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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%
Reserved on:
1st September, 2022
Pronounced on: 11th November, 2022
+
W.P.(C) 5570/2012, CM APPL. 40319/2019, CM APPL.
29200/2022, CM APPL. 32530/2022, CM APPL. 33610/2022 &
CM APPL. 38344/2022
P.K.JAIN
..... Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Arun Bhardwaj, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Nikhil Bhardwaj, Mr.
Abhishek Sharma and Ms.
Gauraan Advocates alongwith
petitioner.
versus
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION AND ANR ..... Respondents
Through:
Mr. Neeraj Bansal, Advocate for
GNCTD.
Mr. R.K. Saini and Mr. Sunil
Beniwal, Advocates for R-2.
CORAM:
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDRA DHARI SINGH
JUDGMENT
CHANDRA DHARI SINGH, J.
1.
The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
has been filed on behalf of Mukherjee Memorial Senior Secondary
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School, through its Principal P.K. Jain, praying for inter alia the
following reliefs:“i) Issue writ, order or direction in the nature of
certiorari quashing and set aside the impugned order
dated 9.8.2012 passed in Appeal No. 51/2011 may
kindly be quashed and set aside and the appeal filed
by the respondent No. 2 before the School Tribunal
may be dismissed with costs.
ii) Cost of the proceedings be awarded in favour of
the Petitioner and against the Respondents.”
FACTUAL MATRIX
2.
A perusal of the record reveals that the following course of events
culminated into the controversy in the instant matter before this Court:a.
The petitioner School appointed respondent no. 2, as TGT
(Mathematics) on 8th July 2008, along with 17 other appointees, in
the pay scale of Rs. 5500-9000. Respondent no. 2, accordingly,
joined his services with the petitioner School on 14th July 2008.
b.
The appointment letter of the newly appointed teachers
mentioned that their appointment was subject to two years‟
probation. The appointment letter also stated that after completion
of two years‟ satisfactory service, the services of the appointee
shall be confirmed.
c.
During the course of his probation, the respondent no. 2 was
issued various letters and memos for his misconduct and
unsatisfactory performance in the School. Pursuant to such memos,
the Management Committee of the petitioner School decided to
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extent the probation period of the respondent no. 2 for a further
period of six months, i.e., till 31st December 2010 after expiry of
the two years‟ probation period. The respondent no. 2 was also
intimated that he and his performance during the extended
probation period would be under scrutiny.
d.
On 30th August 2010, the respondent no. 2 was issued a
Show Cause Notice to explain his unsatisfactory work and conduct.
A subsequent memo was also issued to him on 9th September 2010
and a reply to the same was submitted by him. Thereafter, on 27 th
December 2010, the Management Committee of the School
decided to extend the probation period of respondent no. 2 for
further six months, i.e., till 30th June 2011.
e.
Another memo and a subsequent reminder were issued to
respondent no. 2 on 7th May 2011 and 14th June 2011, respectively,
seeking explanation of his behavior when he failed to go to a class
despite being present in the School and where students got into a
fight leading up to the matter being reported to the Police Station
Seemapuri. Again, the probation period of the respondent no. 2 was
extended for six months, i.e., till 31st December 2011.
f.
On 7th October 2011, the respondent no. 2 was ultimately
terminated from his services upon his overall performance and
conduct being found unsatisfactory.
g.
Against the order of removal from service, the respondent
no. 2 filed an Appeal bearing no. 51/2011 with the Delhi School
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Tribunal, where vide order dated 9th August 2012 while allowing
his Appeal, the Tribunal quashed the order of termination of
services and directed the School to reinstate the respondent no. 2
with all consequential benefits as well as 50% back wages.
3.
The petitioner, by way of filing the instant appeal, has assailed the
said order passed in Appeal No. 51/2011 dated 9th August 2011.
SUBMISSIONS
4.
Mr. Arun Bhardwaj, learned senior advocate appearing on behalf
of the petitioner School submitted that the letter of appointment issued to
the respondent no. 2 mentioned that his appointment would be subject to
a two-year probation period and being satisfied of his performance his
services would be confirmed. It is submitted that since the performance
and conduct of the respondent no. 2 was found unsatisfactory, he was
given the opportunity to improve and therefore, his probation period was
expressly extended three times. After giving him ample opportunities to
improve, his services were ultimately terminated. Moreover, there was no
challenge to the extension of probation period on behalf of the respondent
no. 2.
5.
It is submitted that the following memos were issued to the
respondent no. 2 during the course of his employment with the petitioner
School:a.
1st April 2009 – for misbehaving with a teacher and going to
his class very late.
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b.
23rd April 2009 – for giving an opportunity to reform himself
on the recommendation of the Disciplinary Authority.
c.
2nd May 2009 – for seeking explanation after being
counseled.
d.
9th November 2009 – for not going to his class and because
of him habitually being late for classes and often not even going to
them.
e.
17th November 2009 – for not being able to control a chaotic
class.
f.
7th January 2010 – for improving the atmosphere of the
school and discipline in his class and to also be punctual.
g.
30th August 2010 – for intimating respondent no. 2 that his
work and conduct was not satisfactory.
h.
9th September 2010 – seeking explanation for checking only
two copies in one day.
i.
14th September 2010 – for advising the respondent no. 2 to
refrain from unnecessary verbose.
6.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that Rule 105
of the Delhi School Education Act and Rules, 1973 (hereinafter
“DSEAR”) provides that the period of probation on initial appointment
shall be one year which may be extended and the service of employee
may be terminated without notice during the period of probation, if the
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work and conduct of the employee during the said period is not
satisfactory. This Rule also provides that an employee shall be confirmed
only if the work and conduct of an employee during the period of
probation is found to be satisfactory. It is submitted that Tribunal fell into
an error in holding in para 7 of the impugned judgment while observing
that, “initially, the period of probation is one year and the same may be
extended by another year. In such cases, the maximum period of
probation is only of two years and beyond this period, it is not
permissible to extend the probation.” This is an erroneous view since
upper limit of two years has not been fixed by the DSEAR.
7.
Learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner
submitted that the Tribunal while passing the impugned order erred in
holding that after the expiry of the maximum period of probation, the
respondent‟s services were deemed to be confirmed. It is wrongly
concurred that termination order could be passed only before the expiry
of total period of probation of two years. It is submitted that there is no
principle of confirmation in the eyes of law and an employee can be said
to be confirmed only when a specific order of confirmation has been
issued by the employer.
8.
It is submitted that 22nd February 2011, the petitioner School had
sought approval of the Director of Education seeking termination of the
period of probation from the Directorate, which was never replied to. The
petitioner School cannot be forced to keep an employee who is not
suitable for his post to continue as such against the interest of the
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students. The said action of termination was not punitive but was taken
when the respondent no. 2 was found to be not unfit for the post of TGT
(Mathematics).
9.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner School has lost complete faith in respondent no. 2 and
therefore, he cannot be reinstated in the services. Reliance has been
placed upon the judgment of State Bank of Travancore vs. Prem Singh,
2019 SCC OnLine Del 8258, to submit that when an employee acts in a
manner by which the management loses confidence in him, his
reinstatement cannot be ordered because it would neither be desirable nor
expedient to continue the employee in service. It may also be detrimental
to the discipline or security of the establishment. In case of loss of
confidence, only compensation can be awarded. Reliance has also been
placed on Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School vs. J.A.J.
Vasu Sena., (2019) 17 SCC 157, where the employee who had worked
for 5 years was compensated with Rs. 5,00,000/- and therefore, the
learned senior counsel for the petitioner submitted that in the instant
petition as well the respondent no. 2 may be granted such monetary
compensation to the tune of Rs. 3,00,000/- for working for 3 years with
the petitioner School.
