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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 24.02.2026
+
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & I.A. 5107/2026 (For Dir.)
ORIENTAL FOUNDRY PRIVATE LIMITED
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. R. Sudhinder, Mr. Ashish
Mukhi, Mr. Sanidhya Sonthalia
and Mr. Kanishk Pandey,
Advocates.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR.
Through:
+
.....Respondents
Mr. Shashank Dixit, CGSC
along with Mr. Kunal Raj,
Advocate.
ARB.P. 354/2026
ORIENTAL FOUNDRY PVT LTD
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. R. Sudhinder, Mr. Ashish
Mukhi, Mr. Sanidhya Sonthalia
and Mr. Kanishk Pandey,
Advocates.
versus
UNIION OF INDIA
Through:
.....Respondent
Ms.
Shambhavi
Sharma,
Government Pleader.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
ARB.P. 354/2026
1.
The present Petition, filed under Section 11(6) of the
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeks appointment of a
Sole Arbitrator for the purpose of resolution of disputes that are stated
to have arisen inter se the parties under Contract bearing No.
2024/RS(l)/954/207/1940 dated 01.08.2024, in terms of the Clause 18
contained therein, which has to be read with the Clause 2905(b) of the
Annexure A to the Railway Board Letter No. 2018/TF/Civil/
Arbitration policy dated 12.12.2018 and which read as follows:
“18.0 Settlement of Disputes (Arbitration): The contract will be
governed by the arbitration clause with amendments as specified
in the Railway Board‟s letter No. 2018/TF/Civil/Arbitration
Policy dated 12.12.2018.
CLAUSE 2905(b)
2905(b): Appointment of Arbitrator where applicability of
Section 12 (5) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act has not
been waived off:
(i)
In cases where the total value of all claims in question
added together does not exceed Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees
Fifty Lakh only), the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a
Retired Railway Officer, retired not below the rank of
Senior Administrative (Trade Officer, as the arbitrntor.
For this purpose, the Railway will send a panel of at least
four (4) names of retired Railway Officer(s) empanelled to
work as Railway Arbitrator duly indicating their
retirement dates to the Contractor within 60 days from the
day when a written and valid demand for arbitration is
received by the General Manager.
Contractor will be asked to suggest to General Manager at
least 2 names out of the panel for appointment as
arbitrator within 30 days from the date of dispatch of the
request by Railway, the General Manager shall appoint at
least one out of them as the arbitrator.
(ii)
In cases where the total value of all claims in question
added together exceeds Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rurees Fifty
Lakh only), the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of three (3)
retired Railway Officers, retired not below the rank of
Senior Administrative Grade Officer. For this purpose, the
Railway will send a panel of at least four (4) names of
retired Railway Officer(s) empanelled to work as Railway
Arbitrators duly indicating their retirement date to the
Act
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
Contractor within 60 days from the day when a written
and valid demand for arbitration is received by the
General Manager.
Contractor will be asked to suggest to General Manager at
least 2 names out of the panel for appointment as
Contractor‟s nominee within 30 days from the date of
dispach of the request by Railway. The Genreal Manager
shall appoint at least one out of them as the Contractor‟s
nominee and will, also simultaneously appoint the balance
number of arbitrators either from the panel or from outside
the panel, duly indicating the „Presiding Arbitrator‟ from
amongst the 3 arbitratorts so appointed. General Manager
shall complete this exercise of appointing the Arbitral
Triunal within 30 days from the receipt of the names of
Contractor‟s nominees. While nominating the arbitrators,
it will be necessary to ensure that one of them has served
in the Accounts Department.”
2.
Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that the Notice
under Section 21 of the Act is dated 05.01.2026.
3.
Learned counsel for the Respondents submits that the
Respondents have no objection if the present dispute is referred to
arbitration.
4.
