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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 1 November 2025
Pronounced on: 6 February 2026
+
LPA 320/2024, CM APPL. 23753/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
RFA(OS) 13/2024, CM APPL. 24048/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS P LIMITED
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
RFA(OS) 38/2024
P. M. DIESELS PVT. LTD.
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
LPA 320/2024 & other connected matters
KUMAR
11:48:46
versus
THUKRAL MECHANICALS WORKS
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
+
LPA 324/2024, CM APPL. 24003/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 325/2024, CM APPL. 24007/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
P.M. DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 326/2024, CM APPL. 24011/2024
LPA 320/2024 & other connected matters
KUMAR
11:48:46
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 327/2024, CM APPL. 24015/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 328/2024, CM APPL. 24019/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
P.M. DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
LPA 320/2024 & other connected matters
KUMAR
11:48:46
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 329/2024, CM APPL. 24031/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 330/2024, CM APPL. 24035/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 331/2024, CM APPL. 24039/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
LPA 320/2024 & other connected matters
KUMAR
11:48:46
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 332/2024, CM APPL. 24043/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
LPA 333/2024, CM APPL. 24056/2024
THUKRAL MECHANICAL WORKS
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
PM DIESELS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
+
RFA(OS)(COMM) 11/2024, CM APPL. 24052/2024
SUMITA RANI
.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hemant Singh, Mr. Sachin
Gupta, Mr. Rohit Pradhan, Mr. Ajay, Ms.
LPA 320/2024 & other connected matters
KUMAR
11:48:46
Prashansa Singh, Mr. Adarsh and Ms.
Mahima Chanchalani, Advs.
versus
NITIN MACHINE TOOLS PVT LTD & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. N. Mahabir, Mr. P.C. Arya,
Ms. Noopur Biswas and Mr. Udit Gupta,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
06.02.2026
%
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
Facilitative Index to the Judgment
S.
No.
Subject
Para Nos
A Brief Prefatory Note – The “Kerly impasse”
Facts
The dramatis personae
Trajectory of proceedings
Proceedings relating to CS (OS) 2408/1985 and CO 6/1987
Proceedings culminating in judgment dated 18 December
2008 of the Supreme Court in Thukral Mechanical Works
Proceedings relating to CS (OS) 3804/1992 [later renumbered
CS (Comm) 473/2016]
Proceedings relating to WP (C) 28/2021, WP (C) 29/2021,
WP (C) 31/2021, WP (C) 32/2021, WP (C) 33/2021, WP (C)
34/2021, WP (C) 35/2021, WP (C) 36/2021, WP (C) 38/2021
and WP (C) 39/2021
The Impugned Judgment
PMD is the prior user of the mark FIELDMARSHAL
Diesel engines and centrifugal pumps were allied and cognate
goods
Re. the 1985 suit
Re. Issue 1 - Whether the suit was barred by acquiescence,
1 – 14
LPA 320/2024 & other connected matters
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15 - 17
18 - 28
29 - 31
32 - 33
34 - 35
36 - 37
38 - 41
42 - 47
42 - 43
laches and delay and Issue 6 - Whether PMD had
misrepresented facts
Re. Issues 2 and 4
Re. Issue No. 3 - Whether Thukral’s goods, under the
trademark FIELD MARSHAL, were being passed off as
PMD’s goods? and Issue 7 – Whether PMD was the
proprietor of the trademark FIELDMARSHAL and had the
right of exclusive use thereof in respect of centrifugal pumps
or other goods in the same class or description?
Re. CS (Comm) 473/2016
Re. Issue 3 – Whether PMD was the registered owner of the
FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps and other
goods?
Re. Issue 4 – Whether Thukral was the prior user of the
FIELD MARSHAL trade mark in respect of centrifugal
pumps
Re. Issue 5 – Whether Thukral acquiesced to the user of the
FIELDMARSHAL mark by PMD
Re. Issue 6 – Whether the use of the mark FIELDMARSHAL
by PMD amounted to infringement of the registered trade
mark of Jain and passing off
Re. CO 6/1987
Re. WP (C) 28/2021, WP (C) 29/2021, WP (C) 31/2021, WP
(C) 32/2021, WP (C) 33/2021, WP (C) 34/2021, WP (C)
35/2021, WP (C) 36/2021, WP (C) 38/2021 and WP (C)
39/2021
Rival Contentions
Submissions of Mr. Hemant Singh for Thukral
Apropos CO 6/1987
Re. CS (Comm) 473/2016
Re. CS (OS) 2408/1985
Submissions of Mr. N. Mahabir for PMD
Analysis
Applicable statutory provisions
Scope of rectification proceedings – Section 46 or Section 56?
Re. Section 46 of the TMMA
Re. the 1985 suit and the 1992 suit
Re. RFA (OS) (Comm) 11/2024
Re. LPA 320/2024 and 325-333/2024
Re. RFA (OS) (Comm) 38/2025
Our reasons summarized
Conclusion
LPA 320/2024 & other connected matters
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44 - 45
46 - 47
48 - 54
49 - 50
53 - 54
55 - 57
59 - 65
67 - 78
79 - 100
101 - 126
127 - 130
131 - 145
146 - 176
177 - 204
205 - 214
215 – 220
222 - 223
I.
A Brief Prefatory Note – The “Kerly impasse”
1.
This batch of appeals presented, before us, a situation, of fact
and law, which we have not had an occasion to encounter earlier and
for which, despite our research, we have not been able to find any
judicial precedent, at least in this country.
2.
It is not, however, entirely unexplored, as it manifests what
Kerly, in the following classic statement of the law from his
authoritative treatise on trade marks1, calls an “impasse”:
“Concurrent right
… The statutory right of use given by registration of a mark does
not provide a defence to proceedings for passing off by the use of
the mark; although it is normally expedient for the claimant in such
cases to apply to revoke the registration. Where a party applies to
register a mark but does not immediately use it, and another party
uses the mark and generates sufficient goodwill to support a
passing claim prior to the first use by the registered proprietor, an
impasse ensues. The proprietor of the mark, if valid, may restrain
use by the owner of the goodwill. However, the proprietorship of
the mark provides no defence to a passing off claim by the owner
of the goodwill, notwithstanding the fact that such goodwill was
generated after the application to register the mark.”
(Emphasis supplied)
3.
Thus, Kerly recognizes the possibility of a situation where,
before commencement of user of a registered trade mark by the
registrant (whom we may call A), another person (whom we may call
B), uses an identical mark, for identical goods, without registration,
and acquires goodwill, prior to the commencement of user by A. In
1 Kerly’s Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names
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such a situation, Kerly states that an impasse results, in which A can
injunct B’s user on infringement and B can injunct A’s user on
passing off.
4.
In the present case, moreover, there exists a pronouncement, by
the Supreme Court, holding B to be A’s infringer.
5.
We are faced with precisely such a situation. We have not been
able, however, to come across any judicial precedent which addresses
the issue. It appears, therefore, that the issue is yet res integra.
6.
In conspectus, the situation may be stated thus.
7.
Jain Industries2 is the proprietor of the trade mark FIELD
MARSHAL, with effect from 1965, for centrifugal pumps.
Jain,
however, never used the mark for centrifugal pumps till 1988, through
its successor-in-interest, Thukral Mechanical Works3, to whom it
assigned the mark in 1986.
8.
PM Diesels Private Limited4 does not hold any registration of
the mark FIELDMARSHAL for centrifugal pumps. It, however,
commenced using the FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps
in 1975. By 1988, when Thukral started using its registered FIELD
2 “Jain” hereinafter
3 “Thukral” hereinafter
4 “PMD” hereinafter
LPA 320/2024 & other connected matters
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11:48:46
MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, PMD had acquired
substantial goodwill and reputation.
9.
The Supreme Court, in para 36 of its judgment in Thukral
Mechanical Works v. P.M. Diesels5, categorically holds that, as Jain
was the only registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, PMD, in using the FIELDMARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, infringed Jain’s registration. (One of the errors in
the impugned judgment, to our mind, is that it completely overlooks
this finding of the Supreme Court.)
10.
By virtue of the Supreme Court’s finding on infringement, Jain
would be entitled to injunct PMD from further use of the
FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps. The goodwill earned
by PMD by the said use cannot be a defence to an injunction, once the
use is found to be infringing.
11.
Jain, however, never used the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, and assigned the mark to Thukral in 1986. Thukral
commenced user of the mark for centrifugal pumps in 1988. In the
meanwhile, PMD acquired considerable goodwill and reputation in
the mark FIELDMARSHAL for centrifugal pumps by dint of
continuous user since 1975.
5 (2009) 2 SCC 768
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11:48:46
12.
By dint of the goodwill so acquired, PMD would be entitled to
injunct Thukral from continued user of the FIELD MARSHAL mark
for centrifugal pumps on the ground of passing off. This position also
flows from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Neon Laboratories
v. Medical Technologies Ltd6.
13.
This case, therefore, presents, to our mind, a textbook case of
the “Kerly impasse”.
14.
With that brief prefatory note, we proceed to a more exhaustive
discussion of the facts and legal issues involved.
Facts
II.
The dramatis personae
15.
PMD was the registered proprietor of the word mark
FIELDMARSHAL, in Class 7, vide Registration No. 224879, for
diesel oil engines and parts thereof, under Section 23 of the Trade and
Merchandise Marks Act, 19587, with effect from 16 October 1964.
16.
Jain was the registered proprietor of the word mark FIELD
MARSHAL, in Class 7, vide Registration No. 228867, for centrifugal
pumps, flour mills, machine couplings, pulleys and valves, with effect
from 13 May 1965.
6 (2016) 2 SCC 672
7 “the 1958 TMMA” hereinafter
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11:48:46
17.
Thukral was a partnership firm of Ganga Ram Anil Kumar
(HUF), Sunil Kumar and Sumita Rani, registered vide Partnership
Deed dated 1 April 1989. With effect from 1 April 1992, the
partnership was reconstituted, after which the partners were Ganga
Ram, Sunil Kumar and Sumita Rani. Ganga Ram retired from the
partnership on 1 April 1999, on which date a fresh Partnership Deed
was executed between Sunil Kumar and Sumita Rani. Sunil Kumar
retired on 1 April 2002, whereupon Thukral became a sole
proprietorship of Sumita Rani.
III.
Trajectory of Proceedings
A.
Proceedings relating to Suit 2408/1985 and CO 6/1987
18.
PMD instituted Suit 2408/19858 before this Court, alleging that
Thukral was manufacturing and selling centrifugal pumps under the
mark FIELD MARSHAL and was, thereby, infringing the registered
FIELDMARSHAL trade mark of PMD and also passing off its goods
as those of PMD. In the said suit, an ex parte ad interim injunction,
restraining Thukral from using the mark, was granted by this Court on
19 December 1985.
19.
During the pendency of the 1985 suit, Jain assigned its
registered FIELD MARSHAL trade mark, along with the goodwill
therein, to Thukral, vide Assignment Deed dated 30 May 1986. The
8 “the 1985 suit” hereinafter
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Assignment Deed recorded the fact that Thukral had been using the
FIELD MARSHAL trade mark since 1973.
20.
Thukral accordingly applied, to the Registrar of Trade Marks,
for substituting its name as the registered proprietor of the FIELD
MARSHAL trade mark in place of Jain.
Vide order dated 10
November 1986, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks allowed the
application and registered Ganga Ram Anil Kumar (HUF), Sunil
Kumar and Sumita Rani, trading as Thukral, as the registered
proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL trade mark in the Register of
Trade Marks, with effect from 30 May 1986.
21.
In the interregnum, PMD filed CO 9/1986 before this Court
under Section 46(1)(b)9 and 5610 of the 1958 TMMA against Jain in
9 46.
10 56.
Removal from register and imposition of limitations on ground of non-use.—
(1)
Subject to the provisions of Section 47, a registered trade mark may be taken off the
register in respect of any of the goods in respect of which it is registered on application made in the
prescribed manner to a High Court or to the Registrar by any person aggrieved on the ground
either—
*****
(b)
that up to a date one month before the date of application, a continuous period
of five years or longer had elapsed during which the trade mark was registered and during
which there was no bona fide use thereof in relation to those goods by any proprietor
thereof for the time being :
Provided that, except where the applicant has been permitted under sub-section (3) of
Section 12 to register an identical or nearly resembling trade mark in respect of the goods in
question or where the tribunal is of opinion that he might properly be permitted so to register such a
trade mark, the tribunal may refuse an application under clause (a) or clause (b) in relation to any
goods, if it is shown that there has been, before the relevant date or during the relevant period, as
the case may be, bona fide use of the trade mark by any proprietor thereof for the time being in
relation to goods of the same description, being goods in respect of which the trade mark is
registered.
Power to cancel or vary registration and to rectify the register.—
(1)
On application made in the prescribed manner to a High Court or to the Registrar by any
person aggrieved, the tribunal may make such order as it may think fit for cancelling or varying the
registration of a trade mark on the ground of any contravention, or failure to observe a condition
entered on the register in relation thereto.
(2)
Any person aggrieved by the absence or omission from the register of any entry, or by
any entry made in the register without sufficient cause, or by any entry wrongly remaining on the
register, or by any error or defect in any entry in the register, may apply in the prescribed manner to
a High Court or to the Registrar, and the tribunal may make such order for making, expunging or
varying the entry as it may think it.
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November 1986, seeking that the registration of the FIELD
MARSHAL trade mark in favour of Jain be removed from the
Register of Trade Marks, as Jain had not used the mark for five years
and one month prior to filing of the petition.
22.
CO 9/1986 came up before this Court on 16 January 1987, on
which occasion Thukral pointed out, to this Court, that its name had
been substituted as the registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL
trade mark in the Register of Trade Marks in place of Jain. PMD,
therefore, sought permission to withdraw CO 9/1986 with liberty to
file a fresh rectification proceeding on the same cause of action, which
was granted by this Court.
23.
Consequent on the liberty so granted, PMD filed CO 6/1987,
before this Court, against Thukral, again under Section 46(1)(b) of the
1958 TMMA, without impleading Jain as a party. The petition pleaded
that the cause of action for filing it arose in favour of PMD and
against Thukral on 16 January 1987, when Thukral informed this
Court that it stood substituted as the proprietor of the FIELD
MARSHAL trade mark in the Register of Trade Marks.
24.
On 19 January 1988, this Court modified the ex parte ad
interim injunction earlier granted on 19 December 1985 in the 1985
suit, following Thukral having become the registered proprietor of the
FIELD MARSHAL trade mark. Thukral was permitted to use the
trade mark, but not to copy the logo/style used by PMD, and also to
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mention, on each centrifugal pump sold by it under the FIELD
MARSHAL trade mark, its name and address (as “Sirhind”).
25.
As was subsequently noted by the Supreme Court in para 12 of
its judgment in Thukral Mechanical Works, this order dated 19
January 1988 was never challenged.
26.
CO 6/1987 was transferred to the Intellectual Property
Appellate Board11, which dismissed it on 27 October 2004 on the
ground that, as the petition had been filed against Thukral, the period
of five years’ non-use would have to reckon from the date when
Thukral became the registered proprietor of the mark, i.e. 30 May
1986 and that, therefore, the petition was premature.
27.
PMD challenged the said order before this Court by way of WP
(C) 19632/200412. Vide order dated 5 July 2005, a learned Single
Judge of this Court declined the prayer for stay of operation of the
judgment of the IPAB. This order was carried in appeal to the Division
Bench of this Court vide LPA 2063/200513. By judgment dated 18
January 2006, the Division Bench allowed the LPA as well as WP (C)
19632/2004, observing and holding that (i) Jain had never used the
FIELD MARSHAL mark, (ii) PMD and Thukral alone had used the
mark and (iii) Thukral claimed proprietorship of the mark with effect
from 30 May 1986 when it was assigned to Thukral by Jain. This
11 “IPAB” hereinafter
12 P.M. Diesels Pvt Ltd v. Thukral Mechanical Works & Anr
13 P.M. Diesels Pvt Ltd v. Thukral Mechanical Works & Anr
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Court, therefore, set aside the order dated 27 October 2004 of the
IPAB and directed the IPAB to decide CO 6/1987 on merits.
28.
Thukral challenged the judgment of the Division Bench before
the Supreme Court. It was this challenge which was finally
adjudicated by the Supreme Court vide the judgment in Thukral
Mechanical Works.
B.
Proceedings culminating in judgment dated 18 December 2008
of the Supreme Court in Thukral Mechanical Works
29.
The following observations and findings of the Supreme Court
merit reproduction:
“19. It is in the aforementioned situation, we are called upon to
determine the meaning of the words “for the time being” occurring
in Section 46(1)(b) of the Act. Two interpretations thereto which
are possible are:
(1)
The said words would denote non-use of the trade
mark in relation to the goods by the appellant for a period
of five years or longer; and
(2)
The mark had not been used for a period of five
years or longer either by the present proprietor thereof or
his predecessor.
*****
24.
The question which, therefore, arises is as to who can prove
that he had the bona fide intention to use the trade mark on the date
of application for registration. Indisputably, it would be the
registered proprietor. Section 46 is a penal provision. It provides
for civil or evil consequences. It takes away the valuable right of a
registered proprietor. It, therefore, can be taken away only when
the conditions laid down therefor are satisfied.
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*****
26.
It must not, however, be forgotten that Section 46(1)(b)
provides for a special remedy. As a person obtains a right on and
from the date of registration and/or renewal thereof, he cannot
ordinarily be deprived of his right unless it is shown that the
assignment thereof by its holder was not a bona fide one or had
been made by way of camouflage. If the assignee has obtained
assignment for bona fide use, he may not be fastened with any
liability owing to non-user on the part of his predecessor. In other
words, the mistake of the predecessor should not be visited with
non-use of the present registered owner.