10.
Placing reliance on Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial (Supra) the
learned senior counsel also submitted that there was no deemed
confirmation of the services of the respondent no. 2 since no confirmation
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order was passed after his services were found unsatisfactory. The
relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced hereunder:“56. The first respondent was continued as a
probationer for nearly five years in contravention of
Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules as well as the
appointment letter dated 18-6-2008. There was no
order of confirmation. Though the first respondent
cannot claim a deemed confirmation of service
without the issuance of an order of confirmation, the
power of this Court to do complete justice under
Article 142 of the Constitution must be invoked in an
appropriate manner. While there can be no deemed
confirmation in the favour of the first respondent, the
relief can be suitably moulded by an award of ex
gratia compensation. A teacher who has spent five
valuable years of her life and may now be overaged
to get suitable employment elsewhere must not be left
in the lurch. A management which has defied the law
must be put to terms, which we propose to do under
Article 142.
57. We hold and declare that:
57.1. The words "by another year" in Rule
105(1) of the 1973 Rules stipulate that the
maximum period of probation permissible is
two years. The limit equally applies to
minority institutions covered by the first
proviso to Rule 105.
57.2. Rule 105(2) stipulates a condition
precedent to the issuance of an order of
confirmation. The continuation of the services
of a probationer beyond the period of
probation does not amount to a deemed
confirmation of service. It is only upon the
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issuance of an order of confirmation by the
appointing authority that a probationer is
confirmed in service.
58. We direct, in the exercise of the jurisdiction of
this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, that
the appellants shall pay over to the first respondent a
sum of INR 5,00,000 within a period of four weeks
from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this
order, failing which the amount shall carry an
interest of 9% p.a. till the date of realisation.”
11.
It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that during the period of
probation the performance and conduct of the respondent no. 2 was under
watch by the petitioner being the employer in so far as the
petitioner/employer is the most suited entity to determine the satisfactory
performance of the employee. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner
has relied upon the judgment of St. Thomas School vs. Manish Kaushik,
W.P. (C) 1264/2016 dated 13th April 2017. It is submitted that the
appointment letter itself stipulated the condition that on being satisfied
with the services of the respondent no. 2, his services would be confirmed
and from the very beginning the conduct and performance of the
respondent no. 2 was not satisfactory, therefore, his services were
terminated during the extended probation period.
12.
It is further stated on behalf of the petitioner that departmental
inquiry is not required for termination during probation period for which
he has relied upon the judgments of Muir Mills Unit of NTC (UP) Ltd.
vs. Swayam Prakash Srivastava, (2007) 1 SCC 491 and Hem Singh vs.
Director of Education, W.P. (C) 5788/2011 dated 26th August 2013.
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13.
Learned senior counsel for the petitioner School had duly informed
the Directorate of Education at every stage and representative of the
Directorate of Education was present at every relevant meeting with
respect to Respondent teacher‟s service and the Directorate of Education
knew that the respondent no.2‟s work and conduct was not satisfactory. It
is submitted that despite repeated reminders despite repeated reminders
from the petitioner, no response was received from the Directorate of
Education.
14.
Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned order be set aside.
15.
Per Contra, Mr. Neeraj Bansal, learned counsel for GNCTD and
Mr. R.K. Saini, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no.2
vehemently opposed the instant petition and submitted that there is no
error or illegality in the order passed by the Tribunal.
16.
It is submitted on behalf of the respondent no. 2 that there is no
provision of law which provides for initial probation and extension
thereof. A maximum period for such extension is provided beyond which
it is not permissible to extent the probation and inference in such cases is
that the officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed upon the
expiry of maximum period of probation in case before its expiry the order
of termination has not been passed. It is submitted that the appointment
letter stipulated that upon completion of two years‟ probation, the
services of the respondent no. 2 shall be confirmed and therefore, after
successfully completing the maximum period of probation of two years in
terms of appointment letter on 13th July 2010, which also is the maximum
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period of probation as provided under Rule 105 of DSEAR, the services
of the respondent no. 2 stood confirmed. Therefore, the order of
termination of services of respondent no. 2 passed on 7th October 2012,
treating him as a probationer, was misconceived and without jurisdiction.
17.
It is further submitted that being a private aided school, the
petitioner School was required to seek approval of the Directorate of
Education for termination of services of an employee as per Rule 120 (2)
of the DSEAR. However, no such approval was ever received by the
petitioner.
18.
It is submitted by the learned counsel that the termination order
was passed based on the conduct of the respondent no. 2, however, no
domestic enquiry was carried out by the petitioner School at any point of
time during his tenure. The petitioner School was bound to issue notice,
invite reply, hold enquiry and then take the final decision regarding the
employment of the respondent no. 2. Therefore, the termination was
ordered without following the due process of law and against the
principles of natural justice.
19.
It is submitted on behalf of the respondent no. 2 that the order
dated 9th August 2012 passed by the Tribunal, reinstating the petitioner
with consequential benefits, clearly reveals that all the relevant factors
were taken into consideration while passing a well-reasoned order
without any legal infirmities and same is not liable be interfered by way
of the instant writ petition.
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20.
Heard learned counsel for the parties at length. This Court has
perused the record, including the impugned order dated 9th August 2012.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
21.
The petitioner School has approached this Court aggrieved by the
decision of the Delhi School Tribunal dated 9th August 2012 in Appeal
No. 51/2011 whereby the respondent no. 2 to the order passed by the
petitioner School terminating his services was set aside and he was
directed to be reinstated. The limited question before this Court is
whether the order passed by the Tribunal suffered from any illegality or
error apparent on the face of record.
22.
To adjudicate upon the impugned order dated 9 th August 2012, it is
deemed significant to reproduce the relevant contents of the operative
decision passed by the Tribunal:“6. Now the question arises as to whether the
acceptance of the Appointment letter stipulating the
period of probation as two years is binding upon the
Appellant. It is an established law that an agreement
between two parties cannot be against the statute.
Rule 105 of the Rules provides for a period of
probation of one year only. Even if the letter of
appointment provided for a period of two years, it
cannot prevail upon the statutory provisions of Rules
105 of the Rules. Obviously the period of probation
has to be governed by Rule 105 of the Rules which
provided that the initial appointment of an employee
shall be for a period of one year. The objection thus
raised by the Respondent School is devoid of merits.
The same is hence dismissed.
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8.
Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has dealt with the
issue of 'deemed confirmation' at length in the case
of Dy. Director of Education vs. Veena Sharma, 175
(2010) DLT 311 (DB). The Hon'ble High Court
noticed the case of High Court of Madhya Pradesh
through Registrar and Others vs. Satya Narayan
Jhavar, AIR (2001) SC 3234 where Apex Court had
observed as under:
"The question of deemed confirmation in
service Jurisprudence, which is
dependent upon the language of the
relevant service rules, has been the
subject matter of consideration before
this Court, times without number in
various decisions and there are three
lines of cases on this point. One line of
cases is where in the service rules or in
the letter of appointment a period of
probation is specified and power to
extend the same is also conferred upon
the authority without prescribing any
maximum period of probation and if the
officer is continued beyond the
prescribed or extended period, he
cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In
such cases there is no bar against
termination at any point of time after
expiry of the period of probation. The
other line of cases is that where while
there is a provision the rules for initial
probation and extension thereof, a
maximum period for such extension is
also provided beyond which it is not
permissible to extend probation. The
inference in such cases is that the officer
concerned is deemed to have been
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confirmed upon expiry of the maximum
period of probation in case before its
expiry the order, of termination has not
been passed. The last line of cases is
where, though under the rules maximum
period of probation is prescribed, but
the same requires a specific act on the
part of the employer by issuing an order
of confirmation and of passing a test for
the purposes of confirmation. In such
cases, even if the maximum period of
probation has expired and neither any
order of confirmation has been passed
nor has the person concerned passed the
requisite test, he cannot be deemed to
have been confirmed merely because the
said period has expired."
