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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 13th JANUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+
O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 126/2025 & I.A. 31564/2025
OIL AND NATURAL GAS CORPORATION LTD .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Chetan Sharma, ASG, Mr. R. V.
Prabhat, Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr.
Shubham Sharma, Mr. Vikramaditya
Singh, Mr. Yash Wardhan Sharma,
Mr. Naman, Mr. Daksh Pandit, Mr.
Neeraj Paulose Raj, Advs. and Mr.
Bharat Pandey, Legal Officer
versus
PLANETCAST TECHNOLOGIES LTD
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Anshu Mahajan with Ms. Anjali
Sharma, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1.
The present Petition under Section 14(2) read with Section 32(2)(c) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, (hereinafter referred to as „the
Arbitration Act‟) has been filed by the Petitioner seeking termination of the
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal as well as the arbitration proceedings.
2.
It is the case of the Petitioner that the Arbitral Tribunal has failed to
act in accordance with the mandate of the Arbitration Act which provides
for speedy and cost effective mode of dispute resolution.
3.
Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts, in brief, leading to the present
Petition are as under:
a.
The Petitioner, which is a Public Sector Undertaking, awarded a
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contract to the Respondent for setting up of Point to Multi Point
Radio System for North East and Southern Assets of ONGC to
provide communication facilities in remote areas of North East
and Southern Assets. It is stated that the Contract Agreement
was entered into on 31.07.2012.
b.
It is stated that disputes arose between the parties regarding the
mode and manner of the execution of the contract and the
Petitioner herein terminated the Contract and invoked the bank
guarantees deposited by the Respondent. It is stated that Clause
1.3.22 of the Contract Agreement contains an Arbitration
Clause which provides that disputes arising between the parties
under the Agreement shall be decided by means of Arbitration.
c.
It is stated that Respondent herein filed a Petition under Section
9 of the Arbitration Act challenging the invocation of the Bank
Guarantee by the Petitioner. On 12.03.2015, the Respondent
herein issued a Notice under Section 21 of the Arbitration Act,
invoking Arbitration in accordance with the Arbitration Clause.
Accordingly, a three member Arbitral Tribunal was constituted
to adjudicate upon the disputes which have arisen between the
parties.
d.
The Arbitral Tribunal entered reference on 28.01.2016.
Pleadings were completed on 31.08.2016. Cross-examination of
the Petitioner’s witness was concluded on 13.02.2019. On
08.05.2019, the Arbitral Tribunal directed the parties to file
written submissions within nine months. The Arbitral Tribunal
fixed the dates of arguments on 06.03.2021. However, Covid-
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19 pandemic struck and subsequent hearings were cancelled.
e.
It is stated that after the period of Covid-19 pandemic was over,
on 23.02.2022 the Arbitral Tribunal informed the parties that
despite the Orders of the arbitral Tribunal, written submissions
on behalf of the parties have not been filed. The Arbitral
Tribunal informed the parties that dates for arguments will be
finalised only after written submissions are filed by the parties.
f.
For more than three years there was a complete silence on the
part of the Arbitral Tribunal and on the part of the parties. On
24.08.2025, the Nominee Arbitrator of the Petitioner herein
wrote an e-mail to the Presiding Arbitrator and marked the
same to the Nominee Arbitrator of the Respondent herein and to
the learned Counsels for the parties as well, requesting the
Presiding Arbitrator that since about nine years have elapsed
and written submissions have yet not been filed by the parties, it
would be appropriate to give a seven days’ notice to the parties
for closure of the Arbitral proceedings.
g.
On 25.08.2025, the Presiding Arbitrator resigned from his
position.
h.
By an e-mail dated 25.08.2025, the Nominee Arbitrator of the
Petitioner herein directed the parties to take necessary steps for
reconstitution of the Arbitral Tribunal. The said mail
specifically states that “In case the parties are desirous of
continuing the arbitral proceedings, then may take steps
necessary for reconstitution of the tribunal.” Vide e-mail dated
26.08.2025, learned Counsel for the Respondent/Claimant,
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acknowledged the gross delay in filing the Written Submissions
by both the parties and tendered his unqualified apology for the
same and beseeched the Presiding Arbitrator not to resign from
the Tribunal as that would delay the Arbitration proceedings. In
the same mail it was also prayed that a week’s time be given to
the parties to file their written submissions and post the matter
for hearing thereafter.
i.
