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2026:HHC:46963
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWP No.19625 of 2025
Reserved on: 01.10.2026
Date of decision: 28.10.2026
Uploaded on: 28.10.2026
Pankaj Rai.
...Petitioner.
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr.
…Respondents.
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bhupesh Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1
Yes.
:
Mr. P.S. Patwalia and Mr. Shrawan
Dogra, Senior Advocates with Mr. Tejasvi
Dogra, Ms. Harshika, Ms. Ridhima Karol,
Advocates.
For the respondent(s) :
Mr. Rajiv Atma Ram, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Brijesh Khosla, Advocate with Mr.
Shalabh Thakur, Assistant Advocate
General for respondents-State.
For the petitioner
Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge
Petitioner, being aggrieved by the action of the
respondents by way of rejection of the panel recommended by the
Selection Committee for appointment to the post of Chairman,
Himachal Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter
referred to as the ‘State Commission’), vide decision dated
Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes
-2-
16.09.2025 (Annexure P-6), notified vide Notification dated
30.09.2025 (Annexure P-4), has approached this Court seeking the
following substantial reliefs:“I.
Impugned notification dated 30.09.2025 (Annexure P-4),
as well as the impugned order dated 16.09.2025
(Annexure P-6) whereby, the respondent no. 2 cancelled
selection process for the post of Chairman, HP Electricity
Regulatory Commission in pursuance to the advertisement
dated 14.08.2025, be quashed and set aside.
II.
Respondents No. 1 & 2 may be directed to conclude the
selection process for the post of Chairman, HP Electricity
Regulatory Commission (HPERC) in strict adherence to
the statutory mandate and notified eligibility criteria
ensuring that the petitioner's candidature is duly evaluated
in a fair and time-bound manner.”
Admitted Facts
2.
Respondent-State,
through
the
Department
of
Multipurpose Power Projects (MPP) & Power, Government of
Himachal Pradesh, invited applications from interested and eligible
Indian nationals for one post of Chairman in the Himachal Pradesh
Electricity Regulatory Commission (hereinafter referred as ‘State
Commission’), as per the provisions contained in Section 82(5) and
Section 89 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as
‘2003 Act’) vide advertisement dated 14.08.2025 (Annexure P-1),
with the closing date of 30.08.2025 for submitting applications to be
addressed to the Secretary (Power) to the Government of Himachal
Pradesh.
-3-
3.
Apart from notifying the requirement of submitting a bio-
data with complete details as notified in the advertisement, along
with the mandatory undertaking and declaration, it was also notified
regarding the qualifications for appointment to the post of Chairman
as under:“The qualification for appointment of Chairman of State
Commission and their terms of office and conditions of service are
provided in section 84 and 89 of the Electricity Act, 2003,
respectively. Salary, allowances & other conditions of Chairman
have been provided in the Himachal Pradesh Electricity
Regulatory Commission (Salary, Allowances and other conditions
of Service of Chairman and members) Rules 2006 notified on
30.11.2006 with amendment dated 6th April, 2017 and 7.1.2025.
As per Section 84 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the Chairman
and the Members of the State Commission shall be a person of
ability, integrity and standing who has adequate knowledge of, and
has shown capacity in, dealing with problems relating to
engineering, finance, commerce, economics, law or management.
The Chairman and the Members of the State Commission shall
not hold any other office as provided in sub-section (3) of Section
84 of the Electricity Act, 2003.”
4.
In pursuance to advertisement, the petitioner, amongst
other 16 applicants, applied for the post of Chairman of the State
Commission.
5.
The petitioner, as on date, is serving as Deputy Director
(Administration), Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and
Research (PGIMER), Chandigarh, since 18.12.2023. His application
-4-
was processed and forwarded to the Secretary (Personnel) to the
Government of Himachal Pradesh, vide forwarding letter dated
28.08.2025 sent by the Senior Administrative Officer (NF), PGIMER,
Chandigarh (Annexure P-2), a copy whereof was also endorsed to
the Director, INI-II Section, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare
(MoHFW), New Delhi, for information.
6.
In his application, the petitioner submitted complete
details of his designations and places of posting since May 1993 and
works looked after as detailed therein, which are as under:S.
Complete
Name
of Period
Designation & Organization
(From)
No. Place of Posting
Period
(To)
Nature of Duties
1.
Sr. Engineer
May, 1993
June, 1998
To look after the work of Stacker and
Reclaimer right from construction to
commissioning to operation and
other allied works.
2.
Asstt. Engineer, Govt.
PHSEB
Himachal
Pradesh
of June, 1998
Oct., 2000
Planning, designing and preparation
of specifications of hydro mechanical
components (hydraulic gates &
hoists, penstocks, trash racks, butter
fly valves, electric overhead
travelling cranes, steel liners etc.).
3.
Trainee HAS
Govt.
Himachal
Pradesh
of Nov., 2000
Aug., 2001
Underwent training of Himachal
Administrative Services.
4.
Asstt. Collector Govt.
cum BDO, Pooh
Himachal
Pradesh
of 28.08.2001
30.06.2002 • To supervise the
development of the block.
Ambuja Cement
overall
• To ensure the completion of works
of various heads in a given time
frame.
• To monitor funds and to ensure
proper utilization of funds.
-5-
• To coordinate with all the
departments at the block level as
Executive Officer to Panchayat
Samiti.
5.
Sub Divisional Govt.
Magistrate,
Himachal
Keylong
Pradesh
of 01.07.2002
07.04.2003
To maintain law and order,
coordination with allied departments,
licensing & registration work,
Handling relief operations, Court &
Revenue matters, Enquiries, Protocol
duty, Inspection of development
works, Organization of Fairs etc.
6.
Sub Divisional Govt.
Magistrate,
Himachal
Sundernagar
Pradesh
of 08.04.2003
15.07.2007
To maintain law and order,
coordination with allied departments,
licensing & registration work,
Handling relief operations, Court &
Revenue matters, Enquiries, Protocol
duty, Inspection of development
works, Organization of Fairs etc.
7.
Sub Divisional Govt.
Himachal
Magistrate,
Pradesh
Ghumarwin
of 16.07.2007
26.02.2008
To maintain law and order,
coordination with allied departments,
licensing & registration work,
Handling relief operations, Court &
Revenue matters, Enquiries, Protocol
duty, Inspection of development
works, Organization of Fairs etc.
8.
Addl. Director (IT) Govt.
Himachal
Pradesh
of March,
04.02.2009
To supervise, coordinate and monitor
the progress of various projects
undergoing in IT department.
9.
Sub Divisional Govt.
Magistrate,
Himachal
Hamirpur
Pradesh
of 05.02.2009
06.05.2012
To maintain law and order,
coordination with allied departments,
licensing & registration work,
Handling relief operations, Court &
Revenue matters, Enquiries, Protocol
duty, Inspection of development
works, Organization of Fairs etc.
10.
Govt.
Additional
Himachal
District
Magistrate, Mandi Pradesh
of 07.05.2012
01.11.2014
• To maintain law and order.
• Monitoring of traffic issues.
• Disposal of appeals/court cases.
• Review of various schemes of Govt.
• Land related matters.
• Public Redressal matters.
• Implementation/monitoring of egovernance centres.
-6-
11.
Commissioner,
Municipal
Corporation,
Shimla
Govt.
Himachal
Pradesh
of 03.11.2014
April, 2017
To implement various provisions of
HPMC Act, 1994 and the Bye-laws
framed thereunder and other
instructions issued by the
Government from time to time. In
addition,
monitoring
and
implementation
of
various
State/Central Govt. Schemes and
programmes.
12.
Govt.
Managing
Himachal
Director,
National Health Pradesh
Mission
of April, 2017
July, 2018
Involved in Planning, Management and
implementation of various schemes
and projects of Health Department
and also monitoring various projects
under National Health Mission.
13.
Commissioner,
Govt.
MC, Shimla & Himachal
Pradesh
Managing
Director and CEO,
Shimla Smart
City Ltd.
of 22.07.2018
22.10.2020
• To implement various provisions of
HPMC Act, 1994 and the Bye-laws
framed thereunder and other
instructions issued by the
Government from time to time. In
addition,
monitoring
and
implementation
of
various
State/Central Govt. Schemes and
programmer.
• To accomplish the project of Shimla
Smart City by following the provisions
of HPMC Act, 1994 and other
instructions issued by the
State/Central Government.
14.
Deputy
Commissioner,
Lahaul Spiti
Govt.
Himachal
Pradesh
of 22.10.2020
20.06.2021
• To maintain Law & Order in the
District, Disaster Manager, Protocol
duties etc.
• To monitor the general working of
different government schemes being
implemented in the district.
• To actively coordinate with
different government departments &
NGOs in order to maintain smooth
functioning of Administration.
15.
Deputy
Commissioner,
Bilaspur
Govt.
Himachal
Pradesh
of 28.06.2021
23.02.2023
• To maintain Law & Order in the
District, Disaster Manager, Protocol
duties etc.
• To monitor the general working of
different government schemes being
implemented in the district as well as
monitoring of National Highway
Project and AIIMS, Bilaspur.
-7-
• To actively coordinate with
different government departments &
NGOs in order to maintain smooth
functioning of Administration.
• As Commissioner of Temple Trust,
to ensure that the issues of pilgrims
and other stake holders are
addressed
and
continuous
development is come out for the
convenience of all.
16.
Special
Secretary
(Education)
17.
Deputy Director Postgraduate
18.12.2023
(Admn.)
Institute
of
Medical
Education
&
Research,
Chandigarh
Govt.
Himachal
Pradesh
of 06.03.2023
15.12.2023
Involved in Planning, Management and
implementation of various schemes
and projects of the Education
Department.
Till date
• Looking after the administration,
including judicial matters, service
matters of 9000 employees and
management of the Institute. Also
working as Appellate Authority under
the RTI Act.
• Supervising the Engineering
Services including Civil, Electrical,
Public Health, Refrigeration and
construction of upcoming Centres.
• Working as Estate Officer also and
exercising the powers under the
Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act.
7.
Petitioner also submitted a letter of willingness to resign
from his existing post and to join as Chairman of the State
Commission, if selected, as required under Clause (C) of the
advertisement, along with a point-wise undertaking and declaration
on four points as required under Clause (D) of the notification,
including a declaration that he did not have any financial or other
interest likely to affect prejudicially his functions as Chairman of the
State Commission.
-8-
8.
Accepting the application of the petitioner received from
PGIMER, Chandigarh, the petitioner was called for interview before
the Selection Committee on 14.09.2025, vide call letter dated
06.09.2025 (Annexure P-3). Out of 16 applicants, only 12 applicants,
including petitioner, appeared before the Selection Committee for
interview on 14.09.2025.
9.
After perusal of the applications submitted by the
applicants,
followed
qualifications
and
by
examination
experience,
of
their
educational
interaction
with
them,
due
assessment of their ability and knowledge, and after due
deliberation, the Selection Committee unanimously, keeping in view
the requirements prescribed under Section 84(1) of the Electricity
Act, 2003 and on the basis of particulars furnished in the bio-data as
well as experience from their previous assignments and job profiles,
recommended two candidates, namely the petitioner and one Rajiv
Sood, finding them suitable for the post of Chairman of the State
Commission, but in no order of preference.
10.
The proceedings of the meeting of the Selection
Committee held on 14.09.2025 making such recommendations are
as under: “PROCEEDINGS OF THE MEETING HELD ON 14.9.2025 AT
10:00 AM FOR THE SELECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN,
-9-
HIMACHAL
PRADESH
ELECTRICITY
COMMISSION (HPERC), SHIMLA
REGULATORY
A meeting of the Selection Committee for the selection of
the Chairman, HPERC was held on 14.09.2025. The Chairman of
the Selection Committee, Justice V.K. Sharma (Retd.), and the
Co-Member, Shri Jishnu Barua, attended the meeting in person.
2.
At the outset, the Special Secretary (MPP & Power) to the
Government of Himachal Pradesh placed before the Selection
Committee the advertisement dated 14th August, 2025, issued for
inviting applications to the post of Chairman, HPERC, and
apprised the Committee that the last date for submission of
applications was 30th August, 2025. The Committee perused the
said advertisement.