9.
Perusal of the abovesaid legal position shows
that the cases of employees/ teachers under Act and
Rules fall in the second category referred to above.
As per provisions of Rule 105 of the Act & Rules,
initially the period of probation is one year but the
same may be extended by another year. In such cases
the maximum period of probation is only of two
years. Beyond this period, it is not permissible to
extend the probation. The concept of 'deemed
confirmation' comes into play upon expiry of the
maximum period of probation. In other words, an
order of termination can be passed before the expiry
of the total period of probation of two years.
10. In view of the law discussed above, once an
employee appointed under Delhi School Education
Act & Rules-1973 is deemed to have been confirmed
upon expiry of maximum period of probation of two
years, the question of any further extension in the
period of probation (beyond two years) of services
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does not arise. All the abovesaid extensions in the
period of probation in the present case, therefore,
are illegal unjustifiable and bad in the eyes of law
even if such letters were accepted by the Appellant
without any objection.
11. The Appellant completed two years of period of
probation on 13.07.2010 and no letter terminating
his services prior to this date was issued to him.
Admittedly, the Respondent School did not obtain the
prior approval of the Director of Education while
extending the periods of probation. Perusal of
proviso 105 of the Rules reproduced above shows
that a prior approval of the Director of Education is
required for extending the period of probation of an
employee by another year (employee having been
placed on probation on initial appointment for a
period of one year). Similarly proviso ii to Rule 105
of the Rules reproduced above provides for seeking
prior approval of the Director of Education in
terminating the services of an employee on
probation. Assuming for the sake of arguments that
the Appellant was on probation on 07.10.2011 i.e.
the date on which his services were terminated,
matter required a prior approval of the Director of
Education. No approval of the Director of Education
was admittedly sought by the Respondent School.
12. A careful perusal of the impugned orders shows
that the Respondent School not only referred to the
'unsatisfactory performance' but also referred to the
'conduct' of the Appellant. The impugned orders
when it refers to the 'conduct' of the Appellant as the
basis for terminating the services, it clearly casts a
stigma on him. In such a case, the services could not
have been terminated without conducting a domestic
inquiry. I place reliance upon the case of Dipti
Prakash Banerjee vs. Satyendra Nath Bose
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National Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta and
Others, (1999) 3 SCC 60.
13. In view of the reasons given above, I am of the
considered opinion that the impugned orders are bad
in the eyes of law. The same are hence set aside. The
Appellant is directed to be reinstated in service with
all consequential benefits. The Appellant is entitled
to back-wages @50%. The Appellant will be paid full
salary and other allowances from today till he is
reinstated in service by the Respondent School.
Appellant shall be entitled to simple interest @8%
per annum on the arrears of back-wages in case the
same are not paid within a period of two months
from today. The appeal is accordingly disposed of.
……”
23.
A part of the preliminary arguments on behalf of the respondent no.
2, before this Court as well as before the Tribunal is that the probationary
period of two years and its extension thereof by the petitioner was not in
accordance with law.
24.
The law regarding probation is clear and has been reiterated by the
Division Benches of this Court as well as by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
Being an appointee of a private recognized aided school, the services of
respondent no. 2 are governed by the Delhi School Education Act and
Rules, 1973, as per Rule 4 (f). The DSEAR makes provision for the
probationary period of an employee under its Rule 105, which is
reproduced hereunder:“105. Probation (1) Every employee shall, on initial
appointment, be on probation for a period of one
year which may be extended by the appointing
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authority [with the prior approval of the Director]
and the services of an employee may be terminated
without notice during the period of probation if the
work, and conduct of the employee, during the said
period, is not, in the opinion of the appointing
authority, satisfactory:
[Provided that the provisions of this sub-rule
relating to the prior approval of the Director in
regard to the extension of the period of probation by
another year, shall not apply in the case of an
employee of a minority school:
Provided further that no termination from the
service of an employee on probation shall be made
by a school, other than a minority school, except with
the previous approval of the Director.]
(2) If the work and conduct of an employee during
the period of probation is found to be satisfactory, he
shall be on the expiry of the period of probation or
the extended period of probation as the case may be,
confirmed with effect from the date of expiry of the
said period.
(3) Nothing in this rule shall apply to an employee
who has been appointed to fill a temporary vacancy
or any vacancy for a limited period.
25.
The DSEAR stand amended by the amendment of 1990 which
made significant changes to the provision in question. The words „prior
approval or the Director‟ as well as the two provisos to the Rule were
added by way of this amendment. Therefore, there is no doubt to the fact
that prior to the amendment of 1990, the appointing authority held the
absolute power to extend the period of probation as it deemed fit and for
as long as it willed. However, the powers are now subject to the approval
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of the Director of Education, as defined under Section 2 (g) of the Delhi
School Education Act, 1973.
26.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court makes observation with respect to the
question being adjudicated by this Court qua the requirement for
guidelines to be borne in mind while granting and extending probation
period in the judgment of Durgabhai Deshmukh (Supra) as follows:“51. In the present case, the first respondent served
as a probationer for nearly five years. Rule 105(1)
permits the appointing authority to extend the period
of probation with the prior permission of the
Director. The proviso stipulates that no prior
approval of the Director is required for the extension
of the probationary period by the appointing
authority of a minority institution. The amending
history of the provision shows that prior to the
amendment in 1990, no prior approval of the
Director was required. By virtue of the amending
Rules, 1990 the prior approval of the Director was
made mandatory, save and except for extensions in
the case of minority institutions, for the grant of any
extension in the probationary period. The absolute
discretion vested with the appointing authority of an
institution was made subject to the prior approval of
the Director.
52. The power vested in the Director serves as a
check on the absolute discretion of the appointing
authority to extend the probationary period. The
power vested in the Director, however, to approve a
request of the appointing authority is not unbridled.
Rule 105(1) stipulates that the services of a
probationer may be terminated without notice during
the period of probation where the services of the
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probationer are not "in the opinion of the appointing
authority, satisfactory". Rule 105(2) stipulates that
an order of confirmation may be issued if, in the
opinion of the appointing authority, the performance
of the probationer is satisfactory. The discretion of
the Director must be exercised objectively on the
basis of the material produced by the appointing
authority bearing on the performance of a
probationer.
53. The prior approval of the Director, save and
except for minority institutions, is mandatory and
must be complied with as a condition precedent for
the valid exercise of the power to extend the period
of probation. The Director is required to assess the
determination of the appointing authority and based
on that assessment, to decide whether to approve an
extension of the probationary period. The provision
which mandates that the prior approval of the
Director shall be sought before extending the period
of probation ensures that the appointing authority
may not extend the probationary period without
legitimate reason. The extension of the probationary
period by the appointing authority, save and except
for minority institutions, without the prior approval
of the Director is impermissible in law.”