Vide another e-mail dated 29.08.2025, the Nominee Arbitrator
of the Petitioner informed the parties that they can initiate the
process of nominating the Presiding Arbitrator only if a joint
request is received from the Counsels of both the parties or their
authorised representatives.
j.
Vide e-mail dated 17.09.2025 the Nominee Arbitrator of the
Petitioner informed the parties that they have received a
communication from the learned Counsel for the Petitioner
wherein the learned Counsel for the Petitioner had sought
discharge from the matter and had also sought for 20 days’ time
on behalf of the Petitioner to engage another Counsel. The
newly appointed Counsel for the Petitioner sent an email dated
12.11.2025 to the Nominee Arbitrators objecting to any further
steps being taken by the Nominee Arbitrators for appointment
of a Presiding Arbitrator or revival of the arbitral proceedings.
In the said e-mail it is stated that the arbitral proceedings be
treated as having lapsed or infructuous and/or abandoned in
light of the prolonged delay and resignation of the Presiding
Arbitrator.
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k.
The Co-Arbitrators have sent an e-mail dated 10.12.2025 to
Justice Swatanter Kumar, Former Judge of the Supreme Court
of India, nominating him as the Presiding Arbitrator. In the said
e-mail it was further informed that Justice Swatanter Kumar has
accepted the nomination.
l.
It is this communication which has resulted in filing of the
present Petition.
4.
Learned ASG appearing for the Petitioner submits that the Arbitral
Tribunal has delayed the proceedings and that continuation of the arbitral
proceedings has become unnecessary and impossible. He states that the
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal has to be terminated and the Nominee
Arbitrators cannot be permitted to appoint the Presiding Arbitrator. Learned
Counsel for the Petitioner places reliance on Dani Wooltex Corpn. v. Sheil
Properties (P) Ltd., (2024) 7 SCC 1, and Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder
Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2742, to substantiate his contention.
5.
Per contra, learned Counsel for the Respondent states that the
Petitioner has itself not filed the written submissions and it cannot take
advantage of its own wrong and then seek for termination of the mandate of
the Arbitral Tribunal. He states that it is very unfair on the part of the
Petitioner for praying for termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal
after being the defaulting party itself.
6.
Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on
record.
7.
The Courts have consistently emphasized the necessity of speedy
conclusion of the Arbitral proceedings. The purpose of the arbitration is to
provide a fair, speedy and inexpensive trial by the arbitral tribunal.
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Unnecessary delay or expenses frustrates the very purpose of the Arbitration
Act. The Apex Court in Dani Wooltex Corpn. (supra) has observed as under:
“12. The Arbitration Act has two provisions for
terminating an arbitrator's mandate. Sections 14 and
15 are the relevant sections. The arbitrator is
empowered to withdraw from his office, which
terminates his mandate. However, the arbitral
proceedings continue by the arbitrator's substitution.
*****
14. On a conjoint reading of Sections 14 and 15, it is
apparent that an arbitrator always has the option to
withdraw for any reason. Therefore, he can withdraw
because of the parties' non-cooperation in the
proceedings. But in such a case, his mandate will be
terminated, not the arbitral proceedings.
15. Now, we come to Section 32 of the Arbitration Act,
which reads thus:
“32. Termination of proceedings.—(1) The arbitral
proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral
award or by an order of the Arbitral Tribunal under
sub-section (2).
(2) The Arbitral Tribunal shall issue an order for
the termination of the arbitral proceedings
where—
(a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the
respondent objects to the order and the Arbitral
Tribunal recognises a legitimate interest on his
part in obtaining a final settlement of the
dispute,
(b) the parties agree on the termination of the
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proceedings, or
(c) the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the
continuation of the proceedings has for any
other reason become unnecessary or
impossible.
(3) Subject to Section 33 and sub-section (4) of
Section 34, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal
shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral
proceedings.”
(emphasis supplied)
16. Section 32 provides for the termination of the
arbitral proceedings in the following contingencies:
(a) On making final arbitral award;
(b) On the claimant withdrawing his claim as
provided under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of
Section 32;
(c) Parties agreeing on termination of arbitral
proceedings as provided under clause (b) of subsection (2) of Section 32; or
(d) When the Arbitral Tribunal finds that the
continuation of proceedings has become
unnecessary or impossible for any other reason,
as provided under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of
Section 32.
