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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
Reserved on :07.01.2019
Delivered on: 21 .01.2019
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE V.PARTHIBAN
Crl.A.No.592 of 2018
P.Murali
...
Appellant
vs.
1.M/s.Airmedia Technologies Chennai Pvt.Ltd.,
rep.by its Managing Director,
Mrs.Nirmala Devi
2.Mrs.Nirmala Devi
Managing Director,
M/s.BMD Hotels and Resorts Pvt.Ltd.,
No.12/33, Jambulingam Street, Nungambakkam,
Chennai-600 034
3.Mr.S.Bhaskar
S/o.Sambandam
Director,
M/s.BMD Hotels and Resorts Pvt.Ltd.,
No.12/33, Jambulingam Street,
Nungambakkam,
Chennai-600 034
... Respondents
Criminal Appeal filed under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. against
the judgment dated 27.07.2018, passed by the V Additional
Sessions Judge, Chennai, in C.A.No.105 of 2016, reversing the
order dated 31.03.2016 passed in C.C.No.134 of 2012, by the
Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court No.I, Allikulam,
Chennai.
For Appellant
: Mr.M.Fazulul Haq for
M/s.Juris and Justia
For Respondents : No appearance
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JUDGMENT
The present appeal arises out of the judgment, dated
27.07.2018, passed by the Lower appellate Court, in Crl.A.No.105
of 2016, reversing the order dated 31.03.2016 passed by the
trial
Court,
in
C.C.No.134
of
2012,
convicting
the
respondents/accused
under
Section
of
the
Negotiable
Instruments Act (the 'N.I.Act' for short).
2.The facts which gave rise to the filing of the appeal,
are briefly stated hereunder:
(i)According to the appellant/complainant, he had given
Rs.40,00,000/- to the respondents/accused in 2008 for purchase
of lands in Koovathur Village, Kancheepuram District. Since the
respondents/accused did not purchase any land, as per the
assurance, in order to partially discharge the debt due to the
appellant/complainant,
five
cheques
were
issued,
each
representing Rs.1,50,000/-, in all Rs.7,50,000/-, on various
dates i.e., on 20.12.2009, 20.01.2010, 20.02.2010, 20.03.2010,
20.04.2010. All the cheques were presented on 24.05.2010 with
the complainant's banker. The cheques were returned dishonored
with an endorsement “funds insufficient”, on 25.05.2010. On
knowing about the dishonoring of cheques, a legal notice was
issued on behalf of the complainant on 14.06.2010, which was
received by the accused on 15.06.2010. Since the amounts which
were covered under the cheques were not settled within 15 days
from the date of receipt of notice issued under the provisions
of N.I.Act, a complaint was filed before the trial Court under
Section 138 r/w Section 141 of the N.I.Act.
(ii)Thereafter, on the basis of the affidavit filed on
behalf of the complainant, the same was taken cognizance of by
the trial Court under Section 138 of the N.I.Act, as there was
prima facie material in the complaint and thereupon notice was
issued to the accused. Since the accused, who appeared in
response to the summons, denied the allegations contained in the
complaint, trial was conducted by the trail Court.
3.On behalf of the complainant, the complainant examined
himself in support of the complaint and on his behalf 14
documents were marked as Exs.P1 to P14. On behalf of the accused
no one was examined, but five documents have been marked as
Exs.D-1 to D-5.
4.The complainant, in his evidence before the trial Court
has clearly deposed that an amount of Rs.40,00,000/- was given
to the accused No.1 company and accused Nos.2 & 3, being
Managing Director and Director, are responsible for return of
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the money in discharge of the debt towards the complainant. The
complainant has clearly deposed about the presentation of the
cheques and the return of the cheques by the bank with an
endorsement 'funds insufficient'. Thereafter, a legal notice was
issued within the statutory time and since the amounts were not
settled within the time stipulated in the statute, a complaint
was filed before the trail Court under Section 138 r/w Section
141 of the N.I.Act.