*****
30.
The submission of Mr Sudhir Chandra that the appellant
was an infringer both of the right of M/s Jain Industries as also the
first respondent and, thus, its use was not bona fide in a case of
this nature cannot be accepted. If the appellant infringed the right
of M/s Jain Industries, it was for it to take action therefor. It did
not. The first respondent itself accepts that at least immediately
prior to the institution of the suit, the appellant had been using the
same. We are not concerned herein as to since when it had been
doing so. It obtained an order of injunction. The order of
injunction was vacated. For one reason or the other, the said order
attained finality. Prima facie, therefore, the appellant has been held
to be the registered owner of the trade mark. It is one thing to say
that for the purpose of frustrating an application for rectification,
the appellant had colluded with its predecessor for the purpose of
trafficking by entering into the deed of assignment which is
otherwise illegal and bad in law but it is another thing to say that
the appellant could be proceeded against alone for non-user of the
registered trade mark for a period of more than five years. For the
purpose of making out such a case, both the original registrants as
also the assignee were required to be impleaded as parties.
*****
32.
The court while construing a statute takes into
consideration the parliamentary intent in amending the provisions
thereof. It seeks to enhance the period of moratorium of use of the
registered trade mark from one month to three months so as to
prevent speculative assignment. Thus, a case of speculative
assignment is specifically required to be made out. Such an
application may be maintainable in terms of Section 56 of the Act
but strictly not in terms of Section 46(1)(b) thereof and that too in
the absence of the original registered proprietor.
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33.
We are not satisfied with the explanation offered by the first
respondent that it gave up the case of non-use of the registered
trade mark against M/s Jain Industries on the basis of statement
made by the learned counsel for the appellant; firstly, because
consent does not confer jurisdiction; secondly, because want and/or
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Tribunal cannot be waived as
if any order is passed without jurisdiction, the same would be a
nullity; and thirdly, because the cause of action, even according to
the first respondent in his application before the High Court, was
different.
34.
The counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant did not
state that it had waived its right so far as non-impleadment of M/s
Jain Industries was concerned. It only consented for grant of liberty
in favour of the first respondent for filing of an application for the
selfsame cause of action. The question of maintainability of the
second suit in absence of the registrant proprietor was not and
could not have been the subject-matter of consent at that stage. The
cause of action which permitted the first respondent to file an
application for rectification against M/s Jain Industries was nonuser thereof by it. Its non-user and rectification of the register
could not, in the aforementioned situation, have been tagged with
the cause of action, if any, against the appellant.
35.
The second contention of Mr Sudhir Chandra that the
appellant was an infringer of the trade mark is again a question of
fact. The right of the first respondent as a proprietor of the trade
mark by reason of a long user is required to be determined vis-àvis M/s Jain Industries as also the appellant in the suit filed by it
which is pending. The Board could not, while exercising its
jurisdiction under Section 46(1)(b) of the Act, proceed on the basis
of such presumption.
36.
It is not correct that no cause of action survived against
M/s Jain Industries. It was not lost by reason of assignment as was
contended by the learned counsel. In the suit, only the competing
right of the first respondent qua the appellant can be determined
and not a right against M/s Jain Industries. Such a right cannot be
determined in a proceeding under Section 46(1)(b) of the Act which
is restricted to non-user of the registered trade mark. Both the
appellant and Respondent 1 were the infringers of the right of M/s
Jain Industries as it was the registered proprietor of the trade mark
in respect of the goods in question, namely, centrifugal pumps.
37.
Two interpretations of the said provision Section 46(1)(b)
are possible. While interpreting the same, however, certain basic
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principles of construction of statute must be kept in mind. As it
takes away somebody's right, it deserves strict construction.
Jurisdiction of the Board being dependent on determination of the
foundational facts, the same was required to be established on the
basis of the averments made in the application and not otherwise.
38.
The right of a registered trade mark is not lost
automatically on the expiry of five years and one month. It does not
provide for a “sunset” law. It has to be adjudicated upon. Whether
the registered proprietor of the trade mark had taken recourse to
trafficking or not must be determined in an appropriate proceeding.
The principle of “purchaser of a property has a duty to make
enquiries”, therefore, cannot apply in a case of this nature. So long
as the right to assign a registered trade mark remains valid, once
the same is validly assigned, the assignee derives the same right as
that of the assignor in terms of the statute. A title to a trade mark
derived on assignment as provided for under the Act cannot be
equated with a defective title acquired in any other property as
admittedly on the date of assignment, the right of the registered
trade mark was not extinguished.
*****
40.
Our attention has again been drawn to a passage from Law
of Trade Marks & Geographical Indications by Shri K.C.
Kailasam, wherein the judgment of the Tribunal has been criticised
in the following terms:
“From the above legislative intent, it would seem that the
period of non-use of the trade mark is to be reckoned
continuously from the date of its registration. In American
Home Products Corpn. v. Mac Laboratories (P)
Ltd.14 rendered under the 1958 Act, it was held by the
Supreme Court that ‘the person seeking to have the trade
mark removed from the register has only to prove such
continuous non-user’.
It would appear that neither the UK Act, nor the Indian Act,
at any time envisaged that the commencement of 5 year
period of non-use is to be delinked from the date of
registration of the mark, so as to give a fresh lease of life to
the registration every time there is change in the ownership
of the mark. If that be so, any registered proprietor could
easily defeat an application for rectification by assigning
the mark to some other person to have a fresh period of 5
14 (1986) 1 SCC 465
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years from the date of assignment and thus effectively
frustrate the very object of the provision in Sections
47(1)(a) and (b). Further, it is to be noted that an
assignment is subject to ‘the provisions of the Act and any
rights vested in any other person’ — see Section 37. The
assignor cannot obviously transfer more rights than he
himself has to the assignee under the Act.”
We do not think that the approach of the learned author is entirely
correct. An assignor can transfer only such right which he
possesses. If his title is not extinguished by reason of a provision of
a statute for non-user of the trade mark for a period of five years,
any assignment made shall be valid subject to such situation which
we have noticed in para 30 supra.
41.
For the views we have taken, we are of the opinion that the
impugned judgment cannot be sustained. It is set aside accordingly.
The Board shall, however, proceed to determine afresh the
application filed by the first respondent in the light of the legal
principles explained above.”
(Emphasis supplied)
30.
Thus, the proceedings before the Supreme Court were those that
emanated from CO 6/1987. The IPAB dismissed the petition, the
High Court reversed the decision of the IPAB and remanded the
matter to the IPAB for a decision on merits, and the Supreme Court,
while maintaining the direction to the IPAB to decide CO 6/1987 de
novo, clarified that the decision was required to be taken in the light of
the principles explained by the Supreme Court in its judgment.
31.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to cull out the principles
contained in the judgment of the Supreme Court, thus:
(i)
Section 46(1)(b) of the 1958 TMMA envisaged removal
of a mark from the Register of Trade Marks provided the
proprietor of the registered trade mark had not used the mark
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for the time being, for a period of five years and one month
prior to the filing of the rectification application.
(ii)
The Supreme Court was required to interpret the
expression “for the time being”.
(iii)
The Court was, therefore, required to determine whether
the period of five years’ non-use was to be of Thukral alone, or
of Thukral or his predecessor Jain.
(iv)
Section 46, inasmuch as it took away the right of a
registered proprietor to use his mark, had to be strictly
construed. Strict satisfaction of the conditions of the Section
was, therefore, necessary.
(v)
A person obtained the right to use a mark from the date of
its registration in his name. Where the mark had been assigned
to him by any earlier registrant, therefore, his right to use the
mark could ordinarily be divested only if the assignment was
not bona fide or was by way of camouflage.
(vi)
If the assignment to the assignee was bona fide, his
registration could not be cancelled under Section 46(1)(b)
because of non-use by his assignor. The mistake of the
predecessor could not be visited on the successor.
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(vii) PMD’s contention that Thukral’s use of the FIELD
MARSHAL mark was not bona fide as it infringed the rights of
Jain as well as of PMD was rejected, for the following reasons:
(a)
If Thukral had infringed Jain’s registered trade
mark, it was for Jain to sue Thukral, which it did not.
(b)
PMD had sued Thukral and obtained an ex parte
ad interim order of injunction against Thukral using the
FIELD MARSHAL mark on 19 December 1985 which
was, however, vacated on 19 January 1988.
(c)
The order dated 19 January 1988 also held Thukral
to be the registered owner of the FIELD MARSHAL
mark. That order was never challenged.
(d)
PMD’s contention that it gave up its case of non-
use of the FIELD MARSHAL mark against Jain because
of the statement made by Thukral before the Court on 19
January 1988 was not found acceptable. Even the cause
of action for instituting CO 6/1987, as pleaded therein,
was stated to commence from 19 January 1988,
consequent on Thukral asserting its registration of the
mark.
(viii) Any allegation that the assignment of the FIELD
MARSHAL mark by Jain to Thukral was collusive or
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speculative in nature could not be made without impleading
Jain in the proceedings.
(ix)
Besides, a case of speculative assignment may have been
a ground to seek cancellation of Thukral’s registration of the
FIELD MARSHAL mark under Section 56, but not under
Section 46(1)(b).
(x)
Without impleading Jain, PMD could not have pleaded
non-user of the FIELD MARSHAL mark by Jain as a ground to
remove the registration of the mark which was in favour of
Thukral, in CO 6/1987.
(xi)
Any right of PMD, over the FIELDMARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, consequent on extended user by it, would
have to be adjudicated, vis-à-vis Jain and Thukral, in the 1985
suit. The IPAB could not proceed on any such presumption
while deciding CO 6/1987.
(xii) CO 6/1987 was under Section 46(1)(b) of the 1958
TMMA, which was restricted to non-user. The right of PMD
qua Jain or Thukral could not be determined in these
proceedings.
(xiii) In respect of centrifugal pumps, Jain was the only
registered proprietor prior to the Assignment Deed dated 30
May 1986 of the mark FIELD MARSHAL. As such, PMD and
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Thukral were both infringers of the said registration, to the
extent they used the mark for centrifugal pumps.
(xiv) The IPAB was required to exercise jurisdiction, under
Section 46(1)(b), on the basis of the averments in the
rectification petition filed under the said section, and not
otherwise.
(xv) A valid assignment of a trade mark conferred, on the
assignee, the same rights as vested in the assignor prior to
assignment as, on the date of assignment, the assignor had a
valid registration in the mark.
C.
Proceedings relating to CS (OS) 3804/199215 [later renumbered
CS (Comm) 473/2016]
32.
In the interregnum, in the year 1992, Thukral filed CS (OS)
3804/1992 against PMD and two other defendants, seeking an
injunction against PMD using the mark FIELDMARSHAL, on the
ground that it infringed the registration of the mark FIELD
MARSHAL in favour of Thukral, consequent on the Assignment Deed
dated 30 May 1986, as well the user of the mark FIELD MARSHAL
by Thukral since 1973. In 2002, consequent on Sumita Rani becoming
the sole proprietor of Thukral, the cause title of CS (OS) 3804/1992
was amended to read Sumita Rani v. Nitin Machine Tools Pvt Ltd &
Ors.
15 “the 1992 suit” hereinafter
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33.
Consequent on the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015, CS (OS) 3804/1992 was renumbered CS (Comm) 473/2016.
D.
Proceedings relating to WP (C) 28/2021, WP (C) 29/2021, WP
(C) 31/2021, WP (C) 32/2021, WP (C) 33/2021, WP (C) 34/2021,
WP (C) 35/2021, WP (C) 36/2021, WP (C) 38/2021 and WP (C)
39/202116
34.
PMD filed 10 applications, under Section 23 of the 1958
TMMA, seeking registration of the word mark FIELDMARSHAL in
Class 7 for diesel oil engines and parts thereof, centrifugal pumps,
submersible pumps, electric motors, mono block and foot valves,
claiming user since 1975. Thukral opposed the applications. The
applications were rejected by the Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks
on 12 August 1992. PMD appealed to the IPAB. The IPAB dismissed
the appeals on 11 February 2005.
35.
PMD, vide these 10 writ petitions, challenged the orders dated
11 February 2005 of the IPAB.
IV.
The Impugned Judgment – Findings of the learned Single Judge
A.
PMD is the prior user of the mark FIELDMARSHAL
36.
The learned Single Judge first holds PMD to be the prior user of
the mark FIELDMARSHAL, proceeding on the following reasoning:
16 All titled P.M. Diesels Pvt Ltd v. Thukral Mechanical Works & anr, and collectively referred to,
hereinafter, as “the writ petitions”
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(i)
Original invoices, which were on record, indicated use of
the mark FIELDMARSHAL by PMD since 1963. These
evidenced substantial sales of products by PMD, under the
mark FIELDMARSHAL, since the early 1960s.
(ii)
Invoices from J. Chandrakant & Co.17 documented use of
the mark FIELDMARSHAL by PMD, for diesel engines and
centrifugal pumps, in the 1970s.
(iii)
Brochures and advertisements in various newspapers
evidenced use of the mark FIELDMARSHAL by PMD since
the 1960s and 1970s. These also indicated the use of
FIELDMARSHAL by PMD for centrifugal pumps since the
1970s.
(iv)
The Trade Mark registrations held by PMD stated the use
of the mark FIELDMARSHAL by PMD to be since 1963.
(v)
Several banks, and other institutions, had approved the
products of PMD.
(vi)
Though Jain’s registration for the word mark FIELD
MARSHAL was of 13 May 1965, and claimed user of the mark
by Jain since 1963, no document, evidencing such use, was
forthcoming.
17 “JCC” hereinafter
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(vii) The earliest invoices produced by Thukral were of 1978,
in which the word FIELD MARSHAL had been superimposed,
with the printed invoice reflecting the mark BMS.
(viii) The earliest advertisement or printed invoice produced by
Thukral showing the use of the mark FIELD MARSHAL was
of 1988.
(ix)
There was only one page, in Jain’s catalogue, showing a
flour mill bearing the mark FIELD MARSHAL.
(x)
In the absence of any documentary evidence, it was
incumbent on Thukral to produce collateral evidence of prior
use of the FIELD MARSHAL mark by Jain. It failed to do so.
(xi)
There was absolutely no evidence to indicate that Jain
was using the mark FIELD MARSHAL for centrifugal pumps.
(xii) Further,
(a)
PW-1 Sushil Thukral claimed to have seen invoices
from 1965 for centrifugal pumps, but provided no
supportive basis,
(b)
the dealers DW-2 Faqueer Chand and DW-3
Padam Chand stated that they had been purchasing
FIELD MARSHAL branded centrifugal pumps only
since 1983, and were unable to produce any evidence of
purchases or sales from 1970 to 1981, and
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(c)
invoices and advertisements were all of 1985
vintage.
37.
Predicated on the above reasoning, therefore, the learned Single
Judge holds that PMD was the prior user of the mark
FIELDMARSHAL for diesel engines, centrifugal pumps, monoblock
pumps, submersible pumps and other related products.
B.
Diesel engines and centrifugal pumps were allied and cognate
goods
38.
Thukral contended, before the learned Single Judge, that as
PMD’s registration for FIELDMARSHAL was for diesel engines, and
Thukral was using the mark for centrifugal pumps, there was no
infringement, the goods being different.
39.
The learned Single Judge has rejected the plea on the following
reasoning:
(i)
The evidence on record, in the form of original invoices,
advertisements and newspapers demonstrated that the mark
FIELDMARSHAL was distinctive and adopted by PMD.
(ii)
The mark was initially used for diesel engines, with PMD
expanding the use of the mark, later, to pumps, including
monoblock and centrifugal pumps.
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(iii)
PMD was having centrifugal pumps manufactured from
third parties for sale across the country.
(iv)
Diesel engines and centrifugal pumps were both used in
the agricultural sector. In the absence of electricity, centrifugal
pumps needed electricity to run.
(v)
With respect to centrifugal pumps or diesel engines, the
mark FIELDMARSHAL was arbitrary, and was neither generic
nor descriptive. It was, therefore, entitled to a high level of
protection.
(vi)
The use of the mark FIELDMARSHAL for diesel
engines and other products in the agricultural sector would
obviously result in likelihood of confusion.
(vii) The fact that Thukral had filed CS (OS) 3804/1992
seeking injunction on the ground of infringement and passing
off indicated that Thukral also acknowledged the likelihood of
confusion which would arise consequent on simultaneous use of
the FIELDMARSHAL mark.
(viii) Witnesses had deposed to state that diesel engines and
centrifugal pumps were available for sale in the same shops and
counters. The class of consumers who purchased the two
products was, therefore, the same.
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40.
As such, holds the learned Single Judge, centrifugal pumps
were allied and cognate to diesel engines.
41.
The learned Single Judge proceeds, thereafter, to deal with the
individual litigations as under.
C.
Re. the 1985 suit [P.M. Diesels Ltd v. Thukral Mechanical
Works]
C.1 Re. Issue 1 - Whether the suit was barred by acquiescence,
laches and delay and Issue 6 - Whether PMD had misrepresented facts
42.
These issues have been decided by the learned Single Judge in
favour of PMD and against Thukral on the following reasoning:
(i)
PMD had specifically contended that it had encountered
Thukral’s products in the market in 1985 and proceeded
promptly to file the suit. The fact that PMD had encountered
Thukral’s products in the market in 1985 was also borne out by
the evidence of PW-2 Chandra Kant Popat Lal Patel. It was for
this reason that, in 1987, PMD filed CO 6/1987 against Thukral.