27.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Durgabhai Deshmukh (Supra) has
also categorically settled the position regarding maximum period
permissible for keeping the employee on probation and has held as
follows:“23. Rule 105(1) of the 1973 Rules mandates that
every employee shall be appointed on probation for a
period of one year. The appointing authority may
extend the period of probation "by another year"
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with the prior approval of the Director. Rule 105(1)
also stipulates that if the work and conduct of the
probationer during the probationary period is found
unsatisfactory, the appointing authority may, without
notice, discharge the probationer from service. The
first proviso to Rule 105(1) stipulates that where the
appointing authority of a minority institution extends
the probationary period "by another year", the prior
approval of the Director shall not be required. This
Court is required to construe whether the words "by
another year" appearing in Rule 105(1) and the first
proviso of Rule 105 imply one additional year, or
one year at a time without any limit.
xxxxxxxxxx
25. The consistent meaning imparted to the word
"another" is a single addition or one more. The
ordinary and literal construction of the words
"another" read with the words "for a period of one
year" in Rule 105(1) implies that the appointing
authority may extend the period of probation by one
additional year. The contention that the words "by
another year" imply that the appointing authority
can extend the period of probation by one year at a
time without any limit cannot be accepted as this
would amount to rewriting the provision by
substituting the words "by another year" with the
words "by one year at a time", which is
impermissible in law. Further, had the delegate of
the legislature intended that there is no limit on the
permissible probationary period, the words "by
another year" would have been omitted.
26. The words of a statute should be understood in
the sense in which they best harmonise with the
subject of the enactment and the object which the
legislature has in view. This principle should be a
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useful guide in interpreting the provisions of
delegated legislation in this case, namely, Rule 105.
The purpose of probation is to enable an assessment
to be made of the performance of an employee. It
serves as an opportunity for probationers to establish
by the dint of their work which is rendered during the
period of probation, that they are suitable for being
retained in service. On the part of the employer,
probation enables the appointing authority to
determine the suitability of the probationer for
retention in service.
27. The limit placed on the permissible extension of
the probationary period draws a balance between the
opportunity that must be afforded to a probationer to
modify and improve the quality of service and a
mandate that the appointing authority of an
educational institute hires qualified teachers. To
impart a meaning to the words "by another year"
that the appointing authority may extend the
probationary period one year at a time without a
limit will allow an appointing authority to extend the
probationary period, with the prior approval of the
Director, of a probationer ad nauseum. This would
allow an appointing authority to convert a period of
probation, which serves the limited and time bound
purpose of ascertaining suitability, into a temporary
appointment and defeat the purpose of probationary
service in educational institutions. Though the
legislature or the delegated authority is empowered
in a given case to stipulate that there is no bar on the
period of probation, the interpretation that we have
adopted is supported by the words of Rule 105(1)
and the ordinary meaning imparted to the word
"another".
28. The plain reading of the words "by another year"
implies that the appointing authority of an institution
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may extend the period of probation by one additional
year over and above the mandatory year of
probation with the prior approval of the Director.
Rule 105(1) of the 1973 Rules therefore stipulates a
limitation on the total probationary period to two
years.
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54. Rule 105(1) of the 1973 Rules, by stipulating a
maximum permissible period of probation of two
years, draws a balance between the interests of the
appointing authority in extending the period of
probation to ensure the quality of education and the
interests of probationers in their services not being
extended on probation ad nauseum. The continuation
of the services of a probationer beyond the period
permissible under the 1973 Rules defeats the salutary
purpose underlying the limit stipulated on the period
of extension that may be effected in the probationary
period. Upon the expiry of the period of probation,
the appointing authority is required by law to either
confirm the services of the probationer or terminate
their services. The continuation of the services of a
probationer by the appointing authority under Rule
105 of the 1973 Rules beyond the maximum
permissible period of probation, constitutes a
violation of law. Though as we have held, there is no
provision for deemed confirmation, the conduct of
the management may result in other consequences,
including a decision in regard to whether the
recognition of a school which consistently violates
the law should be withdrawn.
57. We hold and declare that:
57.1. The words "by another year" in Rule 105(1) of
the 1973 Rules stipulate that the maximum period of
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probation permissible is two years. The limit equally
applies to minority institutions covered by the first
proviso to Rule 105. …..
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59. We affirm the view of the Delhi High Court to the
extent that the maximum permissible period of
probation under Rule 105 of the 1973 Rules is two
years, although for the reasons that we have
indicated above. .….”
28.
The principal provision under Rule 105 provides for an initial
probation period of one year and, with the proviso, confers the power to
the appointing authority to extend the probation period. This power is
also subject to the condition that the period of probation may be extended
by „another year‟ with the prior approval of the Director. The debate
before this Court as well as the Hon‟ble Supreme Court has been whether
there is a maximum period prescribed under the Rule 105 for which an
employee can be continued on probation. The aforesaid judgement of
Durgabhai Deshmukh (Supra) clarifies the position. The legislature, by
way of Rule 105 of the DSEAR, sought to offer a protection to the
employees kept on probation indefinitely on the ground of unsatisfactory
performance. A balance was also sought to be brought about by keeping a
check on the appointing authority. Therefore, the intention of the
legislature as well as a bare reading of the Rule, which has also been
interpreted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, clarifies that there is a limit to
the period for which an employee may be kept on probation under the
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DSEAR. The mandate is for an initial year of probation with a subsequent
year of extension of services with the prior approval of the Director.
29.
It is also evident from the above observations of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court that the approval of the Director is a condition which
cannot be dispensed with if the appointing authority is seeking to extend
the period of probation of an appointee. The condition acts as a safeguard
against the absolute powers of the appointing authority and also as a
protective measure for the probationary employees ensuring that their
services are not kept under watch in the garb of probation unreasonably
and without following the due process of law.
30.
In the case at hand, admittedly, after completion of two years of
service of the respondent no. 2, neither any confirmation of services nor
any termination of services order was passed by the petitioner but the
period of probation of the petitioner was extended by virtue of three
subsequent orders extending the period thereof. The petitioner School
sought to extend the probation period of respondent no. 2 when his
conduct and performance was found unsatisfactory. This extension was
granted three times for a period of six months each, however, at no
occasion was the approval of Director had been obtained by the School.
Since, the provision in its bare language mandates the approval of the
Director for extension of probation period and the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has also reiterated the necessity of such an approval, an action of
the petitioner School extending the period of probation of respondent no.
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2 failing to comply with this substantial condition cannot be said to be an
action taken in accordance with law.
31.
However, the peculiar facts and circumstances of the instant
petition, also suggest that the teacher whose probation and its extension
thereof is in consideration, i.e., respondent no. 2, had acted in defiance of
the conduct and standard norms and practices of its employer, i.e., the
petitioner. Accordingly, as the table as placed before indicated, there
were several memos and letters issued to him intimating him about such
defiance and also granting him an opportunity to mend his ways. The
extension of period of probation of the respondent no. 2 was also such
opportunity granted to him not once but three times to improve his
performance and match the quality expected by the petitioner to ensure
welfare of the students and suit their best interest. The extensions were
not an affirmation of his performance but were chances given to the
respondent no. 2 to act in such a manner that would enable the
confirmation of his services. Yet, as per the record, it is evident that the
respondent no. 2 did not mend his ways and continued to act in defiance
and could not deliver the quality of teaching that was reasonably expected
from him. Therefore, an extension of probation period by the petitioner
could not have been said to be an absolute confirmation of services but
was only an opportunity to an employee to keep working at his job.
32.
The question, at this juncture, which arises and falls for
consideration and adjudication by this Court is that considering the
probation to be extended wrongly, whether the services of the petitioner
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were deemed to be confirmed after the initial probation period, as per the
appointment letter and also in accordance with the provision under Rule
105 of the DSEAR, of two years ended.
33.
