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* THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
+ WRIT PETITION No.36437 of 2025
% Dated: 24.06.2026
Between:
# Ogirala Venkata Sai Sunil Manohar
And
The State of Andhra Pradesh and others
..…Petitioner
….Respondents
! Counsel for the petitioner: Sri V.Ravindhar
^ Counsel for the Respondents 1 to 3: Sri J.Krishna Praneeth,
Assistant Government Pleader
Counsel for Respondent No.4: Sri Narasimha Rao Gudiseva
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred:
2019 (7) SCC 42
(2024) 9 SCC 382
2024 Supreme (SC) 411
W.P.No.13079 of 2024 dated 13.12.2024
2007 Supreme (SC) 304
2017(5)ALD 145 (SC)
(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION No.36437 of 2025
Between:
Ogirala Venkata Sai Sunil Manohar
……Petitioner
And
The State of Andhra Pradesh and others
…….Respondents
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
24.06.2026
Submitted for approval:
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
Yes/No
may be allowed to see the Judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be
Yes/No
Marked to Law Reporters/Journals.
3. Whether Their Lordship wishes
Yes/No
to see the fair copy of the Judgment?
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
______________________
SUBHENDU SAMANTA, J
APHC010712042025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA
PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
[3562]
WEDNESDAY, THE 24th DAY OF JUNE 2026
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION NO: 36437/2025
Between:
1. OGIRALA VENKATA SAI SUNIL MANOHAR, S/O.SESHU
KUMAR, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, PRIVATE EMPLOYEE,
R/O.NO.166, RTC COLONY, 4TH ROAD, PATAMATA,
VIJAYAWADA. - 520010.
...PETITIONER
AND
1. THE STATE OF AP, REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
HOME
DEPARTMENT,
SECRETARIAT
BUILDINGS,
VELAGAPUDI, AMARAVATI, GUNTUR DISTRICT - 522237.
2. THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE, , VIJAYAWADA,
GOVERNORPET, VIJAYAWADA, NTR DISTRICT, ANDHRA
PRADESH - 520002.
3. THE SHO, PENAMALURU POLICE STATION,
PENAMALURU, KRISHNA DISTRICT - 521139
KANURU,
4. OGIRALA
CHORAGUDI
KRISHNA
SWOMYA,
W/O.OGIRALA
VENKATA
SAI
SUNIL
MANOHAR,
D/O.CHORAGUDI GOPI KRISHNA, AGED ABOUT 35
YEARS, PRIVATE EMPLOYEE AND HOUSEWIFE, D.NO.878/4, SAIBABA TEMPLE, C/O.PRIYA FOODS OFFISET,
PORANKI,
KRISHNA DISTRICT - 521137.
AND
OGIRALA
@CHORAGUDI
KRISHNA
SWOMYA,
W/O.OGIRALA VENKATA SAI SUNIL MANOHAR,
12,SRI
LAKSHMI
NIVAS,SRI
SIDHI
VINAYAKA
LAYOUT,
BANDAPURA BEHIND NARAYANA PU COLLEGE,
BENGALURU ,KARNATAKA 560049.
AND ALSO
OGIRALA
@CHORAGUDI
KRISHNA
SWOMYA,
W/O.OGIRALA SUNIL MANOHAR,
31 MSP MANGO
MEADOWS-PH 2,1ST CROSS ROAD,
NIMEKAIPURA
ROAD,BUDIGERE CROSS,BOMMENAHALLI VILLAGE,
OPP
PRUKSA
SILVANA
VILLAS,BOMMENAHALLI,
NIMBEKAIPURA,BENGALURU,KARNATAKA
560049.
CAUSE TITLE WITH RESPECTIVE TO 4TH RESPONDENT
WAS AMENDED AS
PER C.O.DT.27.01.2026 VIDE
I.A.NO.1 OF 2026 IN W.P.NO.36437 OF 2025.
...RESPONDENT(S):
Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. V.RAVINDHAR
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. NARASIMHA RAO GUDISEVA
2. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL
The Court made the following:
Date of reserved for orders
: -----------
Date of pronouncement
: 24-06-2026
Date of uploading
: 07-07-2026
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION No.36437 of 2025
ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari)
Heard Sri V.Ravindhar, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri
J.Krishna
Praneeth,
learned
Assistant
Government
Pleader
attached to the office of the learned Advocate General, appearing
for the respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri Narasimha Rao Gudiseva,
learned counsel for respondent No.4.
