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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 20.02.2026
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ARB.P. 1594/2025
OYO HOTELS AND HOMES PRIVATE LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Kuljeet Rawal and Mr.
Aditya Joshi, Advocates.
versus
SHRI DEEPANKUR PATIYAL
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Arshi Arora and Mr. Pallav
Aneja, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Petition, filed under Section 11(5) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeks appointment of an
Arbitrator for the purpose of resolution of disputes that are stated to
have arisen inter se the parties arising out of the Clause 20 as set out
in Management Service Agreement dated 15.11.20242, and which
reads as follows:
“.....
20.
Dispute Resolution. All dispute shall be settled amicably
within 60 (sixty) days by negotiation and discussion among the
Parties. Failing which, Parties shall have the right to refer such
matter to arbitration in accordance with the Indian Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. This Agreement shall be governed by Laws
Act
Agreement
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 1594/2025
of India and courts at New Delhi shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction to preside on matters arising hereunder. The provisions
of this clause shall survive expiry or termination of this Agreement.
The arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in English and seat
of arbitration shall be New Delhi.”
2.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent submits
that although objections to the present Petition have been filed, the
same could not be brought on record. A copy of the objections, as
filed, has been handed over across the bar. The objections, in essence,
are twofold. Firstly, it is contended that the present Petition has been
signed by Ms. Ankita Priya without due authorisation, it being the
Respondent’s case that the Company Secretary, Mr. Arjun Singh
Rawat, was not competent to confer such authority. Secondly, it is
urged that Clause 20 of the Agreement contemplates negotiations and
discussions between the parties, which, according to the Respondent,
constitute a mandatory pre-condition prior to invocation of arbitration.
3.
With regard to the first objection, this Court has perused the
Letter of Authority placed on record as Document-1. The material
reflects that, on the strength of a Board Resolution dated 23.11.2023,
the Company Secretary authorised Ms. Ankita Priya to act on behalf
of the Petitioner. In view thereof, the contention advanced on behalf of
the Respondent that Mr. Arjun Singh Rawat lacked competence to
grant such authorisation is found to be misconceived and
unsustainable.
4.
Adverting now to the second objection, this Court is of the
considered opinion that while the clause envisaging negotiations or
discussions between the parties ought to be encouraged as a matter of
commercial prudence, the same is directory rather than mandatory in
nature and cannot operate as an impediment to the constitution of the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 1594/2025
arbitral tribunal. This position also finds support from the judgments
of this Court in Satpal Sharma v. Union of India3, Union of India v.
Baga Bros4, Sarvesh Security Services (P) Ltd. v. DSIIDC5, Siemens
Ltd. v. Jindal India Thermal Power Ltd.6 and Ravindra Kumar
Verma v. BPTP Ltd.7.
5.
It is apposite to note that the legal position governing the scope
and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the Act is no
longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning8, after
taking into consideration the authoritative pronouncement of the
seven-Judge Bench in Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements
under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re9,
comprehensively delineated the contours of judicial intervention at the
stage of Section 11of the Act. The excerpt of Krish Spg (supra) reads
as under:“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and
agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In
cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been
vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a
party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the
arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration
in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The
parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from
those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8
2015 SCC Online Del 10767
2017 SCC Online Del 8989
2018 SCC Online Del 7996
2018 SCC Online 7158
2014 SCC Online Del 6602
(2024) 12 SCC 1
(2024) 6 SCC 1
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 1594/2025
and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature
was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A)
in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel
parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope
of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
different.
112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the
1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some
of these differences are:
112.1. While Section 8 empowers any “judicial authority” to refer
the parties to arbitration, under Section 11, the power to refer has
been exclusively conferred upon the High Court and the Supreme
Court.
112.2. Under Section 37, an appeal lies against the refusal of the
judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, whereas no such
provision for appeal exists for a refusal under Section 11.
112.3. The standard of scrutiny provided under Section 8 is that of
prima facie examination of the validity and existence of an
arbitration agreement. Whereas, the standard of scrutiny under
Section 11 is confined to the examination of the existence of the
arbitration agreement.
112.4. During the pendency of an application under Section 8,
arbitration may commence or continue and an award can be passed.