5.According to the complainant the money was given to the
accused for purchase of certain lands in Koovathur Village,
Kancheepuram District in 2008 and the accused did not procure
any lands on the basis of the understanding between the
complainant and the accused. In order to partially discharge the
liability, the accused had issued five cheques on the dates
mentioned above and the cheques were dishonored ultimately. The
cheques were marked as Exs.P-1 to P-5 and the return memos were
marked as Ex.P-6 to P-10. The legal notice was marked as Ex.P-11
and Exs.P-12 and 13 are the acknowledgments of the receipt of
the legal notice, by the accused and Ex.P14 is the reply notice
sent by the accused.
6.The trial Court, after adverting to the evidence both
oral and documentary and also after hearing the submissions of
the parties, has come to the conclusion that the accused were
guilty under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. According to the trial
Court, the accused has admitted the issuance of cheques (Exs.P-1
to P-5) as they have not disputed about the execution of the
cheques. The accused have also not denied the fact that the
cheques have returned dishonored. The defence of the accused was
that there were several business transactions between the
complainant and the accused and the cheques were given as a
security for some transactions, but in fact, there was no
legally enforceable debt, attracting the provisions of Section
138 of the N.I.Act. According to the accused there was no
written
acknowledgment of receipt of Rs.40,00,000/- from the
complainant and in their reply notice to the legal notice dated
01.07.2010, the liability has been disowned by the accused and
no rejoinder was sent on behalf of the complainant.
7.According to the accused they have not given any details
in regard to the time of the issuance of cheques and for what
specific transaction Rs.40,00,000/- was given and on what basis
the cheques were presented for not honoring the so called
commitment made on behalf of the accused in regard to the
purchase of land. According to the accused there were sale
deeds, which were marked on their behalf as Exs.D-2 and D-5 and
also the other documents on their behalf to show that there were
several transactions between the appellant and the accused and
some lands were also purchased, in which, the complainant
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himself was shown as Power of Attorney and being a Power of
Attorney, the complainant had sold the same to his wife.
According to the accused the complainant himself was a business
associate of the first accused and the other accused and
therefore, it is not a normal borrowing of money from the
complainant and the cheques were issued for discharge of
liability.
8.The trial Court disbelieved and discountenanced the case
of the respondent/accused for the following reasons:
(a)The contention on behalf of the accused that there were
no written receipt of acknowledgment cannot be countenanced both
on facts and on law for the simple reason that in the reply
notice by the accused dated 01.07.2010, it was clearly admitted
about the payment of Rs.40,00,000/- for purchase of land at
Koovathur Village, Kancheepuram District. Once it is admitted
about the receipt of payment, there need not be any further
proof of any written acknowledgment for receipt of the said
amount. According to the trial Court there was no requirement
for sending a rejoinder and therefore, the absence of any
rejoinder on the complainant side does not really affect the
case of the complainant.
(b)The execution of the cheques was admitted by the accused
and once the execution of the cheques was admitted, there is
presumption in favour of the holder of the cheques under Section
139 of the N.I.Act. Once such presumption is taken, it is for
the accused to prove the contrary. According to the trial Court
the accused have not discharged the burden of proving the
contrary, since no oral evidence was let in on their behalf and
no worthy materials were marked on their behalf to disprove the
case of the complainant. Even though there were several
transactions
appeared
to
have
taken
place
between
the
complainant and the accused, as disclosed from the materials
placed on record, the trial Court, however, was of the view that
there was no evidence let in on behalf of the accused to show as
to what steps have been initiated in order to take back the
cheques given by them, if their version is to be accepted that
there were several transactions which had taken place between
the complainant and the accused. Therefore, the trial Court
refused to believe the version of the accused that it was a
false case. Moreover, the trial Court has also held that in
respect of purchase of certain lands, the complainant has
clearly deposed that it was a different transaction and not the
transaction which was originally agreed upon for purchase of
lands at Koovathur Village, Kancheepuram District. In fact, on
behalf of the accused even the statement was not rebutted by
letting in any contra evidence. The further contention on behalf
of the accused is that the dispute in between the complainant
and the accused was civil in nature and the same cannot be
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brought within the ambit of Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The
trial Court rejected the said submission on the ground that
since the accused having accepted the issuance of cheques and
having accepted the execution of the same, it is always open to
the complainant to choose the forum as he thinks best and the
complainant has chosen to prosecute the case under Section 138
of the N.I.Act, which cannot be found fault with on the ground
that the dispute was civil in nature. Finally, the trial Court
has held that no piece of evidence has been let in on behalf of
the accused to prove the contrary when a presumption has been
raised in favour of the holder of the cheques, viz., the
complainant and in the absence of any evidence to prove the
contrary, the complainant has made out a case for violation of
Section 138 of the N.I.Act.