2.
This writ of Habeas Corpus under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner-father. The
respondent No.4 is the mother of the minor son, who is aged about
six years. The son is with the mother, 4th respondent.
3.
The petitioner filed F.C.O.P.No.207 of 2025 in the Court of
the Judge, Additional Family Court-cum-XIV Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Vijayawada, under Section 25 of the Guardians
and Wards Act, 1890 (in short „the Act, 1890‟), to order restoration
of the custody of the minor son in his favour by directing the
respondent No.4-mother, to handover the custody of the minor to
the petitioner- father.
F.C.O.P.No.207 of 2025 was allowed by
judgment dated 05.06.2025 by the Court of the Judge, Additional
Family Court-cum-XIV Additional District & Sessions Judge,
Vijayawada, appointing the petitioner-father as a guardian to the
ward (child) and the respondent No.4-mother was directed to
handover the custody of minor within a period of 60 days from the
date of the order. The operative part of the order dated 05.06.2025
reads as under:
“In the result, the petition is allowed by appointing the
petitioner-father as a guardian to the ward/child and the
Respondent/Mother is directed to handover the custody
of minor child viz., Ogirala Narasimha Sakthidhar to the
petitioner/father within 60 days from the date of order.
No costs.”
4. The present petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus has been filed
based on the order in F.C.O.P.No.207 of 2025, on the ground that
in view of that order, the writ petitioner is entitled to the custody of
the minor son and that, after the order, the custody of the child with
the mother has become illegal.
So the child is in an illegal
detention of respondent No.4-mother.
5. Learned
counsel
for
the
writ
petitioner
submits
that
consequently, the writ petition for writ of Habeas Corpus is
maintainable for direction to restore custody pursuant to the order
dated 05.06.2025 in petitioner‟s favour. He placed reliance in the
case of Tejaswini Gaud and others v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad
Tewari1, submitting further that after the order dated 05.06.2025,
there is no other remedy open to the petitioner to secure the
custody of the minor son, nor the remedy by way of execution.
6. Sri Narasimha Rao Gudiseva, learned counsel for respondent
No.4-mother submits that the order dated 05.06.2025 passed in
F.C.O.P. is an ex parte order. He submits that the address of the
respondent No.4-mother as shown in the F.C.OP is not the correct
address. The respondent No.4-mother is not residing at that
address but resides at Bangalore. The address of respondent No.4mother mentioned in F.C.O.P is the address of the petitioner
himself. He refers to Ex.P3(Page No.33 of the writ petition). The
said document (Ex.P3) is on the subject of complaint filed by the
petitioner against respondent No.4 for the alleged unlawful removal
of custody of the minor son, in violation of the court‟s order for
custody. In the said document(Ex.P3), the petitioner has given his
2019 (7) SCC 42
address as “Ogirala Venkata Sai Sunil Manohar, S/o Ogirala Seshu
Kumar, 8-78/4, near Saibaba Temple, Srinivasa Nagar, Opp.Priya
Foods, Poranki, Vijayawada – 521137” and the same address i.e.
the address for the petitioner, was given as the address of the
present respondent No.4 in the F.C.O.P. So, there was no notice
of the F.C.O.P to respondent No.4-mother and an ex parte order
dated 05.06.2025 for custody was passed.
7. Learned counsel for respondent No.4 further submits that the
respondent No.4-mother has filed I.A.Nos.26 and 25 of 2026 before
the learned Additional Family Court-cum-XIV Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Vijayawada for setting aside the ex parte order of
custody
dated
05.06.2025
and
for
condonation
of
delay
respectively, which are pending for consideration before the said
Court. An averment to the above effect has been made in para
No.14 of the counter-affidavit of respondent No.4.
8. Learned counsel for respondent No.4 further submits that in the
same way the petitioner also obtained an ex parte decree of
divorce against the respondent No.4 without notice furnishing the
wrong address in F.C.O.P.No.201 of 2025 (i.e. the same address
as given in F.C.O.P.No.207 of 2025 vide order of the same date
05.06.2025 from the same Court.