(ii)
PW-3 also confirmed that Thukral was selling pumps
under the marks BMS, DPF, etc, and produced bills to prove the
point. PW-5 also confirmed that he had purchased centrifugal
pumps from Thukral under the mark BMS. He produced a bill
of Thukral, of 1979, which did not bear the mark FIELD
MARSHAL. Similarly, PW-6, another dealer of PMD, also
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produced the original bill of Thukral, dated 18 December 1979,
which did not feature the FIELD MARSHAL mark.
(iii)
The preponderance of evidence supported PMD, and
established that PMD had been selling diesel oil engines since
1963 and centrifugal pumps at least since 1975.
(iv)
Though Thukral sought to submit that one Karam Chand
Aneja, who was PMD’s selling agent, was aware of the use, by
Thukral, of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps,
knowledge by Karam Chand Aneja, even if it were to be
presumed, could not be attributed to PMD. This was also clear
from the cross-examination of Mr. Karam Chand Aneja, who
deposed as PW-3, to the effect that he was never an employee
of PMD and had never worked as a servant of PMD.
(v)
Acquiescence, in order to operate as a defence against an
injunction in a case of infringement had to be of such a level, as
would constitute indirect encouragement, as held by the
Division Bench of this Court in H.S. Sahni v. Mukul Singhal18.
(vi)
There could be no question of any delay, laches or
acquiescence operating against PMD, as PMD had, since
inception, taken steps to oppose the use and registration of the
mark FIELD MARSHAL by Thukral, including issuance of
legal notice dated 22 June 1982, filing oppositions against
18 (2023) 298 DLT 390
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Thukral’s applications, filing the 1985 suit and filing of
rectification petitions.
(vii) There was nothing to indicate that PMD had knowledge
of Thukral’s use, prior to 1985, of the mark FIELD
MARSHAL.
(viii) Thukral has itself applied for registration of the mark
FIELD MARSHAL on 10 December 1983. During opposition
proceedings in connection with the said application, Thukral
filed the evidence of Anil Kumar Thukral, relying on the
number of invoices, copies of which were also filed before the
learned Single Judge. On PMD pointing out that the original
invoices did not bear the mark FIELD MARSHAL, Thukral
withdrew the documents vide letters dated 20 March 1983 and
30 March 1987. This fact was admitted by DW-1 in crossexamination. This also indicated that Thukral was unable to
establish use of the mark.
(ix)
Thus,
it
was
Thukral
which
had
resorted
to
misrepresentation by tampering with invoices in order to obtain
registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark in its favour.
43.
The learned Single Judge, therefore, decided Issues 1 and 6 in
favour of PMD and against Thukral.
C.2
Issues 2 and 4
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44.
Issue 2, which pertained to territorial jurisdiction, was not
seriously contested by the parties, either before the learned Single
Judge or before us.
45.
Issue 4 was as to whether Thukral had infringed the registered
copyright of PMD. The learned Single Judge held that the device used
by Thukral was not similar to the copyrighted artistic work of PMD
and that, therefore, there was no copyright infringement. This finding
has also not been contested before us.
C.3 Issue No. 3 - Whether Thukral’s goods, under the trademark
FIELD MARSHAL, were being passed off as PMD’s goods? AND
Issue 7 – Whether PMD was the proprietor of the trademark
FIELDMARSHAL and had the right of exclusive use thereof in
respect of centrifugal pumps or other goods in the same class or
description?
46.
The learned Single Judge has decided both these issues in
favour of PMD and against Thukral and has, consequently, decreed
the suit in the said terms, on the following reasoning:
(i)
PMD had succeeded in establishing adoption, by it, of the
mark FIELDMARSHAL since 1963. It was using the mark for
diesel oil engines and other goods. It had substantial sales and
turnover and a long list of dealers. These facts had also been
confirmed by the dealers who appeared as witnesses.
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(ii)
Thukral had not produced any document to prove use of
the mark FIELDMARSHAL by Jain on centrifugal pumps.
(iii)
Thukral sought to contend that PMD had to show
goodwill
on
the
date
of
adoption
of
the
mark
FIELDMARSHAL by Jain, and use after such an adoption was
of no consequence.
(iv)
Registration did not confer goodwill. Use did. In the
absence of any evidence to show use of the mark
FIELDMARSHAL by Jain since 1965, PMD’s user had to be
given preference and precedence. PMD had undoubtedly used
the mark FIELDMARSHAL for diesel oil engines and,
thereafter, adopted the mark for centrifugal pumps, monoblock
pumps and related goods.
(v)
In
such
circumstances,
use
of
the
mark
FIELDMARSHAL by Thukral undoubtedly constituted passing
off, as the marks were identical, the goods were cognate and
allied, the class of consumers targeted were identical and the
trade channels were identical, thereby satisfying the triple
identity test.
(vi)
Thukral’s contention that it was not required to show user
of the FIELDMARSHAL by Jain after 1965, when it was
registered in favour of Jain for centrifugal pumps, was contrary
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to the established principle that registration alone did not confer
rights without corroborative use.
(vii) Thukral’s adoption of the mark FIELDMARSHAL, in the
same field as PMD, was dishonest. Its attempt to legitimise the
user by obtaining an assignment from Jain, could not help it, as
Jain had also not used the mark for centrifugal pumps. The use,
by Jain, of the FIELDMARSHAL mark was also for flour mills.
(viii) The judgments of the Supreme Court in N.R. Dongre v.
Whirlpool Industries19, S. Syed Mohideen v. Sulochana Bai20
and Neon Laboratories made it clear that even a registered
proprietor of a mark could be sued for passing off.
(ix)
PMD was the first adopter and user of the mark
FIELDMARSHAL. The subsequent adoption of the same mark
by Thukral, whether through Jain or otherwise, resulted in
passing off, as the goods were similar.
(x)
The subsequent registration of the mark in favour of Jain
for centrifugal pumps did not constitute a valid defence to a
passing off action.
47.
Following the above reasoning, the learned Single Judge
decreed the suit in terms of prayers 16(i) and 16(ii) thereof, which
read thus:
19 (1996) 5 SCC 714
20 (2016) 2 SCC 683
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“16. It is, therefore, most humbly prayed that decree be passed in
favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants to the following
effects:i)
For perpetual injunction restraining the defendants,
their servants, agents, representatives, dealers, and all other
persons on their behalf from manufacturing selling or
otherwise dealing in diesel oig engines and parts thereof,
electric motors, agricultural pumps or centrifugal pumps or
parts thereof or any other goods of the same description
under the trade mark FIELD MARSHAL or any other trade
mark identical and/or deceptively similar to the plaintiff's
registered trade mark FIELD MARSHAL.
ii)
For perpetual injunction restraining the defendants,
their servants, agents, representatives and all other persons
on their behalf from passing off diesel oil engines, and parts
thereof such as pumps and electric motors and bends,
valves etc. under the trade mark FIELD MARSHAL and/or
any other trade mark which may be identical and/or
deceptively similar to plaintiff's trade mark FIELD
MARSHAL.”
Thukral was further given a period of six months to exhaust its stock,
but was permanently injuncted from any fresh manufacturing under
the mark FIELDMARSHAL.
D.
Re. CS (Comm) 473/2016 [Sumita Rani v. Nitin Machine
Tools]
48.
The findings and decision of the learned Single Judge on the
following issues, framed in CS (Comm) 473/2016, are relevant.
D.1 Re. Issue 3 – Whether PMD was the registered owner of the
FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps and other goods?
49.
On this aspect, the learned Single Judge holds thus:
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(i)
Though the Assignment Deed dated 30 May 1986
recorded Jain’s satisfaction that Thukral had been using the
mark FIELDMARSHAL for centrifugal pumps since 1973, the
basis thereof was unknown. A mere recital could not lead to an
inference, or a conclusion, that Thukral had used the mark.
(ii)
Though Jain had registered the FIELDMARSHAL mark
for flour mills, circulating and centrifugal pumps, coupling for
machines, pulleys and valves, parts of machines, the
assignment, vide the Assignment Deed dated 30 May 1986, of
the FIELDMARSHAL mark, was only for circulating and
centrifugal pumps. The Registrar, therefore, erred in substituting
Thukral, in the Register of Trade Marks, as the subsequent
proprietor for all goods covered by the FIELDMARSHAL
mark, as earlier registered in favour of Jain.
(iii)
Thukral’s contention that the Supreme Court had upheld
the validity of the registration of the FIELDMARSHAL mark in
favour of Jain was incorrect, as the matter had been remanded
for decision afresh, and the Suit and the Rectification
proceedings had been consolidated.
(iv)
User had, therefore, to be established by Thukral, either
directly or through Jain, of the FIELDMARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps.
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(v)
Thukral had not used the FIELDMARSHAL mark till
1985, as had already been held. CO 6/1987 was filed in 1987.
(vi)
Jain claimed 1963 user in its Trade Mark Application, but
1973 user in Clause 2 of the Assignment Deed. This was a
glaring contradiction.
(vii) The only product on which FIELDMARSHAL appeared,
in Jain’s catalogue, was a flour mill.
(viii) There was, therefore, no user of the FIELDMARSHAL
mark by Jain.
(ix)
The evidence of user of the mark by Thukral was not
credible.
(x)
As Jain had no right to obtain a registration of the
FIELDMARSHAL mark, it could not pass on a better title to
Thukral.
50.
Following this reasoning, the learned Single Judge directs the
registration of the FIELDMARSHAL mark in favour of Jain, as
assigned to Thukral, to be cancelled.
D.2 Re. Issue 4 – Whether Thukral was the prior user of the
FIELDMARSHAL trade mark in respect of centrifugal pumps
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51.
The learned Single Judge holds that PMD had been able to
prove its prior user of the FIELDMARSHAL mark and, therefore,
decides this issue against Thukral.
D.3 Re. Issue 5 – Whether Thukral acquiesced to the user of the
FIELDMARSHAL mark by PMD
52.
This issue has also been decided, by the learned Single Judge,
against Thukral, following the finding that PMD had been using the
FIELDMARSHAL mark since 1975 for centrifugal pumps. CS (OS)
3804/1992 has, therefore, been termed by the learned Single Judge to
be an “afterthought” and a counterblast to the 1985 suit. Despite
having always been aware of the use of the FIELDMARSHAL mark
by PMD, the learned Single Judge holds that Thukral never objected
to such use.
D.4 Re. Issue 6 – Whether the use of the mark FIELD MARSHAL
by PMD amounted to infringement of the registered trade mark of Jain
and passing off?
53.
The learned Single Judge, therefore, concludes that, as PMD
was the prior user of the FIELDMARSHAL mark, even prior to the
registration of the mark in favour of Jain, PMD could not be held
guilty of passing off. The learned Single Judge also borrows the
principle, from Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah21, that the
Court has to keep in mind the reasonable possibility of expansion of
the business of the plaintiff.
21 (2002) 3 SCC 65
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54.
The learned Single Judge, therefore, holds that CS (Comm)
473/2016 is liable to be dismissed.
E.
Re. CO 6/1987 [renumbered CO (Comm IPD-TM) 667/2022]
55.
Following preceding discussions, the learned Single Judge
holds that the registration of the FIELD MARSHAL trade mark in
favour of Thukral was defective and that, further, no use of the mark
by Jain was shown.
56.
The impugned judgment further observes as under:
“136. This Court found that Thukral had not used the mark
‘FIELDMARSHAL’ prior to 1985, and further, M/s. Jain Industries
had not used it for their products, except for a flour mill as shown
in a catalogue, extracted above. Despite Thukral's claim of use of
the mark from 1985, and the cancellation petition being filed in
1987, the earliest printed invoice on record, of Thukral bearing the
mark ‘FIELDMARSHAL’ are from 1988, subsequent to the filing
of the cancellation petition. Thus, the use of the said mark by
Thukral does not meet the five-year requirement under Section
46(1)(b) of the 1958 Act.
137. Further, the assignment of the said mark by M/s. Jain
Industries for goods beyond the original assignment deed dated
30th May, 1986 to Thukral shows that it was improperly granted.
The Court notes that the said assignment deed ignored the 1985
suit and found the assignment's recordal in favour of Thukral,
defective due to lack of evidence of use by M/s. Jain Industries.
Thus, this Court concludes that the trade mark registration no.
228867 dated 13th May, 1965 is liable to be rectified or cancelled.”
57.
The impugned judgment concludes, apropos CO (Comm IPD-
TM) 667/2022, by observing that, as there was no use, by Jain, of the
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FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, no goodwill in the
said mark could have been assigned by Jain to Thukral. In view
thereof, the learned Single Judge holds that Registration No. 228867,
dated 13 May 1965, of the mark FIELDMARSHAL, in Class 7,
registered in favour of Thukral, is liable to be cancelled and removed
from the Register of Trade Marks.
F.
Re. WP (C) 28/2021, WP (C) 29/2021, WP (C) 31/2021, WP
(C) 32/2021, WP (C) 33/2021, WP (C) 34/2021, WP (C) 35/2021,
WP (C) 36/2021, WP (C) 38/2021 and WP (C) 39/2021
58.
Following the earlier findings that PMD was the bona fide
adopter, prior user and legitimate owner of the FIELDMARSHAL
mark, the learned Single Judge holds PMD to be entitled to
registration of the mark in respect of the goods applied, in Class 7, in
different languages. The orders of the IPAB, to the contrary have,
therefore, been set aside by the learned Single Judge, who has directed
the applications of PMD to proceed to registration. The writ petitions
have accordingly been allowed.
Rival Contentions
V.
Submissions of Mr. Hemant Singh for the appellant
A.
Re. CO 6/1987
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59.
Appearing for the appellant, Mr. Hemant Singh submits that the
learned Single Judge has sought to justify the cancellation of
Registration
No.
228867,
dated
May
1965,
of
the
FIELDMARSHAL mark in favour of Jain on the ground of an alleged
discrepancy between the user claim in the application filed by Jain, of
1963, and the user claim in the Assignment Deed of 1973, whereas the
reference to 1973 in the Assignment Deed was to the user claim of
Thukral, not of Jain. Mr. Hemant Singh drew our attention to the
issues framed in this suit, of which Issue 3 was worded:
“Whether the Plaintiff is the registered owner through assignment
of the trademark “Field Marshal” in respect of centrifugal pumps?
OPP”
Mr. Hemant Singh points out that para 2 of the Assignment Deed
dated 30 May 1986 recorded the satisfaction of Jain that Thukral had
been using the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps since
1973. The learned Single Judge, he submits, erroneously conflated
this use, by Thukral of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal
pumps since 1973, with the user of the mark by Jain since 1963, in
para 125 of the impugned judgment.
60.
Mr. Hemant Singh further points out that the order dated 16
January 1987, passed by this Court, which permitted PMD to
withdraw CO 9/86, granted PMD liberty to file a fresh cancellation
petition on the same cause of action. Inasmuch as the cause of action,
even as per the pleadings in CO 6/1987, was different from the cause
of action in CO 9/1986, Mr. Hemant Singh submits that CO 6/1987
deserved to be dismissed even on that ground.
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61.
Mr. Hemant Singh further submits that the judgment of the
learned Single Judge is contrary to the judgment dated 18 December
2008 of the Supreme Court. He points out that, in the said judgment,
the Supreme Court specifically held that non-user, by Jain, of the
FIELD MARSHAL mark could not be held against Thukral, and
submits that this is precisely what the learned Single Judge has done.
He points out that, in para 38 of its judgment, the Supreme Court has
clearly held that the assignee derived the same rights as the assignor
and cites, in this context, the decision in Dhariwal Industries v.
M.S.S. Foods22. The Supreme Court has further held that Thukral and
PMD were both infringers of Jain’s registered FIELD MARSHAL
mark for centrifugal pumps.
62.
Mr. Hemant Singh submits that these observations and findings
of the Supreme Court were binding on the learned Single Judge, in
view of the specific direction, in the closing paragraph of the
judgment of the Supreme Court, that the de novo proceedings were
required to abide by the observations of the Supreme Court.
63.
Mr. Hemant Singh further submits that the impugned judgment
is directly contrary to the judgment dated 9 October 2020 of the Single
Bench in WP (C) 4846/2011. He places reliance on paras 12 and 14 to
17 of the said judgment. Even for this reason, Mr. Hemant Singh
submits that the learned Single Judge erred in relying on non-use of
22 (2005) 3 SCC 63
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the FIELD MARSHAL mark by Jain is a ground to justify
cancellation of the registration of the said mark in favour of Thukral.
64.
Mr. Hemant Singh further takes serious exception to the
reference, in paras 2 and 6 of CO (Comm) 6/1987, in which PMD has
pleaded that it was engaged in the manufacture of centrifugal pumps.
Similarly, in Grounds O, P and Q, PMD asserted that if Thukral was
permitted to use the mark FIELD MARSHAL for centrifugal pumps,
it would create confusion in the market. The registration of the mark
in favour of Thukral was also, therefore, pleaded to be in violation of
Section 11(a)23 of the 1958 TMMA. Use of the mark by Thukral was
also alleged to amount to passing off, by Thukral, of its goods as those
of PMD.
65.
In so far as user of the FIELD MARSHAL mark by Thukral for
centrifugal pumps was concerned, Mr. Hemant Singh points out that,
in para 12 of the 1985 suit, it has been admitted, by PMD, that it had
secured name plates of Thukral from the market on 17 December
1985. The use, by Thukral, of the FIELD MARSHAL mark from 1985
could not, therefore, be disputed. Resultantly, submits Mr. Hemant
Singh, no case for rectification of the registration of the FIELD
MARSHAL mark in favour of Thukral, existed, within the meaning of
Section 47 of the 1958 TMMA.
11.
Prohibition of registration of certain marks. – A mark –
(a)
the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion; or
*****
shall not be registered as a trade mark.
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B.
Re. CS (Comm) 473/2016
66.
