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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 07.09.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 14.09.2026
Judgment uploaded on: 14.09.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010410092026
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W.P.(C) 12664/2026 & CM APPL. 58858/2026
P B AGRO LLP
.....Petitioner
Through:
Mr. Dayan Krishnan and Mr.
Mohit
Mathur,
Senior
Advocates with Dr. Seema
Jain, Mr. Ajay K. Jain, Mr.
Dushyant K. Mahant, Ms.
Shivani G. Mahant, Mr.
Ripudaman
Sharma,
Mr.
Harish C. Suri, Ms. Radhika
Yadav, Mr. Shreedhar Kale
and Mr. Vignesh Ramanathan,
Advocates
versus
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
Through:
W.P.(C) 12664/2026
Digitally Signed
By:ZEENAT PRAVEEN
18:19:21
.....Respondents
Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG with
Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, CGSC,
Mr. Vinay Koushik, GP, Mr.
Vinayak Aren and Ms.
Aishwarya Nigam, Advocates
for Respondent No. 1 and 4.
Mr. Rakesh Chaudhary and
Mr. Jay Sharma, Advocates for
R-2/FSSAI
Mr. Shubham Gill, Officer - R4
CORAM:
HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SWARANA KANTA SHARMA
JUDGMENT
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
1.
The petitioner, P.B. Agro LLP, seeks to invoke the writ
jurisdiction of this Court, inter alia, seeking quashing of the Show
Cause Notice dated 11.08.2026 [hereafter „impugned notice‟], as
well as direction to the respondents to restrain from taking any
coercive action against the petitioner and/or its brand ambassadors
for alleged non-compliance with the impugned notice.
INTRODUCTION
2.
The petitioner states that it is a limited partnership, and is the
Master Licensee for manufacture and sale of Elaichi, and Pan Masala
not containing tobacco, under the brand „VIMAL‟ in accordance with
all statutory requirements including but not limited to under the Food
Safety and Standards Act, 2006 [hereafter „FSS Act‟], and the
regulations framed thereunder.
3.
Respondent no. 1 is the Union of India through the Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare [hereafter „the Ministry‟]; respondent
no. 2 is Food and Drug Administration, Food Safety and Standards
Authority of India, Delhi [hereafter „FSSAI‟]; respondent no. 3 is
Assistant Commissioner (Food), Food and Drug Administration,
Greater Mumbai Division, Mumbai, Maharashtra [hereafter „FDA,
Mumbai‟]; and respondent no. 4 is Central Consumer Protection
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Authority, Delhi [hereafter „CCPA‟].
4.
It is the petitioner‟s case that, in the course of promoting its
cardamom (elaichi) product under the brand name „VIMAL‟, it has,
from time to time, engaged reputed actors as brand ambassadors. For
this purpose, the petitioner enters into formal brand endorsement
agreements governing the terms and conditions of their engagement
and the manner in which the advertising campaigns are to be
undertaken. Under these agreements, the petitioner specifically
undertakes that the advertising campaigns shall comply with all
applicable statutory and regulatory requirements. It is further stated
that the agreements record the petitioner‟s representations and
assurances that the cardamom product is fit for consumption and that
the advertising campaigns shall not be misleading or contain any
misrepresentation concerning the product or its features, efficacy,
quality or other attributes. The brand ambassadors agree to render
their services on the basis of the representations and assurances
furnished by the petitioner concerning the quality, credibility and
reputation of the petitioner and the product, as well as the petitioner‟s
representation regarding compliance with the applicable laws.
5.
Primary grievance of the petitioner is that it recently learnt,
through media reports, that FSSAI – through FDA, Mumbai – had
issued the impugned notice to the petitioners‟ brand ambassadors in
relation to the advertising campaign concerning the petitioner‟s
product. The petitioner states that, although the impugned notice
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concerns the advertising campaign undertaken in respect of the
petitioner‟s product, neither has any notice been issued to the
petitioner nor has it been afforded any opportunity of hearing.
6.
Aggrieved thereby, the present writ petition has been filed by
the petitioner, assailing the impugned notice on several grounds.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE COURT
7.