The respondent no. 2 was appointed by the petitioner School vide
appointment letter dated 8th July 2008, which is appended as Annexure P2 to the petition. The appointment of respondent no. 2 was subject to two
years‟ probation. The condition of the appointment letter prescribing the
period of probation is reproduced hereunder:“The appointment is subject to two years probation.
After completing two years satisfactory service, the
service shall be confirmed and benefit of Provident
Fund shall be started in accordance with rules.”
34.
This probation period prescribed in the appointment letter also
stipulated a condition that on completing two years‟ satisfactory services,
the services shall be confirmed. A perusal of the record reveals that
respondent no. 2 joined the services on 14th July 2008, which means that
his officially stipulated probation period ended on 14 th July 2010,
whereafter, the School was to either confirm his appointment, upon being
satisfied of his performance, or terminate his services in accordance with
law. However, the petitioner School, did not take either course of actions
and availed a third option, extending the period of probation of the
respondent no. 2 for further six months at first, and subsequently, two
more extensions were afforded by the petitioner. While the respondent
before the Delhi School Tribunal argued that his case was squarely
covered by the principle of deemed confirmation, the petitioner argued
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the contrary. To this effect, in the impugned order, the Tribunal observed
in the favour of the respondent no. 2.
35.
The principle of deemed confirmation does not find its mention in
the statute of DSEAR, but has been interpreted time and again by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court. The sum and substance of the principle is that it
confers entitlement to probationary employee to seek deemed
confirmation of services upon completion of their probationary period in
the absence of any notice of confirmation or termination of their services.
However, this principle also has limitations and conditions guiding its
implementation to ascertain as to at what stage and under what conditions
would the entitlement arise.
36.
The primary guidelines and directions to this question that have
been relied upon time and again were made in the landmark judgment of
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in High Court Madhya Pradesh and Ors. vs.
Satya Narain Jhavar, (2001) 7 SCC 161. The relevant contents of the
said judgment are reproduced hereunder:“11. The question of deemed confirmation in service
jurisprudence, which is dependent upon the language
of the relevant service rules, has been the subjectmatter of consideration before this Court, times
without number in various decisions and there are
three lines of cases on this point. One line of cases is
where in the service rules or in the letter of
appointment a period of probation is specified and
power to extend the same is also conferred upon the
authority without prescribing any maximum period
of probation and if the officer is continued beyond
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the prescribed or extended period, he cannot be
deemed to be confirmed. In such cases there is no
bar against termination at any point of time after
expiry of the period of probation. The other line of
cases is that where while there is a provision in the
rules for initial probation and extension thereof, a
maximum period for such extension is also provided
beyond which it is not permissible to extend
probation. The inference in such cases is that the
officer concerned is deemed to have been confirmed
upon expiry of the maximum period of probation in
case before its expiry the order of termination has
not been passed. The last line of cases is where,
though under the rules maximum period of probation
is prescribed, but the same requires a specific act on
the part of the employer by issuing an order of
confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of
confirmation. In such cases, even if the maximum
period of probation has expired and neither any
order of confirmation has been passed nor has the
person concerned passed the requisite test, he cannot
be deemed to have been confirmed merely because
the said period has expired.”
37.
Hence, the three situations that are probable to arise are the ones
enumerated above and are referred to hereafter to examine whether the
services of the respondent no. 2 were deemed to be confirmed. First, is
the category of cases where the appointment letter or the respective
service rules specify a period of probation alongwith the power of
extending the same but there is no mention of any maximum period of
probation. Second, are the cases consisting of those where there is a
provision for an initial period of probation and a provision for extension
of this period as well, however, a maximum period for extension is
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provided beyond which the probation period may not be extended. And
finally, third, is the category which comprises of instances where
although under the rules, a maximum period of probation is prescribed,
but the same requires a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing
an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of
confirmation. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court categorically states that only
the cases of services falling under the second category shall be deemed to
be confirmed when the maximum prescribed period of probation ends.
38.
In Kasturi Ram International School and Anr. vs. Directorate of
Education and Anr., LPA 457/2012 decided on 14th October 2015, the
following was observed by a Division Bench of this Court qua Rule 105
of the DSEAR and deemed confirmation of services:“8. Admittedly no order confirming the service of
Ms.Upma Saxena as Principal has been passed. The
law on deemed confirmation of a probationer is
settled and noted in the decision reported as 2001(7)
SCC 161 High Court of MP Vs.Satya Narayan
Jhavar followed by the Supreme Court in the
decision reported as (2005) 13 SCC 179 Rajender
Singh Chauhan & Ors. Vs.State of Haryana & Ors.
Three situations result in two different results is the
ratio which can be culled out from the said two
decisions. Situation one is where in the service rules
or in the letter of appointment a period of probation
is specified with a power to extend the same without
prescribing any maximum period of probation and
no order is passed confirming the probationer. The
second situation is where the rules for initial
probation and extension thereof provide a maximum
period it is not permissible to extend the probation.
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The third is where the rules prescribe a maximum
period of probation but also require a specific act on
the part of the employer to issue an order confirming
the appointment. It was held that cases falling under
situation one or three cannot be treated as a case of
deemed confirmation. Only under situation two
would it be treated as a case of deemed
confirmation.
9. The logic of the reasoning is clear. If, as in
situation two a maximum period for probation is
provided with a negative stipulation that beyond said
period probation cannot continue, it follows
automatically that if the probation continues beyond
the maximum period it has to be treated as a case of
deemed confirmation for the reason the negative
stipulation prohibiting continuation of probation
beyond the maximum period prescribed must take its
effect.
10. Rule 105 DSE Rules cannot be interpreted to be
imbibing the concept of deemed confirmation in the
absence of any specific stipulation on the said count.
This has already been held by this Court in the
decision reported as 222 (2015) DLT 157 Jai
Prakash vs. School Management of ITL Public
School & Anr.”
39.
Further, another Division Bench of this Court in Mitul Goel vs.
Food Corporation of India and Others, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 1773,
also expressed a similar opinion while adjudicating an issue where the
appellant was discharged from services on the ground of not being able to
complete his probation period satisfactorily observing as under:“12. Therefore, there cannot be any disagreement on
the proposition of law that there cannot be any
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automatic confirmation on the expiry of the period of
probation. The terms of the appointment or the
recruitment rules have to be examined to come to the
correct conclusion. Since the relevant clause in the
letter of appointment stipulates an affirmative and
positive act on the part of the employer to confirm
the probationer, we cannot hold that the appellant
was confirmed by way of implication, as there is no
order confirming him on the said post. …”
The Bench referred to the judgment of Medical Council of India
vs. Sangeeta Sharma and Another, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8276,
wherein the following was observed:“19. In Head Master, Lawrence School, Lovedale
(supra), the respondent/probationer was appointed
on the post of a Mistress in the Petitioner School. It
was stipulated in her letter of appointment that she
would be on probation for a period of two years
which may be extended for one year, if necessary. An
order of termination simplicitor was passed against
the respondent-probationer. The said termination
order was assailed before the High Court and was
set-aside by the ld. Single Judge. The LPA preferred
against the said order was also dismissed. The
appeal preferred against the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court was ultimately
allowed by the Supreme Court, wherein it was held
that the status of confirmation of employment had to
be earned and conferred. The Supreme Court held
that there was nothing in the terms of the letter of
appointment from which it could be construed that
after the expiry of the period of probation, the
probationer could have been treated as a deemed
confirmed employee. Had the rule making authority
intended that the probationer would be entitled for
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automatic confirmation upon the expiry of the period
of probation, the recruitment rules would have been
couched in such specific language. Supreme Court
further went on to hold that confirmation of
employment does not occur with efflux of time. An
affirmative or positive act is the requisite by the
employer to confirm a probationer which had not
been done in the present case. The Supreme Court
considered several earlier decisions in this
judgment. The relevant excerpts of Head Master,
Lawrence School, Lovedale (supra) read as follows:
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16. In G.S. Ramaswamy v. Inspector General
of Police [AIR 1966 SC 175], another
Constitution Bench, while dealing with the
language employed under Rule 486 of the
Hyderabad District Police Manual, referred to
the decision in Sukhbans Singh [AIR 1962 SC
1711] and opined as follows: (G.S.