3.
The Special Secretary further informed the Committee that
16 applications had been received for the post of Chairman,
HPERC. He apprised the Committee of the educational
qualifications and experience of the applicants, and placed before
it the applications received, along with the bio-data furnished by
each applicant.
4.
The Selection Committee was apprised that the Chief
Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh is a member
of the Committee, as notified vide Notification dated 25.08.2025.
It was, however, brought to the notice of the Committee that Shri
Prabodh Saxena, presently holding the charge of Chief Secretary,
Government of Himachal Pradesh, has submitted his application
for the post of Chairman, HPERC, and has, therefore, withdrawn
from the Selection Committee.
5.
The Committee took note that Section 85(6) of the
Electricity Act, 2003 stipulates that no appointment of the
Chairman or any other Member shall be invalid merely by reason
of any vacancy in the Selection Committee. In view of the above,
the withdrawal of the Chief Secretary, Government of Himachal
Pradesh, from the Selection Committee was accepted. It was
accordingly observed that the Selection Committee shall function
as a two-member Committee.
6.
It was also apprised that in the advertisement, the
candidates were asked to submit a declaration in the form of
undertaking alongwith their applications on the points that the
applicant does not have any financial or other interest likely to
affect prejudicially his/her function as Chairman, HPERC; whether
any criminal case has been registered against the applicant;
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whether the applicant has been charge-sheeted for any criminal
offence; and whether the applicant has been convicted by any
competent court for any criminal offence. Further, it was apprised
that all the applicants have submitted their applications alongwith
the declaration.
7.
Out of the 16 applicants who had applied for the post of
Chairman HPERC, only 12 applicants, as per Annexure-I,
appeared before the Selection Committee. After perusal of the
applications submitted by the applicants, followed by examination
of their educational qualifications and experience, interaction with
them, due assessment of their abilities and knowledge, and after
due deliberations, both Members of the Selection Committee were
unanimous in their opinion that, keeping in view the requirements
prescribed under section 84(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003 for the
post of Chairman, HPERC, and on the basis of the particulars
furnished in the bio-data, as well as the applicant's experience
from their previous assignments and job profiles, the following two
candidates, in no order of preference, have been found suitable
for the post of Chairman HPERC and are accordingly
recommended for this post.
1.
2.
Sh. Pankaj Rai
Sh. Rajiv Sood
Furthermore, the Selection Committee has satisfied itself that as
required under section 85(5) of the Electricity Act, 2003 the
recommended persons do not have any financial or other interest
which is likely to affect prejudicially their functions as Chairman of
the HPERC.
Sd/[Sh. Jishnu Barua]
Member, Selection Committee
11.
Sd/[Justice V.K. Sharma, (Retd.)]
Chairman, Selection Committee”
The recommendations of the Selection Committee were
submitted before the competent authority and were placed before
the Hon'ble Chief Minister, who, based on the comments recorded
in the file (received under the Right to Information Act), from Note N141 to N-145, dated 16.09.2025, concluded that the panel as
recommended was not acceptable and rejected the same. This
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decision
was
subsequently
notified
vide
Notification
dated
30.09.2025 (Annexure P-4).
Petitioner’s case
12.
It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner is a
serving IAS officer in the State of Himachal Pradesh of the 2014
batch, and he has had a distinguished career as a civil servant, with
educational qualifications of Bachelor in Engineering (Mechanical)
and MBA (Finance). Prior to the induction of the petitioner as a civil
servant in the State of Himachal Pradesh in the year 2000, the
petitioner, after having completed his B.E. (Mechanical), worked as
Senior Engineer from May, 1993 until June, 1998 with a private
company, i.e., Ambuja Cement Ltd.. Thereafter, the petitioner
worked as Assistant Engineer with the H.P. State Electricity Board
(HPSEB) under the Department of MPP & Power from June, 1998
onwards until October, 2000. Subsequently, the petitioner cleared
the Himachal Pradesh Administrative Examination and completed
his training in HAS from November, 2000 until August, 2001. After
having completed the training in the Himachal Administrative
Services, the petitioner was posted as Assistant Commissioner-cumBlock Development Officer, Pooh, District Kinnaur, H.P., and served
therein from 28.08.2001 until 30.06.2002. Later on, from 01.07.2002
until 26.02.2008, the petitioner served as Sub Divisional Magistrate
-12-
in the respective Districts of Himachal Pradesh. Thereafter, from
March, 2008 until 04.02.2009, the petitioner served as Additional
Director (IT) with the Government of Himachal Pradesh. From
05.02.2009 until 06.05.2012, the petitioner again served as SDM,
Hamirpur. Thereafter, from 07.05.2012 until 22.10.2020, the
petitioner had the opportunity to serve as Additional District
Magistrate, Mandi, and thereafter as Commissioner, Municipal
Corporation, Shimla, Mission Director, National Health Mission, and
Special Secretary (Health), and then again as Commissioner,
Municipal Corporation, Shimla & Managing Director, Shimla Smart
City Ltd.. Thereafter, from 22.10.2020 until 23.02.2023, the petitioner
served on the post of Deputy Commissioner, Lahaul & Spiti and
District Bilaspur, respectively. Later on, from 06.03.2023 until
15.12.2023, the petitioner had the opportunity to serve as Special
Secretary (Education), wherein the petitioner was involved in
planning, management, and implementation of various schemes and
projects of the Education Department.
13.
It is further the case of the petitioner that at present the
petitioner is serving as Deputy Director (Administration) with Post
Graduate Institute of Medical Education and Research (PGIMER),
Chandigarh, w.e.f. 18.12.2023, wherein the petitioner is looking after
the administration, including judicial matters, service matters of
-13-
approximately 9000 employees, and management of the Institute.
The petitioner at PGIMER, Chandigarh is also working as Appellate
Authority under the RTI Act. The petitioner is supervising the
Engineering Services/projects, including Civil, Electrical, Public
Health, Refrigeration, and construction of upcoming centres. The
petitioner is also working as Estate Officer, exercising the powers
under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act.
14.
With aforesaid facts, it is case of the petitioner that
rejection of panel recommended by Selection Committee is based
on wrong notion, irrelevant material and misconception, and in view
of Scheme and Provision of 2003 Act, the same is beyond the
competence and domain of the respondent-State and, therefore,
liable to be interfered with by exercising power of judicial review
conferred upon this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India.
Respondents’ response
15.
In response to the petition, it has been contended on
behalf of the respondent-State that the petitioner has no legal right
to seek appointment to the post of Chairman, HPERC, in furtherance
of the advertisement (Annexure P-1). It is further contended it is wellsettled that mere selection does not confer any legal right for
appointment, and mere inclusion of a candidate’s name in the
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selection list gave him no right, and if there was no right, there could
be no occasion to maintain a writ petition for enforcement of a nonexisting right. It has been submitted that Government has taken the
impugned decision in a consideration manner by way of ‘policy
decision’ of not appointing the petitioner for the reasons contained
therein.
16.
It is further case of the respondent that there are no
allegations of the mala fides in the writ petition and no person has
been impleaded as party by name. Thus, in the absence of mala
fides, the impugned decisions have been taken bona fide and in the
best interests of the State and the general public.
17.
It is the further case of the respondents that, referring to
Section 84(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003, it is apparent from the
provisions of this Section that ability, integrity, and standing are
necessary parameters for appointment as Chairman, and standing
is one of the parameters which is not fulfilled by the petitioner, being
not a senior officer in the apex scale, and thus he is lacking in fulfilling
the requirements of Section 84 of the Act.
18.
It has been further submitted that it is apparent from a
perusal of Section 86 of 2003 Act that State Commission discharges
functions of utmost importance to the State including advising the
-15-
State Government on matters contained in Section 86(2) of the 2003
Act. Thus, it is of the utmost importance that the post of Chairman of
the State Commission be held by a senior person of outstanding
ability and integrity having adequate knowledge and demonstrative
capacity in dealing with problems as per Section 84 of the 2003 Act.
Further, that Section 84 read with Section 86 of the 2003 Act make
it incumbent upon the State Government to consider and appoint the
most suitable senior Officer having great ability, integrity and
standing and the decisions of the State Government in Annexures
P-4 and P-6 are in terms of Section 84 read with Section 86 of the
Electricity Act, 2003 in Public Interest.
19.
It has also been further submitted that the impugned
Notification (P-4) and the impugned Order (P-6) are a ‘policy
decision’ of the State Government taken in Public Interest.
20.
It has been further submitted on behalf of the
respondents that there was a procedural error with regard to the
issuance of the advertisement dated 14.08.2025, because the
Selection Committee for the selection of Chairman of the State
Commission was to be notified prior to the issuance of the
notification/advertisement for filling up the post by the Administrative
Department. However, in the present case, the Selection Committee
-16-
was constituted after the issuance of the advertisement, and the
advertisement was required to be ratified by the Selection
Committee, which has not been done. Therefore, because of this
patent procedural error, it necessitated the termination of the
selection proceedings, and accordingly the proceedings have been
terminated on legally valid grounds.
21.
It has been further submitted on behalf of the
respondents that the Selection Committee has not given any
reasons for its recommendations, and among the applicants, other
than the recommended candidates, there were senior IAS Officers
and Technocrats, who had far more experience in Power Sector, as
compared to the recommended candidates, for example (i) Sh. Ram
Shubag Singh (IAS); (ii) Sh. Sanjay Gupta (IAS); and (iii) Sh.
Prabodh Saxena, IAS (now Retd.) who belonged to the IAS batches
of 1987, 1988, and 1990, respectively, whereas the petitioner
belongs to the IAS batch of 2014.
22.
It has been further submitted on behalf of the
respondents that in the course of discharge of his functions, the
Chairman of the State Commission is required to regularly
coordinate and interact with the Chairman HPSEBL; Chairman
HPPCL; Chairman HPTCL and other officers who are of the rank and
-17-
status equivalent to the Chief Secretary to the State Government. It
is, therefore, imperative that the person holding the office of
Chairman HPERC (State Commission) possesses an equivalent
stature, standing, and authority, so as to effectively discharge
statutory responsibilities and engage with heads of power utilities at
the highest level without any institutional or functional incongruity.
23.
It has been further submitted that the competent
authority, upon noticing the cumulative infirmities in the selection
process, namely, absence of recorded reasons, overlooking of Apex
Scale officers, eligibility, and failure to ensure compliance with
mandatory procedural requirements, rightly exercised its discretion
to cancel the selection process in its entirety vide notification dated
30.09.2025, which deserves to be upheld in the eyes of law.
Submissions on behalf of Petitioner:
24.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, referring to
Sections 82, 84, and 85 of the Electricity Act, 2003, has submitted
that the selection of the Chairman is the function of the Selection
Committee, whereas the State Government has only a role for the
constitution of the Selection Committee consisting of a person who
has been a Judge of the High Court as Chairman, the Chief
Secretary of the concerned State, and the Chairman of the Central
-18-
Electricity Authority or Chairman of the Central Commission as
members. The Selection Committee has to finalize the selection of
the Chairman and members within three months and recommend a
panel of two names for every vacancy referred to it. Thereafter, the
State Government has no option to cancel the process for
appointment of Chairman or member only on the ground that the
person is not considered suitable by the Government or the Hon'ble
Chief Minister, as has been done in the present case, because it is
not within the domain of the State to comment upon the suitability of
a candidate recommended by the Selection Committee after
following due process. The role of selection has been vested
exclusively with the Selection Committee, and the Government can
choose either of the two names for filling up the vacancy of Chairman
or member, but cannot reject the panel on the grounds as
enumerated for rejection of the panel and for terminating the
selection process in the present case.
25.
It has been submitted that under Section 84 of the
Electricity Act, 2003, the qualification for appointment of Chairman
or member of the State Commission is that he shall be a person of
ability, integrity, and standing, having adequate knowledge of, and
having shown capacity in, dealing with problems relating to
engineering, finance, commerce, economics, law, or management.