At the outset, the issue of maintainability of the present writ
petition, on account of lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court,
was raised on behalf of the respondents. Accordingly, arguments
were heard by this Court, on the said aspect, on behalf of the
petitioner as well as the respondents.
8.
The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner argued
that the present writ petition is maintainable before this Court, both in
terms of Article 226(1) and 226(2) of the Constitution of India. It was
argued that the petitioner has approached this Court against the
Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, which was the administrative
Ministry under which FSSAI had been established, and FSSAI,
which was the apex authority under the FSS Act and was situated in
New Delhi. It was further submitted that FDA, Mumbai, was under
the overall supervision of FSSAI. Accordingly, it was contended that
this Court had jurisdiction under Article 226(1), as the petition was
directed, inter alia, against an authority situated within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court. The learned senior counsel further argued
that a substantial part of the cause of action had arisen in Delhi,
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thereby conferring jurisdiction on this Court under Article 226(2) of
the Constitution of India. It was submitted that the petitioner carried
on business only from Delhi, the advertising campaign was managed
and operated from Delhi, payments to the brand ambassadors were
made from Delhi, and the impugned notice affected the petitioner‟s
business in Delhi, with the entire injury being suffered in Delhi.
9.
In support of the aforesaid submissions, reliance was placed on
the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Bakshish Ahmad v.
Union of India and Ors.: 2026 INSC 630. It was argued that, under
the FSS Act, FSSAI, Delhi, was the apex authority established under
Section 4, and the Commissioners of Food Safety appointed in
various States were bound to act under its directions in terms of
Section 16(5). It was further submitted that the impugned notice
issued by FDA, Mumbai, had also been marked to the CEO, FSSAI,
in Delhi. On this basis, it was contended that the present petition was
maintainable before this Court under Article 226(1). As regards
Article 226(2), the learned senior counsel placed reliance, inter alia,
on the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Nawal Kishore
Sharma v. Union of India: (2014) 9 SCC 329. It was argued that, in
the present case, although the impugned notice had not been formally
issued to the petitioner, the directions contained therein were
effectively against the petitioner and its business. It was submitted
that the directions requiring the brand ambassadors to immediately
take down the advertisements from platforms within their control,
and not to provide any assistance or cooperation in disseminating the
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same in any form, effectively amounted to a direction to remove and
a ban on the petitioner‟s advertisements. It was further contended that
the direction requiring the sponsors to produce documentary
information establishing that VIMAL Elaichi was an independent
product actually available for sale in the market could, in substance,
be complied with only by the petitioner. On this basis, it was argued
that the impugned notice had been issued without affording the
petitioner any opportunity of hearing, despite the directions contained
therein being effectively against it, and that such directions could not
have been passed without first issuing a show cause notice to the
petitioner. Therefore, it was submitted that the impugned notice was,
in substance, as good as a notice issued to the petitioner in Delhi, and
a substantial part of the cause of action could consequently be said to
have arisen in Delhi.
10.
The learned senior counsel for the petitioner also contended
that CCPA, which was the jurisdictional authority in respect of
surrogate advertising under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019
[hereafter „CPA, 2019‟], was situated in New Delhi and was already
seized of the matter. It was argued that the impugned notice invoked
the Guidelines for Prevention of Misleading Advertisements and
Endorsements for Misleading Advertisements, 2022, which dealt
with surrogate advertising and had been issued by CCPA under
Section 18 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. It was submitted
that the said provision required CCPA to ensure that no false or
misleading advertisement was made and empowered it to issue
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guidelines to prevent unfair trade practices and protect the interests of
consumers. It was further submitted that CCPA, situated at Krishi
Bhawan, New Delhi, had already issued a show cause notice to the
petitioner in respect of the same issue. It was also pointed out that the
impugned notice had been marked to CCPA at New Delhi. On this
basis, it was contended that the present writ petition was maintainable
before this Court under both Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) of the
Constitution of India.
11.