Ramaswamy case [AIR 1966 SC 175], AIR p.
179, para 8)
“8. … It has been held in that case that
a probationer cannot after the expiry
of
the
probationary
period
automatically acquire the status of a
permanent member of a service, unless
of course the Rules under which he is
appointed expressly provide for such a
result. Therefore even though a
probationer may have continued to act
in the post to which he is appointed on
probation for more than the initial
period of probation, he cannot become
a permanent servant merely because of
efflux of time, unless the rules of
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service which govern him specifically
lay down that the probationer will be
automatically confirmed after the
initial period of probation is over. ….
17. In State of U.P. v. Akbar Ali Khan [AIR
1966 SC 1842] another Constitution Bench
ruled that : (AIR p. 1845, para 6)
“6. … If the order of appointment itself
states that at the end of the period of
probation … in the absence of any
order to the contrary, the appointee
will acquire a substantive right to the
post even without an order of
confirmation. In all other cases, in the
absence of such an order or in the
absence of such a service rule, an
express order of confirmation is
necessary to give him such a right.
Where after the period of probation an
appointee is allowed to continue in the
post without an order of confirmation,
the only possible view to take is that by
implication the period of probation has
been extended, and it is not a correct
proposition to state that an appointee
should be deemed to be confirmed
from the mere fact that he is allowed to
continue after the end of the period of
probation.”
20. This Court in V.K. Mittal (supra) culled out law
on deemed confirmation of employment upon
successful completion of probation period, as
follows:
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“64. The legal position on “deemed
confirmation” can be summarised as under:
(a) If in the rule or order of appointment, a
period of probation is specified and a power
to extend probation is also conferred and the
officer is allowed to continue beyond the
prescribed period of probation, he cannot be
deemed to be confirmed. At the end of such
probation he becomes merely qualified or
eligible
for
substantive
permanent
appointment.
(b) There is the other line of cases where even
though there is a provision in the rules for
initial probation and extension thereof, a
maximum period for such extension is also
provided beyond which it is not permissible to
extend probation. The presumption about
continuation, beyond the period of probation,
as a probationer stands negatived by the
fixation of a maximum time-limit for the
extension of probation. In such cases the
officer concerned must be deemed to have
been confirmed.
(c) A third line of cases is where though under
the rules maximum period of probation is
prescribed, it requires a specific act on the
part of the employer by issuing an order of
confirmation and of passing a test for the
purposes of confirmation. In such cases, even
if the maximum period of probation has
expired, and neither any order of confirmation
has been passed nor has the person concerned
passed the requisite test, he cannot be deemed
to have been confirmed merely because the
said period has expired.
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(d) While there could be some other cases
where the rules do not contemplate issuance of
such a specific order in writing but merely
require that there will not be any automatic
confirmation or some acts, other than issuance
of specific orders, are required to be
performed by the parties. Even in those cases,
there would be no „deemed confirmation‟.”
21. Thus, whenever a person is appointed as a
probationer for a specified period, he does not
automatically stand confirmed upon the expiry of
such probation period, unless the maximum period of
probation is prescribed and the person is allowed to
continue even after the expiry of such maximum
period of probation. Unless and until the relevant
recruitment rules or the terms of appointment
specifically provide for either deemed confirmation by providing for a maximum period of probation, or
confirmation is effected by passing an order to that
effect, merely because the express probation period
has expired, it cannot be said to confer on the
probationer the status of deemed confirmed.”
40.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court has also expressed its opinion on the
issue of probation and deemed confirmation in the judgment of
Durgabhai Deshmukh (Supra) and has made the following observations
in this regard:“40. The High Court concluded that Rule 105 fixes a
maximum probationary period of two years and that
consequently, the continuation of the services of the
probationer beyond the period of probation would
amount to a deemed confirmation of service even
without an order of confirmation. Consequently, the
case of the first respondent was according to the
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High Court within the second category of cases
enumerated in Satya Narayan Jhavar [High Court of
M.P. v. Satya Narayan Jhavar, (2001) 7 SCC 161 :
2001 SCC (L&S) 1087] . This Court in Satya
Narayan Jhavar [High Court of M.P. v. Satya
Narayan Jhavar, (2001) 7 SCC 161 : 2001 SCC
(L&S) 1087] enumerated three lines of cases. The
third stipulates those cases where the rules prescribe
a maximum period of probation but also require a
specific act on the part of the employer of issuing an
order of confirmation for the purposes of
confirmation. In such cases, there is no deemed
confirmation of the services of a probationer on their
continuation in service beyond the maximum period
of probation.
41. Admittedly, the appointment letter does not
stipulate that the first respondent shall be confirmed
upon the expiry of the probationary period. Rule
105(2) stipulates that an order of confirmation may
be issued “if the work and conduct of an employee
during the period of probation is found to be
satisfactory”. Rule 105(2) lays down a condition
precedent to the issuance of an order of
confirmation. It is only if the appointing authority is
satisfied with the performance of the probationer that
an order of confirmation may be issued. Rule 105(2)
contains an explicit stipulation requiring the
issuance of an order of confirmation by the
appointing authority upon its assessment that the
performance of the probationer has been
satisfactory. The mere continuation of the services of
a probationer beyond the period of probation does
not lead to a deemed confirmation in service. It is
only upon the issuance of an order of confirmation
by the appointing authority that probationer is
granted substantive appointment in the post.
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42. In G.S. Ramaswamy v. Inspector General of
Police [G.S. Ramaswamy v. Inspector General of
Police, (1964) 6 SCR 279 : AIR 1966 SC 175] , a
Constitution Bench of this Court considered the
promotions of Sub-Inspectors of Police under Rule
486 of the Hyderabad District Police Manual which
stipulated that all officers who are promoted will be
on probation for a period of two years and that they
may be reverted during the aforesaid period if their
work and conduct is not found satisfactory. Noting
that the rule stipulated that “promoted officers will
be confirmed at the end of their probationary period
if they have given satisfaction”, this Court held thus :
(AIR p. 179, para 8)
“8. … Therefore even though a probationer
may have continued to act in the post to which
he is appointed on probation for more than the
initial period of probation, he cannot become
a permanent servant merely because of efflux
of time, unless the rules of service which
govern him specifically lay down that the
probationer will be automatically confirmed
after the initial period of probation is over. …
It is true that the words used in the sentence
set out above are not that promoted officers
will be eligible or qualified for promotion at
the end of their probationary period which are
the words to be often found in the rules in such
cases; even so, though this part of Rule 486
says that “promoted officers will be confirmed
at the end of their probationary period”, it is
qualified by the words “if they have given
satisfaction”. Clearly therefore the rule does
not contemplate automatic confirmation after
the probationary period of two years, for a
promoted officer can only be confirmed under
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this rule if he has given satisfaction. This
condition of giving satisfaction must be
fulfilled before a promoted officer can be
confirmed under this rule and this condition
obviously means that the authority competent
to confirm him must pass an order to the effect
that the probationary officer has given
satisfaction and is, therefore, confirmed.”