-19-
It has been submitted that a person should have adequate
knowledge and capacity in either of the subjects mentioned in the
Section—that is, either in engineering, finance, commerce,
economics, law, or management. The present petitioner, a Graduate
Engineer, with MBA in Finance, has dealt with commercial and
economic issues during his postings, has also performed legal
functions deciding cases under the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, and as on date is performing the job
of management in PGIMER, Chandigarh. Therefore, the petitioner,
in the wisdom of the Selection Committee, was considered suitable
for the post of Chairman along with another person in the panel, and
the State has the option to choose either of them instead of rejecting
the panel by terminating the selection process.
26.
It has been submitted that the reasons mentioned for
rejection in the file notings are beautifully vague.
27.
It has been submitted that the objection with regard to
the irregularity in the process was clarified by the Law Department,
and thereafter the process was continued. Furthermore, there is an
implied ratification of the advertisement by the Selection Committee,
as the Selection Committee had interviewed the persons called who
had responded in pursuance of the advertisement for interview.
-20-
Thus, this objection already stood overruled, and for that reason
alone the Government proceeded further with the process. The plea
of procedural irregularity or illegality is therefore a flimsy ground to
scuttle the lawful process completed by the Selection Committee.
28.
It has been further submitted that seniority has no place
in the qualifications prescribed under Section 84(1) of the Electricity
Act, 2003. It requires capability, capacity, and adequate knowledge
for dealing with problems relating to the subjects contained in that
Section. In case seniority were to be considered as an essential
qualification and parameter, there was no necessity to summon or
call other candidates when three senior IAS officers including (a
retired Chief Secretary and the existing Chief Secretary) were in the
fray as applicants and aspirants for the post of the Chairman.
29.
It has been submitted that for arriving at the decision
through impugned notings N-141 to N-146, the initial notings must
have been submitted by the Chief Secretary who himself was a
candidate.
30.
It has been submitted that the Chief Secretary was
himself one of the applicants, and when he was not selected, he
managed to scuttle the process by using his position in the
-21-
Government on the basis of flimsy and irrelevant grounds other than
justifiable and legal grounds.
31.
It has been submitted by learned Senior Counsel for the
petitioner that the reasons assigned in Notes N-142 and N-143 in
Annexure P-6 are vague, arbitrary, not applicable in the present
case, and irrelevant. The requirement, of being a senior IAS officer
or belonging to the apex scale of the IAS cadre, is alien to the
eligibility criteria provided under Section 84(1) of the Electricity Act,
2003,
and
sitting
like
an
appellate
authority
over
the
recommendations of the Selection Committee is not within the
domain of the Government. Therefore, the objection of the State, that
the proceedings of the Selection Committee are non-speaking
without disclosing reasons, or arbitrary, is not sustainable.
32.
In response to Note N-141, it has been submitted that
there is no requirement of exclusive or essential experience in the
power sector under Section 84(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003.
Different experience in different fields has been recognized as the
criteria for becoming eligible to be appointed as Chairman or
member of the State Commission, and suitability and eligibility under
Section 84(1) is to be assessed by the Selection Committee, and not
by the Government.
-22-
33.
It has been submitted that in view of the vast experience
of the petitioner, including deciding 3,000 cases and managing as
the apex executive officer of PGIMER, it is indicative that the
petitioner is a suitable candidate to be appointed as Chairman.
Referring to the details of postings and experience recorded supra,
learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
petitioner fulfils the requirements of eligibility under Section 84 of the
Electricity Act, 2003, and thus the impugned termination of the
selection process is not sustainable, because a valid process cannot
be cancelled on the whims and fancies of the concerned authority or
the Government.
34.
It has been further submitted that the recommendations
were made on 14.09.2025, and within one day's time they were
rejected and the selection process was terminated illegally.
35.
It has been submitted that in the present case there is a
statutory selection process provided under the Electricity Act, 2003
through a Selection Committee, which cannot be tinkered with by the
Government in conflict with the intention of the lawmakers, who have
assigned the selection of the Chairman and members of the
Regulatory Commission to a Selection Committee headed by a
person who has been a Judge of the High Court. The only exception
-23-
is the appointment of a Judge of the High Court as Chairman of the
State Commission under Section 84(2), where no process is to be
completed through the Selection Committee, and the Government
on its own can appoint a person who is or has been a Judge of the
High Court as Chairman of the State Commission.
36.
It has been submitted that the Government has been
given the choice to select either of the two persons recommended
by the Selection Committee, but not to reject the panel on the ground
of suitability by adjudging the same at the Government level.
Submission on behalf of Respondents-State:
37.
It has been submitted by Mr. Rajiv Atma Ram, learned
Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents, that who is eligible
for the post of Chairman or member of the Regulatory Commission
has been provided not only in Section 84, but in Section 85 as well.
Section 85(5) provides that before recommending any person, the
Selection Committee shall satisfy itself that such person does not
have any financial or other interest which is likely to affect
prejudicially his functions as Chairman or member, as the case may
be. In the present case, this satisfaction was to be ascertained by
the Selection Committee before making the recommendation, but no
-24-
such satisfaction has been recorded by the Selection Committee,
and this defect is incurable.
38.
To substantiate his plea, he has placed reliance on the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand
Lal Jaiswal and Others, (2013) 1 SCC 501. Following paras have
been referred:“K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
21.
We are of the view that non-compliance of sub-section (5)
of Section 85 of the Act is not a procedural violation, as it affects
the very substratum of the appointment, being a mandatory
requirement to be complied with, by the Selection Committee
before recommending a person for the post of Chairman. We are
of the view that non-compliance of sub-section (5) of Section 85
of the Act will vitiate the entire selection process since it is
intended to be followed before making the recommendation to the
State Government. Non-compliance of mandatory requirements
results in nullification of the process of selection unless it is shown
that performance of that requirement was impossible or it could be
statutorily waived. The expression “before recommending any
person” clearly indicates that it is a mandatory requirement to be
followed by the Selection Committee before recommending the
name of any person for the post of Chairman. The expression
“before” clearly indicates the intention of the Legislature. The
meaning of the expression “before” came for consideration before
this Court in State Bank of Travancore v. Mohammad (1981) 4
SCC 82 where the words “any debt due at and before the
commencement of this Act to any banking company” as occurring
in section 4(1) of the Kerala Agriculturist Debt Relief Act, 1970,
were construed by the Supreme Court to mean “any debt due at
and before the commencement of this Act”. We, therefore, find it
difficult to accept the contention of learned senior counsel that this,
being a procedural provision and non-compliance of sub-section
(5) of Section 85 of the Act, is a defect curable by sending the
recommendation back to the Selection Committee for compliance
of sub-section (5) of Section 85 of the Act.
xx
xx
Judgment
Deepak Misra, J.
xx
-25-
14. On an x-ray of the Preamble of the Act and the important
functions ascribed to the State Commission I have no scintilla of
doubt that the selection of Chairman or a member is extremely
important, more so, when there is a statutory prescription about
the manner in which the Selection Committee is required to act. I
may state here that though the language is plain, unambiguous,
clear and leads to a singular construction, yet I think it apt to
reproduce a passage from Utkal Contractors Joinery Pvt. Ltd.
and others etc. v. State of Orissa and others, AIR 1987 SC
1454 wherein Chinnappa Reddy, J. has observed thus: “A statute is best understood if we know the reason for it.
The reason for a statute is the safest guide to its
interpretation. The words of a statute take their colour from
the reason for it. How do we discover the reason for a
statute? There are external and internal aids. The external
aids are Statement of Objects and Reasons when the Bill
is presented to Parliament, the reports of Committees
which preceded the Bill and the reports of Parliamentary
Committees. Occasional excursions into the debates of
Parliament are permitted. Internal aids are the preamble,
the scheme and the provisions of the Act. Having
discovered the reason for the statute and so having set the
sail to the wind, the interpreter may proceed ahead. No
provision in the statute and no word of the statute may be
construed in isolation. Every provision and every word
must be looked at generally before any provision or word
is attempted to be construed. The setting and the pattern
are important.”
(emphasis supplied)
xx
xx
xx
21. I have referred to the aforesaid authorities singularly for the
purpose that regulatory commission is an expert body and in such
a situation the selection has to be absolutely in accord with the
mandatory procedure as enshrined under Section 85 of the Act.
22. In the present context, it has become necessitous to dwell
upon the role of the Selection Committee. Section 85(1) of the Act
provides for constitution of Selection Committee to select
Members of the State Commission. The said Committee, as the
composition would show, is a high powered committee, which has
been authorised to adjudge all aspects. I may hasten to add that I
am not at all delving into the sphere of suitability of a candidate or
the eligibility, for in the case at hand the issue in singularity
pertains to total non-compliance of the statutory command as
envisaged under Section 85(5).
-26-
23. It is seemly to state the aforementioned provision employs the
term “recommendation”. While dealing with the concept of
recommendation, a three- Judge Bench of this Court in A.
Pandurangam Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others[16] has
stated that the literal meaning of the word “recommend” is quite
simple and it means “suggest as fit for employment”. In the present
case the Selection Committee as per the provision was obliged to
satisfy itself when the legislature has used the word “satisfied”. It
has mandated the Committee to perform an affirmative act. There
has to be recording of reasons indicating satisfaction, may be a
reasonable one. Absence of recording of satisfaction is contrary
to the mandate/command of the law and that makes the decision
sensitively susceptible. It has to be borne in mind that in view of
the power conferred on the State Commission, responsibility of
selection has been conferred on a high powered Selection
Committee. The Selection Committee is legally obliged to record
that it has been satisfied that the candidate does not have any
financial or other interest which is likely to affect prejudicially his
functions as Chairman or Member, as the case may be. The said
satisfaction has to be reached before recommending any person
for appointment. It would not be an exaggeration to state that the
abdication of said power tantamounts to breach of Rule of Law
because it not only gives a go by to the warrant of law but also
creates a dent in the basic index of law. Therefore, the selection
is vitiated and it can never come within the realm of curability, for
there has been statutory non-compliance from the very inception
of selection.
24. It is necessary to state here that in many an enactment the
legislature has created regulatory bodies. No one can be oblivious
of the fact that in a global economy the trust on the regulators has
been accentuated. Credibility of governance to a great extent
depends on the functioning of such regulatory bodies and,
therefore, their selection has to be in total consonance with the
statutory provisions. The same inspires public confidence and
helps in systematic growth of economy. Trust in such institutions
helps in progress and distrust corrodes it like an incurable
malignancy. Progress is achieved when there is good governance
and good governance depends on how law is implemented.
Keeping in view the objects and reasons and preamble of the Act
and the functions of the Commission, it can be stated with
certitude that no latitude can be given and laxity can have no
allowance when there is total violation of the statutory provision
pertaining to selection. It has been said long back “a society is well
governed when the people who are in the helm of affairs obey the
command of the law”. But, in the case at hand the Selection
Committee has failed to obey the mandate of the law as a
consequence of which the appellant has been selected and,
therefore, in the ultimate eventuate the selection becomes
unsustainable.
-27-
25. It is manifest in the selection of the appellant that there is
absence of “intellectual objectivity” in the decision making
process. It is to be kept in mind a constructive intellect brings in
good rationale and reflects conscious exercise of conferred power.
A selection process of this nature has to reflect a combined effect
of intellect and industry. It is because when there is a combination
of the two, the recommendations as used in the provision not only
serves the purpose of a “lamp in the study” but also as a “light
house” which is shining, clear and transparent.”
39.
Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
Shailender Kumar Patel vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., Civil
Appeal No.238 of 2026 decided on 20.08.2026 (2026 INSC 902).
Referred paras are as under:“37. In the backdrop of the above, the following questions arise
for consideration before this Court:
i.
Whether a candidate selected and recommended by the
Commission acquires an indefeasible right to appointment
merely by virtue of such selection and recommendation?
ii.
Whether, notwithstanding the recommendation made by
the Commission, the Respondent-State, as the Appointing
Authority, was competent to verify and reassess the
Appellant's eligibility prior to issuance of the final
appointment order, particularly in view of the stipulation
contained in the Commission's communication dated
07.10.2021?
iii.
Whether the Appellant fulfils the teaching criteria and
whether the findings of the committee as to the eligibility of
the Appellant are otherwise legally sustainable?
xx
xx
xx
43.