9. Learned counsel for respondent No.4 further submits that
Section 43 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides for
orders for regulating conduct of proceedings on guardians and
enforcement of those orders.
The petitioner has got statutory
remedy and so, the writ of Habeas Corpus is not maintainable nor
entertainable. He has placed reliance in the cases of Somprabha
Rana and others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and others2,
Nirmala v. Kulwant Singh & Ors.3, Nukala Madhusudhana Rao
v. the State of Andhra Pradesh and others4 and A.V.Papayya
Sastry & Others v. Government of A.P & others5
10.
In reply submission, learned counsel for the petitioner
submits that the applications, I.A.Nos.25 and 26 of 2025 aforesaid
were filed almost six months back and till date, no orders have
been passed on those applications. He reiterated that, in view of
the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Tejaswini Gaud
(supra), a writ of Habeas Corpus is the remedy for securing
custody of the minor child in terms of the order of custody dated
05.06.2025 passed in G.W.O.P which deserves to be issued.
(2024) 9 SCC 382
2024 Supreme (SC) 411
W.P.No.13079 of 2024 dated 13.12.2024
2007 Supreme (SC) 304
11.
We have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused
the material on record.
12.
The point for consideration is :
“Whether by way of the present writ of Habeas
Corpus, the order of custody dated 05.06.2025
passed in F.C.O.P.No.207 of 2025 can be directed
to be implemented or enforced?”
13.
So far as the custody order and its enforcement by way of
writ of Habeas Corpus is concerned, in Tejaswini Gaud (supra),
the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that Habeas Corpus proceedings is
not to justify or examine the legality of the custody.
Habeas
Corpus proceedings is a medium through which the custody of
child is addressed to the discretion of the Court. Habeas Corpus is
a prerogative writ, which is an extraordinary remedy and the writ is
issued where in the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary
remedy provided by the law is either not available or is ineffective
otherwise a writ will not be issued. It was held that in child custody
matter, the writ of Habeas Corpus is maintainable, where it is
proved that the detention of the minor child by a parent or others
was illegal and without any authority of law.
14.
Learned counsel for the petitioner placed much emphasis on
aforesaid para No.19 of the judgment, submitting that the remedy
of execution is not available and after the order dated 05.06.2025
of custody to the petitioner, the custody of the son with the
respondent No.4-mother becomes illegal and the detention illegal.
15.
Para 19 of Tejaswini Gaud (supra) reads as under:
“19. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify or examine
the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus proceedings is a
medium through which the custody of the child is addressed
to the discretion of the Court. Habeas corpus is a prerogative
writ which is an extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued
where in the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary
remedy provided by the law is either not available or is
ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be issued. In child custody
matters, the power of the High Court in granting the writ is
qualified only in cases where the detention of a minor by a
person who is not entitled to his legal custody. In view of the
pronouncement on the issue in question by the Supreme
Court and the High Courts, in our view, in child custody
matters, the writ of habeas corpus is maintainable where
it is proved that the detention of a minor child by a parent
or others was illegal and without any authority of law.”
16.
In Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State of NCT of Delhi
and another6, the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that the High Court
while dealing with the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus concerning a minor child, in a given case, may direct return
of the child or decline to change the custody of the child keeping in
mind all the attending facts and circumstances including the settled
legal position.
The decision of the Court, in each case, must
depend on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case
2017(5)ALD 145 (SC)
brought before it whilst considering the welfare of the child which is
of paramount consideration. The remedy of writ of habeas corpus
cannot be used for mere enforcement of the directions given by the
court against a person within its jurisdiction and convert that
jurisdiction into that of an executing court. Recourse can be taken
to such other remedy as may be permissible in law for enforcement
of the order.
17.
In Nithya Anand Raghavan (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex
Court further held that in a Habeas Corpus petition, the High
Court must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful
or unlawful custody of another person. For considering that issue,
if that another person was none other than the natural guardian of
the minor being the biological mother and once that fact was
ascertained, it could be presumed that the custody of the minor
with his/her mother was lawful. In such a case, only in
exceptionable situation, the custody of the minor may be ordered to
be taken away from the mother for being given to any other person
including the husband (father of the child), in exercise of the writ
jurisdiction. Instead, the other parent could be asked to resort to a
substantive remedy prescribed for getting the custody of the child.