17. Therefore, clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section
32 can be invoked for reasons other than those
mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 32 and clauses
(a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of Section 32. Under
clause (c), the mere existence of a reason for
terminating the proceedings is not sufficient. The
reason must be such that the continuation of the
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proceedings has become unnecessary or impossible. In
a given case, when a claimant files a claim and does
not attend the proceedings, clause (a) of Section 25
comes into operation, resulting in the learned
arbitrator terminating the proceedings. If, after filing a
claim, the claimant fails to appear at an oral hearing
or fails to produce documentary evidence, it cannot be
said that the continuation of proceedings has become
unnecessary. If the claimant fails to appear at an oral
hearing after filing the claim, in view of clause (c) of
Section 25, the learned arbitrator can proceed with the
arbitral proceedings. The fact that clause (c) of Section
25 enables the Arbitral Tribunal to proceed in the
absence of the claimant shows the legislature's
intention that the claimant's failure to appear after
filing the claim cannot be a ground to say that the
proceedings have become unnecessary or impossible.
*****
25. To conclude:
25.1. The power under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of
Section 32 of the Arbitration Act can be exercised only
if, for some reason, the continuation of proceedings
has become unnecessary or impossible. Unless the
Arbitral Tribunal records its satisfaction based on the
material on record that proceedings have become
unnecessary or impossible, the power under clause (c)
of sub-section (2) of Section 32 cannot be exercised. If
the said power is exercised casually, it will defeat the
very object of enacting the Arbitration Act;
25.2. It is the Arbitral Tribunal's duty to fix a meeting
for hearing even if parties to the proceedings do not
make such a request. It is the duty of the Arbitral
Tribunal to adjudicate upon the dispute referred to it.
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If, on a date fixed for a meeting/hearing, the parties
remain absent without any reasonable cause, the
Arbitral Tribunal can always take recourse to the
relevant provisions of the Arbitration Act, such as
Section 25;
25.3. The failure of the claimant to request the Arbitral
Tribunal to fix a date for hearing, per se, is no ground
to conclude that the proceedings have become
unnecessary; and
25.4. The abandonment of the claim by a claimant can
be a ground to invoke clause (c) of sub-section (2) of
Section 32. The abandonment of the claim can be
either express or implied. The abandonment cannot be
readily inferred. There is an implied abandonment
when admitted or proved facts are so clinching that the
only inference which can be drawn is of the
abandonment. Only if the established conduct of a
claimant is such that it leads only to one conclusion
that the claimant has given up his/her claim can an
inference of abandonment be drawn. Even if it is to be
implied, there must be convincing circumstances on
record which lead to an inevitable inference about the
abandonment. Only because a claimant, after filing his
statement of claim, does not move the Arbitral Tribunal
to fix a date for the hearing, the failure of the claimant,
per se, will not amount to the abandonment of the
claim.”
8.
The issue which arises in the present case as to whether this Court
should terminate the arbitral proceedings because one of the parties does not
want the Nominee Arbitrator to proceed further and appoint the Presiding
Arbitrator. There are only four provisions which speak of termination of
arbitral proceedings by an arbitrator and those are Section 25 (a), Section 30
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(2), Section 32 and Section 38 of the Arbitration Act. The issue as to how
the arbitration proceedings are terminated is no longer res integra and has
been decided by the Apex Court in Harshbir Singh Pannu (supra) has held
has under:
“48. Before we proceed to consider whether the order
of termination of the arbitral proceedings for nonpayment of fees passed by the Sole Arbitrator could be
said to be contrary to law, more particularly, the
decision of this Court in Afcons (supra), we must first
try to understand what is the meaning and effect of
“termination of arbitral proceedings” under the Act,
1996.
49. The Act, 1996 nowhere defines the expression
“termination”
or
“termination
of
arbitral
proceedings”. However, these expressions are referred
to in numerous instances within the Act, which we shall
outline hereinafter.
50. Under the Act, 1996 there are only four provisions
which speak of termination of arbitral proceedings by
an arbitrator, those being, Section 25 sub-section (a),
Section 30 sub-section (2), Section 32 and Section 38,
respectively.
51. We must first look into Section 25 of the Act, 1996.
The same reads as under:—
“25. Default of a party.—
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, where,
without showing sufficient cause,—
(a) the claimant fails to communicate his
statement of claim in accordance with sub-section
(1) of section 23, the arbitral tribunal shall
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terminate the proceedings;
(b) the respondent fails to communicate his
statement of defence in accordance with subsection (1) of section 23, the arbitral tribunal
shall continue the proceedings without treating
that failure in itself as an admission of the
allegations by the claimant and shall have the
discretion to treat the right of the respondent to
file such statement of defence as having been
forfeited.
