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2026:MLHC:317
Serial No. 01
Supplementary List
List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
MACApp. No. 3 of 2025
Date of Decision: 09.04.2026
Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.,
G.S. Road, Police Bazar,
Shillong, Meghalaya - 793001,
Represented by its authorized signatory.
…. Appellant
Vs.
1. Smt. Tsering Dolma,
w/o. Shri Ngawang Gyaltsen,
R/o. Mawbah Bazar,
Shillong, East Khasi Hills, Meghalaya
2. Shri Amit Kumar Sah,
S/o. Shri Satyanarayan Sah,
R/o. 11/No. 107, Lower Paltan Bazar,
Shillong
(Owner of Motorcycle No. ML05 K 7356)
Coram:
i)
…. Respondents
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc.:
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s)
:
Yes/No
ii)
For the Respondent(s)
:
Yes/No
Mr. S. Jindal, Adv.
Mr. S. Goenka, Adv.
Mr. N.M. Mansuri, Adv. for R 1.
2026:MLHC:317
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
Records would show that an FIR dated 21.05.2014 was lodged by
one Shri. Dorjee Wangdak informing the Officer-in-Charge of Lumdiengjri
Police Station, Shillong of a Motor accident which occurred on 08.05.2014 at
about 07:50 PM or so.
2.
It is the narration of the informant that his brother Shri. Ngawang
Gyaltsen, was returning home from Police Bazaar, Shillong riding his scooty
bearing registration No. ML-05-L-4231, on reaching MES point, near Military
Hospital, Shillong, all of a sudden, one motor bike (Pulsar) bearing
registration No. ML-05-K-7356 driven by Shri. Amit Shah, coming from the
opposite direction in a rash and negligent manner, dash against his brother’s
scooty, as a result of which, his brother sustained serious and grievous injuries
on the left side knee, hips and face for which, he was immediately removed to
Civil Hospital, Shillong for treatment. However, after one hour, he was
referred to Nazareth Hospital, Shillong, and after two days, he was then shifted
to Apollo Hospital, Chennai for specialize treatment.
3.
In due course, Smti. Tsering Dolma, wife of the injured, Shri.
Ngawang Gyalsten, filed an application under Section 163 of the Motor
Vehicle Act before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, East Khasi Hills,
Shillong, detailing the facts and circumstances of what had happened on the
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date of the incident and the consequent injuries sustained by her husband as a
result of such accident. A claim detailing the medical expenses, travelling
expenses, loss of earning/profit etc., amounting to ₹ 53,45,230/- (Rupees fiftythree lakhs forty-five thousand two hundred thirty) only was made,
demanding the same to be paid by the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., the insurer
of the said bike No. ML-05-K-7356 along with the owner of the said bike.
4.
Upon admission of the said claim application, both the insurance
company and the owner of the bike has contested the claim by filing respective
written statement. On the Tribunal framing relevant issues, evidence of the
claimant’s witnesses being recorded, the Opposite Parties declining to adduce
evidence on their part, the matter was taken up for final hearing. On
consideration of the argument of the parties, the learned Tribunal has then
passed the impugned judgement and award dated 25.10.2024 by which award
the Opposite Party/Insurance company was directed to pay a sum of ₹
12,93,787.11/- (Rupees twelve lakhs ninety three thousand seven hundred
eighty seven and eleven paise) only together with interest @ 8% per annum
from the date of filing of the claim petition that is, 18.08.2014 till payment of
the same.
5.
The Oriental Insurance Company being highly aggrieved and
dissatisfied with the said impugned judgment and award, has now approached
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this Court with this instant appeal with a prayer to set aside/modify the
impugned judgment and order on the grounds set out in the memo of appeal.
6.
Heard Mr. S. Jindal, learned counsel for the appellant/Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd., who has submitted that amongst other grounds made out
to assail the impugned judgment and award, the issue of maintainability of the
claim has also been raised.
7.
That since it was the husband of the claimant/respondent No. 1
herein who has sustained injuries in the said accident, therefore, it is the said
injured/husband who should have filed the claim petition. The provision of
Section 166(1) of the Motor Vehicle Act has been referred to, which provides
that an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature
specified in sub-Section (1) of section 165 may be made...(a) by the person
injured; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured… In this
case, the claimant/wife not being the injured herself or an agent in that sense,
the application at the first instance, cannot be sustained, submits the learned
counsel.
8.