At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the legal position
governing the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section
11(6) of the Act is no longer res integra. A three-Judge Bench of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court in SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish
Spinning2,
after
taking
into
consideration
the
authoritative
pronouncement of the seven-Judge Bench in Interplay Between
Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration Act, 1996 & Stamp
Act, 1899, In re3, comprehensively delineated the contours of judicial
intervention at the stage of Section 11of the Act. The excerpt of Krish
Spg (supra) reads as under:-
(2024) 12 SCC 1
(2024) 6 SCC 1
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
“(c) Judicial interference under the 1996 Act
110. The parties have been conferred with the power to decide and
agree on the procedure to be adopted for appointing arbitrators. In
cases where the agreed upon procedure fails, the courts have been
vested with the power to appoint arbitrators upon the request of a
party, to resolve the deadlock between the parties in appointing the
arbitrators.
111. Section 11 of the 1996 Act is provided to give effect to the
mutual intention of the parties to settle their disputes by arbitration
in situations where the parties fail to appoint an arbitrator(s). The
parameters of judicial review laid down for Section 8 differ from
those prescribed for Section 11. The view taken in SBP &
Co. v. Patel Engg. Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618 and affirmed in Vidya
Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 that Sections 8
and 11, respectively, of the 1996 Act are complementary in nature
was legislatively overruled by the introduction of Section 11(6-A)
in 2015. Thus, although both these provisions intend to compel
parties to abide by their mutual intention to arbitrate, yet the scope
of powers conferred upon the courts under both the sections are
different.
112. The difference between Sections 8 and 11, respectively, of the
1996 Act is also evident from the scope of these provisions. Some
of these differences are:
112.1. While Section 8 empowers any “judicial authority” to refer
the parties to arbitration, under Section 11, the power to refer has
been exclusively conferred upon the High Court and the Supreme
Court.
112.2. Under Section 37, an appeal lies against the refusal of the
judicial authority to refer the parties to arbitration, whereas no such
provision for appeal exists for a refusal under Section 11.
112.3. The standard of scrutiny provided under Section 8 is that of
prima facie examination of the validity and existence of an
arbitration agreement. Whereas, the standard of scrutiny under
Section 11 is confined to the examination of the existence of the
arbitration agreement.
112.4. During the pendency of an application under Section 8,
arbitration may commence or continue and an award can be passed.
On the other hand, under Section 11, once there is failure on the
part of the parties in appointing the arbitrator as per the agreed
procedure and an application is preferred, no arbitration
proceedings can commence or continue.
113. The scope of examination under Section 11(6-A) is confined
to the existence of an arbitration agreement on the basis of Section
7. The examination of validity of the arbitration agreement is also
limited to the requirement of formal validity such as the
requirement that the agreement should be in writing.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
114. The use of the term “examination” under Section 11(6-A) as
distinguished from the use of the term “rule” under Section 16
implies that the scope of enquiry under Section 11(6-A) is limited
to a prima facie scrutiny of the existence of the arbitration
agreement, and does not include a contested or laborious enquiry,
which is left for the Arbitral Tribunal to “rule” under Section 16.
The prima facie view on existence of the arbitration agreement
taken by the Referral Court does not bind either the Arbitral
Tribunal or the Court enforcing the arbitral award.
115. The aforesaid approach serves a twofold purpose — firstly, it
allows the Referral Court to weed out non-existent arbitration
agreements, and secondly, it protects the jurisdictional competence
of the Arbitral Tribunal to rule on the issue of existence of the
arbitration agreement in depth.
****
117. In view of the observations made by this Court in Interplay
Between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration Act, 1996
& the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1, it is clear that the
scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited
to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to
hold that the observations made inVidya Drolia v. Durga Trading
Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1 and adopted inNTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra
Ltd., (2023) 9 SCC 385 that the jurisdiction of the Referral Court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent
decision inInterplay Between Arbitration Agreements under the
Arbitration Act, 1996 & the Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC
1.