43. In Kedar Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab [Kedar
Nath Bahl v. State of Punjab, (1974) 3 SCC 21], the
appellant was appointed to a post in the Punjab
Provincial Service Class I. The appointment letter
stipulated that the period of probation shall be six
months. The appellant continued on probation
beyond the stipulated period of six months and was
eventually reverted back to his previous post. He
instituted proceedings challenging his order of
reversion. The appellant contended that upon the
expiry of the period of probation, he was deemed to
be confirmed in service. Rejecting this contention, a
three-Judge Bench of this Court held thus : (SCC p.
26, para 9)
“9. … The law on the point is now well settled.
Where a person is appointed as a probationer
in any post and a period of probation is
specified, it does not follow that at the end of
the said specified period of probation he
obtains confirmation automatically even if no
order is passed in that behalf. Unless the terms
of appointment clearly indicate that
confirmation would automatically follow at the
end of the specified period, or there is a
specific service rule to that effect, the
expiration of the probationary period does not
necessarily lead to confirmation. At the end of
the period of probation an order confirming
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the officer is required to be passed and if no
such order is passed and he is not reverted to
his substantive post, the result merely is that
he continues in his post as a probationer. …
The terms of appointment do not show that the
appellant would be automatically confirmed
on the expiry of the first six months of
probation nor is any rule brought to our notice
which has the effect of confirming him in the
post after six months of probation.”
This view is also affirmed by the judgments of this
Court in Municipal Corpn., Raipur v. Ashok Kumar
Misra [Municipal Corpn., Raipur v. Ashok Kumar
Misra, (1991) 3 SCC 325 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 1046]
; Jai
Kishan v. Commr.
of
Police [Jai
Kishan v. Commr. of Police, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 364
: 1995 SCC (L&S) 1233] ; State of Punjab v. Baldev
Singh Khosla [State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh
Khosla, (1996) 9 SCC 190 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1210]
and SBI v. Bijoy Kumar Mishra [SBI v. Bijoy Kumar
Mishra, (1997) 7 SCC 550 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1778] .
44. Recently,
in Lawrence
School v. Jayanthi
Raghu [Lawrence School v. Jayanthi Raghu, (2012)
4 SCC 793 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 798] , a two-Judge
Bench of this Court held that even where the relevant
rule prescribes a maximum period of probation, the
use of the words “if confirmed” denote a condition
precedent and that there is no deemed confirmation
of service unless a specific order of confirmation is
issued. The Court held thus : (SCC p. 804, para 38)
“38. Had the rule-making authority intended
that there would be automatic confirmation,
Rule 4.9 would have been couched in a
different language. That being not so, the
wider interpretation cannot be placed on the
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rule to infer that the probationer gets the
status of a deemed confirmed employee after
expiry of three years of probationary period as
that would defeat the basic purpose and intent
of the rule which clearly postulates “if
confirmed”. A
confirmation,
as
is
demonstrable from the language employed in
the rule, does not occur with efflux of time. As
it is hedged by a condition, an affirmative or
positive act is the requisite by the employer. In
our considered opinion, an order of
confirmation is required to be passed.”
45. It emerges from the consistent line of precedent
of this Court that where the relevant rule or the
appointment letter stipulates a condition precedent to
the confirmation of service, there is no deemed
confirmation of service merely because the services
of a probationer are continued beyond the period of
probation. It is only upon the issuance of an order of
confirmation that the probationer is granted
substantive appointment in that post. Rule 105(2)
stipulates the satisfaction of the appointing authority
as a condition precedent to the issuance of an order
of confirmation. The argument advanced by the
learned counsel for the first respondent that there is
a deemed confirmation upon the continuation of
service beyond the expiry of the period of probation
is negatived by the express language of Rule 105(2).
In this view, the continuation of services beyond the
period of probation will not entitle the probationer to
a deemed confirmation of service. The High Court
has erred in holding that there is a deemed
confirmation where the services of a probationer are
continued beyond the expiry of the probationary
period.
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50. In the view that we have taken, the High Court
has erred in concluding that the case of the first
respondent falls within the second category of cases
enumerated in Satya Narayan Jhavar [High Court of
M.P. v. Satya Narayan Jhavar, (2001) 7 SCC 161 :
2001 SCC (L&S) 1087] . Rule 105(2) stipulates the
satisfaction of the appointing authority as a
condition precedent to the issuance of an order of
confirmation. Admittedly, no order of confirmation
was issued by the appointing authority. The case of
the first respondent falls squarely within the third
category of cases enumerated in Satya Narayan
Jhavar [High Court of M.P. v. Satya Narayan
Jhavar, (2001) 7 SCC 161 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1087]
wherein though the rules prescribe a maximum
period of probation and the probationer is continued
beyond the expiry of the probationary period, the
substantive appointment of the probationer is subject
to a specific act on the part of the appointing
authority of issuing an order of confirmation. In the
absence of an order of confirmation, the first
respondent did not acquire the status of a confirmed
employee.”
41.
The facts of the instant matter being similar to the situation in this
judgment, to the extent that the appointment letter of the respondent no. 2
did not stipulate that his services shall stand confirmed upon the expiry of
the probationary period, shall invite the same applicability of the
guidelines issued by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. The principle that in the
absence of a condition stipulated in the appointment letter or the relevant
rules being met there shall be no deemed confirmation of service merely
for the reason of continuance of the services of the respondent no. 2 the
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services of a probationer are continued beyond the period of probation
fits wholly to the situation at hand.
42.
In the instant case, the Delhi School Tribunal, in its order dated 9 th
August 2012, on the question of deemed confirmation, noted as under:“6. Now the question arises as to whether the
acceptance of the Appointment letter stipulating the
period of probation as two years is binding upon the
Appellant. It is an established law that an agreement
between two parties cannot be against the statute.
Rule 105 of the Rules provides for a period of
probation of one year only. Even if the letter of
appointment provided for a period of two years, it
cannot prevail upon the statutory provisions of Rules
105 of the Rules. Obviously the period of probation
has to be governed by Rule 105 of the Rules which
provided that the initial appointment of an employee
shall be for a period of one year. The objection thus
raised by the Respondent School is devoid of merits.
The same is hence dismissed.
8.
Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has dealt with the
issue of 'deemed confirmation' at length in the case
of Dy. Director of Education vs. Veena Sharma, 175
(2010) DLT 311 (DB). The Hon'ble High Court
noticed the case of High Court of Madhya Pradesh
through Registrar and Others vs. Satya Narayan
Jhavar, AIR (2001) SC 3234 where Apex Court had
observed as under:
"The question of deemed confirmation in
service Jurisprudence, which is
dependent upon the language of the
relevant service rules, has been the
subject matter of consideration before
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this Court, times without number in
various decisions and there are three
lines of cases on this point. One line of
cases is where in the service rules or in
the letter of appointment a period of
probation is specified and power to
extend the same is also conferred upon
the authority without prescribing any
maximum period of probation and if the
officer is continued beyond the
prescribed or extended period, he
cannot be deemed to be confirmed. In
such cases there is no bar against
termination at any point of time after
expiry of the period of probation. The
other line of cases is that where while
there is a provision the rules for initial
probation and extension thereof, a
maximum period for such extension is
also provided beyond which it is not
permissible to extend probation. The
inference in such cases is that the officer
concerned is deemed to have been
confirmed upon expiry of the maximum
period of probation in case before its
expiry the order, of termination has not
been passed. The last line of cases is
where, though under the rules maximum
period of probation is prescribed, but
the same requires a specific act on the
part of the employer by issuing an order
of confirmation and of passing a test for
the purposes of confirmation. In such
cases, even if the maximum period of
probation has expired and neither any
order of confirmation has been passed
nor has the person concerned passed the
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requisite test, he cannot be deemed to
have been confirmed merely because the
said period has expired."