Once the registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark in favour
of Thukral is found to be valid, Mr. Hemant Singh submits that the
inevitable sequitur is that the use of the mark FIELDMARSHAL by
PMD for centrifugal pumps was liable to be injuncted as amounting to
infringement within the meaning of Section 2924 of the 1958 TMMA.
C.
Re. CS (OS) 2408/1985
67.
Mr. Hemant Singh submits that, in order to succeed in a passing
off action against Thukral, it was incumbent on PMD to prove the
existence of goodwill prior to 1965 when Jain adopted the FIELD
MARSHAL mark. There is, he submits, practically no evidence of any
such goodwill. All that there is, he submits, are three invoices of 18
May 1963, 6 September 1963 and 5 November 1963, two invoices for
advertisements, dated 11 May 1963 and 31 December 1963 and one
sheet of paper purportedly showing the volume of sales by Jain, with
no corroborative evidence to vouchsafe it. DW-1 Nitin Patel, in crossexamination, he points out, stated that the figures in the sheet had
been entered as per the information given to him by his elder brother
24 29.
Infringement of trade marks. –
(1)
A registered trade mark is infringed by a person who, not being the registered proprietor
of the trade mark or a registered user thereof using by way of permitted use, uses in the course of a
trade mark which is identical with, or deceptively similar to, the trade mark, in relation to any
goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered and in such manner as to render the use of the
mark likely to be taken as being used as a trade mark.
(2)
In an action for infringement of a trade mark registered in Part B of the register an
injunction or other relief shall not be granted to the plaintiff if the defendant establishes to the
satisfaction of the court that the use of the mark of which the plaintiff complains is not likely to
deceive or cause confusion or to be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade between
the goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered and some person having the right, either
as registered proprietor or as registered user, to use the trade mark.
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and that he had not personally seen any of the account books, though
he acknowledged that Jain’s account books were audited by a
Chartered Accountant. He had also disclosed his date of birth as 4
January 1962, meaning that, in 1963, 1964 and 1965, for which years
sales figures were contained in the sheet, he was three, four and five
years of age. This fact, though noted, was brushed aside by the
learned Single Judge, in para 106 of the impugned judgment,
observing that “in family businesses passed down through
generations, evidence is provided based on records and personal
knowledge” and that “commercial realities, particularly of businesses
that are decades old attempting to establish their case in Court, cannot
be overlooked”. Mr. Singh submits that this reasoning is completely
unsustainable in law.
68.
Relying on paras 19 and 20 of the judgment of a Division
Bench of the High Court of Bombay in Sir Mohammed Yusuf v. D25,
Mr. Hemant Singh submits that the mere production of a document is
no proof of its contents, sans the testimony of a competent person
testifying thereto.
69.
No CA audited, or CA certified, statement of sales and expenses
was, however, produced. He cites, in this context, the judgments of
the Supreme Court in Kalyan Kumar Gogai v. Ashutosh Agnihotri26,
Brihan Karan Sugar Syndicate v. Yashwantrao Mohite27 and the
judgment of the High Court of Madras in I.T.C. Ltd v. Nestle India
25 AIR 1968 Bom 112
26 (2011) 2 SCC 532
27 (2024) 2 SCC 577
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Ltd28.
Mr. Singh also relies on para 13 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Laxmikant V. Patel v. Chetanbhai Shah29, which
delineates the ingredients of passing off. Mr. Hemant Singh further
relies on Circular dated 19 May 1992 issued by JCC, PMD’s
distributor, to the effect that the Field Marshal Engine Manufacturing
company did not make centrifugal pumps. This was also admitted by
PW-2 Chandra Kant Popat Lal Patel in his cross-examination dated 7
February 1996.
70.
Sporadic instances of use, submits Mr. Hemant Singh, could not
make out a case of goodwill. Thus, submits Mr. Hemant Singh, as
there was no evidence of goodwill or reputation, of the
FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, in favour of PMD as
on 13 May 1965, no case of passing off was made out.
71.
Mr. Hemant Singh further submits that, in fact, Thukral is the
prior user of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps. He
submits that evidence was forthcoming to demonstrate that Thukral
had supplied centrifugal pumps to K.C. Aneja and Ram Dhan Aneja at
least since 1978. He drew attention, in this context, to (i) invoice
dated 25 October 1978 (Ex. PW-5) by Thukral to Marshal Machinery
Sales Corporation of Mr. R.D. Aneja, (ii) telegram dated 27 April
1979 by Mr. R.D. Aneja vide which an order for six FIELD
MARSHAL centrifugal pumps was placed with Thukral, (iii) invoice
dated 18 August 1978 issued by Thukral to Marshal Machinery for 5
centrifugal pumps, (iv) letter dated 2 March 1981 by Yogesh
28 2020 (84) PTC 395 (Mad-DB)
29 (2002) 3 SCC 65
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Machinery Stores on Thukral for FIELD MARSHAL centrifugal
pumps and (v) letters dated 16 November 1982 and 23 November
1982 from Bharat Tractors, the dealers of PMD to Thukral, which
evidenced engagement of K.C. Aneja in purchase of FIELD
MARSHAL centrifugal pumps from Thukral.
72.
Apropos the finding, in the impugned judgment, that diesel
engines and centrifugal pumps are allied and cognate, Mr. Hemant
Singh submits that no such issue was framed in the suit. This issue, he
points out, was raised by PMD for the first time in its replication. He
cites para 7, 21.1 and 21.2 of the judgment of a learned Single Judge
of this Court in Anant Construction (P) Ltd v. Ram Niwas30 to
contend that relief cannot be granted on the basis of a plea raised for
the first time in replication.
73.
Where goods in respect of which the rival marks are used are
different, no cause of passing off can exist, submits Mr. Hemant
Singh, relying, for the purpose, on para 35 of Nandhini Deluxe v.
Karnataka Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd31 as well as
the decisions of the Chancery Division of the High Court of UK in
British Sugar PLC v. James Robertson & Sons Ltd32 and the
judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Raman Kwatra v. KEI
Industries Ltd33.
30 1994 (31) DRJ 205
31 (2018) 9 SCC 183
32 [1996] RPC 281
33 2023 SCC OnLine Del 38 (DB)
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74.
Diesel engines and centrifugal pumps, submits Mr. Hemant
Singh, cannot, in any case, be regarded as allied and cognate.
75.
Besides, Mr. Hemant Singh submits that Section 29 of the 1958
TMMA envisaged infringement only if the goods of the plaintiff and
defendant were identical. It was only, therefore, if Thukral were using
the FIELD MARSHAL mark for diesel engines that a case of
infringement could be made out, as PMD did not possess any
registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps.
76.
Mr. Hemant Singh further submits that PMD did not lead any
evidence of use, by it, of the FIELDMARSHAL mark, for centrifugal
pumps, since 1963.
77.
Mr. Hemant Singh further places reliance on the Legal
Proceedings Certificate34 dated 16 November 1986 issued by the
office of the Registrar of Trade Marks while registering Thukral as the
subsequent proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for circulating
and centrifugal pumps, couplings for machines and pulleys included
in Class 7.
78.
Mr. Hemant Singh submits that the consequence of the
impugned judgment is that, 40 years after it had commenced use of
the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, Thukral had been
restrained from further using the mark, and registration of the FIELD
MARSHAL trademark for centrifugal pumps has also been cancelled.
34 “LPC” hereinafter
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VI.
Submissions of Mr. N. Mahabir for PMD
79.
Arguing for PMD, Mr. Mahabir submits that PMD had started
using the FIELDMARSHAL mark in 1963, and had started using the
mark for centrifugal pumps in 1975. PW-1 J.R. Vekaria had produced
the original carbon copy of the account books of PMD, which
evidenced sale, by PMD, of centrifugal pumps under the
FIELDMARSHAL trade mark since 1975. Under Section 62 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, he submits that carbon copies constitute
primary evidence. Mr. Mahabir submits that returns from sales of
FIELDMARSHAL branded goods, by PMD, increased from ₹
62126/- in 1963 and ₹ 914978/- in 1965 to ₹ 1211059401/- in 1984
and ₹ 60 crores in 1995, of which 1% was spent in advertisement.
FIELDMARSHAL branded goods, of PMD, were sold through over
1400 dealers all over India.
80.
As against this, Thukral was selling centrifugal pumps, since
1973, under its trade mark BMS. It was only when, in 1985, PMD
came across Thukral’s name plate, that it filed the 1985 suit, which
stands decreed by the impugned judgment.
81.
Mr. Mahabir points out that Thukral’s application No. 373764
for the FIELDMARSHAL mark was opposed by PMD. With the said
application, Thukral had filed sales invoices to evidence sale of goods,
by it, from 1973. The invoices were manipulated by inserting, therein,
the mark FIELDMARSHAL. On being confronted therewith, Thukral,
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vide letter dated 30 March 1987, took back the invoices and withdrew
its application. DW-1 Sushil Thukral, in cross-examination, admitted
having taken back the invoices, but did not produce them, on the
pretext that they had been destroyed during the rains of 1993.
82.
Mr. Mahabir submits that the Assignment Deed dated 30 May
1986 was back dated, for the purposes of securing Registration No.
228667, which was granted on 16 November 1986. In fact, Jain had
never used the FIELD MARSHAL mark. The learned Single Judge,
therefore, submits Mr. Mahabir, rightly cancelled the registration.
83.
Mr. Mahabir submits that centrifugal pumps are allied and
cognate to diesel engines and that, therefore, being the prior user of
the FIELDMARSHAL mark for diesel engines, PMD had a right to
injunct Thukral’s user of the same mark for centrifugal pumps.
Centrifugal pumps are attached to diesel engines, to draw water, and
both are used for agriculture. They were sold together, as was testified
by Anil Kumar. The likelihood of confusion is apparent, as both
products are purchased by the same customer segment, i.e., farmers.
In fact, before the Registrar of Trade Marks, Thukral had clearly
stated that it had no objection to the use, by PMD, of the
FIELDMARSHAL mark for diesel engines. The validity of the said
registration, thereby, stood admitted by Thukral.
84.
The priority of user, by PMD, of the FIELDMARSHAL mark,
submits Mr. Mahabir, is indisputable. Invoices dated 6 September
1963 and 5 November 1963 are on record. The registration of the
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FIELDMARSHAL word mark in favour of PMD is of 16 October
1964. As against this, Thukral’s first user of the FIELDMARSHAL
mark, of which there is any evidence on record, is of 1988. The fact
that
no
invoices,
evidencing
user,
by
Thukral,
of
the
FIELDMARSHAL mark, prior to 1988, were forthcoming, was
admitted by DW-1 Sushil Thukral, DW-2 Faqeer Chand and DW-3
Padam Chand. 60 invoices had been placed, on record, by the said
DWs, all of which referred to the mark BMS. Jain’s registration of
the FIELD MARSHAL mark is also after PMD’s, on 13 May 1965.
As the prior user of the FIELDMARSHAL mark for diesel engines,
therefore, PMD had the right to injunct the use, by Thukral, of the
identical mark for centrifugal pumps, which were allied and cognate
to diesel engines. Mr. Mahabir submits that the use of the mark
FIELD MARSHAL by Thukral for centrifugal pumps, in 1985, was
likely to lead to passing off.
85.
Mr. Mahabir has repeatedly emphasized the fact that CO 6/1987
was filed under Section 46 and Section 56 of the TMMA 1958 and
that, therefore, all grounds, including deceptive similarity, likelihood
of confusion, and possibility of passing off, were available to PMD to
be urged in support of the plea of rectification. The Supreme Court
remanded CO 6/1987 to be decided afresh. The declaration of law, in
the judgment of the Supreme Court, was only with respect to Section
46, and not Section 56. Thus viewed, the likelihood of passing off,
were Thukral’s FIELD MARSHAL mark to be permitted to be used
for centrifugal pumps, was sufficient to justify its removal from the
register, under Section 56 of the 1958 TMMA.
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86.
Even apropos Section 46, submits Mr. Mahabir, the onus to
prove user of the mark was on Thukral, and has not been discharged.
87.
Once it had thus been established that PMD was the prior user
of the FIELDMARSHAL mark, having used it since 1963, there was
no question of restraining PMD from using the mark. Invoking the
law declared by the Supreme Court in Laxmikant V. Patel, Mr.
Mahabir submits that PMD was entitled, any time, to expand the use
of the FIELDMARSHAL mark into the area of centrifugal pumps.
Mr. Mahabir submits, relying on Neon Laboratories, Whirlpool
Industries, Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar & Co.35 and L.D.
Malhotra Industries v. Ropi Industries36, that a registered proprietor
of a trade mark cannot restrain a prior user thereof.
88.
Inasmuch as PMD had been using the FIELDMARSHAL mark
since 1963, Mr. Mahabir submits that the learned Single Judge has
rightly allowed its registration in all languages.
89.
The judgment, dated 18 December 2008, of the Supreme Court,
submits Mr. Mahabir, concerns only Section 46, and does not examine
Section 56 of the 1958 TMMA. In fact, the fact that CO 6/1987 had
been filed under Section 46 and 56 of the 1958 TMMA had not been
noticed either by the IPAB, or the High Court, or the Supreme Court.
35 ILR (1977) II Delhi 709 (DB)
36 ILR (1976) I Delhi 278
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90.
PMD, submits Mr. Mahabir, had clearly asserted, in the 1985
suit, that it had valid and subsisting registrations of the FIELD
MARSHAL trade mark in Class 7 and had also annexed, with the
plaint, its statement of sales and expenses incurred in advertisement
and promotion of the mark, with corresponding assertions in paras 4
and 5 of the plaint. While the user of the FIELDMARSHAL mark, by
PMD, dated back to 1963, Thukral’s first invoice, evidencing use of
the mark by it, was of 1988.
91.
Mr. Mahabir submits that cogent and credible evidence,
regarding use, by it, of the FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal
pumps, at least since 1975, had been led by PMD, and not traversed.
He refers us, first, to the evidence of PW-1 J.R. Venkaria, partner in
JCC in which, in examination-in-chief, PW-1 deposed thus:
“I am partner of M/S.J. Chandrakant & Co. The said company was
established in the year 1968. We are selling diesel engines
alongwith pump sets bearing the trade mark ‘Field Marshal’. The
said diesel engines and pumps are manufactured by M/s.P.M.
Diesels Pvt. Ltd. They are manufacturing diesel engines since 1963
and pump since 1975. I have got bills to show that I have sold their
Centrifugal pumps and engines for the year 1975. I have brought
with me my account books as well as the books containing the
counter foil of the bills under which I have sold those engines and
centrifugal pumps.
Indira Engineering Company is known to me. There was a
contract between my company and Indira Engineering Company. I
have produced on record copy of the agreement between Indira
Engineering Company and J. Chandrakant & Co. in the suit. I
have also brought with me the original agreement. The said
original agreement is bearing the signatures of my partner Mr. P.N.
Patel. I know the signatures of Mr. P.N. Patel and I can identify the
same. The said agreement is dated 23.04.1975. It bears the
signature of Mr. P.N. Patel. I identify the same. The contents
therein are correct. The said document is exhibited and marked
Exhibit PW 1/1.
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I have brought with me the original carbon bills dated 30.05.75,
30.5.76, 9.6.75, 30.5.75, 9.6.75, drawn respectively in favour of
M/s Marshal Engineering Company. M/s Popular Machinery
Stores, Delhi, M/s Punjab Engineering Co., Muzaffarnagar, M/s
Deshsewak Iron Stores, Nilokheri and Atak Machinery stores,
Kanpur. All these bills are issued by me company. All these bills
are signed by Mr. Suresh Singhvi, our Accounts Manager and he
has issued them under my instructions. The contents therein are
correct. The said bills are exhibited and marked as Exhibit PW.1/2
to Exhibit PW.1/6 respectively. I am now shown photostat copies
of the aforesaid five bills. All these photostate copies are correct
copies of Exhibit PW-1/2 to Exhibit PW.1/6. The contents therein
are correct. (The photostat copies of the aforesaid bills are marked
as Exhibits PW.1/2-A to Exhibits PW.1/6-A respectively. Original
carbon bills bearing Exhibit PW.1/2 to Exhibit PW.1/6 are returned
to the witness on the condition that he would produce the same as
and when asked to do so).”
(Emphasis supplied)
Mr. Mahabir submits that PW-1 was not cross-examined on any of the
above assertions. He points out that PW-1 has further stated, in his
examination-in-chief, that JCC only sold articles beraing the FIELD
MARSHAL mark and that its annual turnover was of over ₹ 40 crores.
He also drew our attention to the Dealership Agreement with JCC (Ex.
PW-1/1), which was only for pumps, and to the invoices on record as
PW-1/1 to PW-1/6, which were for FIELD MARSHAL power driven
pumps.
92.
Mr. Mahabir also relies on the examination-in-chief of PW-2
Chandra Kant Popat Lal Patel, the Managing Director37 of JCC, in
which PW-2 has deposed that (i) PMD was advertising its business
under the title FIELDMARSHAL since 1963, and was having a yearly
turnover of more than ₹ 60 crores, (ii) they were selling their products
37 “MD” hereinafter
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in India through 1400 dealers, as well as in the Middle East, Far East
and Africa, (iii) pumps could function only either with the diesel
engines or with current supply, (iv) diesel engines and centrifugal
pumps were generally sold to common consumers, producing
agricultural products, at the same counters, (v) the 1985 suit was filed
when some dealers complained, in 1984-1985, that centrifugal pumps
were being sold in the market under PMD’s brand name which, on
inquiry, were found to be produced by Thukral and (vi) as a result,
PMD was facing damages. Mr. Mahabir also points out that PMD had
placed, on record, invoices covering the period from 1963 to 1984.