The learned senior counsel argued that the impugned notice
was wholly without jurisdiction, as the provisions invoked therein
had no application to the petitioner‟s case and respondent no. 3 had
no authority to issue directions for taking down the advertisements. It
was further submitted that the issue of surrogate advertising was
already being examined by CCPA, which had also issued a show
cause notice to the petitioner. Accordingly, it was contended that the
impugned notice was liable to be quashed for want of jurisdiction.
12.
Conversely, the learned CGSC appearing for the respondent
nos. 1 and 4, i.e. the Ministry and the CCPA, argued that the present
petition was liable to be dismissed at the threshold, being nonmaintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. It was submitted that
neither Article 226(1) nor Article 226(2) of the Constitution was
attracted in the present case. The learned CGSC contended that
respondent no. 1/Ministry had no role in the issuance of the
impugned notice, and neither any substantive relief had been sought
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against the Ministry or even against respondent no. 4/CCPA. It was
argued that the mere fact that the petitioner was based in Delhi could
not confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court, particularly when
the impugned notice had been issued by respondent no. 3, i.e. the
FDA, Mumbai, under the Government of Maharashtra. Attention was
drawn to the heading of the impugned notice, which specifically
referred to the Government of Maharashtra and the Food and Drug
Administration, Maharashtra State, Mumbai. It was submitted that
the State of Maharashtra, which was the principal authority
responsible for issuance of the impugned notice, was not even before
this Court to defend the same.
13.
The learned CGSC further drew attention to Section 30 of the
FSS Act, to contend that certain functions under the said enactment
were to be performed by the Commissioner of Food Safety of the
concerned State. It was also submitted that the impugned notice had
been issued exclusively to three brand ambassadors of VIMAL
Elaichi, all of whom were residents of Mumbai, and none of them
had instituted any proceedings challenging the said notice. As regards
respondent no. 4, it was argued that the CCPA is conducting its own
proceedings and that the present challenge did not, in substance,
relate to any action taken by it. Accordingly, it was contended that
this Court had neither territorial jurisdiction nor was it the forum
conveniens for adjudication of the present petition.
14.
The learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 2/FSSAI also
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argued that the impugned notice had been issued by FDA, Mumbai,
Maharashtra, and that the mere location of the petitioner‟s office or
that of the apex body i.e. FSSAI in Delhi could not confer territorial
jurisdiction upon this Court.
15.
This Court has heard and considered the arguments addressed
on behalf of the petitioner as well as the respondents alongwith the
material placed on record.
ANALYSIS & FINDINGS
The principal issue which arises for consideration is – whether
16.
this Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution in respect of the impugned show cause notice issued by
the FDA, Mumbai, merely because the petitioner is based in Delhi
and some of the authorities impleaded in the writ petition as
respondents, i.e. the Ministry, FSSAI and CCPA, are located in
Delhi.
17.
In the present case, the following facts are not in dispute:
a)
The impugned show cause notice has been issued by
respondent no. 3, i.e. Assistant Commissioner (Food),
Food and Drug Administration, Greater Mumbai Division,
Mumbai, Maharashtra
b)
The impugned notice itself bears the heading „Government
of Maharashtra, Food and Drug Administration, Food and
Drug Administration, Maharashtra State, Mumbai‟.
c)
The impugned notice has been issued to three brand
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ambassadors of the petitioner‟s product, VIMAL Elaichi.
d)
The said three noticees are residents of Mumbai,
Maharashtra.
e)
None of the said brand ambassadors has challenged the
impugned notice before this Court.
f)
The petitioner, which is based in Delhi and had engaged
the said brand ambassadors, has instituted the present
proceedings, although no show cause notice has been
issued to it.
18.
Clearly, a perusal of the impugned notice shows that it has
been issued by FDA, Mumbai, in the claimed exercise of the powers
available to the State food safety authorities under the FSS Act. At
this stage, there is no direction, command, communication, order or
other material placed before the Court to show that respondent no.