9.In the above said circumstances the trial Court has
convicted the respondents/accused under Section 138 of the
N.I.Act
and
sentenced
them
to
undergo
years
simple
imprisonment with a fine of Rs.10,000/-. Further, as per
Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C., the trial Court has also ordered
compensation of Rs.7,50,000/-, being the cheque amount, payable
in three months by the accused Nos.2 & 3 and in default of
payment
of
the
compensation,
they
would
undergo
simple
imprisonment for six months. As against the said order passed by
the trial Court, an appeal has been filed by the accused before
the lower Appellate Court in Crl.A.No.105 of 2016.
10.The lower Appellate Court, while dealing with the
appeal, has reversed the order of the trial Court and acquitted
the accused. The lower Appellate Court has given several reasons
for reversing the order of the trial Court as under:
(a)the trial Court has simply invoked Sections 118 & 139 of
N.I. Act to presume the consideration and legally enforceable
debt on the Negotiable Instruments issued by the accused. Such a
course is not open when the parties are closely associated in
business transaction. The complainant was a business associate
of the accused, which was an admitted fact.
(b)though the accused persons have not denied the payment
of Rs.40,00,000/- by the complainant, yet it was an admitted
fact that the accused persons negotiated for purchase of lands,
for which, Power of Attorney was obtained in the name of the
complainant
from
the
land
owners
and
subsequently
the
complainant himself has executed sale deeds in favour of his
wife.
Therefore,
it
is proved that there were several
transactions between the complainant and the accused, who were
working closely as business associates.
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(c)merely because the cheques were issued based on some
oral business arrangement or agreement, it will not give rise to
criminal prosecution. Even if the cheques were dishonored, since
the dispute arises out of the said transaction, the same is
purely civil in nature and it requires detailed probe into the
business relationship between the parties. The complainant
cannot invoke the penal clause under Section 138 of the N.I.Act.
There were several circumstances under which cheques were issued
by the people and all these circumstances will not give rise to
file a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. Only in cases
where a legally enforceable debt or liability is proved to be in
existence, the penal provision under Section 138 of the N.I.Act
can be invoked.
(d)no prudent man will pay such a huge amount without
acknowledgment or receipt or terms of agreement. The nature of
transaction between the complainant and the accused speaks
something more exists between the complainant and the accused.
(e)it is not revealed by the complainant as to on which
date he gave money and on which date the accused gave cheques.
Whether the cheques were issued post dated or after demand made
by the complainant are also not spoken by the complainant.
(f)the complainant has also not stated as to whether the
land purchase dealing with the third accused is in the
individual capacity or in the capacity of the Director of the
first accused company.
(g)the explanation given by the accused persons
issuance of the cheques was quite probable, reasonable
acceptable.
for
and
(h)the cheque bounce cases cannot be treated as criminal
cases in strict sense. This is a quasi civil case, where the
preponderance of probabilities plays a vital role. If the
accused is able to raise a probable defense, it creates a doubt
on the very existence of legally enforceable debt or liability,
the prosecution must fail.
With the above said reasoning, the lower Appellate Court has
concluded that there was no legally enforceable debt or
liability and therefore, the complaint was not maintainable
under Section 138 of the N.I.Act.