He also took us through statements of dealers, during evidence before
the learned Single Judge, testifying to purchase of FIELDMARSHAL
pumps from PMD at various points of time, from as far back as 1975.
He referred us to various advertisements placed on record by PMD,
evidencing use of the FIELDMARSHAL mark by it. The fact of sale,
and advertisement, by PMD, of FIELD MARSHAL pumps at least
since 1975, he submits, also stands vouchsafed by the invoices and
advertisements on record in CS (OS) 3804/1992.
93.
As against this, Faqueer Chand, who deposed as DW-2, and
claimed to know Thukral since 1983, deposed that he did not know
who manufactured BMS branded pumps and that, in the invoices
produced by him and exhibited as DW-2/1 to DW-2/5, the word
“FIELD MARSHAL” was not mentioned.
94.
On the aspect of infringement within the meaning of Section 29
of the 1958 TMMA, Mr. Mahabir submits that the word “same”, as
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used therein, should also be read as including “similar”, so as to
include allied and cognate goods.
95.
The plea that diesel engines and centrifugal pumps are allied
and cognate, submits Mr. Mahabir, was specifically advanced in the
replication filed by PMD in the 1985 suit. Once a replication was
allowed to be taken on record, it constitutes part of the pleadings in
the suit. He points out that the advertisements filed by Thukral with
CS (OS) 3804/1992 itself showed pumps and diesel engines being
sold together, thus:
96.
Mr. Mahabir further places reliance on paras 26 and 27 of the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Thukral Mechanical Works, which
discourage trafficking in trade marks, and go on to hold that the
question of whether, in a given case, Section 46(1)(b) read with
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Section 4838 of the 1958 TMMA would include a registered proprietor
as also one who had otherwise acquired a right over the mark would
depend on the facts and circumstances of the case.
97.
Adverting to the observations, in para 36 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court, that Thukral and PMD were both infringers of Jain,
and that, in the 1985 suit, only the competing right of PMD vis-à-vis
Thukral could be determined, and not a right against Jain, Mr.
Mahabir submits that they were rendered in the particular
circumstances with which the Supreme Court was seized in the said
paragraph. These observations, he submits, could not operate as a
proscription on the Court examining whether Jain had used the FIELD
MARSHAL mark.
98.
Mr. Mahabir next trains his guns on the Assignment Deed dated
30 May 1986. He submits that, while the Assignment Deed stated that
Jain had raised objections regarding use of the mark FIELD
MARSHAL by Thukral for centrifugal pumps, valves and machine
couplings, no such objection had ever been raised. Further, though
para 2 of the Assignment Deed recorded Jain’s satisfaction that
Thukral had been using the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal
pumps since 1973, he submits that the earliest evidence of such user,
48.
Registered users(1)
Subject to the provisions of section 49, a person other than the registered proprietor of a
trade mark may be registered as the registered user thereof in respect of any or all of the goods in
respect of which the trade mark is registered otherwise than as a defensive trade mark; but the
Central Government may, by rules made in this behalf, provide that no application for registration
as such shall be entertained unless the agreement between the parties complies with the conditions
laid down in the rules for preventing trafficking in trade marks.
(2)
The permitted use of a trade mark shall be deemed to be use by the proprietor thereof, and
shall be deemed not to be use by a person other than the proprietor, for the purposes of section 46 or
for any other purpose for which such use is material under this Act or any other law.
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as has been found by the learned Single Judge, is of 1988. He further
submits that, though para 4 of the Assignment Deed purported to
transfer, to Thukral, the rights, title and interest of Jain in the FIELD
MARSHAL mark along with goodwill in the business of centrifugal
pumps and valves in which the mark had been used, there was in fact
no such use and, consequently, no goodwill either.
99.
On the aspect of evidence, Mr. Mahabir submits, relying on the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Star Paper Mills v. Beharilal
Madanlal Jaipuria Ltd39, that personal knowledge is not necessary
while deposing for a Company. He further relies on Section 32(2)40 of
the Evidence Act to submit that a witness is competent to depose with
respect to facts outside his knowledge. He further cites, in this
context, the following passage from Sarkar’s Law of Evidence, 18th
Edn:
“Personal Knowledge. – Under the English rule, the maker of the
entry should have also personal knowledge of the statements
contained therein [Tay s. 700]. The rule is strictly adhered to. There
is no similar restrictions as to personal knowledge in the Act,
which simply requires that entries in accounts should, in order to
be relevant, be regularly kept in the ordinary course of business;
and although it may no doubt be important to show that the person
making or dictating the entries had, or had not personal knowledge
of the facts stated, this is a question which according to the rule
here affects the value and not the admissibility of the entries [see R
v. Hanumanta41. The contrary opinion in Maroti v. Mahadeo42,
that personal knowledge is required cannot be regarded as good
39 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1267
40 (2)
Or is made in course of business.— When the statement was made by such person in the ordinary
course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books
kept in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgment
written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or of a document
used in commerce written or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written
or signed by him.
41 1 B 610,616
42 A 1947 N 106
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law as nowhere does cl (2) say so, nor was attention drawn to
Hanumanta's Case].
The rule of personal knowledge cannot but fail to cause
hardship in many cases or to present practical impossibility.
Suppose you come to purchase an article from a salesman who
reported the fact to the book-keeper of the shop who made the
entry of the sale or that the book-keeper posted the entry of sale in
the day-book by reference to the counterfoils of the cash-memos
issued. If personal knowledge were insisted upon, the entry would
not be receivable as the book-keeper had no such knowledge. The
difficulty with which the rule is beset is discussed at length in
Wigmore s. 1530. He says: "Now the ordinary conditions of
mercantile and industrial life in some offices do in fact constantly
present just such a case of practical impossibility. Suppose an offer
of books representing transactions during several months in a large
establishment. In the first place, the employees have in many cases
changed and the former ones cannot be found: in the next place, it
cannot always be ascertained accurately which employee
concerned in each one of the transactions represented by the
hundreds of entries; in the third place, even if they would be
ascertained, the production of the scores of employees, to attend
court and identify in tidious succession the detailed items of
transactions would interrupt and derange the work of the
establishment and the evidence would be obtained at a cost
practically prohibitory; and finally, the memory of such persons
when summoned, would usually afford little real aid. If
unavailability of impossibility is the general principle that controls,
is not this a real case of unavailability? Having regard to the fact of
mercantile and industrial life, it cannot be doubted that it is. In
such a case, it should be sufficient if the books were verified on the
stand by a supervising officer who knew them to be the books of
regular entries kept in that establishment. No doubt much should
be left to the discretion of the trial court; production may be
required for cross-examination, where the nature of the
controversy seems to require it" [Wig s. 1530]. The dispensing
with the strict rule of personal knowledge in cl (2) is therefore an
improvement. But the means or opportunities of the writer's
knowledge must nevertheless be important in some cases and
explored in cross-examination and failure to show it cannot but
affect the weight of evidence, though not its admissibility
100. Mr. Mahabir finally submits that the breach of Section 11 has to
be examined by the Court as on the date of filing of the rectification
petition and cites, in this context, paras 30 to 34 of the decision of one
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of us (C. Hari Shankar, J), sitting singly, in Fybros Electric Pvt Ltd v.
Vasu Dev Gupta43 and para 16 of L.D. Malhotra Industries.
Analysis
VII. Applicable statutory provisions
101. All proceedings, which stand decided by the impugned
judgment, were instituted before the enactment of the 1999 TMA.
They would, therefore, be governed by the 1958 TMMA.
102. Sections 46 and 56 of the 1958 TMMA envisage removal of a
registered trade mark from the register.
103. Section 46(1)(a) is not of relevance, as has also been noted by
the Supreme Court in its judgment in Thukral Mechanical Works.
104. Section 46(1)(b) permits a registered trade mark to be removed
from the register on application by any aggrieved person, if more than
five years and one month have elapsed from the date of registration of
the mark, during which there was no bona fide use, by the proprietor
of the registration, of the registered mark, in respect of goods for
which it was registered.
43 (2023) 96 PTC 120
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105. Sections 56(1) and (2) are substantially similar to the
corresponding sub-sections of Section 57 of the 1999 TMA. Both
provisions are invokable only on application by the person aggrieved.
106. Section 56(1) empowers the Court to cancel or vary the
registration of a trade mark if registrant has failed to observe any
condition, in relation to the registered trade mark, entered in the
register. This provision, again, is of no significance in the present
case.
107. Section 56(2) applies where (i) the mark is entered in the
register without sufficient cause, or (ii) the mark is wrongly remaining
on the register, or (iii) there is an error or defect in the entry in the
register.
108. CO 6/1987 effectively invoked circumstances (i) and (ii).
109. Section 56(2) relates one back to Sections 9 and 11 of the 1958
TMMA. Sections 9 and 11 of the TMMA 1958 are roughly parallel to
the corresponding provisions in the TMA 1999.
110. Section 9 of the TMMA 1958 is of no relevance to the case
before us.
111. Of the various clauses of Section 11 of the 1958 TMMA, the
only relevant clause is clause (a)44, which proscribes the registration
44 11.
Prohibition of registration of certain marks. – A mark –
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of a mark, the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause
confusion.
112. With respect to Section 11 of the 1958 TMMA, two aspects are
especially relevant.
113. The first is that there is no provision, in Section 11 of the 1958
TMMA, parallel to Section 11(3)(a)45 of the 1999 TMA, which
proscribes registration of a mark, if its use in India is liable to be
prevented by virtue of any law, in particular the law of passing off.
Nonetheless, this absence may not be of particular significance, in
view of the existence of clause (a) in Section 11 of the 1958 TMMA.
114. When one adverts to clause (a) of Section 11 and compares it to
Section 11(1) of the 1999 TMA, it becomes apparent that Section
11(a) of 1958 TMMA is much more widely worded.
115. In order for Section 11(1) of the 1999 TMA to apply, the
applicant’s trade mark must either be identical, or similar, to an earlier
trade mark. Further, the goods or services covered by the marks must
be identical or similar. Owing to the combined effect of these factors,
there must exist a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, or
a likelihood of public associating the marks with one another. It is
(b)
the use of which would be likely to deceive or cause confusion; or
*****
shall not be registered as a trade mark.
(3) A trade mark shall not be registered if, or to the extent that, its use in India is liable to be
prevented—
(a)
by virtue of any law in particular the law of passing off protecting an unregistered trade
mark used in the course of trade; or
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only when these factors coalesce that the registration of a mark can be
refused under Section 11(1) of the 1999 TMA. Further, the
explanation below Section 11(4) of the 1999 TMA also defines
“earlier trade mark” as a mark which already stands registered or a
mark in respect of which the application for registration is pending.
116. Section 11(a) of the 1958 TMMA is not subject to such
constrains. It proscribes registration of a mark, the use of which would
be likely to deceive or cause confusion. Though there are no
guidelines contained in the provision, it is obvious that it has to be
reasonably interpreted. Broadly speaking, the likelihood of deception
or confusion would ordinarily arise, under Section 11(a), where there
already exists a mark, being used for goods or services, as would
result in registration of the applicant’s mark causing confusion in the
minds of the public.
117. Significantly, unlike Section 11(1) of the 1999 TMA, Section
11(a) of the 1958 TMMA does not refer to any identity or similarity of
goods or marks. The Court has, therefore, with it, wide latitude in
arriving at a conclusion on the aspect of likelihood of confusion.
118. We need not, however, for the purposes of the present
proceedings, enter into any dissertation with respect to the amplitude
of the expression “likelihood of confusion” as employed in Section
11(a) of the 1958 TMMA. Clearly, if the trade mark, of which
registration is sought, is identical or deceptively similar to a registered
trade mark, which stands registered for goods which are similar to
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those in respect of which registration is sought by the applicant,
registration would have to be refused under Section 11(a) as the
likelihood of confusion is apparent.
119. These are the provisions which relate to cancellation of a
registered trade mark.
120. Insofar as passing off is concerned, Section 27(2)46 of the 1958
TMMA is identical to Section 27(2) of the 1999 TMA, and reserves
the right to sue in respect of passing off. All principles relating to
passing off, as applicable under the 1999 TMA would, therefore, ipso
facto apply to proceedings under the 1958 TMMA as well.
121. There is, however, a significant difference in the provisions
relating to infringement, as contained in the 1958 TMMA and 1999
TMA. While Section 29 of the 1999 TMA has several sub-sections,
covering infringement of various hues, Section 29 of the TMMA is
much more simplistically worded. In fact, there is effectively only one
provision which deals with infringement under the 1958 TMMA, and
that is Section 29(1). Section 29(1) envisages infringement as taking
place where a person, who is not a registered proprietor of a
trademark or a permitted user thereof uses, in the course of trade, a
mark which is identical, or deceptively similar to a registered
trademark, in relation to any goods in respect of which the trademark
is registered, and in such manner as to render the use of the mark
likely to be taken as being used as a trademark.
46 (2)
Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights of action against any person for passing off
goods as the goods of another person or the remedies in respect thereof.
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122. In the facts of the present case, the italicised words are of
significance. Infringement, under Section 29(1) of the 1958 TMMA,
occurs only where the allegedly infringing mark is used in relation to
the goods in respect of which the infringed mark is registered. The
goods have, therefore, to be identical. Unlike the 1999 TMA, the 1958
TMMA does not envisage infringement as taking place where the
goods are merely similar.
123. We, therefore, unequivocally reject Mr. Mahabir’s contention
that infringement, under the 1958 TMMA, could occur even where the
goods of the plaintiff and the defendant are not the same. Under the
1958 TMMA, infringement can take place only where the defendant
uses the infringing mark in respect of the goods for which the mark is
registered in favour of the plaintiff. No case of infringement can be
made out if the goods are not identical, even if they are similar, or
allied or cognate.
124. We may go to the extent of observing that, even if the goods
fall within the same class, there would still be no case of infringement
in terms of Section 29 of the 1958 TMMA, as the words used in the
Section are “goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered”.
Identity of goods is, therefore, the statutory sine qua non for Section
29 of the 1958 TMMA to apply.
125. It is trite that Court cannot re-write a statute, even by applying
the principles of purposive interpretation. The words “goods in respect
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of which the trade mark is registered”, are clear, unequivocal, and do
not admit of two interpretations.
126. In the present case, PMD had no registration of the Field
Marshal Mark for centrifugal pumps. It could not, therefore, sustain a
case of infringement against Thukral, on the ground that Thukral was
using an identical Field Marshal Mark for centrifugal pumps. This, to
us, is apparent even at the very outset.
VIII. Scope of the rectification proceedings – Section 46 or Section
56?
127. Mr. Hemant Singh assiduously sought to contend that Section
56 of the TMMA was not available to PMD, as CO 9/1986 had been
preferred against Jain only under Section 46 of the TMMA and, while
allowing CO 9/1986 to be withdrawn with liberty to file a fresh
rectification petition vide order dated 16 January 1987, this Court had
specifically required the fresh proceeding to be on the same cause of
action.
128. Mr. Hemant Singh’s contention is, therefore, that CO 6/1987
would also be maintainable against Thukral only under Section 46,
and not under Section 56 of the 1958 TMMA.
129. We find ourselves unable to accept this contention. In the first
place, para 7 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thukral
Mechanical Works specifically notes the fact that CO 6/1987 had
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been preferred by PMD against Thukral under Sections 46 and 56 of
the 1958 TMMA. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has remanded CO
6/1987 for de novo consideration, without entering any caveat
restricting the scope of remand to Section 46 of the 1958 TMMA.
130. We, therefore, are of the opinion that it would be open to PMD
to rely both on Section 46 as well as on Section 56 of the TMMA in
support of CO 6/1987.
IX.
Re: Section 46 of the TMMA
131. Section 46(1)(b) of the 1958 TMMA, as we have already noted,
envisages removal of a registered mark from the Register of Trade
Marks, if the registrant of the mark has not used the mark bona fide in
terms of the registration, for a period of five years and one month.
132. The learned Single Judge has relied on the fact that there was
no use, by Jain, of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps
despite obtaining a registration in that regard. The proof of first use of
the mark FIELD MARSHAL for centrifugal pumps by Thukral,
according to the learned Single Judge, is of 1988. CO 6/1987 was filed
on 19 January 1987. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, allowed
PMD’s application under Section 46 of the 1958 TMMA on the
ground that including the non-use of the FIELD MARSHAL trade
mark by Jain, the mark had remained in dis-use for more than five
years and one month since the date of registration in favour of Jain for
centrifugal pumps on 13 May 1965.
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133. We agree with Mr. Hemant Singh that the said findings of the
learned Single Judge are contrary to para 26 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Thukral Mechanical Works, which specifically
rules that non-use by Jain, could not be relied upon against Thukral, in
the Section 46 proceedings.
134. The Supreme Court has clearly held that non-use by Jain, could
become relevant, if at all, only if the assignment of the mark by Jain to
Thukral is to be treated as a camouflage and Jain and Thukral are to be
treated as acting in concert. For this purpose, the Supreme Court has
clarified that Jain would have to be impleaded as a party in the
proceedings.
135. After the rendition of the judgment by the Supreme Court,
PMD, in fact, moved Application MP 161/2009 before the IPAB to
implead Jain in CO 6/1987. That application was dismissed by the
IPAB, vide order dated 27 January 2011. PMD carried the matter
further to this Court by way of WP (C) 4846/2011, which was also
dismissed by a learned Single Judge of this Court, vide judgment
dated 9 October 2020. While dismissing the said writ petition, the
learned Single Judge, returned the following pertinent observations:
13.