2/FSSAI, as the apex statutory body under the FSS Act, had directed
FDA, Mumbai to issue the impugned notice or to initiate any
particular action against the brand ambassadors engaged by the
petitioner. Thus, the material available before the Court indicates that
the impugned notice is an action independently initiated by the FDA,
Mumbai, Government of Maharashtra, on the basis of its own
assessment of the relevant facts and in the claimed exercise of its
statutory powers. The mere fact that FSSAI is the apex body under
the enactment, or that it is situated in Delhi, cannot alter the source or
character of the show cause notice impugned in the present petition.
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19.
Furthermore, the impugned notice appears to have been issued
by respondent no. 3 with reference to the provisions relating to
restrictions on advertisements and prohibition of unfair trade
practices under Section 24 of the FSS Act. The respondent no. 3 has
also referred to the statutory position concerning the prohibition of
pan masala in the State of Maharashtra under Section 30(2)(a) of the
said Act. Whether the said provisions were correctly invoked,
whether the notice is otherwise sustainable, and whether the
petitioner has a valid defence on merits are matters which may arise
for consideration in appropriate proceedings. At the present stage,
however, these aspects only reveal that the subject matter of the
impugned action is located in Maharashtra, inasmuch as the alleged
prohibited activity, the regulatory action, the authority issuing the
notice and the persons to whom the notice was addressed are all
connected with the State of Maharashtra. As observed above, there is
no material on record or no pleading to the effect that the impugned
notice was issued pursuant to any decision taken by any authority
situated in Delhi.
20.
The nature of the reliefs sought by the petitioner are also
required to be considered, for adjudicating the issue in question. It is
noted that the principal relief sought in the writ petition is the
quashing of the impugned notice – issued by respondent no. 3, i.e.
FDA, Mumbai. The petitioner has further sought a direction
restraining the „respondents‟ from taking coercive action for alleged
non-compliance with the impugned notice. However, in substance,
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the reliefs are directed against the notice issued by FDA, Mumbai,
and that any action for alleged non-compliance with that notice, if at
all warranted, would necessarily have to be considered and taken by
the authority which issued it, i.e., respondent no. 3/FDA, Mumbai.
The petitioner has not pointed out any independent order, direction or
decision of the Ministry or FSSAI which is under challenge in the
present petition. In the considered opinion of this Court, the mere
impleadment of the Ministry or FSSAI, without any specific relief
being sought against them and without any impugned action
attributable to them, cannot confer territorial jurisdiction upon this
Court, which otherwise does not exist.
21.
The petitioner has principally relied upon the fact that it is
based in Delhi and that the advertising campaign was allegedly
conceived, managed or paid for from Delhi. In the opinion of this
Court, these facts, by themselves, do not constitute a part of the cause
of action in the present case. To note at the cost of repetition, the
impugned notice is not addressed to the petitioner herein. The
petitioner has not been called upon to submit any reply to respondent
no. 3. No direction, as yet, has been issued to the petitioner to remove
any advertisement, produce any document, discontinue any activity
or appear before the FDA, Mumbai or any other authority either in
Maharashtra or Delhi. The impugned notice has been issued to three
brand ambassadors engaged by the petitioner, all of whom are
residents of Mumbai.
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22.
It is well-settled that the expression “cause of action” refers to
the bundle of material facts which the petitioner must establish to
obtain the relief claimed. A fact which is merely incidental, collateral
or remote, and which has no real bearing upon the lis, cannot be
treated as a part of the cause of action for conferring territorial
jurisdiction. The pleadings have to be examined in substance and not
merely by accepting the form in which the petitioner chooses to
present them. Moreover, a petitioner cannot be permitted to create
territorial jurisdiction by referring to facts which do not have any
nexus with the impugned action. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim: (2007) 11 SCC 335, held
that not every fact pleaded constitutes a part of the cause of action,
and the Court must consider whether such fact constitutes a material,
essential or integral part of the cause of action. The relevant
observations are as under:
“37. From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the
ratio laid down in a catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear
that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the
appellant-petitioner would or would not constitute a part of
cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact
constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of
action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the
cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the court, the
court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the
suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a “part of cause of
action”, nothing less than that…”
23.