11.On behalf of both the appellant/complainant and the
respondents/accused, before the lower Appellate Court, number of
decisions were cited. However, the lower Appellate Court has
concluded that in view of the elaborate discussion on the
factual matrix of the case, the citations relied on by both the
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parties need not be gone into in detail. In fact the Appellate
Court has not discussed about any citation at all, while
disposing of the appeal. Ultimately, the Appellate Court has
held that the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I.Act is
rebuttable and the accused persons have rebutted the same
successfully. As against the said finding by the lower Appellate
Court, the present appeal has been filed.
12.The learned counsel appearing for the appellant would
submit that the judgment of the trial Court was well considered
and well founded and it dealt with each of the contentions put
forth on behalf of both sides. The trial Court has also
considered
the
oral
and
documentary
evidence
in
proper
perspective and came to the definite conclusion about the guilt
of the accused for violating Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The
Trial Court has firmly held that the accused persons have failed
to discharge the burden cast upon them, once there was a
presumption in favour of the holder of the cheque was
established. It is on record that no evidence was let in on
behalf of the accused to prove the contrary except marking five
documents, which did not impact much on the complainant. When
the order of the trial Court was on the basis of sound material
evidence, unfortunately the lower Appellate Court has over
turned the said order on the basis of the reasons as
aforementioned, which cannot either be countenanced in law or on
facts.
13.According
to
the
learned
counsel
for
the
appellant/complainant, the lower Appellate Court has completely
erred in coming to the conclusion against the complainant that
in view of several transactions which had taken place between
the complainant and the accused, there cannot be any presumption
of existence of any legally enforceable debt or liability. Such
conclusion by the lower Appellate Court is contrary to the
explicit provision as contained in Section 139 of the N.I.Act.
In support of his contention, the learned counsel would rely
upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in
Kishan Rao vs. Shankargouda (2018 0 Supreme (SC) 678). He would
draw reference to paragraph Nos.10 and 15 to 23 which are
extracted hereunder:
“10.The
trial
court
after
considering
the
evidence on record has returned the finding that
the cheque was issued by the accused which
contained
his
signatures.
Although,
the
complainant led oral as well as documentary
evidence to prove his case, no evidence was led
by the accused to rebut the presumption regarding
existence of debt or liability of the accused.
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15. The High Court has not returned any finding
that order of conviction based on evidence on
record suffers from any perversity or based on no
material or there is other valid ground for
exercise of revisional jurisdiction. There is no
valid basis for the High Court to hold that the
accused has been successful in creating doubt in
the mind of the Court with regard to the
existence of the debt or liability. The appellant
has proved the issuance of cheque which contained
signatures of the accused and on presentation of
the
cheque,
the
cheque
was
returned
with
endorsement "insufficient funds". Bank official
was produced as one of the witnesses who proved
that the cheque was not returned on the ground
that it did not contain signatures of the accused
rather it was returned due to insufficient funds.
We are of the view that the judgment of High
Court is liable to be set aside on this ground
alone.
16. Even though judgment of the High Court is
liable to be set aside on the ground that High
Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction, to
satisfy ourselves with the merits of the case, we
proceeded to examine as to whether there was any
doubt with regard to the existence of the debt or
liability of the accused.
17. Section 139 of the Act, 1881 provides for
drawing the presumption in favour of holder.
Section 139 is to the following effect:
"139.Presumption in favour of holder.- It shall
be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that
the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the
nature referred to in section 138 for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
other liability."
18. This Court in Kumar Exports vs. Sharma
Carpets, 2009 (2) SCC 513, had considered the
provisions of Negotiable Instruments Act as well
Evidence Act. Referring to Section 139, this
Court laid down following in paragraphs 14, 15,
18 and 19:
"14. Section 139 of the Act provides that it
shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved,
that the holder of a cheque received the cheque
of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the
discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or
other liability.