The Supreme Court set out the principles required to be
applied while considering an application for rectification of a
Register under Section 46(1)(b) of the Act. The question whether
the Register was required to be rectified on account of non-use of a
trademark is required to be considered with reference to the
registered owner of the said trademark at the material time. This
High Court’s view that if the non-use of the trademark attached a
disability to the assignor of a trademark, such disability would also
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be inherited by the assignee, was not accepted by the Supreme
Court. However, the Supreme Court also clarified that if the
assignment was merely to frustrate the provision of the law and
made as a device to traffic in trademark, such an assignment of a
trademark would not frustrate the provisions of Section 46(1)(b) of
the Act. Having set out the principles, the Supreme Court remanded
the matter to IPAB to decide the same in accordance with the said
principles.
14.
In view of the above, the only question to be considered by
the IPAB was whether the petitioner had made out a case of
trafficking of trademark and had impugned the assignment on the
said ground. A clear reading of the application for rectification
(C.O. No. 9/1987) indicates that the petitioner had not laid any
such challenge in its application. Mr Lall contended that it was the
petitioner’s case that the assignment of the trademark was mala
fide and to frustrate the provisions of law. However, a bare perusal
of the application indicates that the principal ground urged by the
petitioner in its application is that the registration of the trademark
in favour of M/s Jain Industries was liable to be rectified as the
same had not been used for a period of five years and one month.
Although the petitioner has also averred that the assignment of the
trademark was mala fide, a close examination of the pleadings
indicates that it is not the petitioner’s contention that there was any
trafficking of the trademark or that Thukral was squatting on the
same. On the contrary, it is an admitted case that Thukral was
using the trademark in respect of its goods (although it is
contended that the same amounted to infringement of the
petitioner’s trademark). The petitioner had alleged that Thukral had
secured an assignment of the said trademark to frustrate the
petitioner’s suit for infringement. The contention that M/s Jain
Industries and Thukral had been trafficking in the trademark and
had registered the same without the intention to use it and that the
trademark had been assigned only for the purpose of keeping the
registration alive without any intention of using the same, is
inconsistent with the case set up by the petitioner. Thus, the
contention that M/s Jain Industries is required to be impleaded on
the basis of the law as laid down by the Supreme Court, is
unmerited.
15.
In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the disability
attached to the assignor on account of non-use would not survive
once the said trademark has been assigned to a bona fide user
prior to the institution of any action for rectification of the Register
on account of non-user. In the present case, the fact that Thukral
has been using the said trademark in respect of goods manufactured
by it, is admitted. Thus, the petitioner’s application for rectification
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of the trademark solely on the ground that M/s Jain Industries had
not used the said trademark for a period of five years and one
month after its registration is not sustainable. The observations
made by the Supreme Court that a petition for rectification of a
registration on account of or non-use by the assignor would not be
maintainable without impleading the assignor is in the context
where the petitioner also challenges the assignment as being mala
fide and with the view to frustrate the provisions of Section
46(1)(b) of the Act.
16.
In the present case, the petitioner had alleged that the
trademark was liable to be rectified as it had been erroneously
entered in the Register. The petitioner specifically pleaded that the
trademark in question was registered without sufficient cause and is
wrongly remaining on the Register of Trademarks. It had further
pleaded that the assignment of trademark amounts to a fraud and is
also unsustainable in law. Clearly, in order to urge the said ground,
it was necessary for the petitioner to have impleaded the assignor
(M/s Jain Industries) as well as the assignee (Thukral). Not
impleading the assignor would clearly be fatal to this case.
However, the petitioner had chosen not to implead M/s Jain
Industries at the material time. In the aforesaid circumstances, this
Court concurs with the IPAB that impleading M/s Jain Industries at
this stage (that is, after twenty-three years) would not be apposite.
17.
The petitioner’s contention that it had become necessary to
implead M/s Jain Industries only on account of the decision
rendered by the Supreme Court in the matter is erroneous as the
observations made by the Supreme Court were in the context of the
petitioner’s ground regarding non-use of the trademark and the
allegations that it had been fraudulently transferred. There is little
doubt that the assignor (M/s Jain Industries) was required to be
impleaded in case its original registration in its favour was being
questioned as being made without sufficient cause or the
assignment made by M/s Jain Industries was sought to be
challenged as fraudulent and a subterfuge to squat on the
registration.
18.
In view of the above, this Court finds no reason to interfere
with the impugned order. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
The pending application is also disposed of.”
(Emphasis supplied)
136. PMD never chose to challenge the aforesaid judgment dated 9
October 2020 in WP (C) 4846/2011 which, therefore, attained finality.
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The decision of the learned Single Judge to also include non-use by
Jain, of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, while
considering the merits of CO 6/1987 is, therefore, additionally
contrary to the observations and findings in the judgment dated 9
October 2020 supra of the learned Single Judge.
137. Once the aspect of non-use of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps by Jain is excluded for consideration, it is clear that
no case for removal of the registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark
in favour of Thukral, from the Register of Trade Marks, was made out
under Section 46 of the 1958 TMMA. Thukral was substituted as the
registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL trade mark in the
Register of Trade Marks only on 10 November 1986, with effect from
30 May 1986. Even as per the findings of the learned Single Judge,
there was evidence of use of the FIELD MARSHAL mark by Thukral
for centrifugal pumps from 1988. It could not, therefore, be said that
as the registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps with effect from 30 May 1986, there was more than
five years’ lack of use of the mark by Thukral as would justify
cancellation of the mark under Section 46 of the 1958 TMMA.
138. The decision of the learned Single Judge in allowing CO 6/1987
under Section 46 of the 1958 TMMA cannot therefore, to our mind,
sustain.
139. Though the learned Single Judge has not examined whether the
registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark in favour of Thukral with
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effect from 30 May 1986 could be rectified under Section 56 of the
1958 TMMA, we do so. Having done so, we are of the view that the
answer has to be in the negative. The validity of the Assignment Deed
dated 30 May 1986 cannot be questioned, especially in view of (i) the
finding, by the Supreme Court, that, if the Assignment Deed is
pleaded to be collusive or a camouflage, that would require Jain to be
impleaded as a party, (ii) PMD’s application to implead Jain as a party
was dismissed by the IPAB, whose decision was affirmed by this
Court in its judgment dated 9 October 2020 in WP (C) 4846/2011, and
(iii) PMD never chose to assail the said decision. Once the
Assignment Deed is regarded as valid, the substitution of Thukral, in
place of Jain, as the registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL
mark for centrifugal pumps and other connected items in the Register
of Trade Marks was but a sequitur thereof.
140. The substitution of Thukral in place of Jain as the registered
proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL trade mark for centrifugal
pumps, and other like goods, cannot be said to infract Section 11(a) of
the 1958 TMMA.
141. Thukral stood substituted, with effect from 30 May 1986, as the
registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL mark in Registration
No. 228867 in place of Jain. The entitlement of Thukral to hold the
said registration has, therefore, to be determined as on 13 May 1965,
when the FIELD MARSHAL mark was registered in favour of Jain in
Class 7.
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142. The validity of the registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark
in favour of Jain in Class 7, as granted on 13 May 1965 is, to our
mind, incontrovertible, in view of the following finding, in para 36 of
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thukral Mechanical Works
which, we feel with greatest respect, has not been noticed by the
learned Single Judge while rendering the impugned judgment:
“36. … Both the appellant and Respondent 1 were the infringers
of the right of M/s Jain Industries as it was the registered
proprietor of the trade mark in respect of the goods in question,
namely, centrifugal pumps.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Supreme Court, in the concluding paragraph of its judgment,
specifically directed the remand proceedings to be determined in the
light of the legal principles explained earlier in the judgment. The
afore-extracted finding in para 36 of the judgment of the Supreme
Court, therefore, bound the learned Single Judge, as it binds us. The
pre-eminent right of Jain to use the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps stands emphatically confirmed by the Supreme
Court. The registration of the mark FIELD MARSHAL in favour of
Jain, in Class 7, for flour mills, circulating and centrifugal pump;
couplings for machines; pulleys included in class 7; and valves (parts
of machines) is, therefore, ipso facto valid.
143. Mr. Mahabir has contended that the judgment of the Supreme
Court was rendered in the context of Section 46, and not Section 56,
of the 1958 TMMA, and, to that extent, we agree with him. We
cannot, however, endorse his submission that the afore-extracted
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finding, in para 36, can be ignored when examining the merits of the
entire matter, for the following five reasons:
(i)
The finding, to our mind, reflects the view of the
Supreme Court, flowing from the fact that the only registrant of
the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps is Jain, and
that no other entity, including Thukral and PMD, can claim to
proprietorship of such a registration.
(ii)
Even otherwise, the reference to “infringement” clearly
indicates that the Supreme Court has pronounced on the legal
effect of the competing registrations in the light of Section 29 of
the 1958 TMMA, as that is the statutory provision which deals
with infringement. The legal position, as enunciated in para 36,
cannot, therefore, be wished away on the ground that the
Supreme Court was, in the appeal before it, essentially
concerned with Section 46 of the 1958 TMMA.
(iii)
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has, in its judgment, noted
the fact that PMD had sought cancellation of the registration of
the FIELD MARSHAL mark in favour of Thukral under
Section 46 as well as Section 56 of the 1958 TMMA. The aforeextracted finding, as contained in para 36 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court would, therefore, apply to PMD’s application
under both the provisions, and its scope cannot legitimately be
watered down, much less wished away.
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(iv)
Fourthly, even on merits and in law, the view expressed
by the Supreme Court is unexceptionable. Jain was, in fact, the
only registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps. The use of the mark FIELD MARSHAL for
centrifugal pumps by Thukral was, therefore, ipso facto
infringing of Jain’s registration.
(v)
Registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark in favour of
Thukral in Class 7 for centrifugal pumps would also not infract
Section 12(1)47 of the 1958 Act, as the said provision applies
only where there is an earlier mark for the same goods, and
there has never been any registration of the FIELD MARSHAL
mark for centrifugal pumps except Registration No. 228867
issued to Jain with effect from 13 May 1965.
144. No case is, therefore, made out, even under Section 56 of the
1958 TMMA, to cancel the registration of the FIELD MARSHAL
trade mark in favour of Jain, or the substitution of Thukral as the
registered proprietor of the mark in the certificate of registration.
145. We, therefore, are of the opinion that CO 6/1987 was liable to
be dismissed. The impugned decision of the learned Single Judge, to
the contrary, appears not to have noticed the impact of the afore-
12.
Prohibition of registration of identical or deceptively similar trade marks.
(1)
Save as provided in sub- section (3), no trade mark shall be registered in respect of any
goods or description of goods which is identical with or deceptively similar to a trade mark which is
already registered in the name of a different proprietor in respect of the same goods or description
of goods.
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extracted observation contained in para 36 of the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Thukral Mechanical Works.
X.
Re. the 1985 suit and the 1992 suit
146. Mr. Hemant Singh sought to submit that the only, and
inexorable, sequitur, to upholding the validity of the substitution of
Thukral, in place of Jain, as the registered proprietor of the FIELD
MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps etc., was that PMD was liable
to be injuncted from using an identical mark for centrifugal pumps.
147. The submission is more attractive, facially, than it actually is on
merit.
148. Para 36 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thukral
Mechanical Works holds, as we have already noted, that, as Jain was
the only registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, PMD, in using the FIELDMARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, infringed Jain’s registration.
149. PMD could not, therefore, seek any injunction against Jain’s use
of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps on the ground
of infringement. This position would apply, equally, vis-à-vis Thukral,
once Thukral stood substituted as the registered proprietor of the
FIELD MARSHAL trade mark for centrifugal pumps, in place of Jain.
An infringer cannot, quite obviously, seek to injunct use of the
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infringed mark by the person whose mark is infringed, on the ground
of infringement.
150. Could, however, such an action lie, on the ground of passing
off?
151. Section 27(2) of the 1958 TMMA, like Section 27(2) of the
1999 TMA, saves the right to sue in respect of passing off.
152. This throws up an important legal issue, viz., whether an
infringer can seek to injunct the person whose trade mark it has
infringed, from using the mark, on the ground of passing off.
153. The issue squarely arises for consideration in the case before us.
154. PMD has a registration of the mark FIELDMARSHAL for
diesel engines. It has no registration of the mark for centrifugal
pumps. Jain had a registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps. The Supreme Court holds, therefore, that PMD, in
using the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, infringed
Jain’s registration. Thus far, there can be no dispute, once the Supreme
Court has pronounced on the issue.
155. Having obtained a registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark
for centrifugal pumps, however, Jain never chose to use the mark
during the entire period for which it remained its registered proprietor.
The first use of the mark FIELD MARSHAL by Thukral for
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centrifugal pumps, holds the learned Single Judge, is of 1988. We
have set out the basis for the learned Single Judge so holding, and, on
a perusal of the evidence on record, we are in entire agreement with
her. There is nothing to support the purported use of the mark FIELD
MARSHAL by Thukral for centrifugal pumps since 1973, though the
Assignment Deed so states. No invoices or other documents, to that
effect, are on record. The first invoice of Thukral, manifesting such
use, is of 1988. Clearly, therefore, no use was made of the registration
obtained by Jain, of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal
pumps for 23 years – close to a quarter of a century – after the
registration had been obtained in 1965.
156. As against this, there is clear evidence, both documentary and
oral, of PMD having used the FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal
pumps at least since 1975. The sales figures and advertisement
expenses on record indicate that, by 1988, it had amassed considerable
goodwill in the FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps.
157. By the time Thukral commenced using the FIELD MARSHAL
mark for centrifugal pumps, therefore, PMD had considerable
goodwill in the same mark, for the same goods. Viewed thus, there is
clearly no reason for us to interfere with the decision of the learned
Single Judge from injuncting Thukral from using the FIELD
MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps.
158. Two issues are, however, required to be addressed by us, before
confirming the finding of the learned Single Judge in that regard.
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159. The first is that PMD has itself been held, by the Supreme
Court, in its judgment in Thukral Mechanical Works, to be an
infringer of Jain’s registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps. Would this make a difference?
160. The second is the date prior to which PMD would have to
establish acquisition of goodwill in use of the FIELDMARSHAL
mark for centrifugal pumps, in order to be able to injunct Thukral
from such use. Would it have to be prior to the registration of the
FIELD MARSHAL mark in favour of Jain for centrifugal pumps, i.e.,
prior to 13 May 1965, or prior to commencement of user of the mark
by Thukral for centrifugal pumps, i.e., prior to 1988?
161. Mr. Hemant Singh urges the former. The learned Single Judge
has held the latter.
162. Kerly, in his treatise Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names,
illuminatingly addresses both these issues in a classic statement of the
law, referring to the situation that results as an “impasse”, to which we
have already alluded at the commencement of this judgment:
“Concurrent right
… The statutory right of use given by registration of a mark does
not provide a defence to proceedings for passing off by the use of
the mark48; although it is normally expedient for the claimant in
such cases to apply to revoke the registration. Where a party
48 Kerly refers, significantly, here, to Section 2(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1994, which is identical in terms
to Section 27(2) of the 1958 TMMA and Section 27(2) of the 1999 TMA, and reads, “… nothing in this Act
affects the law relating to passing off”.
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applies to register a mark but does not immediately use it, and
another party uses the mark and generates sufficient goodwill to
support a passing claim prior to the first use by the registered
proprietor, an impasse ensues. The proprietor of the mark, if valid,
may restrain use by the owner of the goodwill. However, the
proprietorship of the mark provides no defence to a passing off
claim by the owner of the goodwill, notwithstanding the fact that
such goodwill was generated after the application to register the
mark.”
(Emphasis supplied)
A.
The decision in Inter Lotto
163. Kerly, in the afore-extracted passage, cites the judgment of the
UK Court of Appeal in Inter Lotto (UK) Ltd v. Camelot Group plc49,
which dealt with a similar issue. A reading of the judgment reveals
that the provisions of the Trade Marks Act 1994, in the context of
which it was rendered, were largely similar to those of the 1958
TMMA and, indeed, the 1999 TMA.
164. Inter Lotto was using the mark “Hotpicks” from November
2001, albeit without any registration of the mark in its favour.
Camelot, the respondent before the Court of Appeal, obtained a
registration of the mark “Hotpicks” for the same activity, with effect
from 17 October 2001. User of the mark “Hotpicks” by Camelot,
however, commenced on 10 July 2002.
165. Inter Lotto sought an injunction against user of the mark
“Hotpicks” by Camelot on the ground of passing off. The date by
which Inter Lotto was required to establish existence of goodwill, for
49 [2004] 1 WLR 955
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the said purpose, arose for consideration. Inter Lotto contended that it
had amassed considerable goodwill by 10 July 2002, when Camelot
actually started using the mark. Camelot, on the other hand, contended
that Inter Lotto was required to establish the existence of goodwill
prior to 17 October 2001, the effective date of the registration of the
mark “Hotpicks” in its favour.
166. The Court of Appeal held, in para 29 of the report, that the
relevant date on which the existence of goodwill of Inter Lotto was to
be examined, was not earlier than April 2002, which was the date of
commencement of the conduct complained of, i.e., the passing off, by
Camelot, of its services as those of Inter Lotto by using the
“Hotpicks” mark. The issue was separately addressed by Pill LJ, thus:
“50. Section 5 makes provision for protection of earlier rights
but makes the date of application for registration crucial to the
resolution of competing claims, it is submitted. Rights crystallise at
that date. Under section 5(4) registration should be refused if there
existed at the date of application a conflicting passing off right, but
a right which comes into existence after the date of application
does not affect the grant of registration. Where a trader claims he
has a right to sue for passing off which prevents a second trader
obtaining a trade mark registration, he has to show that the right
existed at the date of application for registration. If he establishes
that it does, the application should be refused (or if it has already
been granted, it should be declared invalid and removed from the
register: section 47(2)). If, on the other hand, a trader claiming that
he has a passing off right cannot show that the right existed at the
date of application for registration by a second trader, the second
trader is entitled to registration and to complain of the use by the
first trader of the trade mark from the date of application for
registration, though he cannot bring an action for infringement
until the mark is registered: section 9(3). That is so even if the first
trader has, between the date of application and the grant of
registration, which may include the period between the date of
application and the second trader's first use of the mark, built up a
reputation and goodwill under the mark.”