9.
Perusal of the abovesaid legal position shows
that the cases of employees/ teachers under Act and
Rules fall in the second category referred to above.
As per provisions of Rule 105 of the Act & Rules,
initially the period of probation is one year but the
same may be extended by another year. In such cases
the maximum period of probation is only of two
years. Beyond this period, it is not permissible to
extend the probation. The concept of 'deemed
confirmation' comes into play upon expiry of the
maximum period of probation. In other words, an
order of termination can be passed before the expiry
of the total period of probation of two years.
10. In view of the law discussed above, once an
employee appointed under Delhi School Education
Act & Rules-1973 is deemed to have been confirmed
upon expiry of maximum period of probation of two
years, the question of any further extension in the
period of probation (beyond two years) of services
does not arise. All the abovesaid extensions in the
period of probation in the present case, therefore,
are illegal unjustifiable and bad in the eyes of law
even if such letters were accepted by the Appellant
without any objection.”
43.
This Court, however, differs in opinion with the position presented
by the Tribunal. As discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the petitioner
School is governed by the DSEAR, which makes provision for probation
of employees working at the schools falling under the ambit of the Act &
Rules. The petitioner School being a private recognized aided school also
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falls under the DSEAR. Rule 105 of the DSEAR provides for an initial
period of probation of one year and an extension by another year. Hence,
in the case at hand, there were relevant rules in place applicable to the
petitioner School prescribing the maximum probation period for
respondent no. 2. Further, the relevant provision subjects confirmation of
service after probation to satisfaction of the appointing authority by
postulating that „services of an employee may be terminated without
notice during the period of probation if the work, and conduct of the
employee, during the said period, is not, in the opinion of the appointing
authority, satisfactory‟ and therefore, provides for a condition for passing
a test for the purposes of continuation of service. The appointment letter
dated 8th July 2008 also made a specific mention of the condition that
„after completing two years satisfactory service, the service shall be
confirmed‟.
44.
Therefore, the position of law stands settled when it comes to the
issue of deemed confirmation by an examination of the judgments
referred to above. An examination of the relevant provision read with the
appointment letter reveals that there was a maximum period of probation
is prescribed, but the same required a specific act on the part of the
employer, by issuing an order of confirmation and passing a test, for the
purposes of confirmation of employment. Therefore, the reasonable
conclusion that follows is that the case of the petitioner falls under the
third line of cases as detailed in the judgment of Satya Narain Jhavar
(Supra) and not under the second category as noted by the Tribunal.
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Unless there is an express condition to the effect that the services of an
employee shall stand confirmed on the end of expiry period, there
remains nothing to suggest that the principle of deemed confirmation will
stand in way in discharge of services. The position stands different for
cases where there is a negative stipulation that beyond the said period,
probation of the respondent no. 2 could not have continued, in which case
the reasonable and legal consequence that would follow would be deemed
confirmation of services, however, this is absolutely not the case before
this Court in the dispute between the instant parties.
45.
After the period of probation prescribed expired and neither any
order of confirmation had been passed nor had the person concerned
passed the requisite test, his services could not deemed to have been
confirmed merely because the said period had expired. This Court
distinguishes with the observations of the Tribunal and finds that the
services of the respondent no. 2 were not deemed to be confirmed after
his probation period expired, irrespective of the fact that such period was
prescribed and extended rightly or wrongly. This Court relies upon the
aforesaid judgments while differentiating the decision of the Delhi School
Tribunal on the issue of deemed confirmation and holds that the principle
does not favour the petitioner and could not have been interpreted as so
by the Tribunal.
46.
The petitioner School vide order dated 7th October 2011 discharged
the respondent no. 2 from services after not being found suitable for the
post of TGT (Mathematics) for which he was appointed. Challenging the
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said order, the respondent no. 2 approached the Delhi School Tribunal
and passed the impugned order dated 9 th August 2012 and set aside the
termination order. After the elaborate and comprehensive discussion on
the issue of deemed confirmation, there does not remain much to examine
with respect to the termination order. After the probationary period of the
respondent no. 2 ended, there was admittedly no order of confirmation of
services. Therefore, had there been no extension of the period of
probation and even a termination order, the services of the respondent no.
2 were deemed to be terminated considering that he failed to fulfil the
necessary condition of completion of two years‟ satisfactory service and
that there was no express order of confirmation of employment of the
petitioner.
47.
The petitioner School has also raised objection to the impugned
order directing it to reinstate the respondent no. 2 to service on the ground
of loss of confidence and strained relationship with the employer. It is not
the case of the petitioner that there were only a few isolated cases against
the respondent no. 2 which led to his discharge from services. The record
reveals that every few weeks a Show Cause letter or a memo was being
issued to the respondent no. 2 regarding his conduct or performance. The
petitioner School had several reasons to conclude that the performance of
the respondent no. 2 was unsatisfactory. The students, who are at the
center of focus for the petitioner, were not benefitting in any way from
the employment of the respondent no. 2, since during his service, neither
classes were being conducted properly, nor the classwork and homework
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of the students was being checked and corrected. An incident of argument
and fight between certain students leading up to filing of an FIR also
came up during arguments which again indicates the incapability of
respondent no. 2 to fulfil his duties. It is certain that there is a question on
the eligibility and credibility of the respondent no. 2 when it comes to his
service with the petitioner School and there is no doubt that the petitioner
School would have lost confidence in respondent no. 2 due to his conduct
and performance. A person unsuitable for a specific post may not be
employed on the same especially when it is the education of children
which is at stake.
CONCLUSION
48.
Keeping in view the position reiterated by the Division Benches of
this Court as well as by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court it is conclusively
held that at no point of time were the services of the respondent no. 2
deemed to be confirmed since the case of respondent no. 2 did not fall
under the category of cases of deemed confirmation as per the guidelines
issued and interpreted with respect to Rule 105 of the DSEAR. Moreover,
it is also to be seen that the petitioner, being a custodian of welfare of all
the children falling under its purview, has to ensure the best of its
students‟ interests. It has the responsibility to ensure that the students
bestowed with the kind of quality education that will shape them into the
leaders of tomorrow. In this process, the School makes certain decisions
which may not always be in the best interest of an individual but will
indisputably benefit the students and enhance the quality of education
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they are being imparted. After being granted several opportunities of
improvement, the performance and demeanor of the respondent no. 2
remained to be such which undoubtedly required interference and action
on part of the petitioner School.
49.
Therefore, after thorough consideration of the facts, circumstances,
material on record, contents of the impugned order, submissions made on
behalf of the parties before this Court as well as the contentions raised in
the pleadings and written submissions, it is found that the Tribunal has
committed an error while setting aside the order of the petitioner School
terminating the services of the respondent no. 2. This Court finds merit in
the objections raised by the petitioner to the impugned order passed by
the Delhi School Tribunal and finds it apposite to set the same aside.
50.
Accordingly, the instant petition stands allowed and the order dated
9th August 2012 passed in Appeal No. 51/2011 by the Delhi School
Tribunal along with directions qua reinstatement of the respondent no. 2
are set aside.
51.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
52.
The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
(CHANDRA DHARI SINGH)
JUDGE
NOVEMBER 11, 2022
Aj/Ms
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