On the other hand, under Section 11, once there is failure on the
part of the parties in appointing the arbitrator as per the agreed
procedure and an application is preferred, no arbitration
proceedings can commence or continue.
113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined
to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section
7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also
limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement should be in writing.
114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose — firstly, it
allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration
agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence
of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the
arbitration agreement in depth.
****
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996
& the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
hold that the observations made inVidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 and adopted inNTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra
Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent
decision inInterplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC
1.
****
119. The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed
question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the
parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence-competence would
require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, should not be looked into by the Referral Court,
even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal
first has had the opportunity of looking into it.
120. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an
arbitrator by exercise of the powers under Section 11, the Referral
Court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the
contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by
arbitration. Mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in
any way mean that the Referral Court is diluting the sanctity of
“accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the claimant to walk back
on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the
principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the legislative intent of
minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full
effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it is always open
for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction”
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the
Arbitral Tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be
adjudicated.
121. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex facie meritless”,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they
require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the
principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and
judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 1594/2025
122. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal at the stage of Section 11
petition also does not mean that the Referral Courts forego any
scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The 1996 Act clearly vests the national courts with the
power of subsequent review by which the award passed by an
arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any of the parties to the
arbitration.
*****
126. The power available to the Referral Courts has to be construed
in the light of the fact that no right to appeal is available against
any order passed by the Referral Court under Section 11 for either
appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Thus, by delving
into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the nascent stage of
Section 11, the Referral Courts also run the risk of leaving the
claimant in a situation wherein it does not have any forum to
approach for the adjudication of its claims, if its Section 11
application is rejected.
127. Section 11 also envisages a time-bound and expeditious
disposal of the application for appointment of arbitrator. One of the
reasons for this is also the fact that unlike Section 8, once an
application under Section 11 is filed, arbitration cannot commence
until the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by the Referral Court. This
Court, on various occasions, has given directions to the High
Courts for expeditious disposal of pending Section 11 applications.
It has also directed the litigating parties to refrain from filing bulky
pleadings in matters pertaining to Section 11. Seen thus, if the
Referral Courts go into the details of issues pertaining to “accord
and satisfaction” and the like, then it would become rather difficult
to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of
pleadings.
128. We are also of the view that ex facie frivolity and dishonesty
in litigation is an aspect which the Arbitral Tribunal is equally, if
not more, capable to decide upon the appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the parties. We say so because the Arbitral Tribunal
has the benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
pleadings in much more detail than the Referral Court. If the
Referral Court is able to see the frivolity in the litigation on the
basis of bare minimum pleadings, then it would be incorrect to
doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the
same inference, most likely in the first few hearings itself, with the
benefit of extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.”
(emphasis supplied)
6.
The decision in Krish Spinning (supra) thus unequivocally
reiterates that the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the Act, is required to confine itself to a prima facie
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 1594/2025
examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and nothing
beyond. The Court’s role is facilitative and procedural, namely, to give
effect to the parties’ agreed mechanism of dispute resolution when it
has failed, without embarking upon an adjudication of contentious
factual or legal issues, which are reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal.
7.
In view thereof, this Court is of the view that the matter may be
referred to arbitration for the purpose of resolution of disputes as
between the parties.
8.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the
approximate amounts which are disputed are to the tune of Rs. 1.8
crores.
9.
In view of the fact that disputes have arisen between the parties
and there is an Arbitration clause in the Agreement, this Court is
inclined to appoint an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes
between the parties.
10.
Accordingly, Mr. Essenese Obhan, Advocate (Mobile No.
9899377703), is appointed as the sole Arbitrator.
11.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the Delhi
International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) and would abide by its rules
and regulations. The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to fees as per
the Schedule of Fees maintained by the DIAC.
12.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite
disclosure under Section 12 (2) of the Act within a week of entering of
reference.
13.
The Registry is directed to send a receipt of this order to the
learned arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through email.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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ARB.P. 1594/2025
14.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
15.
Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy
between the parties. Let a copy of the said order be sent to the
Arbitrator through the electronic mode as well.
16.
Accordingly, the present Petition stands disposed of.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 20, 2026/tk/kr
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
17:42:57
ARB.P. 1594/2025
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