It is settled law that a recommended candidate does not
have an indefeasible right to appointment and the Appointing
Authority retains certain discretion in the matter of appointments.
The mere inclusion of a candidate's name in a select list or in a
recommendation by the selection body/Commission does not
create a vested right to appointment. Selection undoubtedly
confers upon the candidate a right to fair, non-arbitrary and
-28-
equitable consideration for appointment, but it does not by itself
crystallise into an absolute right to be appointed to the post.
xx
xx
xx
46.
This right to reject the recommendation of the
Commission can pertain to all stages of the recruitment process,
as below:
(i)
Even if the selection process is lawful and the select
list is valid, the Appointing Authority can still decline to
make an appointment under the select list because of a
change in government policy insisting on higher standards
of competence. [See State of Haryana v. Subash Chander
Marwaha, (1974) 3 SCC 220, wherein it was held that
where appointments are made by selection from a number
of eligible candidates, it is open to the Government to fix a
score which is much higher than the one required for more
eligibility, with a view to maintain high standards of
competence, as it essentially a matter of administrative
policy, and if the State Government thinks that in the
interest of judicial competence, persons securing less than
55% of marks in the competitive examination should not be
selected for appointment, those who got less than 55%
have no right to claim that the selections be made of also
those candidates who obtained less than the minimum
fixed by the State Government].
(ii)
The Appointing Authority can also refuse to make
an appointment if the selection process is vitiated by
illegalities such as fraud, manipulation, nepotism, leakage
of exam papers, rigging of exam results, corruption,
adoption of unfair means, etc., the facts of which must be
well established.
(iii)
The Appointing Authority may decline to appoint
any recommended candidate if, on necessary verification
of documents, it finds that the candidate is not eligible. We
will deal with this issue in detail hereinafter, as this is the
principal issue involved in this proceeding.
xx
xx
xx
53. The Appellant's principal submission is that once the
Commission declared him eligible, permitted him to participate in
the interview process, and ultimately recommended his name for
appointment to the post of Registrar, the issue of eligibility stood
conclusively determined by virtue of Rule 10 of the Service Rules,
1983 and could not thereafter be reopened by the RespondentState. Rule 10 of the Service Rules, 1983, provides as follows:
“10. Commission's decision about the eligibility of
candidates Final.— The decision of the Commission as to
the eligibility or otherwise of a candidate for selection shall
-29-
be final and no candidate to whom a certificate of
admission has not been issued by the Commission shall
be interviewed by them.”
xx
xx
xx
59.
The Respondent-State sought to overcome this legal
hurdle by contending that the recommendation letter dated
07.10.2021 issued by the Commission contained a stipulation that
granted them the authority to re-examine the Appellant’s eligibility,
which in our view appears to be without any substance. The
relevant portion of the communication dated 07.10.2021 of the
Commission reads as follows:
“Before issuing the appointment letter, verification of all
original educational certificates and other documents of the
candidates and, in case of candidates belonging to the
physically handicapped category, their disability
certificates, shall compulsorily be undertaken. Further
action regarding appointment shall be taken only after
verification and satisfaction regarding the eligibility of the
candidate for the post.”
(emphasis added)
This communication, in our view, has to be read in the light of Rule
10. The words ‘verification’ and ‘satisfaction’ in the communication
must be understood within the scope of the constitutional scheme
and the statutory rules and cannot render Rule 10 redundant or
otiose. The executive order cannot have the effect of diluting a
statutory provision. We have already held that the Appointing
Authority, having final discretion to appoint a recommended
candidate, must also be satisfied that the candidate is eligible, as
only someone who is eligible can hold a public post.
But as discussed above, such discretion of the Appointing
Authority is circumscribed by the constitutional scheme and the
relevant statutory provisions. Thus, verification as contemplated
under the aforesaid communication could have been undertaken
only to verify the genuineness of the documents, or if the
Commission had made a patently wrong determination, or if new
materials were brought on record clearly showing that the
candidate is not eligible.
Thus, if, at the time of verification, it is found that the documents
were fraudulently acquired or forged, that there was patent
illegality in the determination by the Commission,
-30-
or that new documents or materials emerged that clearly show the
candidate is not eligible, the Appointing Authority may decline to
accept the Commission's recommendation. But in light of Rule 10,
it is not open to them to conduct a de novo examination of the
question of eligibility of the Appellant but to refer it back to the
Commission. We, therefore, find substance in the Appellant’s
contention that the Respondent-State lacked the ability to
independently reopen the question of eligibility after the same had
been verified by the Commission in the light of Rule 10 of the
Service Rules, 1983.
We must also note that in respect of other recommended
candidates, appointments have been made, thus showing that
there were no issues with the selection process. But the
appointment of the Appellant was held up, as the Appointing
Authority treated him as ineligible. In our view, the Appointing
Authority could not have re-determined this aspect at this stage
and reject the recommendation for the reasons discussed above.
40.
It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that
there is no application of mind by the Selection Committee, as the
recommendation does not deal with the eligibility criteria or
comparative merits of the 12 candidates, and it is silent about the
comparative merits of all candidates, reflecting only two names to be
suitable without giving details of the merits of the other candidates.
41.
It has been further submitted on behalf of the
respondents that the experience of the petitioner prior to 2014 was
on posts lower than the IAS cadre post, and therefore that career
cannot be treated as the standing of the petitioner.
42.
It has been submitted that the petitioner is a Mechanical
Engineer, whereas in the Regulatory Commission, experience as an
Electrical Engineer would have been relevant so as to handle
-31-
situations while performing duties as Chairman of the Regulatory
Commission, and thus there is neither ability nor standing of the
petitioner to treat him suitable for the post of Chairman. It has been
further submitted that standing includes experience as well as
seniority, but the same has been ignored by the Selection Committee
while recommending the panel of select candidates.
43.
In this regard, learned Senior Counsel has referred
judgment passed in Jitender @ Kalla vs. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi) and Anr., 2025 AIR SC 3124. Following paras are relevant:“19. The learned Solicitor General appeared on behalf of the
Secretary General of the Supreme Court of India, as also in his
capacity as the Solicitor General of India. Appearing on behalf of
the Secretary General of the Supreme Court of India, the learned
counsel took us through Para 74 of the judgement in Indira
Jaising-1. He submitted that in the light of the experience gained
by the Supreme Court of India, since the designation procedure
prescribed in Indira Jaising-1 was conceived, several
predicaments have arisen, which show that the system has not
yielded the results it intended to achieve. He submitted that the
assessment conducted by a permanent committee, as proposed
by Indira Jaising-1, should be discontinued. In support of this
submission, he relied on Sub-Section (2) Section 16 of the
Advocates Act, 1961 which reads thus:
“Section 16. Senior and other advocates.
(1)….
(2) An advocate may, with his consent, be designated as
senior advocate if the Supreme Court or a High Court is of
opinion that by virtue of his ability, 1[standing at the Bar or
special knowledge or experience in law] he is deserving of
such distinction”
xx
xx
xx
46. Learned counsel Mr. Anilendra Pande, appearing for the
Supreme Court Arguing Counsel Association (unregistered),
submitted that the designation system should be all-inclusive,
-32-
ensuring consideration for Advocates from rural backgrounds,
backward classes, and marginalized communities.
xx
xx
xx
65. We have noted that in Sub-section (2) of Section 16, as it
existed prior to 31st January, 1974, the criteria was ability,
experience and standing at the Bar. After the amendment with
effect from 31st January, 1974, the criterion of ability and standing
at the Bar remain. What is added is special knowledge or
experience in law. The intention of the Legislature, as reflected in
the amendment, is that mere experience in the profession cannot
be the criterion. Therefore, the experience simpliciter is done away
with and replaced by “experience in law”. In the point-based
format, 20 points have been provided for practice beyond 20
years and 10 or more points for 10 to 20 years. There is no doubt
that no Advocate can be said to have standing contemplated by
Sub-section (2) of Section 16, unless he has spent a sufficiently
long time in the profession.
66. There can be many members of the Bar who have a long
presence in the profession. There are many members of the Bar
who continue to practice for a long time, though their appearances
are minimal. Only the number of years spent in practice cannot be
a major criterion for designation by any stretch of imagination. Let
us test with an example i.e. a member of the Bar, who has not
performed or is not up to the mark, can get 20 points out of 100
only on the ground that he or she has continued to be a member
of the Bar for more than 20 years. Therefore, in our view, assigning
points on the basis of experience in terms of the number of years
is something which will require reconsideration as it does not
serve the object sought to be achieved by this Court. Moreover,
the length of practice cannot be a rational criterion. On the
contrary, it will help those who do not deserve designation as they
will get points on the basis of the number of years in practice.
xx
xx
xx
75. We have already held in paragraph 60 that considering the
object of the exercise undertaken by this Court, the directions
issued in Indira Jaising-1 and 2 were never intended to be final.
Indira Jaising-1 specifically records need for reconsiderations by
suitable additions/deletions in the light of the experience to be
gained over a period of time. Even Indira Jaising-2 reiterates this
position and holds that the process of improvement is continuous,
based on our experience. What we have held in earlier paragraphs
shows that the system of 100 point-based assessment has not
achieved the desired objectives. Moreover, the experience shows
that the points-based assessment is not flawless. We have
realized that with experience. Therefore, paragraph 73.7 deserves
deletion in exercise of powers reserved in paragraph 74 of Indira
Jaising-1 read with paragraph 51 in Indira Jaising-2. When we do
this, it will not amount to review or recall of the decisions. After
-33-
finding that the point-based assessment is not workable, we will
be failing in our duty if we fail to do what we are expected to do in
the light of paragraph 74 of Indira Jaising-1.
76. On plain reading of Sub-section (2) of Section 16, the
Legislature never contemplated an Advocate making an
application seeking designation. The scheme of Sub-section (2) of
Section 16 indicates that designation has to be conferred by the
Supreme Court or the High Courts. The scheme of Sub-section
(2) of Section 16 indicates that an individual Judge of the Supreme
Court or the High Court, as the case may be, cannot recommend
any Advocate for designation as the decision is a collective
decision of the Full Court. Even if an Advocate deserving of a
designation does not apply for designation, on the basis of the
discussion in the house, the Full Court can always recommend
his/her designation, subject to his/her consent. For that purpose,
the recommendation in writing of an individual Judge is not
warranted.
xx
xx
xx
80. Another question is whether a number of years of practice or
minimum income should be a criterion. It all depends on the
situation in every State. If a condition of minimum income is
introduced, the process will cease to be inclusive. Income is one
of the several factors to be considered. The requirement of a
minimum practice of 10 years should be retained as the standing
at the Bar can be assessed only if the Advocate has practiced for
a reasonably long time.
xx
xx
xx
87. We, therefore, pass following orders:
(i) We direct that the directions contained in paragraph 73.7 of
Indira Jaising-1 as amended by Indira Jaising-2 shall not be
implemented.”
44.
It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that
the Selection Committee cannot determine suitability, as it is the
appointing authority which has to determine suitability. In support of
this submission, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the
-34-
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra Gupta vs. Union of
India & Ors., (2009) 8 SCC 275. Following judgments are relevant:39.
At this stage, we may state that, there is a basic difference
between "eligibility" and "suitability". The process of judging the
fitness of a person to be appointed as a High Court Judge falls in
the realm of "suitability". Similarly, the process of consultation falls
in the realm of suitability. On the other hand, eligibility at the
threshold stage comes under Article 217(2)(b).
40.
This dichotomy between suitability and eligibility finds
place in Article 217(1) in juxtaposition to Article 217(2). The word
"consultation" finds place in Article 217(1) whereas the word
"qualify" finds place in Article 217(2). This dichotomy is succinctly
brought out in the Constitutional Law of India by H.M. Seervai,
Fourth Edition, at page 2729, which is quoted hereinbelow:"From Article 217(1) as enacted in 1950 the
following things are clear. First, Art. 217(1) provided
for the appointment of only permanent High Court
Judges. They were permanent in the sense that
they continued to hold their office till they attained
the age of 60 years. They were not "permanent" as
opposed to Addl. Judges who held office for a
period not exceeding 2 years, because in 1950 our
Constitution did not provide for Addl. Judges.