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15. Presumptions are devices by use of which the
courts are enabled and entitled to pronounce on
an issue
notwithstanding that there is no
evidence or insufficient evidence. Under the
Evidence Act all presumptions must come under one
or the other class of the three classes mentioned
in
the
Act,
namely,
(1)
"may
presume"
(rebuttable), (2) "shall presume" (rebuttable),
and (3) "conclusive presumptions" (irrebuttable).
The term "presumption" is used to designate an
inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the
existence of a fact, conveniently called the
"presumed fact" drawn by a judicial tribunal, by
a process of probable 13 reasoning from some
matter of fact, either judicially noticed or
admitted or established by legal evidence to the
satisfaction
of
the
tribunal.
Presumption
literally
means
"taking
as
true
without
examination or proof".
18. Applying the definition of the word "proved"
in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to the
provisions of Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, it
becomes evident that in a trial under Section 138
of the Act a presumption will have to be made
that every negotiable instrument was made or
drawn for consideration and that it was executed
for discharge of debt or liability once the
execution of negotiable instrument is either
proved or admitted. As soon as the complainant
discharges
the
burden
to
prove
that
the
instrument, say a note, was executed by the
accused, the rules of presumptions under Sections
118 and 139 of the Act help him shift the burden
on the accused. The presumptions will live, exist
and survive and shall end only when the contrary
is proved by the accused, that is, the cheque was
not issued for consideration and in discharge of
any debt or liability. A presumption is not in
itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie
case for a party for whose benefit it exists.
19. The use of the phrase "until the contrary is
proved" in Section 118 of the Act and use of the
words "unless the contrary is proved" in Section
139 of the Act read with definitions of "may
presume" and "shall presume" as given in Section
4 of the Evidence Act, makes it at once clear
that presumptions to be raised under both the
provisions are rebuttable. When a presumption is
rebuttable, it only points out that the party on
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whom lies the duty of going forward with
evidence, on the fact presumed and when that
party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably
tending to show that the real fact is not as
presumed, the purpose of the presumption is
over."
19. This Court held that the accused may adduce
evidence to rebut the presumption, but mere
denial regarding existence of debt shall not
serve
any
purpose.
Following
was
held
in
paragraph 20:
"20....The accused may adduce direct evidence to
prove that the note in question was not supported
by consideration and that there was no debt or
liability to be discharged by him. However, the
court need not insist in every case that the
accused should disprove the non-existence of
consideration and debt by leading direct evidence
because the existence of negative evidence is
neither possible nor contemplated. At the same
time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing
of the consideration and existence of debt,
apparently would not serve the purpose of the
accused. Something which is probable has to be
brought on record for getting the burden of proof
shifted to the complainant.
To disprove the presumptions, the accused should
bring on record such facts and circumstances,
upon consideration of which, the court may either
believe that the consideration and debt did not
exist or their non-existence was so probable that
a prudent man would under the circumstances of
the case, act upon the plea that they did not
exist..."
20. In the present case, the trial court as well
as the Appellate Court having found that cheque
contained the signatures of the accused and it
was given to the appellant to present in the Bank
of the presumption under Section 139 was rightly
raised which was not rebutted by the accused. The
accused had not led any evidence to rebut the
aforesaid presumption. The accused even did not
come in the witness box to support his case. In
the reply to the notice which was given by the
appellant the accused took the defence that the
cheque was stolen by the appellant. The said
defence was rejected by the trial court after
considering the evidence on record with regard to
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which no contrary view has also been expressed by
the High Court.
21. Another judgment which needs to be looked
into is Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, 2010 (11) SCC
441. A three Judge Bench of this Court had
occasion to examine the presumption under Section
139 of the Act, 1881. This Court in the aforesaid
case has held that in the event 16 the accused is
able to raise a probable defence which creates
doubt with regard to the existence of a debt or
liability, the presumption may fail. Following
was laid down in paragraphs 26 and 27:
"26. In light of these extracts, we are in
agreement with the respondent claimant that the
presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act
does indeed include the existence of a legally
enforceable debt or liability. To that extent,
the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan
Bhat, (2008) 4 SCC 54, may not be correct.