(c) a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or to
produce documentary evidence, the arbitral
tribunal may continue the proceedings and make
the arbitral award on the evidence before it.”
52. Section 25 sub-section (a) of the Act, 1996,
provides for the termination of arbitral proceedings by
an arbitrator on the ground of default on the part of
the claimant. It stipulates that, where a claimant fails
to provide a statement of his claim(s) in terms of
Section 23, without showing any sufficient cause for
such failure, the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the
proceedings.
53. Section 25 sub-section(s) (b) and (c) further clarify
that, any default in filing of the statement of defence by
the respondent or a default in appearance or
production of any evidence, respectively, shall not
constitute a ground for termination of the arbitral
proceedings.
54. The expression “the arbitral tribunal shall
terminate the proceedings” used in sub-section (a)
Section 25 indicates that in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary, it would be mandatory for
the arbitral tribunal to terminate the arbitral
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proceedings, where the claimant defaults in either
filing or communicating its statement of claim(s) in the
manner provided under Section 23 of the Act, 1996.
55. On the other hand, the words “the arbitral tribunal
shall continue the proceedings” employed in subsection (b) of Section 25 indicates that, if the
respondent fails to either file or communicate its
statement of defence, the same shall not be ground to
terminate the proceedings, and the arbitral tribunal
would be mandatorily required to continue the
proceedings.
56. Whilst continuing with the proceedings, it would be
within the discretion of the arbitral tribunal to either
forfeit the right of the respondent to file its statement of
defence, or to permit the filing of the same by
condoning the default, if sufficient cause is shown.
However, any failure in filing of the statement of
defence, shall not be treated as an admission of the
allegations by the claimant.
57. The purport behind requiring the arbitral tribunal
to continue with the proceedings, even when the
respondent chooses to not file its statement of defence,
is to ensure that the arbitral proceedings are not
frustrated by any devious respondent, who may not be
inclined to have the adjudication reach its logical
conclusion. It is to prevent the arbitration process from
being abused and subverted by a party who, through
deliberate inaction, seeks to impede its culmination.
58. Lastly, Section 25 sub-section (c) deals with a
situation, where any party either fails to appear before
the arbitral tribunal or produce any documentary
evidence, that may be required by the arbitral tribunal.
In such a scenario, the said provision empowers the
arbitral tribunal to continue with the proceeding, and
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pass an award based on the evidence before it,
irrespective of the non-appearance of any party or the
non-production of any evidence.
59. The use of the expression “may continue the
proceedings and make the arbitral award” in Section
25 sub-section (c) is particularly noteworthy.
60. Unlike sub-section(s) (a) and (b), which expressly
provide the consequence of any default by the parties
in complying with the requirements laid down therein,
namely, that the arbitral proceedings shall terminate
and shall not terminate, respectively, Section 25 subsection (c) is conspicuously silent on any such
consequence.
61. Even though Section 25 sub-section (c), by use of
the word “may”, leaves it to the wisdom of the arbitral
tribunal to continue the proceedings and make an
award, it nowhere empowers the arbitral tribunal to
terminate the proceedings, where it chooses to not
continue the proceedings and make an award.
62. This nuanced distinction between Section 25 subsection(s) (a) and (b) on one hand, and sub-section (c)
on the other, is of vital importance for the purpose of
understanding the scope of Section 32 of the Act, 1996,
more particularly, sub-section (2)(c), thereof.
63. How this plays out vis-á-vis the legislative scheme
of Act, 1996, particularly in respect of „termination of
proceedings‟ shall be discussed in more detail, in the
latter parts of this judgment.
64. The substantive part of Section 25 stipulates that
the rigours of the said provision are subject to any
agreement by the parties in this regard, or the
existence of any sufficient cause for a default in either
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the filing of a statement of claim or defence, the
production of any evidence or in appearing before the
arbitral tribunal.
65. In other words, under Section 25, it is open for the
parties to agree on the procedure or course of action
which is to be followed by the arbitral tribunal, in the
event of any default on part of either parties, in the
filing, production or appearance before the arbitral
tribunal.
66. The parties, by an agreement in this regard, may
choose that the non-filing of a statement of claim shall
not be a ground for termination of arbitral
proceedings, or vice-versa, that a default in the same
even if it has occasioned by a sufficient cause, shall be
a ground for termination of the proceedings.
67. However, in the absence of any such agreement,
the rigours of Section 25, in the even of any default by
the parties in complying with the requirements laid
down therein, will only spring into action where such
default is “without sufficient cause”.