18.
Para Nos.29 and 30 of Nithya Anand Raghavan (supra)
deserve reproduction which as under:
“29. The High Court while dealing with the petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus concerning a minor
child, in a given case, may direct return of the child or
decline to change the custody of the child keeping in mind
all the attending facts and circumstances including the
settled legal position referred to above. Once again, we
may hasten to add that the decision of the Court, in each
case, must depend on the totality of the facts and
circumstances of the case brought before it whilst
considering the welfare of the child which is of paramount
consideration. The order of the foreign Court must yield to
the welfare of the child. Further, the remedy of writ of
habeas corpus cannot be used for mere enforcement
of the directions given by the foreign court against a
person within its jurisdiction and convert that
jurisdiction into that of an executing court. Indubitably,
the writ petitioner can take recourse to such other remedy
as may be permissible in law for enforcement of the order
passed by the foreign Court or to 16 113 (2004) Delhi Law
Time 823 resort to any other proceedings as may be
permissible in law before the Indian Court for the custody of
the child, if so advised.
30. In a habeas corpus petition as aforesaid, the High Court
must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful
or unlawful custody of another person (private respondent
named in the writ petition). For considering that issue, in a
case such as the present one, it is enough to note that the
private respondent was none other than the natural
guardian of the minor being her biological mother.
Once that fact is ascertained, it can be presumed that
the custody of the minor with his/her mother is lawful.
In such a case, only in exceptionable situation, the
custody of the minor (girl child) may be ordered to be
taken away from her mother for being given to any
other person including the husband (father of the child),
in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Instead, the other parent
can be asked to resort to a substantive prescribed remedy
for getting custody of the child.”
19.
In Somprabha Rana (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court
summarized the propositions of law on the point of direction
for custody of the minor in a petition for Habeas Corpus under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India in Para No.9 which is
reproduced as under:
“9. After having perused various decisions of this Court, the broad
propositions of settled law on the point can be summarised as follows:
9.1. Writ of Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ. It is an extraordinary
remedy. It is a discretionary remedy;
9.2.The High Court always has the discretion not to exercise the
writ jurisdiction depending upon the facts of the case. It all
depends on the facts of individual cases;
9.3. Even if the High Court, in a petition of Habeas Corpus, finds that
custody of the child by the respondents was illegal, in a given case,
the High Court can decline to exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India if the High Court is of the view that at the
stage at which the Habeas Corpus was sought, it will not be in the
welfare and interests of the minor to disturb his/her custody; and
9.4. As far as the decision regarding custody of the minor children is
concerned, the only paramount consideration is the welfare of the
minor. The parties' rights cannot be allowed to override the child's
welfare. This principle also applies to a petition seeking Habeas
Corpus concerning a minor.”
20.
In Nirmala (supra), the Hon‟ble Apex Court held that no
hard and fast rule can be laid down insofar as the maintainability of
a habeas corpus petition in the matters of custody of a minor child
is concerned and further that as to whether the writ court should
exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction or not will depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case.
21.
Learned counsel for the respondent No.4 placed reliance in
A.V. Papayya (supra), to contend that the order dated 04.05.2025
was obtained by fraud and it is a nullity and non est in the eye of
law. So, a writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be issued to implement
the order dated 04.05.2025.
In A.V. Papayya Sastry (supra),
the Hon‟ble Apex Court held in paras 22 to 26 as under:
“22.
It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment,
decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or
Authority is a nullity and nonest in the eye of law. Such a judgment,
decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has to be
treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even
in collateral proceedings.
23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley7, Lord
Denning observed:
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be
allowed to stand, if it has been obtained by fraud."
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn.,
p.644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that
though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from
within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though
it is not permissible to show that the court was 'mistaken', it might be
shown that it was 'misled'. There is an essential distinction between
mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that
an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground
that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the
decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can
be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the
judgment
25. It has been said; Fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et
jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none
(fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the
design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking
undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of
another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are
(1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502,
actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which
vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle
of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an
absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by
dishonest and fraudulent litigants.”
22.
In the facts of the present case, the writ of Habeas Corpus
deserves not to be issued based on the order dated 05.06.2025.