The next issue raised by the learned counsel is that, in the
impugned judgment, the learned Tribunal has noted at para 24 that CW-3, the
Investigating Officer has stated that the pillion rider has recalled that at the
time of the accident, there was one unknown OMNI private car moving in the
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same direction which hit the bike and then hit the scooty which was coming
from the opposite direction and both the bike and the scooty fell down. This
aspect of the accident was completely overlooked by the Tribunal in evidence,
as by such statement, the cause of the accident and the fault thereof, can be
attributed to the driver of the said OMNI car, but what was held is that it was
the driver of the motorbike who was negligent and responsible for the said
accident. However, mere filing of a chargesheet without any concrete
evidence cannot make the bike owner/respondent No. 2 criminally liable for
the accident. Even, if there is such finding or evidence, the same cannot have
any bearing on the findings of the MACT as has been held in the case of
Mahita Dhanvati v. Phulwant Mahendra Singh, 1993 SCC Online MP 92,
para 10.
9.
Yet another issue raised is one involving the policy conditions,
which according to the learned counsel, has not been properly adjudicated by
the learned Tribunal, inasmuch as, on reaching a finding that there was a
breach of the condition of insurance policy by Opposite Party No. 2/Owner of
the motorbike/respondent No. 2 herein, such findings based on the evidence
that the said owner of the bike at the time of the accident was only holding a
learner licence, and though, there was also a pillion rider with him at that time,
yet there is no evidence that such pillion rider possessed a valid driving
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licence, hence a breach of the relevant policy condition has occurred.
However, inspite of such findings, the learned Tribunal instead of exonerating
the appellant/Insurance Company from any liability, has foisted the entire
liability upon the Insurance Company to pay the awarded amount, which is an
incorrect approach, submits the learned counsel. The case of United India
Co. Ltd v. Gian Chand, (1997) 7 SCC 558, para 10 as well as the case of
Ram Chandra Singh v. Rajaram (2018) 8 SCC 799 was referred to in this
regard.
10.
As to the amount of compensation awarded, the learned counsel
has submitted that firstly, the learned Tribunal has awarded an amount of ₹
11,03,787.11/- (Rupees eleven lakhs three thousand seven hundred eightyseven and eleven paise) only for medical treatment, travelling expenses and
accommodation at Chennai which did not match with the documents in record.
Secondly, the award of ₹ 60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand) only on account of
loss of income, taking the income of the injured as ₹ 10,000/- per month
without any proof of such monthly income, could not have been done so.
Under such circumstances, the thumb rule adopted by the courts is that the
notional income is to be calculated based on the minimum wages in force as
on the date of the accident, which have not been followed in this case. The
case of Shanti Devi v. Bhagwan Das in which vide order dated 06.04.2009,
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the Hon’ble Delhi High Court at para 8 & 9 has dealt with this issue has been
relied upon by the learned counsel.
11.
The learned counsel has also questioned the imposition of interest
@ 8% p.a. on the awarded amount from the date of filing of the claim by the
learned Tribunal to say that the same is not in conformity with the rate of
interest that has been judicially settled by this Court in the case of New India
Assurance Insurance Co. Ltd. V. Khein Kharsati, 2021 SCC Online Megh
218, para 26. As such, this Court may reduce the rate of interest to @ 6% per
annum or at most to @ 7% per annum.
12.
In view of the submission made, the learned counsel has urged that
the appellant/Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd cannot be fasten with the liability of
the award to pay compensation to the claimant/respondent No. 1 to the claim
filed under Section 166 M.V. Act,1988.
13.
Per contra, Mr. N.M. Mansuri, learned counsel for the
respondent/claimant, while defending the stand taken by the learned Tribunal
and the findings thereof, as has been indicated in the impugned judgment and
order, has submitted that the accident in question has resulted in injuries
sustained by the victim/injured. This fact has been proved through
documentary and oral documents including the FIR, medical report and also
the testimony of the Investigating Officer which would cover the case of the
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respondent/claimant to sustain a claim for compensation under Section 166 of
the Motor Vehicle Act 1988. As such, there is no dispute as to the
maintainability of the claim application.
14.
With regard to the issue of negligence, that the learned Tribunal
has come to a finding that the cause of the accident was due to the rash and
negligent driving of the owner of the motor bike who has dashed against the
injured husband of the claimant on 08.05.2014 at about 7:50 PM at MES point
near first gate of Military Hospital, Shillong, has also been proved through
cogent evidence.
15.