The mere fact that the petitioner is incorporated, carries on
business or maintains an office in Delhi cannot mean that every
regulatory action taken against its product by an authority in another
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State becomes amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. If such a
principle were accepted, a company carrying on business throughout
the country could challenge every order or notice issued by a State
authority before the High Court within whose jurisdiction its
registered office or principal place of business is situated, irrespective
of the place of issuance of the order, the authority issuing it, the
persons affected by it or the subject matter of the proceedings.
24.
In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu:
(1994) 4 SCC 711, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that the mere
fact that the petitioner learnt of the tender through a newspaper
published in Calcutta, submitted its tender and revised price bid from
Calcutta, maintained an office there, or made representations and
received communications there, did not confer territorial jurisdiction
upon the Calcutta High Court. Such facts were merely incidental and
had no direct nexus with the impugned action. The Supreme Court
further held that even service of notice at a particular place would not
constitute a part of the cause of action unless such notice formed an
integral part of the cause of action.
25.
In Aligarh Muslim University v. Vinay Engineering
Enterprises (P) Ltd.: (1994) 4 SCC 710, Three-Judge Bench of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court held as under
“2. We are surprised, not a little, that the High Court of
Calcutta should have exercised jurisdiction in a case where it
had absolutely no jurisdiction. The contracts in question were
executed at Aligarh, the construction work was to be carried
out at Aligarh, even the contracts provided that in the event of
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dispute the Aligarh Court alone will have jurisdiction. The
arbitrator was from Aligarh and was to function there. Merely
because the respondent was a Calcutta-based firm, the
High Court of Calcutta seems to have exercised jurisdiction
where it had none by adopting a queer line of reasoning.
We are constrained to say that this is a case of abuse of
Jurisdiction and we feel that the respondent deliberately moved
the Calcutta High Court ignoring the fact that no part of the
cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of that Court.
It clearly shows that the litigation filed in the Calcutta High
Court was thoroughly unsustainable.”
(emphasis added)
26.
Further, in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties: (1985) 3
SCC 217 also, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that the location of
the petitioners or their office is not relevant to determine whether a
Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a petition.
27.
The petitioner has also attempted to invoke the jurisdiction of
this Court by referring to the alleged injury caused to it. This
contention, too, does not assist the petitioner at this stage. In this
Court‟s view, the impugned notice is only a show cause notice, and
no order pursuant thereto has been passed by respondent no. 3.
Indeed, the petitioner has not even been served with a show cause
notice requiring it to submit a reply. The alleged injury is therefore, at
present, founded substantially on the petitioner‟s apprehension
regarding the possible consequences of the impugned notice issued to
the brand ambassadors. Such apprehension cannot, by itself, be
treated as a completed or substantial cause of action arising in Delhi,
since the mere issuance of show cause notice, by the authorities
situated in Mumbai, to the persons residing in Mumbai, cannot be
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characterised as causing grave or actionable injury to the petitioner in
Delhi, particularly when the petitioner has not been called upon to do
anything and no order has been passed against it.
28.
It is also pertinent to note that the three persons to whom the
impugned notice was issued have not approached this Court. The
petitioner seeks to challenge a notice issued to others, on the basis of
its own commercial and contractual connection with those persons. In
the above background, this Court also deems it apposite to briefly
examine the averments in the writ petition and the pleaded cause of
action.
29.
The petitioner‟s own pleadings also demonstrate that the real
dispute is situated in Maharashtra. A substantial part of the
petitioner‟s challenge, as averred in the writ petition, proceeds on the
following assertions:
● pan masala is prohibited in the State of Maharashtra;
● VIMAL
Elaichi, which is the product shown in the
advertisement, is not itself a prohibited commodity;
● respondent no. 3/FDA, Mumbai has allegedly admitted in
media interviews that the petitioner‟s pan masala is not
manufactured in Maharashtra since 2001;
● the allegations in the impugned notice concern the alleged
manufacture, sale and promotion of VIMAL-branded pan
masala, tobacco or gutka in Maharashtra;
● the petitioner relies upon alleged statements made by officers
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of respondent no. 3/FDA, Mumbai after issuance of the
impugned notice;
● the petitioner refers to alleged stringent actions allegedly being
taken by the State of Maharashtra against persons dealing in
prohibited items like gutka;
● the petitioner asserts that no manufacturing unit or transport
network dealing in VIMAL-branded pan masala has been
found in Maharashtra by the GST authorities; and
● the petitioner contends that, in the absence of any sale of even
a single pouch of VIMAL pan masala in Maharashtra, the
allegation of surrogate advertising is baseless.