Secondly, Art. 217(2) prescribed the qualifications
which a person must possess before he could be
appointed a High Court Judge. Thirdly Art. 217(1)
provided the procedure to be followed before a
person was appointed a High Court Judge. That
procedure was designed to test the fitness of a
person to be appointed a High Court Judge: his
character, his integrity, and his competence in
various branches of the law, and the like. In
recruiting a person from the Bar, his experience in
different kinds of litigation would also be taken into
account. The thing to note is that Art. 217 (1)
provides for a once for all test of a person's fitness
to be a High Court Judge. A person who has passed
that test is subject to no other test of fitness but will
continue to hold his office till he attains the age of
retirement which had been fixed at 60 years till
1963. But once appointed, his performance on the
Bench may be good, bad or indifferent. His
judgments and orders may be subject to appeal in
High Court, and are certainly subject to appeal to
the Supreme Court under Art. 136 if not under other
Articles of Chap. IV of part VI."
-35-
41.
The appointment of a Judge is an executive function of the
President. Article 217(1) prescribes the constitutional requirement
of "consultation". Fitness of a person to be appointed a Judge of
the High Court is evaluated in the consultation process (see
Basu's Commentary on the Constitution of India, Sixth Edition, p.
234). Once this dichotomy is kept in mind, then, it becomes clear
that evaluation of the worth and merit of a person is a matter
entirely different from eligibility of a candidate for elevation. Article
217(2), therefore, prescribes a threshold limit or an entry point for
a person to become qualified to be a High Court Judge whereas
Article 217(1) provides for a procedure to be followed before a
person could be appointed as a High Court Judge, which
procedure is designed to test the fitness of a person to be so
appointed: his character, his integrity, his competence, his
knowledge and the like.
42.
Hence, Article 217(1) and Article 217(2) operate in different
spheres. Article 217(1) answers the question as to who "should be
elevated" whereas Article 217(2) deals with the question as to who
"could be elevated". Enrolment of an advocate under the 1961 Act
comes in the category of who "could be elevated" whereas the
number of years of actual practice put in by a person, which is a
significant factor, comes in the category as to who "should be
elevated".
43.
One more aspect needs to be highlighted. "Eligibility" is an
objective factor. Who could be elevated is specifically answered
by Article 217(2). When "eligibility" is put in question, it could fall
within the scope of judicial review. However, the question as to
who should be elevated, which essentially involves the aspect of
"suitability", stands excluded from the purview of judicial review.
44.
At this stage, we may highlight the fact that there is a vital
difference between judicial review and merit review. Consultation,
as stated above, forms part of the procedure to test the fitness of
a person to be appointed a High Court Judge under Article 217(1).
Once there is consultation, the content of that consultation is
beyond the scope of judicial review, though lack of effective
consultation could fall within the scope of judicial review. This is
the basic ratio of the judgment of the Constitutional Bench of this
Court in the case of Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record
Association (supra) and Re.
45.
Lastly, it may also be stated that the present case arises
from a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution by
way of a writ of quo warranto and not a writ of certiorari.
Significance of Explanation (a) and Explanation (aa) inserted in
Article 217(2) vide Forty-fourth Constitutional Amendment Act.
46.
One of the questions which arises for determination before
us is: whether by insertion of Explanation (aa) appended to Article
217(2)(b), the effect of judgment of this Court in Prof. C.P.
-36-
Agarwal's case (supra) stands nullified? To answer the above
question, we need to refer to Article 124(3) (which has been
quoted hereinabove).
47.
Article 124 deals with establishment and Constitution of
Supreme Court. Article 124(3) prescribes qualifications for
appointment of a person as a Judge of the Supreme Court. Article
124(3)(b) inter alia states that a person shall not be qualified for
appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court unless he has been
for at least 10 years an advocate of a High Court. This sub-clause
has to be read with Explanation-II which is similar to Explanation
(aa) appended to Article 217(2)(b).
48.
Commenting on Explanation-II, H.M. Seervai in
Constitutional Law of India, First Edition, p. 1012, has this to say:
"The qualification for appointment as a judge of the
Supreme Court is the holding of a judge's office for
at least five years in a High Court or in two or more
High Courts in succession; or at least ten years'
standing as an advocate of a High Court or two or
more High Courts in succession; or distinction
achieved as a jurist [Art. 124(3)]. In computing the
period during which a person has been an
advocate, any period during which he has held
judicial office not inferior to that of a District Judge
after he become an advocate, is to be included [Art.
124 (3) Expl. II]. It is clear that the explanation is not
attracted if a person has been an advocate for ten
years before accepting any judicial appointment, for
that by itself is a sufficient qualification for
appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court."
(emphasis supplied)
49.
In our view, Explanation (aa) appended to Article 217(2) is
so appended so as to compute the period during which a person
has been an advocate, any period during which he has held the
Office of a Member of a Tribunal after he became an advocate. As
stated by the learned Author, quoted above, if a person has been
an advocate for ten years before becoming a member of the
Tribunal, Explanation (aa) would not be attracted because being
an advocate for ten years per se would constitute sufficient
qualification for appointment as a Judge of the High Court.
50.
Before concluding on this point, we may state that the word
"standing" connotes the years in which a person is entitled to
practice and not the actual years put in by a person in practice
(see Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition Reissue, Volume
3(1), paragraphs 351 and 394 of the Chapter under the Heading
`Barristers'.) Under Section 220(3)(a) of the Government of India
Act, 1935, qualifications were prescribed for appointment as a
Judge of a High Court. A Barrister of at least ten years standing
-37-
was qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the High Court. As
stated above, the word `standing' connotes the years in which a
person is entitled to practice, not the actual years put in by that
person in practice.
51.
In Re. Lily Isabel Thomas reported in AIR 1964 SC 855 this
Court equated "right to practice" with "entitlement to practice" (see
para 11). In our view, Article 217(2)(b), therefore, prescribes a
qualification for being appointed a Judge of the High Court. The
concept of "actual practice" will fall under Article 217(1) whereas
the concept of right to practice or entitlement to practice will fall
under Article 217(2)(b). The former will come in the category of
"suitability, the latter will come in the category of "eligibility".
45.
Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
Union of India vs. Maj. Gen. Manomoy Ganguly, 2018(9) SCC 65.
Relevant paras are as under:40.
When we read the aforesaid para (i) as a whole, we find
force in the submission of the appellant that the word ‘inter se’
applies both to seniority as well as suitability. Therefore, ‘inter se
suitability’ is also to be assessed inasmuch as this assessment is
‘in the light of their earlier experience of serving in a particular
service’. As far as consideration on the parameters of ‘inter se
seniority’ is concerned, it would mean that a person who is senior
gets precedence. To this extent, there is no quarrel. Question is
as to what meaning is to be assigned to ‘inter se suitability’. Two
questions arise from the above. First, what is the meaning of
‘suitability’. Second, how the expression ‘inter se suitability’ is to
be construed, i.e. whether it should be understood as choosing a
‘more suitable’ officer for appointment as DGsMS. As far as inter
se suitability is concerned, all the eligible officers in the rank of Lt.
General (& Equiv), having regard to their earlier experience of
serving in particular services, they are to be considered for
appointment as DGsMS of services (i.e. DGMS (Army)).
41.
Let us first consider the meaning of ‘suitability’.
42.
In English parlance, the word ‘suitable’ is assigned the
meaning as ‘appropriate, fitted for the purpose or acceptable’. The
concise Oxford Dictionary defines the word suitable as ‘well fitted
for the purpose; appropriate’. This ordinary meaning is to be given
effect to as a general guide, unless this expression is given special
meaning in a statute or rule in administrative instructions. In R
(Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation Authority7, the House of Lords
-38-
remarked that “the word ‘suitability’ is an empty vessel which is
filled with meaning by context and background.
43.
In service jurisprudence, where the word ‘suitable’ is
normally examined from the point of view as to whether a
particular person is suitable to hold a particular post, it is construed
as ‘fit’ to hold that post. It would mean that the job profile and job
requirement of a particular post would be seen and then, going by
the calibre, competence, attributes, skill and experience of the
candidate, it would be ascertained as to whether such a person
would be able to discharge the duties of the post i.e. whether he
is suited to carry out the functions of the post, to the satisfaction
of his employer.
44.
It, thus, follows from the above that the person to be eligible
should quality the following conditions:
(i)
the officer should be in the rank of Lt. General (&
Equiv);
(ii)
such an officer should be holding the post of Comdt
AM 7 (2005) UKHL 28 C&C; and
(iii)
he should have a minimum remainder service of
one year from the date of occurrence of the
vacancy.
45.
Adverting to the second question, the prefix ‘inter se’ has
also to be given some meaning as it cannot be rendered otiose.
Therefore, whereas while assessing ‘suitability’, it has to be seen
that a particular officer is not unfit for the post, when it comes to
‘inter se suitability’, it has reference to assessing the suitability of
all eligible officers and thereafter finding who is more suitable to
occupy such a post. We have to keep in mind that these are very
high ranking posts and, therefore, the competent authority is
supposed to choose a more suitable officer for such posts. We are
of the opinion that for expressing such an intention, the Circular
could have been worded more appropriately and with clarity to
avoid such doubts. However, since the word ‘inter se’ is used, it
implies that the intention behind laying down this criteria was to
give these posts to a better suited person after evaluating their
inter se suitability. Of course, while doing this exercise seniority of
an officer is also to be given due weightage, meaning thereby if
the senior most person is competent to hold the post, he is to be
given preference. Therefore, we conclude that the view of the AFT
that the post of DGMS (Army) is to be filled by the officer on the
strength of ‘seniority-cum-suitability’, where seniority is a decisive
factor and suitability is a secondary factor, is not correct. In the
entire discussion resting with the aforesaid view, the Tribunal
ignored the fact that it is not only seniority and suitability simpliciter
but ‘inter se’ seniority and suitability. The expression ‘inter se’ is
totally ignored and there is no discussion thereupon at all, which
has led the AFT to take wrong view insofar as interpretation of the
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criteria laid down in the Circular dated 10 th July, 1992 is
concerned, which talks of ‘inter se seniority and suitability’.
46.
It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents that
suitability is not justiciable, as eligibility is to be determined
objectively, whereas suitability is subjective. Determination of
suitability depends upon subjective satisfaction, and therefore the
subjective satisfaction of the appointing authority cannot be
questioned in judicial review. Judicial review can lie against a
decision determining eligibility, but suitability, being determined on
subjective satisfaction, cannot be subjected to judicial review,
particularly when reasons for rejection are assigned and contained
in Annexure P-6, and in the recommendations (Annexure P-5) the
satisfaction of the Selection Committee as required under Section
85(5) is absent, and no reasons have been given for ignoring senior
IAS officers and including the petitioner and another person of lower
standing in the select panel.
47.
It has also been contended on behalf of the respondents
that the application of the petitioner was required to be routed
through the Government of India, but it was directly sent to the
Secretary (Personnel) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, and
therefore, for not submitting the application through proper channel,
the application of the petitioner was liable to be rejected.
-40-
48.
Lastly, it has been submitted on behalf of the
respondents that the Government is not a post office. There were
three senior IAS officers belonging to the batches of 1987, 1988, and
1990 having experience of manning the post of Chief Secretary,
whereas the petitioner is an IAS officer of the 2014 batch having
lesser experience than the other senior IAS officers. As there was no
standard, no determination of eligibility, no verification and
satisfaction under Section 85(5) of the Act, no criteria, no
comparison of inter se merit, and no basis for making
recommendations in the select list, the recommendations were not
deserving of acceptance. Since the Government has the right to
assess suitability before making an appointment, the impugned
rejection of the select panel and termination of the process for
appointment of Chairman of the State Commission deserves to be
sustained, as no ground has been made out for judicial review of the
impugned decision.
49.
To substantiate the plea that mere selection does not
confer any indefeasible legal right for appointment, the respondents
have placed reliance on the pronouncements of the Apex Court in
Dr. Rai Shavendra Bahadur vs. Governing Body, AIR 1962 SC
1210; State of Haryana vs. Subhash Chander Marwaha, (1974) 3
SCC 220; Mani Subrat Jain vs. State of Haryana, (1977) 1 SCC
-41-
486. It has been further submitted that the judgments referred to by
the petitioner in Shankarsan Dash vs. Union of India, (1991) 3
SCC 47, R.S. Mittal vs. Union of India, (1995) Supp. 2 SCC Pg.