In this connection, the learned counsel has led this Court to the
evidence of the I/O who has deposed before the Tribunal as CW-3, when in
his examination in chief he has stated that “As per the sketch map I found the
scooty as well as the bike was parked in a corner of the road side 2 meters
away from the Military gate and on analyzing the debris found in the place of
occurrence was 2 meters away from the Military gate total width of the road
Nos. 12.70 meters and it was also evident that the bike bearing registration
No. ML-05-K-7356 was in a totally wrong side.
It was due to rushed (sic rash) and negligent driving of the rider of
the motor cycle bearing registration No. ML-05-K-7356 the accident took
place”.
2026:MLHC:317
16.
Even, from the evidence of the victim/injured himself, when he
has deposed before the Tribunal as CW-2 he has stated “…after closing my
shop in the evening I proceeded towards my resident at Mawbah Bazar,
Shillong on my Scooty and on reaching near MES point near first Gate
Military Hospital, Shillong, I noticed one Motor Bike bearing Registration
No. ML-05-K-7356 driven in high speed by Opposite Party No. 2 approaching
me from the opposite direction, dashed against my Scooty, resultantly I was
thrown up in the air and fell on the other side of the road adjacent to the
footpath and lost my complete consciousness…”. This evidence has not been
shaken or contradicted by the owner of the motor bike, as such, on this ground
alone, rash and negligent driving on the part of the rider of the motor bike has
been clearly established.
17.
As
to the contention of the learned counsel for the
appellant/Insurance Company that there was a breach of the policy condition,
that is, that the rider/owner of the said motor bike was not having a valid
driving licence, inasmuch as, he was only holding a learner’s licence,
therefore, for having breached the policy condition in this regard, the
appellant/Insurance Company is therefore not liable to be fastened with any
liability, even to the satisfaction of the awarded amount. As has been directed
by the learned Tribunal in the impugned judgment, the learned counsel has
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submitted that this contention cannot be sustained, since it is the consistent
view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in a number of judgments that mere
breach of a policy condition such as the absence of a proper driving licence,
would not absolve the insurer from its statutory liability, vis-à-vis, third
parties. The case of National Insurance Company Ltd., v. Swaran Singh,
AIR 2004 SC 1531, para 105 was referred too, to support his contention.
18.
While referring to the facts of the case of the parties herein, the
learned counsel has further submitted that the contention that a person holding
a learner licence must be accompanied by a person who is holding a valid
driving licence as contemplated under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988, and the
Central Motor Vehicle Rules, 1989, the same does not apply to drivers of a
motor cycle holding a learners licence. The learned counsel has submitted that,
this assertion has the backing of a related judgment of the Hon’ble Karnataka
High Court in the case of Senior Divisional Manager, National Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Shri Jyotiba Appaji Shigate and Ors., at para 10, 23, 24 and 28
of the same passed in Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 20655/2011 (MV),
Order dated 21.08.2019.
19.
Going further on this, the learned counsel has submitted that the
learned Tribunal on its own, had presumed that the pillion rider has no valid
licence inspite of no evidence produced in this respect.
2026:MLHC:317
20.
That the learned Tribunal has invoked the principle of pay and
recovery, being made applicable to the appellant/insurance company as far as
the said award is concerned, the learned counsel has submitted that even, if it
is clear that there was no breach of any policy condition, the fact that the
learned Tribunal has allowed the appellant insurance company to satisfy the
award at the first instance and then to recover the same from the insured/owner
of the motor bike, the same is a concession which should have been accepted
by the appellant/Insurance Company herein. The principle of pay and recover
in compensation cases arising out of a motor vehicle accident has also found
placed in many a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, for instance, in the
case of Swaran Singh (supra).
21.
The objection of the appellant/insurance company as regard the
quantum of compensation awarded, particularly the contention as to the
expenses said to have been incurred by the injured in course of his medical
treatment, including cost of accommodation, transportation (flight charges),
that the same does not tally with the documentary evidence, is also not wellfounded, since all the expenses incurred have been placed before the learned
Tribunal, and on calculation of the same, compensation was awarded towards
such expenses, as such, it cannot be said that there was wrongful gain by the
injured in this regard, submits the learned counsel.
2026:MLHC:317
22.
The learned counsel has then submitted that the amount of
compensation has not yet been paid to the injured or to the claimant, except in
course of proceedings a sum of ₹ 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) or so, has been
received by the injured.
23.
On the income of the injured, the learned counsel has submitted
that the injured is a businessman and his monthly income is definitely more
than ₹ 6,000 per month, the learned Tribunal has thought it fit to calculate his
monthly income @ ₹ 10,000/- per month, even though the claimant has sought
for calculation of monthly income @ ₹ 25,000/- per month.