30.
In the considered opinion of this Court, the aforesaid
averments in the writ petition, in light of the fact that impugned
notice is issued by the authorities, and issued to the persons, situated
in State of Maharashtra, are not just incidental pleadings, but
constitute a substantial part of the petitioner‟s challenge to the
impugned notice. The petitioner itself seeks to establish that the
impugned notice is factually incorrect because VIMAL pan masala is
not manufactured or sold in Maharashtra, that the FDA, Mumbai has
misunderstood the nature of the product advertised, and that the
alleged prohibited activity has not taken place in that State.
Consequently, the petitioner‟s own case is that the respondent no. 3,
i.e. an authority under the Government Maharashtra, has wrongly
proceeded on the basis that the petitioner is manufacturing, selling or
promoting a prohibited product in Maharashtra. Therefore, for the
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purpose of territorial jurisdiction, such averments in the writ petition
clearly show that the central controversy concerns the legality and
correctness of an action taken by the FDA Mumbai, in relation to
alleged activities in Maharashtra.
31.
In Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd.: (2002) 1 SCC 567,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court considered whether the Gujarat High
Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition
challenging denial of benefits under the Passport Scheme. Though the
petitioner carried on its export-import business at Ahmedabad, placed
and executed orders there, made payments and received documents
there, and suffered the commercial consequences of the denial at
Ahmedabad, the passbook in question had been issued at Chennai,
the competent authority was situated there, and the relevant entries
and processing under the scheme were undertaken by authorities at
Chennai. The Supreme Court held that the Gujarat High Court did
not have jurisdiction to entertain the lis, and it was the Madras High
Court, before which the writ petition should have been filed. It was
reiterated by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that every fact pleaded in a
petition does not ipso facto constitute a part of the cause of action.
Only those facts which have a direct nexus or relevance to the lis can
confer territorial jurisdiction. Facts which are merely incidental or
have no bearing on the dispute cannot, by themselves, give rise to a
cause of action within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court.
32.
The petitioner herein has further relied upon the fact that
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respondent no. 4/CCPA is situated in Delhi and that proceedings
concerning surrogate advertising are pending before it. In the
considered view of this Court, this submission is equally insufficient
to confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court.
33.
As disclosed in the petition itself, the proceedings before the
CCPA arise out of some proceedings (public interest litigation) in
which the High Court of Allahabad had directed the CCPA to
conduct an investigation concerning surrogate advertisements and
pan masala advertisements, in which various companies and
manufacturers, including the petitioner, were parties. The CCPA is
stated to be conducting its own proceedings in that regard. However,
neither any order passed by the CCPA has been challenged in the
present petition, nor has the CCPA passed any order in relation to the
impugned notice issued by respondent no. 3. The impugned notice
issued by the FDA, Mumbai and the proceedings before the CCPA
are, prima facie, separate proceedings arising from separate actions
taken by separate authorities. The mere pendency of similar
proceedings before an authority situated in Delhi cannot confer
territorial jurisdiction upon this Court in respect of an independent
notice issued by a State authority in Maharashtra.
34.
In light of above facts and circumstances, the argument
advanced on behalf of the petitioner, if accepted, would lead to an
untenable consequence. Undisputedly, FSSAI is the apex statutory
body under the FSS Act, and is situated in Delhi. If the mere
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existence of FSSAI in Delhi was sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon this Court, then every show cause notice or order issued by a
Food Safety Commissioner or an officer of the Food and Drug
Administration of any State in the country could be challenged before
this Court, even where – the notice or order was issued by the
concerned State authority; the authority was appointed or functioning
under the State Government; the affected persons and addressees
were situated in that State; the alleged activity took place in that
State; no direction or communication had been issued by FSSAI
requiring the State authority to take the impugned action; and no
order or decision of FSSAI was under challenge. Such an
interpretation would render the territorial limitations contained in
Article 226 practically meaningless.