However, this does not in any way cast doubt on
the correctness of the decision in that case
since it was based on the specific facts and
circumstances therein. As noted in the citations,
this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable
presumption and it is open to the accused to
raise a defence wherein the existence of a
legally enforceable debt or liability can be
contested. However, there can be no doubt that
there is an initial presumption which favours the
complainant.
27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a
reverse onus clause that has been included in
furtherance of the legislative objective of
improving
the
credibility
of
negotiable
instruments. While Section 138 of the Act
specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to
the
dishonour
of
cheques,
the
rebuttable
presumption under Section 139 is a device to
prevent undue delay in the course of litigation.
However, it must be remembered that the offence
made punishable by Section 138 can be better
described as a regulatory offence since the
bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of
a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to
the
private
parties
involved
in
commercial
transactions. In such a scenario, the test of
proportionality should guide the construction and
interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the
defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge
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an unduly high standard or proof."
22. No evidence was led by the accused. The
defence taken in the reply to the notice that
cheque was stolen having been rejected by the two
courts below, we do not see any basis for the
High court coming to the conclusion that the
accused has been successful in creating doubt in
the mind of the Court with regard to the
existence of the debt or liability. How the
presumption under Section 139 can be rebutted on
the evidence of PW.1, himself has not been
explained by the High court.
23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are
of the view that the High Court committed error
in setting aside the order of conviction in
exercise
of
revisional
jurisdiction.
No
sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High
Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise
its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the
conviction.”
The learned counsel would therefore submit that the order of the
trial Court needs to be reinstated and the judgment of the lower
Appellate Court is to be interfered with.
14.Despite notice having been served and the receipt of
which having been acknowledged, there is no representation on
behalf of the respondents. Though the names of the respondents
were ordered to be printed and despite the printing of their
names today in the cause list, there was no representation on
their behalf. Even on an earlier occasion there was no
representation on behalf of the respondents.
15.Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and perused
the material evidence placed on record.
16.As narrated above, the trial Court has dealt with each
and every aspect of the complaint as well as the defence taken
on behalf of accused persons and rendered a finding to the
effect that there was a legally enforceable debt as against the
accused persons, at the instance of the complainant. The
conclusion reached by the trial Court appears to be well founded
and valid for the simple reason that the trail Court was guided
rightly by the principle of presumption in favour of the holder
of the cheque, particularly when admittedly the cheques have
been executed by the respondents/accused. Once the execution of
the cheques was admitted, the burden shifts on the accused
persons to prove the contrary and the accused persons have
failed to discharge the burden by not letting in any oral
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evidence at all and also not letting in any worthy material
evidence.
17.The reasons as set forth by the appellate Court cannot
stand the test of proper judicial scrutiny, since the appellate
Court has unnecessarily presumed certain things without support
of any material evidence. The Appellate Court has assumed that
no prudent person will pay Rs.40,00,000/- without obtaining any
written receipt or documentation. Such conclusion by the lower
Appellate Court is erroneous for the reason that in the reply
notice of the accused person dated 01.07.2010 it was admitted
about the receipt of payment of Rs.40,00,000/- from the
complainant. Once the accused persons themselves have admitted
the factum of receipt of the amount, the Appellate Court has
completely erred in drawing its own conclusion, contrary to the
records.
18.Further the Appellate Court was merely guided by the
fact that there were several transactions as between the
complainant and the accused persons and therefore, it was not a
simple transaction and hence Section 138 of N.I.Act was not
attracted at all. Such conclusion does not have support of any
evidence at all, in the first place. The Appellate Court has
traversed beyond the pile of evidence that was made available
before the trial Court and needlessly drawn certain presumptions
in favour of the accused persons. The Appellate Court has also
mistaken itself by concluding that the dispute is purely civil
in nature and therefore, the complainant was not entitled to
invoke the penal provision of Section 138 of the N.I.Act. The
Appellate Court failed to appreciate that it is always open to
the complainant to maintain his complaint under Section 138 of
the N.I.Act and he can always proceed against the person for
recovery of the amount in civil proceedings. Because there is a
remedy available in civil proceedings, the complainant cannot be
shut out from availing remedy under Section 138 of the N.I.Act.