230; Dinesh Kumar Kashyap vs. South East Central Railway,
(2019) 12 SCC 798, and State of Assam vs. Arabinda Rabha,
(2025) 7 SCC 705, in fact, support the respondents instead of the
petitioner.
Rebuttal on behalf of Petitioner:
50.
In response, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner
has submitted that standing means holding some substantial
position, and the petitioner is not ineligible for having lower seniority
than other candidates. The Selection Committee is not required to
give reasons for the suitability of the recommended panel or nonsuitability of others, nor can the basis or criteria of suitability be
questioned on that ground.
51.
In rejoinder, Mr. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel for
the petitioner, has submitted that the role of the Selection Committee
is to determine suitability, and such role cannot be assumed by the
Government under the garb of its decision-making power as the
appointing authority. The selection is finalized under Section 85(3)
and the panel is recommended under Section 85(4), and the
-42-
Government has to select one of the persons recommended in the
panel unless there is patent illegality on the face of it. In any case,
the Government cannot usurp the role of determining suitability,
which has been assigned to the Selection Committee. In the present
case, rejecting the panel recommended by the Selection Committee
headed by a retired Judge of the High Court does violence to the
Act. The State is considering itself as an appellate authority, which
is impermissible under the scheme of the Act. Permitting the State
to continue with its decision would amount to rewriting the statute by
the Government, whereas the statute has vested the power of
selection of two persons to be recommended in the panel in the
Selection Committee.
52.
To substantiate the plea raised on behalf of the
petitioner, reliance has been placed Dalpat Abasabeh Solunke and
Ors. vs. Dr. B.S. Mahajan & Ors., (1990) 1 SCC 305. Following are
the referred paras:12.
It will thus appear that apart from the fact that the High
Court has rolled the cases of the two appointees in one, though
their appointments are not assailable on the same grounds, the
Court has also found it necessary to sit in appeal over the decision
of the Selection Committee and to embark upon deciding the
relative merits of the candidates. It is needless to emphasise that
it is not the function of the Court to hear appeals over the decisions
of the Selection Committees and to scrutinize the relative merits
of the Candida tes. Whether a candidate is fit for a particular post
or not has to be decided by the duly constituted Selection
Committee which has the expertise on the subject. The Court has
no such expertise. The decision of the Selection Committee can
-43-
be interfered with only on limited grounds, such as illegality or
patent material irregularity in the Constitution of the Committee or
its procedure vitiating the selection, or proved mala fides affecting
the selection etc. It is not disputed that in the present case the
University had constituted the Committee in due compliance with
the relevant statutes. The Committee consisted of experts and it
selected the candidates after going through all the relevant
material before it. In sitting in appeal over the selection so made
and in setting it aside on the ground of the so called comparative
merits of the candidates as assessed by the Court, the High Court
went wrong and exceeded its jurisdiction.
53.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme in East
Coast Railway & Anr. vs. Mahadev Appa Rao & Ors., (2010) 7
SCC 678. Referred paras are as under:“8.
The High Court was also of the view that no reasons for
cancellation of the test having been recorded even on the file
contemporaneously maintained for that purpose, the same could
not be supplied in the affidavit filed in reply to the Writ Petition
challenging the said order, especially when the cancellation of the
test was not according to the High Court necessitated by any
irregularity in the conduct of the test or any mala fides vitiating the
same. In the absence of any such infirmity the cancellation of the
examination was arbitrary and unsustainable, declared the High
Court.
9.
8. There is no quarrel with the well-settled proposition of
law that an order passed by a public authority exercising
administrative/executive or statutory powers must be judged by
the reasons stated in the order or any record or file
contemporaneously maintained. It follows that the infirmity arising
out of the absence of reasons cannot be cured by the authority
passing the order stating such reasons in an affidavit filed before
the Court where the validity of any such order is under challenge.
The legal position in this regard is settled by the decisions of this
Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji
(AIR 1952 SC 16) wherein this Court observed :
"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory
authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations
subsequently given by the officer making the order of what
he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended
to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant
-44-
to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings
and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and
must be construed objectively with reference to the
language used in the order itself. "
xx
xx
xx
14.
It is evident from the above that while no candidate
acquires an indefeasible right to a post merely because he has
appeared in the examination or even found a place in the select
list, yet the State does not enjoy an unqualified prerogative to
refuse an appointment in an arbitrary fashion or to disregard the
merit of the candidates as reflected by the merit list prepared at
the end of the selection process. The validity of the State's
decision not to make an appointment is thus a matter which is not
beyond judicial review before a competent Writ court. If any such
decision is indeed found to be arbitrary, appropriate directions can
be issued in the matter.”
54.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme in
Shankasan Dash Vs. UOI (Shankarsan Dash Vs. Union of India),
reported in (1991) 3 SCC 47. Referred paras are as under:7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified
for appointment and adequate number of candidates are found fit,
the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be
appointed which cannot be legitimately denied. Ordinarily the
notification merely amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates
to apply for recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire
any right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so
indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the
vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has the
licence of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision not to fill up
the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for appropriate reasons.
And if the vacancies or any of them are filled up, the State is bound
to respect the comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at
the recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted. This
correct position has been consistently followed by this Court, and
we do not find any discordant note in the decisions in State of
Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others, [1974] 1 SCR
165; Miss Neelima Shangla v. State of Haryana and Others,
[1986] 4 SCC 268 and Jitendra Kumar and Others v. State of
Punjab and Others, [1985] 1 SCR 899.
-45-
8. In State of Haryana v. Subhash Chander Marwaha and Others,
(supra) 15 vacancies of Subordinate Judges were advertised, and
out of the selection list only 7, who had secured more than 55%
marks, were appointed, although under the relevant rules the
eligibility condition required only 45% marks. Since the High Court
had recommended earlier, to the Punjab Government that only the
candidates securing 55% marks or more should be appointed as
Subordinate Judges, the other candidates included in the select
list were not appointed. They filed a writ petition before the High
Court claiming a right of being appointed on the ground that
vacancies existed and they were qualified and were found
suitable. The writ application was allowed. While reversing the
decision of the High Court, it was observed by this Court that it
was open to the Government to decide how MANY appointments
should be made and although the High Court had appreciated the
position correctly, it had ``somehow persuaded itself to spell out a
right in the candidates because in fact there were 15 vacancies''.
It was expressly ruled that the existence of vacancies does not
give a legal right to a selected candidate. Similarly, the claim of
some of the candidates selected for appointment, who were
petitioners in Jitendra Kumar and Others v. State of Punjab and
Others, was turned down holding that it was open to the
Government to decide how many appointments would be made.
The plea of arbitrariness was rejected in view of the facts of the
case and it was had that the candidates did not acquire any right
merely by applying for selection or even after selection. It is true
that the claim of the petitioner in the case of Miss Neelima Shangla
v. State of Haryana was allowed by this Court but, not on the
ground that she had acquired any right by her selection and
existence of vacancies. The fact was that the matter had been
referred to the Public Service Commission which sent to the
Government only the names of 17 candidates belonging to the
general category on the assumption that only 17 posts were to be
filled up. The Government accordingly made only 17 appointments
and stated before the Court that they were unable to select and
appoint more candidates as the Commission had not
recommended any other candidate. In this background it was
observed that it is, of course, open to the Government not to fill up
all the vacancies for a valid reason, but the selection cannot be
arbitrarily restricted to a few candidates notwithstanding the
number of vacancies and the availability of qualified candidates;
and there must be a conscious application of mind by the
Government and the High Court before the number of persons
selected for appointment is restricted. The fact that it was not for
the Public Service Commission to take a decision in this regard
was emphasised in this judgment. None of these decisions,
therefore, supports the appellant.
-46-
55.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme in R.S.
Mittal Vs. Union of India, reported in 1995 Supp (2) SCC 230.
Referred para is as under:10.
xx
xx
xx
It is no doubt correct that a person on the select- panel has no
vested right to be appointed to the post for which he has been
selected. He has a right to be considered for appointment. But at
the same time, the appointing authority cannot ignore the selectpanel or decline to make the appointment on its whims. When a
person has been selected by the Selection Board and there is a
vacancy which can be offered to him, keeping in view his merit
position, then, ordinarily, there is no justification to ignore him for
appointment. There has to be a justifiable reason to decline to
appoint a person who is on the select-panel. In the present case,
there has been a mere inaction on the part of the Government. No
reason whatsoever, not to talk of a justifiable reason, was given
as to why the appointments were not offered to the candidates
expeditiously and in accordance with law. The appointment should
have been offered to Mr. Murgod within a reasonable time of
availability of the vacancy and thereafter to the next candidate.
The Central Government's approach in this case was wholly
unjustified.
56.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted
that the Hon'ble Supreme in K. Manjusree Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Anr., reported in (2008) 3 SCC 512 has held that
changing the rules of the game after the game was played, is
impermissible and deprives the candidates of their legitimate right of
the consideration under the previous Rules. It has been submitted
that same preposition has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court
-47-
Shashi Bhushan Prasad vs. State of Bihar & Ors., SLP(Civil)
No.7527 of 2023.
57.
In Sivananda C.T. & Ors. vs. High Court of Kerala &
Ors, (2024) 3 SCC 214, it has been contended by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that an individual who claim benefit or entitlement
based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation has to establish: (i)
The legitimacy of the expectation and (ii) that denial of legitimate
expectation led to violation of Article 14. The principles of good
administration require that the decision of public authorities must
withstand the test of consistency, transparency and predictability to
avoid being termed as arbitrary and violative Article 14. Further a
Public Authority must objectively demonstrate by placing relevant
material before the court that its decision was in the public interest
but not to frustrate a claim of legitimate expectation.
58.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme in Tej
Prakash Pathak vs. Rajasthan High Court, (2025) 2 SCC 1.
Referred paras are as under:21. To effectively analyse and adjudicate upon the questions
referred, we would divide our discussion into following parts:
21.1 (a) When the recruitment process commences and comes to
an end;
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22.2(b) Basis of the doctrine that ‘rules of the game’ must not be
changed during the course of the game, or after the game is
played;
22.3(c) Whether the decision in K. Manjusree (supra) is at
variance with earlier precedents on the subject;
22.4(d) Whether the above doctrine applies with equal strictness
qua method or procedure for selection as it does qua eligibility
criteria;
22.5(e) Whether procedure for selection stipulated by Act or Rules
framed either under the proviso to Article 30910 of the Constitution
or a Statute could be given a go-bye;
22.6(f) Whether appointment could be denied by change in the
eligibility criteria after the game is played.
xx
xx
xx
39.
The law in this regard is already settled by a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Shankarsan Dash in the following terms:
“7. It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are
notified for appointment and adequate number of
candidates are found fit, the successful candidates acquire
an indefeasible right to be appointed which cannot be
legitimately denied. Ordinarily the notification merely
amounts to an invitation to qualified candidates to apply for
recruitment and on their selection they do not acquire any
right to the post. Unless the relevant recruitment rules so
indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any
of the vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State
has the license of acting in an arbitrary manner. The
decision not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona
fide for appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of
them are filled up, the State is bound to respect the
comparative merit of the candidates, as reflected at the
recruitment test, and no discrimination can be permitted”.
xx
xx
xx
63.
In Section (C) above, we have already noticed the
Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Shankarsan Das
(supra) where it was held:
“7.
Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate,
the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the
vacancies. However, it does not mean that the State has
the license of acting in an arbitrary manner. The decision
not to fill up the vacancies has to be taken bona fide for
appropriate reasons. And if the vacancies or any of them
are filled up, the State is bound to respect the comparative
merit of the candidates, as reflected at the recruitment test,
and no discrimination can be permitted.”
-49-
64.