68. We say so because, the substantive part of Section
25 opens with the words “where, without showing
sufficient cause,—”. A plain reading of the aforesaid
expression indicates that it governs the entire scheme
of Section 25 of the Act, 1996.
69. There is nothing in the bare text of Section 25 to
suggest that the condition of an „absence of a sufficient
cause‟, stipulated in the substantive portion is confined
in its application to only some sub-section(s) of Section
25 and not to the provision as a whole.
70. This requirement of first, ascertaining, whether a
sufficient cause exists for any default by a party in
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terms of Section 25, is indispensable. It applies equally
to all sub-section(s) of Section 25. The arbitral tribunal
is required to satisfy itself of the absence of a sufficient
cause, before it can proceed to take recourse under any
of the sub-section(s) of Section 25, as the case may be.
71. Thus, in the absence of any agreement, the
yardstick or test for the exercise of the limited
discretion conferred upon the arbitral tribunal under
Section 25, would be to see, if any sufficient cause
existed for the default.
72. An arbitral tribunal may exercise its power to
either terminate the proceedings, or forfeit the right to
file a statement of defence or pass an award ex-parte
or sans the production of any piece of evidence, under
Section 25 sub-section(s) (a), (b) and (c), respectively,
upon its satisfaction that no sufficient cause existed for
such default.
73. We shall now look into Section 30 of the Act, 1996,
which reads as under:—
“30. Settlement.—
(1) It is not incompatible with an arbitration
agreement for an arbitral tribunal to encourage
settlement of the dispute and, with the agreement
of the parties, the arbitral tribunal may use
mediation, conciliation or other procedures at any
time during the arbitral proceedings to encourage
settlement.
(2) If, during arbitral proceedings, the parties
settle the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall
terminate the proceedings and, if requested by the
parties and not objected to by the arbitral
tribunal, record the settlement in the form of an
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arbitral award on agreed terms.
(3) An arbitral award on agreed terms shall be
made in accordance with section 31 and shall
state that it is an arbitral award.
(4) An arbitral award on agreed terms shall have
the same status and effect as any other arbitral
award on the substance of the dispute.”
74. Section 30 of the Act, 1996, inter-alia provides the
manner in which the parties, after the commencement
of the arbitral proceedings, may arrive at a settlement
in respect of the dispute between them.
75. The provision embodies the cardinal principle of
consent being the cornerstone of arbitration, by
recognizing the autonomy of the parties to settle their
dispute at any point in time during the arbitration
proceedings. It fortifies that the commencement of
arbitration does not take away such autonomy, and the
pendency of proceedings, will not be fatal to any
outside settlement.
76. The other foundational pillar of arbitration,
namely, the resolution of disputes, fairly and
effectively, has been enshrined in sub-section (1) of
Section 30. Under this provision, a positive duty has
been cast upon the arbitral tribunal to encourage and
facilitate a settlement between the parties.
77. The provision elaborates, that this duty may be
discharged by the arbitral tribunal through mediation,
conciliation or any other process, that it considers
expedient for meeting the ends of justice and
facilitating a settlement between the parties.
78. Sub-section (2) of Section 30 is of particular
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importance for our discussion. It provides that where
the parties arrive at a settlement in respect of the
dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the
proceedings. It further states, that if the parties so
request, the arbitral tribunal, if it has no objection,
shall record the terms of the settlement in the form of
an award.
79. What would be the form and manner in which the
award recording the settlement arrived at by the
parties is to be made, as-well as the effect of such an
award, have been delineated in the subsequent subsections.
80. Section 30 sub-section(s) (3) and (4), stipulates that
the contents of the award must conform to the
parameters laid down in Section 31 and that it shall
have the same status and effect as any other award,
under the Act, 1996, respectively.
81. As per Section 30 of the Act, 1996, more
particularly sub-section (2), the arbitral tribunal is
required to terminate the proceedings, upon the
settlement of the dispute by the parties. This is because,
once the dispute between the parties stands settled,
nothing remains for the arbitral tribunal to adjudicate
upon.
82. Before we proceed to look into Section 32 of the
Act, 1996, it would be apposite to first understand
when an arbitral tribunal would be empowered to
terminate the arbitral proceedings as per Section 38 of
the said Act.
83. Section 38 of the Act, 1996 reads as under:—
“38. Deposits.—
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(1) The arbitral tribunal may fix the amount of the
deposit or supplementary deposit, as the case may
be, as an advance for the costs referred to in subsection (8) of section 31, which it expects will be
incurred in respect of the claim submitted to it:
Provided that where, apart from the claim, a
counter-claim has been submitted to the arbitral
tribunal, it may fix separate amount of deposit for
the claim and counter-claim.