24.
As far as the rate of interest awarded by the learned Tribunal, the
same sought to be reduced by the appellant herein, the learned counsel has
submitted that the claim application was filed way back in the year 2015, when
the rate of interest then was 7% per annum for savings account. Therefore, it
would not be prudent to reduce the rate of interest as awarded.
25.
In view of the above, the learned counsel has submitted that the
impugned judgment and award have been passed by the learned Tribunal after
meticulously appreciating both oral and documentary evidence on record,
such findings may therefore, not be disturbed by this Court.
26.
The case of the parties herein has been set out hereinabove, as
such, the facts need not be repeated, except if so required. This is a case where
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a motor vehicle accident involving the husband of the respondent
No.1/claimant, who was injured as a result thereof, has not been disputed. The
fact that a claim for compensation has been preferred before the Member,
Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Tribunal, Shillong with a prayer for
compensation for the cost of medical treatment of the injuries sustained as
well as other incidental costs is also a matter of records. That the learned
Tribunal has eventually allowed the prayer made in the impugned judgment
and award, is therefore the subject matter of this appeal.
27.
The first objection raised by the appellant/Insurance Company is
the issue of maintainability. That since the claim before the Tribunal has been
filed by the wife of the injured, who does not fit the description of an ‘Agent’
as per the provision of Section 164 of the MV Act, 1988, the claim has become
invalid, the application ought to have been dismissed on this ground alone was
the contention of the appellant.
28.
On the issue of maintainability, this Court has noticed that the
claim application has been preferred under Section 163 of the Motor Vehicle
Act, however Section 163 of the Act speaks of a scheme for payment of
compensation in case of hit and run motor accidents, which is not the case
herein. This is obviously an error committed by the claimant which at the
relevant point of time have not been raised before the Tribunal by any of the
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parties. This error would not be so material in the light of the manner in which
the proceedings have been carried out before the Tribunal, which for all intent
and purposes, have proceeded as one under Section 166.
29.
Section 166 of the Act provides for application for compensation,
inter-alia, by the person who has sustained the injury: or by any agent duly
authorised by the person injured….. In this case, in the evidence of the
claimant, she has clearly stated that she had filed the claim petition on behalf
of her injured husband on being duly authorised. The injured, in his evidence
as CW-2 has also stated that the claim application has been filed by his wife
since at the relevant point of time, he was recovering from his injuries and
was bedridden, as such, he has authorised his wife to file claim application.
30.
The learned counsel for the appellant has sought to qualify the
term ‘Agent’ as found in Section 166(1)(d) as a person employed to do any
act for another, and that in this case, the husband could not have employed his
wife to act on his behalf. However, the meaning is very clear, inasmuch as,
the wife of the injured husband has been authorised and employed, that is,
‘engaged’ to represent him in dealings with a third person. Therefore, there is
nothing forbidden or illegal as far as the conduct or the act of the said wife
(agent) is concerned. This Court would therefore hold that the claim
application is valid and maintainable in the manner in which it was filed.
2026:MLHC:317
31.
On the issue of negligence, the injured has deposed before the
Tribunal as CW-2. In his evidence, he has clearly narrated the manner in which
the accident had occurred, and has stated that at that time when he reached
near MES point, he noticed the said motor bike driven by the owner/opposite
party No. 2, coming at a high speed towards him and had dashed his scooty
resulting in him being thrown up in the air and falling to the other side of the
road, and soon after, he lost consciousness. This particular assertion has not
been specifically contradicted by the owner of the said motor bike or by the
Insurance Company in their respective cross examination. Therefore, the
testimony of the injured as CW-2 has to be taken as a testimony of an eyewitness. Such witness has to be considered a sterling witness and his evidence
to be accepted as wholly reliable. Accordingly, even on this ground, the issue
of rash and negligent driving has to be decided to pinpoint the same to no one
else, except to the owner of the said motor bike.
32.
Again, on the issue of breach of policy conditions that is, that the
appellant/Insurance Company is not liable to pay compensation or to
indemnify the loss said to be incurred by the owner of the said motor bike on
the ground that he has violated the policy condition, wherein since he was
admittedly having only a learner’s diving licence at the time of the accident,
there is no proof that he was accompanied by a person holding an effective
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driving licence at the time of an accident. Thus, the requirement said out in
Rule 3(b) of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, has been violated, the
same which reads as follows:
“3. General. —The provisions of sub-section (1) of section 3 shall
not apply to a person while receiving instructions or gaining
experience in driving with the object of presenting himself for a
test of competence to drive, so long as—
….(b) such person is accompanied by an instructor
holding an effective driving licence to drive the vehicle and such
instructor is sitting in such a position to control or stop the
vehicle.”