Thus, in light of the decision in Shankarsan Das (supra), a
candidate placed in the select list gets no indefeasible right to be
appointed even if vacancies are available. Similar was the view
taken by this Court in Subash Chander Marwaha (supra) where
against 15 vacancies only top 7 from the select list were
appointed. But there is a caveat. The State or its instrumentality
cannot arbitrarily deny appointment to a selected candidate.
Therefore, when a challenge is laid to State’s action in respect of
denying appointment to a selected candidate, the burden is on the
State to justify its decision for not making appointment from the
Select List.
xx
xx
xx
65.6 Placement in the select list gives no indefeasible right to
appointment. The State or its instrumentality for bona fide reasons
may choose not to fill up the vacancies. However, if vacancies
exist, the State or its instrumentality cannot arbitrarily deny
appointment to a person within the zone of consideration in the
select list.
59.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has also
placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme in State of
Assam & Ors. vs. Arabinda Rabha & Ors., (2025) 7 SCC 705.
Referred paras are as under:59.
We are conscious of the line of decisions of this Court and
have noted some of them here, which lay down the law that mere
empanelment/enlistment does not result in accrual of any
indefeasible right in favour of such empanelled/selected candidate
as well as the law that the employer may, in its wisdom, either
decide to cancel the select list or not carry on the process further
resulting in the notified/advertised vacancy/vacancies not being
filled up pursuant to the selection process, which has been
conducted. What it means is that an empanelled/selected
candidate can claim no right of appointment, if the State has
cogent and germane grounds for not making the appointment.
However, at the same time, it is also the law that the appointing
authority cannot ignore the select panel or decline to make the
appointment on its whims. Shankarsan Das (supra) cautions that
the State has no licence to act in an arbitrary manner. In R.S. Mittal
v. Union of India19, a coordinate bench held that when a person
has been selected by the Selection Board and 1995 Supp (2) SCC
230 there is a vacancy which can be offered to him, keeping in
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view his merit position, then, ordinarily, there is no justification to
ignore him for appointment and that there has to be a justifiable
reason to decline to appoint a person who is on the select panel.
The position in law finds reiteration in a decision of recent origin in
Dinesh Kumar Kashyap v. South East Central Railway20, where
the majority held that the employer must give cogent reasons for
not appointing selected candidates.
60. Any decision taken not to appoint despite there being
vacancies and a valid select list, obviously, is in the nature of a
policy decision. It has to be borne in mind that securing public
employment is the dream of many, who put their heart and soul to
prepare for it. Nowadays, aspirants undertake rigorous study
sessions as well as training modules to equip themselves, which
also comes at a heavy cost. That apart, since every process of
recruitment necessarily involves substantial expenses which are
borne from the public exchequer and at the same time the
aspirants for the posts (who, as per their own estimation, have
performed sufficiently well and therefore stand a good chance of
being appointed upon figuring in the select list) cherish fond hopes
of a bright and secure future, the law is clear that the policy
decision not to carry the process forward must be taken bona fide,
there has to be justifiable reason if the (2019) 12 SCC 798 process
is abandoned mid-way, and such decision must not suffer from the
vice of arbitrariness or the whims of the decision maker. This acts
as a check on the employer’s power deciding against not making
any appointment from the select list despite availability of
vacancy/vacancies on the advertised/notified public post(s). A writ
court may, upon reaching the requisite satisfaction, intervene in
such manner and make such directions as the facts and
circumstances warrant. We, therefore, do not find it acceptable
that the aspirants, not having an indefeasible or vested right of
appointment, do not also have the right to question any decision
adverse to their interest affecting achievement of their goals to
secure public employment. Whether, and to what extent, any relief
should be granted, must depend on the facts of each case.
Relevant Provisions of Electricity Act, 2003:
60.
Before proceeding further, the relevant provisions of
Sections 82, 84, and 85 of the Electricity Act, 2003, relevant for
consideration of the issues involved in the petition, read as under:Section 82. (Constitution of State Commission): --- (1) Every
State Government shall, within six months from the
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appointed date, by notification, constitute for the purposes of
this Act, a Commission for the State to be known as the (name
of the State) Electricity Regulatory Commission:
Provided that the State Electricity Regulatory Commission,
established by a State Government under section 17 of the
Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998 and the enactments
specified in the Schedule, and functioning as such immediately
before the appointed date, shall be the State Commission for the
purposes of this Act and the Chairman, Members, Secretary, and
other officers and other employees thereof shall continue to hold
office, on the same terms and conditions on which they were
appointed under those Acts:
Provided further that the Chairman and other Members of
the State Commission appointed, before the commencement of
this Act under the Electricity Regulatory Commissions Act, 1998
or under the enactments specified in the Schedule, may on the
recommendations of the Selection Committee constituted under
sub-section (1) of Section 85 be allowed to opt for the terms and
conditions under this Act by the concerned State Government.
(2) The State Commission shall be a body corporate by the
name aforesaid, having perpetual succession and a common seal,
with power to acquire, hold and dispose of property, both movable
and immovable, and to contract and shall, by the said name, sue
or be sued.
(3) The head office of the State Commission shall be at
such place as the State Government may, by notification, specify.
(4) The State Commission shall consist of not more
than three Members, including the Chairman.
(5) The Chairman and Members of the State
Commission shall be appointed by the State Government on
the recommendation of a Selection Committee referred to in
section 85.
xx
xx
xx
Section 84. (Qualifications for appointment of Chairman and
Members of State Commission): --- (1) The Chairman and the
Members of the State Commission shall be persons of ability,
integrity and standing who have adequate knowledge of, and
have shown capacity in, dealing with problems relating to
engineering, finance, commerce, economics, law or
management.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),
the State Government may appoint any person as the Chairman
from amongst persons who is, or has been, a Judge of a High
Court: Provided that no appointment under this sub-section shall
-52-
be made except after consultation with the Chief Justice of that
High Court.
(3) The Chairman or any other Member of the State
Commission shall not hold any other office.
(4) The Chairman shall be the Chief Executive of the State
Commission.
Section 85. (Constitution of Selection Committee to select
Members of State Commission): --- (1) The State Government
shall, for the purposes of selecting the Members of the State
Commission, constitute a Selection Committee consisting of
–
(a) a person who has been a Judge of the High Court….
Chairman;
(b)
the
Chief
Secretary
of
the
concerned
State…………. ….Member; (c) the Chairman of the
Authority
or
the
Chairman
of
the
Central
Commission ………….. Member:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply
to the appointment of a person as the Chairman who is or has
been a Judge of the High Court.
(2) The State Government shall, within one month from the
date of occurrence of any vacancy by reason of death, resignation
or removal of the Chairman or a Member and six months before
the superannuation or end of tenure of the Chairman or Member,
make a reference to the Selection Committee for filling up of the
vacancy.
(3) The Selection Committee shall finalise the selection
of the Chairman and Members within three months from the
date on which the reference is made to it.
(4) The Selection Committee shall recommend a panel
of two names for every vacancy referred to it.
(5) Before recommending any person for appointment
as the Chairman or other Member of the State Commission,
the Selection Committee shall satisfy itself that such person
does not have any financial or other interest which is likely to
affect prejudicially his functions as such Chairman or
Member, as the case may be.
(6) No appointment of Chairman or other Member shall be
invalid merely by reason of any vacancy in the Selection
Committee.
-53-
Consideration, Analysis and Conclusion:
61.
One
ground
cited
for
rejecting
the
panel
as
recommended is that there were complaints regarding the process
adopted for the notification and advertisement issued, as well as
other legal and technical matters brought on record. However,
except citing solitary ground, regarding requirement of ratification of
advertisement by Selection Committee, no other complaint has been
referred to in the reply or brought on record. The irregularity brought
on record is that the Selection Committee was constituted after
advertising the post, whereas the Selection Committee had to be
formed first, the vacancies were to be referred to the Selection
Committee, and thereafter the advertisement was to be issued. It
was asserted that since the advertisement had already been issued,
the same had to be ratified by the Selection Committee, and thus
there was a procedural error with regard to the issuance of the
advertisement, which, as per the advice of the Law Department,
could be ratified by the Selection Committee; however, the
Committee did not ratify the same, and therefore the procedural error
remained in the selection proceedings.
62.
As evident from the reply itself, in Section 85 of the
Electricity Act, 2003, there is no provision directing the constitution
-54-
of the Selection Committee prior to the advertisement of the post.
There is only a provision that the State Government shall make a
reference to the Selection Committee for filling up the vacancy within
one month from the occurrence of any vacancy by reason of death,
resignation, or removal of the Chairman or member, and six months
before the superannuation or end of tenure of the Chairman or
member, whereupon the Selection Committee shall finalize the
selection of the Chairman or member within three months from the
date on which reference is made to it.
63.
There is no specific provision warranting the constitution
of the Selection Committee first and thereafter advertising the post.
Even otherwise, such a defect cannot be a ground for rejection of
the panel when the Government itself permitted the continuation of
the process by constituting the Selection Committee, and thereafter
the Selection Committee considered the applications received in
pursuance of the advertisement published prior to its constitution,
which amounts to ratification of the advertisement by the Selection
Committee. Had there been any objection on the part of the
Selection Committee regarding the advertisement of the post prior to
its constitution, or any reservation in proceeding further in
furtherance of the said advertisement, the Selection Committee
would not have considered the applications placed before it by the
-55-
Secretary (Power) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh received
in response to the advertisement in reference.
64.
It is also apt to record that this discrepancy, if so
considered, was well within the knowledge of the Government, and
the matter was referred to the Law Department, which had opined
that this defect was curable by ratification of the advertisement by
the Selection Committee. There is an implied ratification of the
advertisement expressed in conduct by the Selection Committee. In
case the State was still considering it a serious defect, it ought to
have withdrawn the advertisement so as to enable the Selection
Committee to issue a fresh advertisement. But that was not done.
Now, after the completion of the selection process, such a curable
defect cannot be taken as a ground for rejection of the panel
recommended by the Selection Committee, solely for the reason that
the persons so recommended are not being considered suitable by
the Government, which is not within the domain of the Government.
Therefore, the plea justifying the rejection of the panel on this ground
is not only a vague excuse, but arbitrary in nature, and thus not
sustainable.
65.
The plea of the respondents that no criteria was applied
and no reasons were assigned for the recommendations is also
-56-
contrary to the record. From the proceedings of the meeting held on
14.09.2025, whereby the panel of two candidates, as required under
Section 85(4) of 2003 Act, was recommended by the Committee, it
is clearly evident that the Selection Committee recommended the
names after examination of the educational qualifications and
experience of the 12 candidates who appeared before it, interaction
with them, due assessment of their abilities and knowledge, and after
due deliberations, keeping in view the requirements prescribed
under Section 84(1) of the Act, as well as the particulars furnished
by the candidates in their bio-data submitted along with their
applications in response to the advertisement.
66.
Under the Electricity Act, 2003, there is no requirement
to submit a result sheet showing the comparative merit of all
applicants along with the recommendations. Section 85(4) of the Act
provides that the Selection Committee shall recommend a panel of
two names for every vacancy referred to it. It does not mandate that
the Selection Committee shall submit complete details of the
comparative merit of all candidates who appeared before it.
67.
With regard to the recording of satisfaction under
Section 85(5) of the Act concerning any financial or other interest
likely to affect prejudicially the functions of the selected candidate as
-57-
Chairman or member of the State Commission, there is an
unambiguous and clear reference in the proceedings recommending
the names of the selected candidates, stating that it was apprised to
the Committee that the candidates had submitted declarations in the
form of undertakings along with their applications to the effect that
they did not have any financial or other interest likely to affect
prejudicially their functions as Chairman of the State Commission. It
was duly recorded by the Committee that all applicants had
submitted their applications along with the requisite declarations.
The recommendations were arrived at after perusal of the
applications submitted by the applicants, with reference to the
particulars furnished in their applications including bio-data, and the
declarations submitted along with the applications. Thus, on this
count as well, no ground is made out for rejection of the panel
recommended by the Selection Committee.
68.
Moreover, aforesaid ground has been taken for the first
time in the reply filed by the respondents. It does not find mention
either in Annexure P-6 or in the impugned notification (Annexure P4). Therefore, this objection appears to be an afterthought in order
to justify the rejection of the panel recommended by the Selection
Committee, and is not available to the respondents to justify their
decision of terminating the selection process.
