 11. The Court held as
under:“9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning,while considering all earlier
pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of
seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 & the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re has held that scope of inquiry at the
stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent of
prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing
else.
10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no.114 in the case
of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd that observations made in
Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., and adopted in NTPC
Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd.,that the jurisdiction of the referral court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re:
Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no.114 in the case of SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd reads as under:“114. In view of the observations made by this Court
in In Re: Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of
enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is
limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the
arbitration agreement, and nothing else. For this
reason, we find it difficult to hold that the
observations made in Vidya Drolia (supra) and
adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that the
jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the
issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11
extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the
subsequent decision in In Re: Interplay (supra).”
11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have
been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is
equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:34
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025 & connected matters
case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P)
Ltd., however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11
must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time-consuming and
costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated
such as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim
through arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the
limited scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the
interest of the parties who might be constrained to participate in
the arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal
eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be
borne by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have
abused the process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to
the other parties to the arbitration.
12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the
adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent and
malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration
proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts of
Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:“20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 : 2024 INSC 532] ,
frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which the
referral court should not decide at the stage of Section
11 as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent
to adjudicate the same.
21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the
limited jurisdiction of the referral courts under
Section 11 must not be misused by parties in order to
force other parties to the arbitration agreement to
participate in a time consuming and costly arbitration
process. This is possible in instances, including but
not limited to, where the claimant canvasses the
adjudication of non-existent and mala fide claims
through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of
judicial interference of the referral courts with the
interests of the parties who might be constrained to
participate in the arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral
Tribunal may direct that the costs of the arbitration
shall be borne by the party which the Tribunal
ultimately finds to have abused the process of law and
caused unnecessary harassment to the other party to
the arbitration. Having said that, it is clarified that the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:34
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025 & connected matters
aforesaid is not to be construed as a determination of
the merits of the matter before us, which the Arbitral
Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to determine.”
13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section 11
proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to the
extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of
the referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act
and further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally confined
to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural
safeguards but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the
arbitral process. Any transgression beyond this limited judicial
threshold would not only contravene the legislative intent
enshrined in Section 8 and Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk
undermining the sanctity and efficiency of arbitration as a
preferred mode of dispute resolution. The referral Court must,
therefore, exercise restraint and refrain from venturing into the
merits of the dispute or adjudicating issues that fall squarely within
the jurisdictional domain of the arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen
that the scope of enquiry at the referral stage is conservative in
nature. A similar view has also been expressed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S.
Patel”.
9.
In view of the fact that disputes have arisen inter se the parties,
there being an arbitration clause stipulated in the Agreement and as
the respective parties are ad idem that the matter may be referred to
adjudication by a learned Sole Arbitrator, there is no impediment in
appointing the sole Arbitrator.
10.
Ms. Nisha Bhambhani, Advocate, is appointed as the sole
Arbitrator, to adjudicate upon the disputes inter se the parties.
11.
Learned Arbitrator is requested to enter into the reference and
adjudicate upon the present Applications filed under Section 9 of the
Act, treating them as Applications under Section 17 of the Act, at the
earliest, since it is contended that continuance of the cooking activities
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:34
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025 & connected matters
being carried out by M/s Paprika Kitchen constitutes a fire hazard.
12.
The said proceedings shall be conducted under the aegis of the
Delhi International Arbitration Centre [“DIAC”] and would abide by
the rules and regulations of the DIAC.
13.
The Registry is directed to send a copy of this order to the
learned Arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through email.
14.
The learned sole Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the Act.
15.
The learned sole Arbitrator shall be entitled to fee in accordance
with the Fourth Schedule of the Act or as may otherwise be agreed to
between the parties and the learned sole Arbitrator.
16.
The parties shall share the learned sole Arbitrator’s fee and
arbitral costs, equally.
17.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
18.
Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy
between the parties.
19.
It is directed that status quo shall be maintained until the
learned Arbitrator adjudicates upon the present Applications which
are, as stated, to be treated as Applications filed under Section 17 of
the Act.
20.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with all pending
Application(s), if any, are disposed of in aforesaid terms.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:34
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025 & connected matters
21.
A photocopy of the Order passed today be kept in the connected
matters.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 23, 2026/ v/her/dj
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:34
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 510/2025 & connected matters
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