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167. The existing law in UK is, therefore, clear on the point that
goodwill has to be shown by the plaintiff to exist on the date of
commencement of actual user of the mark by the defendant, and not
on the effective date of registration of the mark in its favour.
B.
The decision in Neon Laboratories and its effect
168. In the context of the law as applied in this country, the
judgment of the Supreme Court in Neon Laboratories is of
considerable significance.
169. Medical Technologies Limited50, the respondent before the
Supreme Court and the original plaintiff, claimed user of the mark
PROFOL since April 1998. On coming to learn that Neon
Laboratories51 was introducing a drug, in the market, with the same
constituents under the name ROFOL, MTL instituted the suit, seeking
an injunction against Neon using the mark ROFOL, on the ground that
the marks ROFOL and PROFOL were deceptively similar to each
other. The mark ROFOL stood registered in favour of Neon with
effect from 19 October 1992, though Neon commenced user of the
mark only from 16 October 2004. In the interregnum, MTL claimed
to have amassed considerable goodwill and reputation in the mark
PROFOL.
50 “MTL” hereinafter
51 “Neon” hereinafter
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170. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether, in such
circumstances, MTL could succeed in maintaining an action for
passing off against Neon, thus:
“8.
It may be reiterated that the respondent-plaintiffs assert that
their predecessor-in-interest had initiated user of the trade
mark Profol in 1998, when it commenced production thereof and
the respondent-plaintiffs succeeded to the user of the mark upon
amalgamation with their predecessor-in-title in the year 2000. The
position that emerges is that whilst the appellant-defendant had
applied for registration of its trade mark several years prior to the
respondent-plaintiffs (1992 as against 26-5-1998 at the earliest),
the user thereof had remained dormant for twelve years. We can
appreciate that this passivity may be the result of research of the
product or the market, but the appellant-defendant will have to
explain its supineness through evidence. In this interregnum, the
respondent-plaintiffs had not only applied for registration but had
also commenced production and marketing of the similar drug and
had allegedly built up a substantial goodwill in the market
for Profol. The legal nodus is whether the prior registration would
have the effect of obliterating the significance of the goodwill that
had meanwhile been established by the respondent-plaintiffs.
Would a deeming provision i.e. relating registration retrospectively
prevail on actuality—competing equities oscillate around prior
registration and prior user.
9.
Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (the Act) deserves
reproduction herein:
“34. Saving for vested rights.—Nothing in this Act shall
entitle the proprietor or a registered user of registered trade
mark to interfere with or restrain the use by any person of a
trade mark identical with or nearly resembling it in relation
to goods or services in relation to which that person or a
predecessor-in-title of his has continuously used that trade
mark from a date prior—
(a)
to the use of the first-mentioned trade mark
in relation to those goods or services be the
proprietor or a predecessor-in-title of his; or
(b)
to the date of registration of the firstmentioned trade mark in respect of those goods or
services in the name of the proprietor of a
predecessor-in-title of his;
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whichever is the earlier, and the Registrar shall not refuse
(on such use being proved), to register the secondmentioned trade mark by reason only of the registration of
the first-mentioned trade mark.”
This section palpably holds that a proprietor of a trade mark does
not have the right to prevent the use by another party of an
identical or similar mark where that user commenced prior to the
user or date of registration of the proprietor. This “first user” rule is
a seminal part of the Act. While the case of the respondentplaintiffs is furthered by the fact that their user commenced prior to
that of the appellant-defendant, the entirety of the section needs to
be taken into consideration, in that it gives rights to a subsequent
user when its user is prior to the user of the proprietor and prior to
the date of registration of the proprietor, whichever is earlier. In the
facts of the case at hand, the appellant-defendant filed for
registration in 1992, six years prior to the commencement of user
by the respondent-plaintiffs. The appellant-defendant was, thus, not
prevented from restraining the respondent-plaintiffs' use of the
similar mark Profol, but the intention of the section, which is to
protect the prior user from the proprietor who is not exercising the
user of its mark prima facie appears to be in favour of the
respondent-plaintiffs.
10.
Section 47 of the Act is in the same vein and statutory strain
inasmuch as it postulates the possibility of a registered mark being
taken off the register on an application being made by any
aggrieved person, inter alia, on the ground that for a continuous
period of five years and three months from the date on which the
trade mark was registered, there was no bona fide use thereof. In
the case in hand, prima facie, it appears that for over five years
after a registration application was made by the appellantdefendant, the mark was not used. Facially, the Act does not permit
the hoarding of or appropriation without utilisation of a trade mark;
nay the appellant-defendant has allowed or acquiesced in the user
of the respondent-plaintiffs for several years. The legislative intent
behind this section was to ordain that an applicant of a trade mark
does not have a permanent right by virtue of its application alone.
Such a right is lost if it is not exercised within a reasonable time.
11.
We must hasten to clarify that had the appellant-defendant
commenced user of its trade mark Rofol prior to or even
simultaneous with or even shortly after the respondent-plaintiffs'
marketing of their products under the trade mark Profol, on the
appellant-defendant being accorded registration in respect
of Rofol which registration would retrospectively have efficacy
from 19-10-1992, the situation would have been unassailably
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favourable to it. What has actually transpired is that after applying
for registration of its trade mark Rofol in 1992, the appellantdefendant took no steps whatsoever in placing its product in the
market till 2004. It also was legally lethargic in not seeking a curial
restraint against the respondent-plaintiffs. This reluctance to
protect its mark could well be interpreted as an indication that the
appellant-defendant had abandoned its mark at some point during
the twelve-year interregnum between its application and the
commencement of its user, and that in 2004 it sought to exercise its
rights afresh. It would not be unfair or fanciful to favour the view
that the appellant-defendant's delayed user was to exploit the niche
already created and built-up by the respondent-plaintiffs for
themselves in the market. The “first in the market” test has always
enjoyed pre-eminence. We shall not burden this judgment by
referring to the several precedents that can be found apposite to the
subject. In the interest of prolixity we may mention only N.R.
Dongre and Milmet Oftho Industries v. Allergan Inc.52
In Whirlpool, the worldwide prior user was given preference nay
predominance over the registered trade mark in India of the
defendant. In Milmet, the marks of pharmaceutical preparation
were similar but the prior user worldwide had not registered its
mark in India whereas its adversary had done so. This Court
approved the grant of an injunction in favour of the prior user.
Additionally, in the recent decision in S. Syed Mohiden, this Court
has pithily underscored that the rights in a passing-off action
emanate from common law and not from statutory provisions,
nevertheless the prior user's rights will override those of a
subsequent user even though it had been accorded registration of
its trade mark. The learned counsel for the appellant-defendant has
endeavoured to minimise the relevance of Whirlpool as well
as Milmet by drawing the distinction that those trade marks had
attained worldwide reputation. However, we think that as world
shrinks almost to a global village, the relevance of the transnational
nature of a trade mark will progressively diminish into
insignificance. In other words, the attainment of valuable goodwill
will have ever increasing importance. At the present stage, the
argument in favour of the appellant-defendant that we find holds
more water is that in both Milmet and Whirlpool, as distinct from
the case before us, the prior user of the successful party predated
the date of application for registration of the competing party. The
question to examine, then, would be whether prior user would have
to be anterior to the date of application or prior to the user by the
appellant-defendant. In other words, the question before the Court
would remain whether the situation on the date of application for
registration alone would be relevant, or whether the developments
52 (2004) 12 SCC 624
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in the period between this date and the date of grant of registration
would have any bearing on the rights of the parties. All these
considerations will be cast into a curial cauldron to be appreciated
by the Court before which the suit is being contested. In these
premises, we cannot conclude that a prima facie case has not been
disclosed by the respondent-plaintiffs.”
171. The judgment in Neon Laboratories, when applied to the facts
of the present case, clearly supports the stand adopted by PMD.
Though Jain had obtained a registration of the FIELD MARSHAL
mark for centrifugal pumps, with effect from 13 May 1965, which
never used the said mark even till the date when it transferred the
registration of the mark alongwith the goodwill therein to Thukral, by
the assignment deed dated 30 May 1986. Even thereafter, the evidence
of user of the mark FIELD MARSHAL for centrifugal pumps, by
Thukral, is forthcoming only from 1988. There was no user, of the
registration obtained by Jain of the mark FIELD MARSHAL for
centrifugal pumps for 23 years after it was obtained in 1965.
172. In the interregnum, PMD commenced using the mark FIELD
MARSHAL for centrifugal pumps from 1975. By 1988, when Thukral
commenced user of the mark for centrifugal pumps, considerable
goodwill and reputation of the FIELDMARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, had enured in favour of PMD.
173. In such circumstances, applying the law laid down by the
Supreme Court in Neon Laboratories, which reflects the legal
position as settled by Kerly and elucidated in the judgment of the UK
Court of Appeal in Inter Lotto, PMD would be entitled to maintain a
passing off action against Thukral on the basis of the goodwill
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accumulated by it between 1975 and 1988, when Thukral commenced
user of the mark FIELD MARSHAL, for centrifugal pumps.
174. Inasmuch as Jain had not cared to exploit the registration of the
mark FIELD MARSHAL for centrifugal pumps obtained by it with
effect from 13 May 1965, for 23 years, we are in agreement with the
learned Single Judge that Thukral could not seek to displace the right
of PMD to obtain an injunction on the ground of passing off, arising
out
of the goodwill
accumulated by
PMD
of the mark
FIELDMARSHAL for centrifugal pumps between 1975 and 1988, on
the basis of the archaic registration of the mark obtained by Jain with
effect from 13 May 1965.
175. We may note that Thukral would not be able to capitalize even
on the exception engrafted in the opening sentence in para 11 of the
decision in Neon, as there is no evidence of user either by Thukral or
by Jain, of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps prior
to the commencement of user of the mark by PMD in 1975.
176. We, therefore, uphold the decision of the learned Single Judge
granting an injunction, in favour of PMD and against Thukral,
restraining use of the FIELD MARSHAL mark by Thukral for
centrifugal pumps, on the ground of passing off.
XI.
Re. RFA (OS) (Comm) 11/2024
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177. This appeal assails the rejection, by the learned Single Judge, of
CS (Comm) 473/2016 [nee CS (OS) 3804/1992].
178. This case, to our mind, presents a classic example of the “Kerly
impasse”. While PMD is entitled to an injunction against the use of
the FIELD MARSHAL mark by Thukral on the ground of passing off,
in view of the goodwill that PMD has amassed between 1975 and
1988, Thukral would equally be entitled to an injunction against PMD
on the ground of infringement.
179. We have spent considerable time reflecting on whether such an
injunction, on the ground of infringement, can be granted even where
the infringer has acquired goodwill by use of the infringing mark.
Indisputably, the right to injunction, in a passing off action, is
predicated on goodwill arising from use, whereas the right to
injunction, following infringement, is a right arising from registration.
This throws, into sharp relief, the oft cited plea that “user trumps
registration” in trade mark matters.
180. Kerly indisputably recognizes, in such a context, the existing of
contrasting rights to obtain injunction; of the registrant on the basis of
registration, and of the owner of goodwill on the basis of the goodwill
earned.
181. Is the law in India different? Does the owner of the goodwill
have, on the basis of the goodwill earned, a right to block the
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entitlement of the registrant to obtain an injunction on the basis of
infringement?
182. Again, indisputably, in our opinion, no such fetter is put in
placed by the statute. The statutory position is, in this context, the
same, under the 1958 TMMA and the 1999 TMA. We, naturally,
advert to the former, as the 1958 TMMA is what concerns us.
183. Section 28(1)53 of the 1958 TMMA confers, to a registrant of a
validly registered trade mark, a right to obtain relief against
infringement, which includes the right to an injunction. Any use of an
identical, or deceptively similar, trade mark, by a person who has no
registration therefor or other permission to so use the mark, is
infringing, within the meaning of Section 2954.
184. Section 28(1) is, however, made subject to the other provisions
of the 1958 TMMA. This would, therefore, make Section 28(1) subject
to Section 27(2) as well as Section 33 (which parallels Section 34 of
the 1999 TMA).
185. Section 27(2), undoubtedly, holds that nothing in the 1958
TMMA affects the rights of action against any person for passing off
Rights conferred by registration. –
(1)
Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark in Part A or
Part B of the register shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor of the trade mark the exclusive
right to the use of the trade mark in relation to the goods in respect of which the trade mark is
registered and to obtain relief in respect of infringement of the trade mark in the manner provided
by this Act.
54 Section 29 of the 1958 TMMA is, in this context, distinct from Section 29 of the 1999 TMA, as it does not
include, in the scope of “infringement”, use of an identical or deceptively similar trade mark for similar – i.e.,
allied or cognate – goods or services. The goods or services have to be the same.
53 28.
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his goods as those of another, or to obtain an injunction on that basis.
That, however, only saves passing off actions and the right to obtain
injunction in such cases. It does not derogate from the right conferred
in Section 28(1).
186. We may express it otherwise. The injunction that an owner of
goodwill (let us call him X) can obtain against the registered
proprietor of the mark (let us call him Y), by virtue of Section 27(2)
on the ground of passing off, may affect the right of Y to further use
the mark, but cannot affect the right of Y to obtain relief against
infringement, on the basis of Section 28(1). This is because the right
to relief, in a case of passing off, does not extend to undoing the
registration granted to Y.
187. Once the registration of Y thus remains inviolate, the right to
obtain an injunction against any person who, not being a registered or
permissive user thereof, uses an identical or deceptively similar mark
for identical goods, flowing from Section 29(1), 28(1) and 106 of the
1958 TMMA, also stand preserved.
188. The TMMA does not envisage goodwill to be a defence against
injunction, where infringement is found to exist.
189. The only protection against injunction, available to X (the
owner of the goodwill), in such a case, is under Section 33 of the
TMMA – corresponding to Section 34 of the 1999 TMA. It is only in
such a case that “user trumps registration”. User is accorded priority
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over registration, therefore, only where the user, by the defendant is
prior both to the user of the mark by the plaintiff as well as the
registration of the mark in the plaintiff’s favour.
190. That the right to protection against injunction, arising from
priority of user, extends only to Section 33 of the 1958 TMMA – or
Section 34 of the 1999 TMA – is apparent from the following
passages, from S. Syed Mohideen:
“30.1. From the reading of Section 27(2) of the Act, it is clear that
the right of action of any person for passing off the goods/services
of another person and remedies thereof are not affected by the
provisions of the Act. Thus, the rights in passing off are emanating
from the common law and not from the provisions of the Act and
they are independent from the rights conferred by the Act. This is
evident from the reading of the opening words of Section 27(2)
which are “Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to affect rights….”
30.2. Likewise, the registration of the mark shall give exclusive
rights to the use of the trade mark subject to the other provisions
of this Act. Thus, the rights granted by the registration in the form
of exclusivity are not absolute but are subject to the provisions of
the Act.
30.3. Section 28(3) of the Act provides that the rights of two
registered proprietors of identical or nearly resembling trade marks
shall not be enforced against each other. However, they shall be
same against the third parties. Section 28(3) merely provides that
there shall be no rights of one registered proprietor vis-à-vis
another but only for the purpose of registration. The said provision
28(3) nowhere comments about the rights of passing off which
shall remain unaffected due to overriding effect of Section 27(2) of
the Act and thus the rights emanating from the common law shall
remain undisturbed by the enactment of Section 28(3) which
clearly states that the rights of one registered proprietor shall not
be enforced against the another person.
30.4. Section 34 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provides that
nothing in this Act shall entitle the registered proprietor or
registered user to interfere with the rights of prior user. Conjoint
reading of Sections 34, 27 and 28 would show that the rights of
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registration are subject to Section 34 which can be seen from the
opening words of Section 28 of the Act which states “Subject to
the other provisions of this Act, the registration of a trade mark
shall, if valid, give to the registered proprietor….” and also the
opening words of Section 34 which states “Nothing in this Act
shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of registered trade
mark to interfere….” Thus, the scheme of the Act is such where
rights of prior user are recognised superior than that of the
registration and even the registered proprietor cannot
disturb/interfere with the rights of prior user. The overall effect of
collective reading of the provisions of the Act is that the action for
passing off which is premised on the rights of prior user generating
a goodwill shall be unaffected by any registration provided under
the Act. This proposition has been discussed in extenso in
Whirlpool, wherein the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court
recognised that the registration is not an indefeasible right and the
same is subject to rights of prior user. The said decision
of Whirlpool was further affirmed by the Supreme Court of India
in N.R. Dongre v. Whirlpool Corpn.
30.5. The above were the reasonings from the provisions arising
from the plain reading of the Act which gives clear indication that
the rights of prior user are superior than that of registration and
are unaffected by the registration rights under the Act.
*****
32.
Thirdly, it is also recognised principle in common law
jurisdiction that passing off right is broader remedy than that of
infringement. This is due to the reason that the passing off doctrine
operates on the general principle that no person is entitled to
represent his or her business as business of other person. The said
action in deceit is maintainable for diverse reasons other than that
of registered rights which are allocated rights under the Act. The
authorities of other common law jurisdictions like England more
specifically Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, 14th
Edn., Thomson, Sweet & Maxwell South Asian Edition recognises
the principle that where trade mark action fails, passing off action
may still succeed on the same evidence. This has been explained
by the learned author by observing the following:
“15-033. A claimant may fail to make out a case of
infringement of a trade mark for various reasons and may
yet show that by imitating the mark claimed as a trade
mark, or otherwise, the defendant has done what is
calculated to pass off his goods as those of the claimant. A
claim in ‘passing off’ has generally been added as a second
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string to actions for infringement, and has on occasion
succeeded where the claim for infringement has failed.”