-58-
69.
Section 84(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003 prescribes the
eligibility criteria and qualifications for appointment of the Chairman,
which does not restrict the field of knowledge or capacity in dealing
with problems relating to electricity generation, transmission, or
supply only; rather, it provides that adequate knowledge and
capacity in dealing with problems relating to engineering, finance,
commerce, economics, law, or management shall be the
qualification for such appointment, along with ability, integrity, and
standing. Therefore, the plea of the respondents that the petitioner
was not having experience in the power sector and thus was not
suitable is misconceived. Had such been the intention of the
legislature, it would have been specifically provided in this Section
that only persons having experience, adequate knowledge, and
capacity in the field of the power sector shall be eligible to be
appointed as Chairman of the State Commission. In such an
eventuality, as provided under Section 84(2), no person who is or
has been a Judge of the High Court could ever have been appointed
as Chairman of the State Commission, whereas, as informed during
arguments, in a number of States, persons who have been Judges
of the High Court have indeed been appointed as Chairmans. Their
eligibility and qualification to be appointed as Chairman is drawn
from Section 84(1), which provides "law" as one of the distinct fields
-59-
in which adequate knowledge and capacity to deal with problems is
sufficient for appointment as Chairman of the State Commission.
70.
No doubt, along with other requisite qualifications,
ability, integrity, and standing are also mandatory requirements for
appointment. However, this provision nowhere provides that only
senior scale IAS officers shall possess ability, integrity, and standing.
Had it been so, it would have been specifically provided in the
Section, and the advertisement would have been published inviting
applications exclusively from senior IAS officers serving in the
senior/Apex scale or higher posts of the administration. It is another
issue as to whether such senior IAS officers would necessarily have
adequate knowledge or capacity to deal with problems relating to the
power sector.
71.
The judgments referred to on behalf of the respondents
with regard to standing on the basis of seniority are misconceived
and not applicable to the present case. In the present case, eligibility
has to be considered and determined strictly on the basis of the
provisions of Section 84(1) of the Act, whereas in the judgments
referred to by the respondents, there were specific statutory rules
providing for taking into consideration seniority for determining
-60-
suitability, eligibility, and standing for appointment to a particular
post.
72.
In view of the eligibility and qualifications prescribed for
appointment as Chairman and member of the State Commission, the
ground for rejection of the panel on the premise that earlier this
position was manned by apex scale IAS officers having experience
in policy making, or by senior technocrats with full exposure to policy
matters in the electricity sector, cannot be a valid ground for rejection
of the select panel. Similarly, the fact that the previous Chairman of
the Commission was Chairman of the Bhakra Beas Management
Board (BBMB) before assuming charge of Chairman of the State
Commission is not a valid ground, but rather an arbitrary excuse to
reject the recommendations of the Selection Committee. Neither in
the advertisement nor in the provisions of the Act is there any such
requirement as has been referred to in Note N-143 of Annexure P-6.
73.
Section 84(1) of the Act does not contemplate the
appointment of Chairman only from amongst senior officers, apex
scale IAS officers, senior technocrats, or persons who have
remained heads of certain institutions prior to assuming charge of
the State Commission. Had that been the intention, the legislature
would have incorporated a specific clause under Section 84
-61-
providing that senior officers shall be given preference for
appointment as Chairman of the State Commission. That is not the
intent of the Act.
74.
The rejection of the select panel on the ground that the
recommended candidate does not enjoy the status of those who held
the position in the past is arbitrary.
75.
Applications for appointment of Chairman/member of
State Commission are invited from the open market, and it is
erroneous to presume that senior officers with more years of
experience would necessarily possess more knowledge or capacity
than junior officers with experience of lesser period. There may be
Secretary-level officers or officers who have served in high-ranking
positions for longer period, but not possessing adequate knowledge
or capacity to deal with problems relating to engineering, finance,
commerce, economics, law, or management, whereas there may be
relatively junior officers with experience with lesser period, but
possessing adequate knowledge and capacity to deal with such
problems.
76.
Length of experience/standing does not matter as a
standalone metric in the field of knowledge. What matters is how
much the subject matter has been understood by the person.
-62-
Similarly, seniority in service or age of person is also not only a basic
parameter to assess his standing, adequate knowledge and/or
capacity to deal with issues/subject matter/problems, related to
relevant field(s). It may be a relevant factor but cannot be sole
criteria.
77.
Practical skill, adaptability and proven impact outweigh
time based tenure. In a classic Advaita Vedanta text, the Ashtavakra
Geeta, this core philosophy is beautifully illustrated during
conversation between Ashtavakra and King Janaka by the statement
that true wisdom is not measured by the greyness of one’s hair but
by the clarity of one’s understanding. A young person can possess
more knowledge and capability, while an elder may not acquire that
much despite more length of experience.
78.
The scheme for constitution of the State Commission,
including the appointment of the Chairman and its members, clearly
indicates that the Legislature has vested the task of selection in the
Selection Committee constituted under Section 85(1) of the Act.
Section 82 provides for the constitution of the State Commission
consisting of not more than three members, including the Chairman,
with the further provision under Section 82(5) that the Chairman and
members of the State Commission shall be appointed by the State
-63-
Government, but on the recommendations of the Selection
Committee referred to in Section 85. The appointing authority is the
State Government, but the selection of the Chairman and members
has been entrusted to the Selection Committee.
79.
Section 85(1) provides for the constitution of a Selection
Committee headed by a person who has been a Judge of the High
Court as Chairman, with two members—namely, the Chief Secretary
of the concerned State and the Chairman of the Central Electricity
Authority or Chairman of the Central Commission. As provided under
Section 82(4), the Commission shall consist of not more than three
members, meaning thereby that the Commission can be a singlemember Commission or have two members only, as there is an
upper cap on the number of members including the Chairman, but
no minimum strength has been prescribed under the Act.
80.
It is also apt to record that Section 85(6) provides that
no appointment of Chairman or other member shall be invalid merely
by reason of any vacancy in the Selection Committee. Once
constituted, the Selection Committee does not suffer any invalidity in
recommending a panel for appointment merely because there was a
vacancy. In the present case, the Committee was constituted
consisting of a retired Judge of the High Court as Chairman, and the
-64-
Chief Secretary of the State and the Chairman of the Central
Electricity Authority as members. Since the Chief Secretary was
himself an applicant and aspirant for appointment as Chairman, as
informed, he recused himself from the proceedings of the Selection
Committee. In view of the express provisions of Section 85(6), the
recommendations made by the Selection Committee were and are
valid.
81.
Section 85(4) provides that the Selection Committee
shall recommend a panel of two names for every vacancy referred
to it. Thereafter, as provided under Section 82(5), the Chairman or
member, as the case may be, of the State Commission shall be
appointed by the State Government. The Act nowhere provides for
the rejection of a recommended panel, made by the Selection
Committee after adopting due process in terms of the Act and taking
into consideration the qualifications provided under Section 84(1).
82.
The scheme of the Act clearly indicates that the
Government has no role in determining the suitability of a candidate.
No doubt, the Government can question a recommendation if an
ineligible candidate is recommended by the Selection Committee.
However, the domain to judge the suitability of persons to be
included in the panel for recommendation of appointment as
-65-
Chairman or member of the State Commission vests exclusively in
the Selection Committee. By making a provision for appointing a
person who has been a Judge of the High Court as Chairman of the
Selection Committee, statutory sanctity has been attached to the
selection process completed by it.
83.
The Act nowhere provides that the Government can
refer back the panel recommended by the Selection Committee or
reject it on the ground that, in the opinion of the Government, there
were other senior persons, (including its former or present Chief
Secretaries), senior to the person recommended who were not
included in the panel. The intention of the Legislature is not to
appoint the Chairman and members of the State Commission at the
whims, fancies, or liking of the State Government; and therefore, that
power has been vested in the Selection Committee.
84.
The impugned decision of the Government is not based
on legal and valid grounds, and has been arrived at on the
misconceived notion that it can sit over the recommendations as an
appellate authority to comment upon and redetermine the suitability
of candidates by referring to their seniority, higher pay scale, or
higher positions than the persons recommended by the Selection
Committee.
-66-
85.
From the minutes of the Selection Committee, it is
evident that the Committee considered every aspect related to
candidates like bio-data, educational qualifications, experience,
knowledge, assessment of abilities, capabilities and knowledge
during interactions and through due deliberations, as well as the
undertakings and declarations submitted by the applicants as
required under the Act, including the recommended candidates.
While eligibility can be considered on the basis of set parameters of
academic qualifications, the suitability of a candidate has to be
judged on the basis of qualifications prescribed under Section 84(1),
which involves subjective satisfaction. In the present case, the right
of arriving at such subjective satisfaction vests with the Selection
Committee, and not with the Government. Had the determination of
suitability been intended to be vested in the Government, there
would have been no occasion to provide for the constitution of a highpowered Selection Committee, headed by a person, who has been
Judge of the High Court, and the recommendation of a panel of two
candidates by such Committee, leaving the Government only the
choice thereafter to appoint the Chairman or member out of the
select panel. The discretion of the Government is available for
choosing either of the two recommended candidates, but not for
rejecting the panel on the ground that other applicants, in the opinion
-67-
of the Government, were more suitable, more capable, or senior to
the persons included in the panel.
86.
The plea that the application of the petitioner was not
routed through the proper channel in order to justify the rejection of
the recommended panel is equally unsustainable. The application
was submitted by the petitioner to his immediate controlling
authority, which forwarded the same to the Secretary (Power) to the
Government of Himachal Pradesh. The Secretary (Power),
accepting the application as having been routed through the proper
channel, placed it along with the applications of other candidates
before the Selection Committee. In case there was any defect in
processing the application, the same ought to have been pointed out
at the initial stage, and in that event, either the alleged mistake would
have been rectified or the application would have been rejected for
want of routing through the proper channel. Having accepted and
processed the application and placed it before the Selection
Committee, this plea taken by the respondents is of no assistance to
them.
87.
In the aforesaid factual matrix, the pleas raised by the
respondents that mere inclusion of a candidate's name in the select
list does not confer any indefeasible right to seek appointment and
-68-
judgment cited in support of their plea, are not attracted, because
the rejection of the selection panel is based upon flimsy, arbitrary,
and vague grounds which are not available and permissible to the
Government for taking the impugned decision.
88.
No doubt, personal mala fide has not been alleged in the
writ petition, however, it is a case of legal mala fide where the
provisions of the Act have been misconceived, and power, beyond
that which is vested in the State, has been presumed and exercised,
resulting in taking a decision which is not sustainable in the eyes of
law.
89.
In case the plea of the respondents is accepted and the
impugned decision is not interfered with, it shall amount to re-writing
of the statute and insertion of a provision which otherwise has not
been provided either expressly or impliedly. Instead, such power has
been excluded not only impliedly but expressly by restricting the
domain of the Government under Section 82(5) to make appointment
of the Chairman or Member of the State Commission on the
recommendations of the Selection Committee, and by providing no
other provision granting discretion to the State to accept or reject the
panel so recommended by the Selection Committee.
-69-
90.
After taking into consideration the rival contentions of the
parties, the case law cited by them, and the provisions of the Act, we
are of the considered opinion that the action of the respondents is
arbitrary, and arbitrariness is an antithesis of the equality clause
contained in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Thus, the
impugned decision is not sustainable being arbitrary, irrational, and
beyond the domain of the Government.
91.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the
considered opinion that the impugned decision is not sustainable,
and accordingly, the writ petition is allowed in the following terms:
(i)
Decision dated 16.09.2025 (Annexure P-6) and
Notification dated 03.10.2025 (Annexure P-4) are
quashed and set aside.
(ii)
Respondents are directed to complete the
process of appointment of Chairperson of the H.P.
Electricity Regulatory Commission (HPERC)/
State
Commission
on
the
basis
of
recommendations dated 14.09.2025 (Annexure P5) on or before 10.11.2026.
-70-
92.
Petition is disposed of in aforesaid terms along with
pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
(Vivek Singh Thakur)
Judge
28th October, 2026
(Pardeep)
(Bhupesh Sharma)
Judge
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