19.Likewise the lower Appellate Court has unnecessarily
presumed that there was no legally enforceable debt, in the
absence of any rebuttal by the accused persons. This Court is
unable to appreciate as to the basis of such conclusion by the
Appellate Court when no material is available to come to such a
conclusion
that
the
accused
persons
have
rebutted
the
presumption under Section 118 and under Section 139 of the
N.I.Act.
The conclusion by the Appellate Court that there was
a doubt in regard to the transaction itself and therefore,
Section 138 of the N.I.Act is not attracted, cannot also be
countenanced on fact for the reason that the receipt of the
payment has been accepted and the issuance of cheques, by
affixing their signatures, has also been accepted by the
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accused. In which event the lower Appellate Court has drawn
conclusion on the basis of its own perception and understanding
without any supportive evidence at all. The conclusion by the
Appellate Court that it is not a simple case of borrowal and
therefore, Section 138 of the N.I.Act is not attracted, is also
invalid for the reason that in business transactions it is
always not one of a simple issuing cheque for any loan. It can
always be for discharge of liability which may arise of various
business transactions between the parties. Therefore, the
Appellate Court has misdirected itself while coming to such
conclusion that only in case of simple transaction, Section 138
of the N.I. Act can be attracted. The lower Appellate Court has
completely failed to appreciate the scheme of the provisions of
the N.I.Act on the aspect of issuing negotiable instruments.
20.The lower Appellate Court has also failed to refer to
various decisions cited on behalf of the parties, but proceeded
to hold that in view of the conclusion reached on the basis of
factual matrix of the case, there was no need to elaborate the
decisions. Such conclusion by the lower Appellate Court cannot
be
held
to
be
valid,
while
exercising
its
appellate
jurisdiction. When decisions are cited on behalf of the parties
it is imperative on the part of the lower Appellate Court to
apply the ratio laid down in those decisions to the factual
matrix of the case and it cannot completely discard the same
because of the fact that the Appellate Court is being satisfied
about the factual matrix of the case. The conclusion, to say the
least, by the lower Appellate Court, on this aspect cannot be
countenanced in law. Even otherwise the other reasons as weighed
with the Appellate Court cannot be acceptable legal basis for
over turning the verdict of the trial Court.
21.In the opinion of this Court the trial Court has given
a detailed order dealing with every aspect of the complaint as
well as the defence put forth on behalf of the accused and
unless such findings by the trial Court, on the basis of oral
and documentary evidence, is found to be perverse and legally
unacceptable, it is not for the lower Appellate Court to reverse
the same. In this case the lower Appellate Court has completely
failed to give any contra finding, except drawing its own
presumptions, unrelated to the materials which are placed on
record before the lower Appellate Court. On the whole, the
judgment of the lower Appellate Court cannot stand the test of
judicial scrutiny of this Court and the same is therefore,
liable to be set aside.
For the above said reasons the criminal appeal is
allowed. The judgment passed by the lower Appellate Court is set
aside. The conviction and sentence passed in Calendar Case
No.134 of 2012, by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court
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No.I, Allikulam, Chennai,
are confirmed. The trial court is
directed to take appropriate steps so as to secure the accused
persons in order to serve the sentence.
Sd/Assistant Registrar(CS-III)
//True copy//
Sub Assistant Registrar
msk/pns
To
1.The
V Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai
2. - do – Through' The Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai.
3.The Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court No.I,
Allikulam, Chennai,
4. -do- Through' The Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Chennai.
+2cc to M/s.Juris and Justia, Advocate SR.No.4185
Crl.A.592 of 2018
PA(CO)
GMY(13/02/2019)
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