32.1. The same author also recognises the principle that the
Trade Marks Act affords no bar to the passing off action. This has
been explained by the learned author as under:
“15-034. Subject to possibly one qualification, nothing in
the Trade Marks Act, 1994 affects a trader's right against
another in an action for passing off. It is, therefore, no bar
to an action for passing off that the trade name, get up or
any other of the badges identified with the claimant's
business, which are alleged to have been copies or imitated
by the defendant, might have been, but are not registered
as, trade marks, even though the evidence is wholly
addressed to what may be a mark capable of registration.
Again, it is no defence to passing off that the defendant's
mark is registered. The Act offers advantages to those who
register their trade marks, but imposes no penalty upon
those who do not. It is equally no bar to an action for
passing off that the false representation relied upon is an
imitation of a trade mark that is incapable of registration. A
passing off action can even lie against a registered
proprietor of the mark sued upon. The fact that a claimant
is using a mark registered by another party (or even the
defendant) does not of itself prevent goodwill being
generated by the use of the mark, or prevent such a
claimant from relying on such goodwill in an action against
the registered proprietor. Such unregistered marks are
frequently referred to as ‘common law trade marks’.”
32.2. From the reading of the aforementioned excerpts
from Kerly's Law of Trade Marks and Trade Names, it can be said
that not merely it is recognised in India but in other jurisdictions
also including England/UK (Provisions of the UK Trade Marks
Act, 1994 are analogous to the Indian Trade Marks Act, 1999) that
the registration is no defence to a passing off action and nor the
Trade Marks Act, 1999 affords any bar to a passing off action. In
such an event, the rights conferred by the Act under the provisions
of Section 28 have to be subject to the provisions of Section 27(2)
of the Act and thus the passing off action has to be considered
independent “Iruttukadai Halwa” under the provisions of the
Trade Marks Act, 1999.
33.
Fourthly, it is also a well-settled principle of law in the
field of the trade marks that the registration merely recognises the
rights which are already pre-existing in common law and does not
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create any rights. This has been explained by the Division Bench
of the Delhi High Court in Century Traders in the following
words:
“10. ‘16. … First is the question of use of the trade mark.
Use plays an all-important part. A trader acquires a right of
property in a distinctive mark merely by using it upon or in
connection with his goods irrespective of the length of such
user and the extent of his trade. The trader who adopts such
a mark is entitled to protection directly the article having
assumed a vendible character is launched upon the
market. Registration under the statute does not confer any
new right to the mark claimed or any greater rights than
what already existed at common law and at equity without
registration. It does, however, facilitate a remedy which
may be enforced and obtained throughout ‘the State and it
established the record of facts affecting the right to the
mark. Registration itself does not create a trade mark. The
trade mark exists independently of the registration which
merely affords further protection under the statute.
Common law rights are left wholly unaffected.’
*****
33.2. We uphold the said view which has been followed and
relied upon by the courts in India over a long time. The said views
emanating from the courts in India clearly speak in one voice,
which is, that the rights in common law can be acquired by way of
use and the registration rights were introduced later which made
the rights granted under the law equivalent to the public user of
such mark. Thus, we hold that registration is merely a recognition
of the rights pre-existing in common law and in case of conflict
between the two registered proprietors, the evaluation of the better
rights in common law is essential as the common law rights would
enable the court to determine whose rights between the two
registered proprietors are better and superior in common law
which have been recognised in the form of the registration by the
Act.”
191. These passages warrant a close and searching study, to
appreciate their import. The Supreme Court has, in these passages,
recognized that the right arising from user and goodwill is superior to
the right arising from registration, to the extent that registration
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cannot be cited as a defence against an injunction where a case of
passing off, predicated on goodwill, is made out. Equally, the right to
protection against injunction, in a case where the owner of goodwill
enjoys priority of user over user as well as registration of the
registrant, is preserved. The right emanating from registration, which
must cede place to the right of the prior user, who has accumulated
goodwill, to an injunction against passing off, is the right to use the
registered mark, and nothing more than that55. In other words, where
a case of passing off is made out, the defendant cannot escape an
injunction on the ground that it is a registered proprietor of the mark
which the owner of goodwill seeks to injunct.
192. The rights flowing from registration, under Section 28(1), are
subject to the rights of action against any person for passing off. That
right of action entitles the owner of goodwill only to injunct the other
from continuing to use its mark. It does not, in any way, entitle the
owner of goodwill to divest the registrant of the right to obtain relief
against infringement, flowing from the registration.
193. In fact, the afore-extracted passages from S. Syed Mohideen
make it clear that registration “facilitates a remedy which may be
enforced and obtained throughout the State”.
This remedy of a
registrant-plaintiff, which is sanctified by Section 28(1) read with
Section 106 of the 1958 TMMA [or Section 28(1) read with Section
135 of the 1999 TMA], is not divested because of the goodwill earned
by the defendant. No such proposition flows, whether from Neon
55 Refer para 30.2 of S. Syed Mohideen
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Laboratories, or N.R. Dongre, or Whirlpool. The only protection
against injunction, that the non-registrant owner of goodwill can
claim against the registered proprietor of the mark, is under Section 33
of the 1958 TMMA/Section 34 of the 1999 TMA.
194. Inasmuch as the user of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps by PMD is of 1975 vintage, much after the
registration of the mark in favour of Jain with effect from 1965, PMD
cannot seek sanctuary behind Section 33.
195. Any other understanding of the legal position would result in
the Court rewriting the provisions of the TMMA – or the TMA – to
incorporate, therein, earning of goodwill consequent on user as an
additional defence against injunction, even in the case of infringement
of a registered trade mark. The Court cannot, it is settled, re-write the
statute. The statute has granted an additional level of protection to a
prior user, but only where the circumstances attract Section 33 of the
TMMA/Section 34 of the TMA which, in turn, would apply only
where the user of the infringing mark, by the defendant, pre-dates
both registration and user of the plaintiff. A Court cannot, by judicial
fiat, grant any additional layer of protection. We are satisfied that
Neon Laboratories, Syed Mohideen and N.R. Dongre, too, have not
done so.
196. The sequitur is plain. In view of the finding, by the Supreme
Court, that PMD had infringed Jain’s registration of the FIELD
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MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, PMD would be liable to be
injuncted against continuing to use the infringing mark.
197. The learned Single Judge has dismissed the suit following her
finding that the registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, initially in favour of Jain and later transferred to
Thukral, was liable to be cancelled.
198. We, however, have not been able to uphold the said decision of
the learned Single Judge, as already noted supra. To our mind, CO
6/1987, by PMD seeking cancellation of the registration of the FIELD
MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, in favour of Thukral, would
have to be dismissed.
199. Mr. Hemant Singh submits that the logical sequitur to
sustaining the registration of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps, originally in favour of Jain and later transferred to
Thukral, would be that the use of the mark by PMD for centrifugal
pumps would be liable to be injuncted, on the ground of infringement.
200. The submission, to our mind, has merit.
201. Section 28(1) of the 1958 TMMA, like Section 28(1) of the
1999 TMA, confers, on the holder of a valid trade mark registration,
the exclusive right to use the mark for the goods or services in respect
of which it is registered, and the right to obtain relief against
infringement. We have already held the registration of the trade mark
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FIELD MARSHAL for centrifugal pumps, as granted to Jain and,
subsequently, to Thukral, to be valid, and the decision of the learned
Single Judge to cancel the said registration not to be legally
sustainable. Thukral would, therefore, consequent on being substituted
as the registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL vide order dated
16 November 1986 with effect from 30 May 1986, be entitled to relief
against infringement, which would occur on the use, by any other
person, of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps.
202. Section 106(1)56 of the 1958 TMMA (parallel to Section 135 of
the 1999 TMA) includes, among the reliefs in cases of infringement,
injunction against continued use of the infringing mark. By
application of this provision, therefore, Thukral would be entitled to
injunct PMD from continuing to use the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps.
203. The learned Single Judge, while dealing with CS (OS)
2408/1985, and PMD’s entitlement to an injunction against Thukral
thereunder, holds that registration is not a defence in a passing off suit.
Equally, however, the accumulation of goodwill, by use of an
infringing mark is not a defence in an infringement action. PMD
cannot, therefore, plead the goodwill that it has earned by use of the
infringing FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps from 1975
56 106.
Reliefs in suits for infringement or for passing off. –
(1)
The relief which a court may grant in any suit for infringement or for passing off referred
to in Section 105 includes an injunction (subject to such terms, if any, as the court thinks fit) and at
the option of the plaintiff, either damages or an account of profits, together with or without any
order for the delivery-up of the infringing labels and marks for destruction or erasure.
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to 1988 as a defence to resist an injunction, once the use of the mark
has been found to be infringing.
204. CS (Comm) 473/2016 would, therefore, have to be decreed, to
the extent it seeks permanent injunction against PMD using the
FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps.
XII. LPA 320/2024 and 325-333/2024
205. PMD filed 10 applications on 16 June 1984 for registering the
mark FIELDMARSHAL in Class 7 for diesel oil engines (not for land
vehicles) and parts thereof, centrifugal pumps, submersible pumps,
electric motors (not for land vehicles), mono block and foot valves in
different regional languages.
206. The Assistant Registrar in the Trade Marks Registry, vide order
dated 12 August 1992, rejected PMD’s applications insofar as they
sought registration of the FIELDMARSHAL mark for goods covered
under Thukral’s pre-exising Registration No. 228867 in class 7 and
held that PMD’s mark could be registered for goods other than those
covered by the above-mentioned registration.
207. The latter part of the order, which held the applications to be
worthy of consideration in respect of goods other than those included
in Thukral’s Registration No. 228867, was never challenged. It does
not, therefore, concern us.
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208. To the extent the Assistant Registrar rejected the 10 applications
of PMD seeking registration of the FIELDMARSHAL mark for goods
included in Thukral’s Registration No. 228867, PMD filed 10 appeals
before the IPAB.
209. All 10 appeals were rejected by the IPAB on 11 February 2005.
210. The orders rejecting the appeals were assailed by PMD by way
of the 10 writ petitions, which stand allowed by the learned Single
Judge.
211. As a result, the learned Single Judge has held PMD to be
entitled to register the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps
in Class 7 in 10 regional languages.
212. Thukral assails the said decision by way of these LPAs.
213. Following our decision that the registration of the FIELD
MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, in favour of Jain with effect
from 13 May 1965, later transferred in the name of Thukral, is valid,
PMD
cannot
be
allowed
to
simultaneously
register
the
FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, in view of Section
12(1) of the 1958 TMMA.
214. As a result, we uphold the impugned order dated 11 February
2005 of the IPAB, dismissing the 10 writ petitions filed by PMD
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challenging the said decision, and set aside the impugned judgment
insofar as it allows the said writ petitions.
XIII. RFA (OS) (Comm) 38/2024
215. This is an appeal by PMD, assailing the judgment of the learned
Single Judge to the extent it rejects PMD’s prayer for rendition of
accounts in CS (OS) 2408/1985.
216. The learned Single Judge has rejected the prayer on the ground
that Thukral had used the FIELD MARSHAL consequent on vacation
of an interim injunction granted vide order dated 19 January 1988 in
CS (OS) 2408/1985.
217. A claim for rendition of accounts has to be supported by
pleadings. The Supreme Court, in K.C. Skaria v. Govt of State of
Kerala57 held thus, with respect to the relief of rendition of accounts:
“17. To summarise, a suit for rendition of accounts can be
maintained only if a person suing has a right to receive an account
from the defendant. Such a right can either be (a) created or
recognised under a statute; or (b) based on the fiduciary
relationship between the parties as in the case of a beneficiary and
a trustee; or (c) claimed in equity when the relationship is such
that rendition of accounts is the only relief which will enable the
person seeking account to satisfactorily assert his legal right. Such
a right to seek accounts cannot be claimed as a matter of
convenience or on the ground of hardship or on the ground that the
person suing did not know the exact amount due to him, as that will
open the floodgates for converting several types of money claims
into suits for accounts, to avoid payment of court fee at the time of
institution.”
(Emphasis supplied)
57 (2006) 2 SCC 285
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Clearly, therefore, a prayer for rendition of accounts cannot be treated
as a matter of course. The plaint has to contain the requisite pleadings
to maintain the prayer.
218. The plaint in CS (OS) 2408/1985 does not, to our mind, contain
these pleadings. All that is stated, in para 11 of the plaint, is that
PMD’s sales ran into several thousands of crores, and that they had
spent enormous amounts in advertising. These averments, by
themselves, could not make out a case for seeking rendition of
accounts.
219. The fact that Thukral was using the FIELDMARSHAL mark
for centrifugal pumps pursuant to interim orders passed by this Court,
too, was a relevant circumstance, and we are in agreement with the
learned Single Judge in her conclusion that no satisfactory case for
directing Thukral to render accounts was made out.
220. No case, therefore, is made out, for us to interfere with the
decision of the learned Single Judge to reject PMD’s prayer for
rendition of accounts.
Our reasons summarized
221. We summarize the reasons for our decision, as under:
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(i)
The Supreme Court, in para 36 of its judgment in
Thukral Mechanical Works, held that PMD, in using the
FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, had infringed
Jain’s registration.
(ii)
The Supreme Court further held that, to question the
validity of the Assignment Deed dated 30 May 1986, in which
case alone could the non-use of the FIELD MARSHAL mark
by Jain be taken into consideration while examining the liability
of Thukral’s registration, of the said mark, to cancellation under
Section 46 of the 1958 TMMA, Jain had to be made a party.
(iii)
PMD applied, to the IPAB, to implead Jain as a party in
CO 6/1987. The application was dismissed. WP (C) 4846/2011,
preferred thereagainst by PMD, was also dismissed vide
judgment dated 9 October 2020, with clear observations to the
effect that the non-user by Jain could not be used to cancel
Thukral’s registration under Section 46. That order was never
challenged, and attained finality.
(iv)
The Supreme Court, too, in its judgment in Thukral
Mechanical Works, held that non-use by Jain of the FIELD
MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps could not be used as a
ground to cancel the registration of the mark in favour of
Thukral.
(v)
The judgment of the learned Single Judge in CO 6/1987,
directing cancellation of the registration of the FIELD
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MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, in favour of Jain and
later transferred to Thukral, is directly contrary to paras 36 and
38 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Thukral
Mechanical Works, as well as the judgment dated 9 October
2020 of this Court in WP (C) 4846/2011.
(vi)
The impugned judgment, insofar as it allows CO 6/1987
and directs cancellation of the registration of the FIELD
MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, in favour of Thukral
or Jain, for that matter, cannot sustain. CO 6/1987 is, therefore,
liable to be dismissed.
(vii) Thukral is entitled, therefore, by virtue of its registration
of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, to
injunct PMD from further use of the mark for centrifugal
pumps, under Section 28(1) of the 1958 TMMA. To that extent,
the decision of the learned Single Judge to dismiss CS (Comm)
473/2016 cannot sustain either. CS (Comm) 473/2016 would,
therefore, be liable to be allowed, to the extent of injuncting
PMD from further using the FIELDMARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps.
(viii) At the same time, the acquisition of goodwill in the
FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, by PMD, from
1975 to 1988, would entitle PMD to injunct Thukral from using
the FIELD MARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, applying
the law laid down in Neon Laboratories. CS (OS) 2408/1985
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would, therefore, be entitled to succeed, and, to that extent, the
impugned judgment has to be upheld.
(ix)
For the reasons set out in paras 180 to 196 supra, we are
of the opinion that PMD cannot escape such an injunction on
the ground of the goodwill earned by it from 1975 to 1985, or
even under Section 27(2) of the 1958 TMMA.
Protection
against injunction would have been available, applying Neon
Laboratories, S. Syed Mohideen and N.R. Dongre, had Section
33 applied. As, however, the user of the FIELD MARSHAL
mark by PMD for centrifugal pumps is of 1975 vintage, much
after the registration of the mark in favour of Jain, Section 33
does not come to PMD’s aid.
(x)
CS (Comm) 473/2016 would, therefore, have to be
allowed, and the decision of the learned Single Judge, to the
contrary, cannot sustain.
(xi)
The impugned judgment, insofar as it allows the 10 writ
petitions filed by PMD, would have to be set aside as, once the
1965 registration of Jain, and the 1986 substitution of Thukral
as the registered proprietor of the FIELD MARSHAL mark for
centrifugal pumps is upheld, the simultaneous registration of
the mark in favour of PMD for centrifugal pumps, from a later
date, would infract Section 12(1) of the 1958 TMMA.
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Conclusion
222. Resultantly, in the above terms and to the above extent,
(i)
LPA 324/2024 is allowed and CO 6/1987 is dismissed,
(ii)
RFA (OS) 13/2024, is dismissed, and the impugned
judgment, insofar as it allows CS (OS) 2408/1985, is upheld,
(iii)
RFA (OS) 38/2024 is dismissed,
(iv)
RFA (OS) (Comm) 11/2024, as well as CS (Comm)
473/2016, from which it emanates, are allowed, to the extent
that PMD would also stand permanently injuncted from further
use of the FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps, and
(v)
LPA 320/2014, LPA 325/2024 to LPA 333/2024 are
allowed, and the writ petitions from which they arise are
dismissed, to the extent they relate to the entitlement of PMD to
obtain registrations, in various regional languages, of the
FIELDMARSHAL mark for centrifugal pumps.
223. There shall be no orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
FEBRUARY 06, 2026/aky/dsn/yg
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