****
119. The question of “accord and satisfaction”, being a mixed
question of law and fact, comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Arbitral Tribunal, if not otherwise agreed upon between the
parties. Thus, the negative effect of competence-competence would
require that the matter falling within the exclusive domain of the
Arbitral Tribunal, should not be looked into by the Referral Court,
even for a prima facie determination, before the Arbitral Tribunal
first has had the opportunity of looking into it.
120. By referring disputes to arbitration and appointing an
arbitrator by exercise of the powers under Section 11, the Referral
Court upholds and gives effect to the original understanding of the
contracting parties that the specified disputes shall be resolved by
arbitration. Mere appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal does not in
any way mean that the Referral Court is diluting the sanctity of
“accord and satisfaction” or is allowing the claimant to walk back
on its contractual undertaking. On the contrary, it ensures that the
principle of arbitral autonomy is upheld and the legislative intent of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
minimum judicial interference in arbitral proceedings is given full
effect. Once the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted, it is always open
for the defendant to raise the issue of “accord and satisfaction”
before it, and only after such an objection is rejected by the
Arbitral Tribunal, that the claims raised by the claimant can be
adjudicated.
121. Tests like the “eye of the needle” and “ex facie meritless”,
although try to minimise the extent of judicial interference, yet they
require the Referral Court to examine contested facts and
appreciate prima facie evidence (however limited the scope of
enquiry may be) and thus are not in conformity with the
principles of modern arbitration which place arbitral autonomy and
judicial non-interference on the highest pedestal.
122. Appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal at the stage of Section 11
petition also does not mean that the Referral Courts forego any
scope of judicial review of the adjudication done by the Arbitral
Tribunal. The 1996 Act clearly vests the national courts with the
power of subsequent review by which the award passed by an
arbitrator may be subjected to challenge by any of the parties to the
arbitration.
*****
126. The power available to the Referral Courts has to be construed
in the light of the fact that no right to appeal is available against
any order passed by the Referral Court under Section 11 for either
appointing or refusing to appoint an arbitrator. Thus, by delving
into the domain of the Arbitral Tribunal at the nascent stage of
Section 11, the Referral Courts also run the risk of leaving the
claimant in a situation wherein it does not have any forum to
approach for the adjudication of its claims, if its Section 11
application is rejected.
127. Section 11 also envisages a time-bound and expeditious
disposal of the application for appointment of arbitrator. One of the
reasons for this is also the fact that unlike Section 8, once an
application under Section 11 is filed, arbitration cannot commence
until the Arbitral Tribunal is constituted by the Referral Court. This
Court, on various occasions, has given directions to the High
Courts for expeditious disposal of pending Section 11 applications.
It has also directed the litigating parties to refrain from filing bulky
pleadings in matters pertaining to Section 11. Seen thus, if the
Referral Courts go into the details of issues pertaining to “accord
and satisfaction” and the like, then it would become rather difficult
to achieve the objective of expediency and simplification of
pleadings.
128. We are also of the view that ex facie frivolity and dishonesty
in litigation is an aspect which the Arbitral Tribunal is equally, if
not more, capable to decide upon the appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the parties. We say so because the Arbitral Tribunal
has the benefit of going through all the relevant evidence and
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
pleadings in much more detail than the Referral Court. If the
Referral Court is able to see the frivolity in the litigation on the
basis of bare minimum pleadings, then it would be incorrect to
doubt that the Arbitral Tribunal would not be able to arrive at the
same inference, most likely in the first few hearings itself, with the
benefit of extensive pleadings and evidentiary material.”
(emphasis supplied)
5.
The decision in Krish Spinning (supra) thus unequivocally
reiterates that the Referral Court, while exercising jurisdiction under
Section 11 of the Act, is required to confine itself to a prima facie
examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and nothing
beyond. The Court‟s role is facilitative and procedural, namely, to give
effect to the parties‟ agreed mechanism of dispute resolution when it
has failed, without embarking upon an adjudication of contentious
factual or legal issues, which are reserved for the Arbitral Tribunal.