35.
In this regard, the observations of the Coordinate Bench of this
Court in Indure Private Limited v. Government of NCT of Delhi:
2026 SCC OnLine Del 2386 are also noteworthy:
“36. A petitioner who approaches this Court to assail a decision
of an authority situated in Delhi, when the underlying cause for
the said decision lies elsewhere, effectively attempts to make
this High Court a mini-pan-India superior court exercising
jurisdiction over all events which take place throughout this
Country. There is no gainsaying with the proposition that every
High Court is competent to adjudicate upon a lis which arises
from events or actions taking place within its territory. Merely
because the ultimate order, which is based on events taking
place outside Delhi and takes cognizance of actions outside of
Delhi, is passed within the jurisdiction of this Court, a writ
petition ought not be entertained by this Court.
37. Naturally, being the capital of the Country, various
authorities and bodies having pan-India jurisdiction would be
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located within the jurisdiction of this Court. Merely because
the decision making authority happens to be in Delhi, ought not
to be the sole reason to entertain a lis in this Court. The
decision, no doubt, may be passed in the national capital, but it
is usually against persons situated outside Delhi; and even
more importantly, for actions which took place beyond the
borders of this Court. The act of giving a hearing in Delhi, or
the passing of an order in Delhi, is merely a result of a
body/authority being situated in the national capital, it has
nothing to do with the lis, the offending action, the legal injury
or the foundational facts on the basis of which action is being
taken.”
36.
Thus, it is well-settled that the situs of the apex statutory body
cannot, by itself, determine the territorial jurisdiction in respect of
every independent action taken by subordinate or State authorities
across the country. What is required to be considered by a Court is
the real and direct nexus between the facts relied upon and the cause
of action arising within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. In the
present case, no such nexus with Delhi has been established, and the
presence of the Ministry and FSSAI in Delhi is not sufficient when
the impugned action emanates entirely from the State of Maharashtra
and FDA, Mumbai, with no decision of either the Ministry or FSSAI
being under challenge.
37.
Insofar as the repeated reliance placed on behalf of the
petitioner on the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case
of Bakshish Ahmad (supra) is concerned, this Court is of the opinion
that the same is distinguishable on facts. A perusal of the said
decision reveals that the Supreme Court was dealing with a case
where the appellant, a member of the Border Security Force (BSF),
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had challenged his dismissal from service before the Delhi High
Court, although the order of dismissal had been passed outside Delhi
and the events leading to such dismissal had also occurred outside its
territorial jurisdiction. In arriving at its conclusion, the Supreme
Court relied upon its earlier decision in Shri Ranjeet Mal v. General
Manager, Northern Railway, Baroda House, New Delhi: (1977) 1
SCC 484 wherein it had been held that the Union of India would be
liable for enforcement of an order quashing the dismissal or removal
of a railway servant, and not merely the officer who had passed the
order. This principle, read with sections 4 and 5 of the Border
Security Force Act, 1968, rendered the Union of India and the
Director General, BSF, whose offices were situated in New Delhi,
necessary parties to the proceedings. The Supreme Court also took
note of Rule 22(4) of the BSF Rules, under which every order of
dismissal or removal was required to be reported to the Director
General. It was in this specific statutory and administrative context
that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that the Delhi High Court
possessed territorial jurisdiction, in terms of Article 226(1) of the
Constitution, in case of termination of service of any member of
Central Armed Police Forces including BSF. Thus, the present case is
distinguishable from the said decision.
38.
It is well-settled that for determining territorial jurisdiction, the
Court is required to examine the pleadings as a whole and ascertain
the substance of the dispute. The Court cannot permit jurisdiction to
be created by selectively referring to facts such as the petitioner‟s
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registered office, the place from which payments were made, or the
location where the advertising campaign may have been conceived or
managed, when those facts have no direct bearing on the validity of
the impugned notice. The Court must also guard against a situation
where pleadings are moulded in a manner so as to project incidental
facts as constituting the cause of action, while the material facts
relating to the actual dispute lie elsewhere. Facts which have no
bearing on the lis, or which are merely background facts, do not
confer territorial jurisdiction merely because they are pleaded in the
petition.