(2) The deposit referred to in sub-section (1) shall
be payable in equal shares by the parties:
Provided that where one party fails to pay his
share of the deposit, the other party may pay that
share:
Provided further that where the other party also
does not pay the aforesaid share in respect of the
claim or the counter-claim, the arbitral tribunal
may suspend or terminate the arbitral
proceedings in respect of such claim or counterclaim, as the case may be.
(3) Upon termination of the arbitral proceedings,
the arbitral tribunal shall render an accounting to
the parties of the deposits received and shall
return any unexpended balance to the party or
parties, as the case may be.”
84. The provision of Section 38 deals with deposit of
“costs”. The term “costs” refers to the expenses
incurred in conducting and facilitating the arbitral
proceedings. Such costs are determined by the arbitral
tribunal in accordance with Section 31A of the Act,
1996. Sub-Section(s) (3) and (4) of Section 31A
enumerate the circumstances which may be taken into
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account by the arbitral tribunal for determining such
costs.
85. The Explanation appended to Section 31A of the
Act, 1996, further states that the term “costs” means
the reasonable costs relating to, the fees of the
arbitrators, the administrative outlays of the tribunal,
the legal fees and charges, and any other expenses
incurred in connection with the arbitral proceedings
and the Award.
86. Section 38 sub-section (1), empowers the arbitral
tribunal to direct the deposit of a certain portion of
these “costs” by the parties, in the form of an advance
towards the immediate expenses, the tribunal expects
to likely incur for the continuation of the arbitral
proceedings in respect of the claim(s) before it.
87. Where a counter-claim is also filed, the arbitral
tribunal is further empowered, under the Proviso to
sub-section (1) of Section 38 to fix separate amounts of
deposit for the claim and the counter-claim, as the case
may be.
88. Section 38 sub-section (2) embodies the general
rule, that any deposit, which may be required by the
arbitral tribunal, shall be payable by the parties in
equal proportions. In other words, both the claimant
and the respondent are ordinarily responsible to pay
50% of the deposit, respectively.
89. The First Proviso to Section 38 sub-section (2),
further stipulates that, where either party defaults
paying his share of the deposit, then the same may be
paid by the other party.
90. The Second Proviso to Section 38 sub-section (2) is
of particular importance. It provides that, in the event
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the other party also declines to pay the aforesaid share
of the deposit, the arbitral tribunal may either suspend
or terminate the proceedings in respect of such claim
or counter-claim, as the case may be.
91. To put it simply, where both the parties fail to make
the deposit as required by the arbitral tribunal in
respect of a claim or a counter-claim then in such a
situation, the tribunal would be empowered to either
suspend or terminate the proceedings qua such claim
or counter-claim.
92. Lastly, Section 38 sub-section (3), provides that
once the proceedings stand terminated, the arbitral
tribunal shall furnish the account of all the deposits
received by it, and return any unexpended balance to
the parties.
93. Both Section(s) 25 and 30 of the Act, 1996
respectively, insofar as termination of arbitral
proceeding is concerned, are an exception to the
general rule contained in Section 32 sub-section (1) of
the Act, 1996.
94. We may now proceed to look into Section 32 of the
Act, 1996. The said provision reads as under:—
“32. Termination of proceedings.—
(1) The arbitral proceedings shall be terminated
by the final arbitral award or by an order of the
arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2).
(2) The arbitral tribunal shall issue an order for
the termination of the arbitral proceedings
where—
(a) the claimant withdraws his claim, unless the
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respondent objects to the order and the arbitral
tribunal recognises a legitimate interest on his
part in obtaining a final settlement of the
dispute,
(b) the parties agree on the termination of the
proceedings, or
(c) the arbitral tribunal finds that the
continuation of the proceedings has for any
other reason become unnecessary or
impossible.
(3) Subject to section 33 and sub-section (4) of
section 34, the mandate of the arbitral tribunal
shall terminate with the termination of the arbitral
proceedings.”
95. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision,
particularly, Section 32 sub-section (1), reveals that,
the termination of arbitral proceedings under the Act,
1996, may occur in two distinct ways; first, through the
passing of the final award, or secondly by an order of
the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2), thereof.