6.
In view of the consensus of the parties, this Court is of the view
that the matter may be referred to arbitration for the purpose of the
resolution of disputes as between the parties.
7.
Material on record indicates that the valuation of the present
dispute is stated to be approximately Seven (7) Crores.
8.
Accordingly, Mr. Shashank Garg, Senior Advocate (Mobile
No. +91-9811526671), is appointed as the Arbitrator to adjudicate the
disputes inter se the parties.
9.
The learned Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration
proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite
disclosures as required under Section 12(2) of the Act.
10.
The learned Arbitrator shall be entitled to a fee in accordance
with the Fourth Schedule of the Act.
11.
The parties shall share the learned Arbitrator's fee and arbitral
costs equally.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
12.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
13.
Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy.
Let a copy of the said order be sent to the learned Arbitrator through
the electronic mode as well.
14.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the above-stated terms.
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & I.A. 5107/2026 (For Dir.)
15.
The present Petition has been filed under Section 9 of the Act,
seeking the following interim reliefs:
“a. Direct the Respondent No.1 to maintain status quo and not take
any coercive/precipitative steps, including invocation/encashment
of
bank
guarantee
dated
24.07.2024
being
B.G.
No.7124IGP006076824 issued by Respondent No.2 for an amount
of Rs. 7,20,26,700/- (Rupees Seven Crore Twenty Lakhs TwentySix Thousand Seven Hundred Only) pursuant to the Amendment
Letter No. IV dated 08.12.2025 issued by it till the time an arbitral
tribunal is constituted and an application under Section 17 of the
Arbitration Act is filed before it by the Petitioner;
b. Direct the Respondent No.2 not to encash bank guarantee dated
24.07.2024 being B.G. No. 7124IGP006076824 issued by
Respondent No.2 for an amount of Rs. 7,20,26,700/- (Rupees
Seven Crore Twenty Lakhs Twenty-Six Thousand Seven Hundred
Only);
c. Direct the Respondent No.1 to maintain status quo and not take
any coercive/precipitative steps, including invocation/encashment
of bank guarantee dated 23.07.2025 being B.G. No.
71241GP002321425 issued by the Respondent No.2 for an amount
of Rs. 7,20,26,700/- (Rupees Seven Crore Twenty Lakhs TwentySix Thousand Seven Hundred Only) issued by it till the time an
arbitral tribunal is constituted and an application under Section 17
of the Arbitration Act is filed before it by the Petitioner;
d. Direct the Respondent No.2 not to encash bank guarantee dated
23.07.2025 being B.G. No. 71241GP002321425 issued by the
Respondent No.2 for an amount of Rs. 7,20,26,700/- (Rupees
Seven Crore Twenty Lakhs Twenty-Six Thousand Seven Hundred
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
Only)
e. In the alternate if the bank guarantees have been invoked and
encashed prior to the present application being heard, directing the
Respondent No. 1 to deposit before this Hon'ble Court an amount
of Rs. 7,20,26,700/- (Rupees Seven Crore Twenty Lakhs TwentySix Thousand Seven Hundred Only);
f. ad-interim and ex-parte orders in terms of prayer (a) to (e) above;
g. for cost of this Petition; and
h. Pass such other and further order(s) as may be deemed foand
probe in the facts and circumstances of the present case.”
16.
Since a learned Arbitrator has already been appointed this
Petition shall be treated as an application under Section 17 of the Act,
and the learned Arbitrator shall consider and decide the same. Interim
Order dated 12.12.2025 to continue till the Application under Section
17 is adjudicated upon by the learned Arbitrator.
17.
The present Petition along with pending application(s), if any, is
disposed of accordingly.
18.
A photocopy of the Order passed today be kept in the connected
matters.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 24, 2026/tk/va
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
12:30:07
O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 507/2025 & connected matter
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