39.
At the same time, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that
the petitioner has been able to disclose some remote or incidental
cause of action with Delhi, this Court is of the view that the present
case is not an appropriate case for exercise of jurisdiction having
regard to the doctrine of forum conveniens. As already discussed
above at length, the entire cause of action has arisen in the State of
Maharashtra. The actual noticees, who are residents of Maharashtra,
have also not challenged the notice. In view thereof, the courts in
Maharashtra are the natural and convenient forum for adjudication of
the dispute.
40.
In the above background, it would be pertinent to note that in
Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India: (2004) 6 SCC 254,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had examined the scope of territorial
jurisdiction under Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India and held
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that the mere location of the seat of the Union Government or the
authority concerned does not, by itself, confer territorial jurisdiction
upon a High Court. It was observed that jurisdiction under Article
226 is determined by whether any part of the cause of action has
arisen within the territorial limits of the High Court concerned.
Further, the concept of forum conveniens was explained by the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the said decision by way of following
observations:
“Forum conveniens
30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small
part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction
of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to
be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide
the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the
doctrine of forum conveniens.”
41.
In this regard, it would also be relevant to take note of the
decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case of State of Goa v.
Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd.: (2023) 7 SCC 791. In the
said case, the petitioner had challenged various notifications under
the CGST Act 2017 and IGST Act 2017, alongwith with ratenotifications issued by the States of Goa, Maharashtra, Punjab and
Sikkim. It was pleaded that one of the notifications under challenge
was issued by the State of Sikkim and the registered office of the
petitioner was also situated in Sikkim. Nevertheless, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held that the High Court of Sikkim was not clothed
with the requisite jurisdiction to entertain the petition, as the major
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and substantial part of the cause of action had arisen within the
jurisdiction of another High Court. The Supreme Court observed that,
even assuming that a slender part of the cause of action arose within
the territorial jurisdiction of High Court of Sikkim, such fact, by
itself, could not be a determinative factor compelling that Court to
entertain the writ petition. Relying upon Kusum Ingots (supra) and
Ambica Industries v. CCE: (2007) 6 SCC 769, the Supreme Court
reiterated that the doctrine of forum conveniens must also be
considered, particularly where the principal and material facts giving
rise to the lis arise within the jurisdiction of another High Court.
Thus, neither the challenge to one notification issued by the State of
Sikkim, nor the location of the office of the petitioner in Sikkim,
were considered to be the material facts or prayers to determine the
cause of action, when the primary notification in challenge, among
several others, was issued by the State of Goa.
42.
In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the
considered view that the petitioner has failed to establish that any
substantial or material part of the cause of action has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The impugned show cause notice
was issued by the FDA, Mumbai, State of Maharashtra – to the brand
ambassadors engaged by the petitioner, who are residents of Mumbai
– in relation to alleged activities and alleged statutory violations in
Maharashtra. Though the petitioner has impleaded the Ministry and
the FSSAI, which are situated in Delhi, as parties in the writ petition,
neither any specific relief is claimed against either of them, nor any
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direction or order passed by these authorities has been challenged
before the Court or even placed on record with the writ petition. The
factum of petitioner operating its business from Delhi or engaging
brand ambassadors from Delhi, especially when the impugned notice
has not been issued to the petitioner herein, cannot by themselves
confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court, in light of the judicial
precedents of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court as well as this Court.
43.
The present petition is, accordingly, held to be non-
maintainable for want of territorial jurisdiction. In addition, the Court
also finds that courts in Maharashtra are the more appropriate and
convenient forum for the petitioner to raise its grievances concerning
the impugned notice, as per doctrine of forum conveniens.
44.
The petition is therefore dismissed on this ground, without
expressing any opinion on the merits of the petitioner‟s challenge.
Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
45.
The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith.
DR. SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J
SEPTEMBER 14, 2026
T.D./T.S.
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