96. Section 32 sub-section (2) of the Act, 1996
warrants a careful examination. The said provision
sets out the three situations in which an arbitral
tribunal may, without rendering the final award,
terminate the arbitral proceedings by passing an order
to that effect. The arbitral tribunal may, by an order,
terminate the proceedings where:—
(i) First, as per sub-clause (a), if the claimant
withdraws his claim, and the respondent has no
objection to the withdrawal. However, if the
respondent raises an objection to the withdrawal,
on the ground that it may impede the dispute from
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being finally resolved, the arbitral tribunal may
refuse to terminate the proceedings. What is
sought to be conveyed by the phrase “the arbitral
tribunal recognises a legitimate interest on his
part in obtaining a final settlement of the dispute”
used in sub-clause (a) is that, the objection to the
withdrawal by the respondent, must be founded
upon a genuine interest on his part, in having the
dispute resolved. Where such objections are
motivated by any extraneous considerations, such
as an intent to either delay or protract the dispute
or to vexatiously harass the claimant through the
continuation of the proceedings, the arbitral
tribunal may decline to entertain such objections.,
and proceed to order a termination of the
proceedings.
Where any objection has been raised by the
respondent, the arbitral tribunal, before passing
an order for termination of the proceedings, is
required to make a finding, that the objections
raised, are not bona-fide insofar as the resolution
of the dispute is concerned.
Insofar, as the question when such a respondent
could be said to have a legitimate interest in
securing the final settlement of dispute is
concerned, it is not possible to lay down any
straitjacket formula or prescribe any exhaustive
list. The answer must invariably turn upon the
peculiar facts and attendant circumstances of
each case. Each case would have to be assessed,
keeping in mind the nature of the claims, the stage
of the proceedings, the evidence on record, and
the preliminary findings already made by the
arbitral tribunal. We shall discuss this in more
detail in the latter parts of this judgment.
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(ii) Secondly, as per sub-clause (b), where both
the parties agree to the termination of the arbitral
proceedings, the arbitral tribunal shall pass an
order to such effect.
(iii) Thirdly, as per sub-clause (c), where the
arbitral tribunal finds that the continuation of the
proceedings has “for any other reason” become
unnecessary or impossible, the arbitral
proceedings shall pass an order terminating the
proceedings.
97. We shall discuss sub-section (2) of Section 32,
particularly, the scope and extent of the arbitral
tribunal's authority to pass an order for termination of
proceedings thereunder, in more detail in the
subsequent parts of this judgment.
98. Lastly, sub-section (3) of Section 32 stipulates what
would be the legal effect of the termination of arbitral
proceedings under the Act, 1996. It provides that,
subject to the provisions of Section(s) 33 and 34(4), the
termination of the arbitral proceedings, shall in
consequence also terminate the “mandate of the
arbitral tribunal”.
99. To put it simply, upon termination of the arbitral
proceedings, either by way of a final award or an
order to that effect, as the case may be, the arbitral
tribunal, save and except the exercise of the limited
powers conferred upon it by Section(s) 33 and 34(4)
respectively, shall cease to have any further power or
function, under the Act, 1996.
100. Thus, apart from the power to correct or interpret
an award and eliminating the grounds for setting aside
the arbitral award, in terms of Section(s) 33 and 34(4)
respectively, the arbitral tribunal, upon the termination
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of the proceedings, is divested of all other powers, and
no longer has any jurisdiction, in respect of the
dispute.”
9.
In the opinion of this Court, none of the provisions, namely, Section
25, 30 (a), 32 (a) or Section 38 of the Arbitration Act apply in the present
case where the Presiding Arbitrator has resigned on 25.08.2025. Both the
Nominee Arbitrators have repeatedly informed the parties that they are
prepared to proceed ahead for appointment of Presiding Arbitrator if the
parties so desire. It is not necessary for the Nominee Arbitrators to seek the
consent of the parties to proceed ahead with the appointment of the
Presiding Arbitrator.
10.
At this juncture, it is pertinent to reproduce the Arbitration Clause and
the same reads as under:
“1.3.2 Arbitration
Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the
contract, if any dispute, difference, question or
disagreement arises between the parties hereto or their
respective representatives or assignees, in connection
with construction, meaning, operation, effect,
interpretation of the contract or breach thereof which
parties are unable to settle mutually, the same shall be
referred to Arbitration as provided hereunder:
1. A party wishing to commence arbitration proceeding
shall invoke Arbitration Clause by giving 60 days
notice to the other party. The notice invoking
arbitration shall specify all the points of disputes with
details of the amount claimed to be referred to
arbitration at the time of invocation of arbitration and
not thereafter. If the claim is in foreign currency, the
claimant shall indicate its value in Indian Rupee for
the purpose of constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
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2. The number of the arbitrators and the appointing
authority will be as under:
Claim
amount
(excluding
claim for
interest and
counter
claim,
if
any)
Number
arbitrator
of
Upto Rs. 50
lakhs
Sole Arbitrator:
to be appointed
from a panel of
retired officers
from
ONGC/other
PSUs/Non-PSU
organizations
Above Rs.