33.
The response of the respondent No.1/claimant to this, that is, that
although the said rules mandates that a person holding a learner driving
licence must be accompanied by an instructor or a duly licence driver seated
beside him, such rule does not apply in case of a person holding a learner’s
driving licence who is riding a motor cycle. The practicality of it, is that, it is
not possible even for a person who is an instructor or one who is holding a
valid driving licence to be seated as a pillion rider in a motor cycle and from
his situation to be able to control the said motor cycle while in motion. The
reference to the case of Jyotiba Appaji Shigate (supra) at para 24 of the same,
wherein the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court has observed that the proviso to
Rule 3 (supra) would be applicable only to a person who holds a learner’s
licence for a motor vehicle, but not a motor cycle, is also found acceptable by
this Court.
2026:MLHC:317
34.
The offshoot of this, is whether a person who holds a learner
licence can be considered as one who holds a valid driving licence, the answer
to this is ‘yes’. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Swaran Singh
(supra) at para 88 and 105 (viii) has observed as follows:
“88. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for grant of learner's
licence. (See Section 4(3), Section 7(2), Section 10(3) and Section
14). A learner's licence is, thus, also a licence within the meaning
of the provisions of the said Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that
a vehicle when being driven by a learner subject to the conditions
mentioned in the licence, he would not be a person who is not duly
licensed resulting in conferring a right on the insurer to avoid the
claim of the third party. It cannot be said that a person holding a
learner's licence is not entitled to drive the vehicle. Even if there
exists a condition in the contract of insurance that the vehicle
cannot be driven by a person holding a learner's licence, the same
would run counter to the provisions of Section 149(2) of the said
Act.
105. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised
in these petitions are as follows:
`````(viii) If a vehicle at the time of accident was driven by
a person having a learner's licence, the insurance companies would
be liable to satisfy the decree.”
35.
Under such circumstances, it can be said that there is no breach of
any policy conditions by the insured who was holding a valid licence (albeit
a learner licence) at the time of the said accident. For his negligence, the
insurer is liable under the principle of vicarious liability. There being no
contest as to the fact that the said motor cycle in question was insured with
the appellant/Insurance Company at the relevant period, the same being duly
valid, therefore, for the liability initially fasten upon the insured motor cycle,
2026:MLHC:317
the Insurer/Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. is liable to indemnify such liability,
vis-à-vis, the claimant or by extension, the injured herein.
36.
Having established the fact that the appellant/Insurance Company
is liable to satisfy the award of compensation as has been made by the
Tribunal, the objection of the appellant as to the amount of expenditure
expended by the injured, this Court, on perusal of the manner in which the
Tribunal has calculated the said amount based on the bills and vouchers
produced by the claimant, there appears to be no fault on the part of the
Tribunal in reaching such conclusion. Accordingly, the same is hereby
accepted as it is. Even the award made on non-pecuniary loss, such as, loss of
income, award on account of pain and suffering etc., this too deserves no
modification by this Court.
37.
However, as to the rate of interest imposed by the Tribunal, this
Court would agree with the learned counsel for the appellant/Insurance
Company as well as on the basis of the prevailing economic condition of the
Country, that the rate of interest awarded should be 7% per annum instead of
8% per annum as has been awarded. To the amount awarded as fair
compensation, the same will also carry an interest of 7% per annum from the
date of filing of the claim application till payment of the same.
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38.
As has been observed hereinabove, in the final analysis, this Court
finds that the award of compensation as has been calculated by the Tribunal is
found just and proper, the same is hereby maintained. However, as to who is
liable to satisfy the same, under the circumstances, the appellant/Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd is found liable to satisfy the same. To this extent, the
impugned judgment is modified accordingly.
39.
Therefore, the total amount on being calculated including interest
thereon is to be paid to the claimant/respondent No.1 by the appellant/Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd., within 45(forty-five) days from the date of receipt of the
certified copy of this order.
40.
In view of the above, this appeal is hereby disposed of. No costs.
41.
Registry to return back the Lower Court case record.
Judge
DARIKORDOR NARY
Date: 2026.04.09 16:41:23 IST
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