50 lakhs to
Rs. 5 crores
Sole Arbitrator:
to be appointed
from a panel of
retired jurists
Appointing
authority
By ONGC
Note: ONGC
will forward a
list containing
names of five
retired officers
from
ONGC/other
PSUs/Non-PSU
organizations
for
selecting
one from the list
who will be
appointed
as
sole arbitrator
By ONGC
Note: ONGC
will forward a
list containing
names of five
jurists to the
other party for
selecting
one
from the list
who will be
appointed
as
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Above Rs. 5
crores
3 Arbitrators
sole arbitrator
One arbitrator
by each party
and the 3rd
arbitrator, who
shall be the
presiding
arbitrator, by
the
two
arbitrators.
ONGC
will
appoint
its
arbitrator from
the panel of
jurists
3. The parties agree that they shall appoint only those
persons as arbitrators who accept the conditions of
this arbitration clause, including the fees schedule
provided herein. No person shall be appointed as
arbitrator or presiding arbitrator who does not accept
the conditions of this arbitration clause.
4. Parties agree that there will be no objection if the
Arbitrator appointed holds equity shares of ONGC
and/or is a retired officer of ONGC/any other PSU.
However, neither party shall appoint its serving
employee as arbitrator.
5. If any of the Arbitrators so appointed dies, resigns,
becomes incapacitated or withdraws for any reason
from the proceedings, it shall be lawful for the
concerned party/parties to appoint another person in
his place, in the same manner as aforesaid. Such
person shall proceed with the reference from the
stage where his predecessor had left it if both parties
consent for the same; otherwise, he shall proceed de
novo.
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6. Parties agree that neither party shall be entitled for
any pre-reference or pendente-lite interest on its
claims. Parties agree that any claim for such interest
made by any party shall be void.”
(emphasis supplied)
11.
A reading of the Arbitration Clause indicates that once the Nominee
Arbitrators have been appointed, then it is the duty of the Nominee
Arbitrators to appoint the Presiding Arbitrator. Under the terms of the
contract, even the resignation of the Presiding Arbitrator cannot amount to
termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal. The Nominee
Arbitrators can appoint the Presiding Arbitrator and continue with the
arbitration.
12.
The present case is not where the Arbitral Tribunal has terminated the
proceedings and as stated earlier, the resignation of the Presiding Arbitrator
will not amount to termination of the arbitral proceedings. The Nominee
Arbitrators can appoint the Presiding Officer and the consent of the parties
for appointing the Presiding Arbitrator is not necessary as neither the Act
not the Arbitration Clause provides for the same.
13.
Once the Nominee Arbitrators have been appointed by the parties, the
decision to appoint the Presiding Arbitrator is with the Nominee Arbitrators
only. In the opinion of this Court, none of the provisions of Arbitration Act
are attracted to the facts of this case as in the present case, the Arbitral
Tribunal has not terminated its mandate and, therefore, the Nominee
Arbitrators have not become de jure or de facto ineligible to act as
Arbitrators and appoint the Presiding Arbitrators. Vide an e-mail dated
10.12.2025, the Nominee Arbitrators have appointed Justice Swatanter
Kumar, Former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, as the Presiding
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Arbitrator, in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act and the
Arbitration Clause.
14.
Undoubtedly, between February, 2022 and August, 2025, the Arbitral
Tribunal has not proceeded further but this Court cannot ignore the fact that
both the parties have failed to file written submissions within the stipulated
time and now it is not open for the Petitioner to take advantage of its own
wrong.
15.
Since the Arbitration proceedings commenced prior to 2015, the
application to seek extension of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal under
Section 29A of the Arbitration Act does not arise and, therefore, Section
29A of the Arbitration Act would not be applicable to the facts of this case.
16.
The Arbitral Tribunal is requested to conclude the Arbitral
proceedings as expeditiously as possible keeping in mind the spirit of the
Arbitration Act.
17.
With these observations, the Petition is dismissed. Pending
applications, if any, also stands dismissed.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
JANUARY 13, 2026
Rahul
Signed By:HARIOM
SINGH KIRMOLIYA
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