That very order has been obtained by not furnishing correct
address of the respondent No.4 resulting into an order of custody in
favour of petitioner behind the back of the respondent No.4. We
say so for the following reasons born from the record before us:
(i) In F.C.O.P.No.201 of 2025 for divorce
filed by the writ
petitioner the address of the respondent No.4 as mentioned is
as follows:
“Ogirala @ Choragudi Krishna Sowmya, W/o. Ogirala
Venkata Sai Sunil Manohar, D/o. Choragudi Gopi
Krishna, Hindu, aged about 35 years, Private Employee
and Housewife, Resident
of D.No.8-78/4,
Saibaba
Temple, C/o. Priya Foods Offiset, Poranki, Krishna
District.”
(ii) In
F.C.O.P.No.207
of
for
guardianship and custody, also
appointment
of
the
the address of the 4th
respondent was mentioned as follows:
“Ogirala @ Choragudi Krishna Swomya, W/o. Ogirala
Sunil Manohar, D/o. Choragudi Gopi Krishna, Hindu,
aged about 35 years, Private Employee and Housewife,
D.No.8-78/4, Saibaba Temple, C/o. Priya Foods Offiset,
Poranki, Krishna District.”
(iii)
The above address is of the petitioner which is evident
from the petitioner‟s letter on the subject „complaint‟ (AnnexureP3 at page 39).
(iv)
In F.C.O.P.No.201 of 2025 filed by the petitioner for
divorce under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of Hindu Marriage Act, his
case, inter alia, as per para 4 of the judgment dated 05.06.2025
granting divorce (P4), is that “the respondent left from the
matrimonial home on 15.04.2022 with bag without intimation to
the petitioner and stayed at her parents‟ house” and further that
“the respondent openly proclaimed that she will not attend the
petitioner”.
(v) Para 4 of the judgment dated 05.06.2025 in F.C.O.P.No.201
of 2025 reads as under:
“4. It is further submitted that the petitioner tried to
convince the respondent and requested her to change the
attitude and thereby to lead happy and harmonious
marital life and all the efforts made by the petitioner were
proved futile and all subsequent dates the respondent
behaved as dutiful wife and on 15.04.2022 the
respondent left from the matrimonial home along with
her bag without any intimation to the petitioner and
stayed at her parents house. After knowing the same
the petitioner went to her parents house, but the
respondent and her family members admonished the
petitioner with foul and filthy language and the respondent
openly proclaimed that she will not join with the petitioner
at any cost and also the petitioner vexed with the attitude
of the respondent and decided to dissolve the marriage
between them. Hence, the petitioner is constrained to file
this petition for granting degree of divorce by dissolving
their marriage between them on the ground of cruelty,
desertion.”
(vi)
So, in view thereof the parental address of the
respondent No.4 must also have been mentioned in F.C.O.P
No.207 of 2025, which was not done neither in F.C.O.P.No.201
of 2025 nor in F.C.O.P.No.207 of 2025.
(vii)
In the „final legal notice dated 23.12.2025‟ (P-2 page
29 to 32), given by the writ petitioner‟s counsel to the 4 th
respondent, after the judgments in F.C.O.P.Nos.201 of 2025
and F.C.O.P.Nos.207 of 2025, the addresses of the respondent
No.4 are disclosed as under:
“To.
Ms. Ogirala @ Choragudi Krishna Sowmya, Ex.W/o. Sri
Ogirala Venkata Sai Sunil Manohar, D/o. Sri Choragudi
Gopi Krishna, Aadhaar-recorded address for service:
31, MSP Mango Meadows-Phase 2, 1st Cross Road,
Nimbekaipura Road, Budigere Cross, Bommenahalli
Village, Opp. Pruksa Silvana Villas, Bommenahalli,
Nimbekaipura, Bengaluru, Karnataka – 560049.
Last known addresses and as per FCOP record:
D.No.8-78/4, Saibaba Temple, C/o. Priya Foods Offiset, Poranki,
Krishna District, Andhra Pradesh, Vijayawada – 521137.
(1) 12, Sri lakshmi Nivas, Sri Sidhi Vinayaka Layout Bandapura,
Behind Narayana PU College, Bengaluru, Karnataka-560049.
(2) #9 Sri Nilayam, Near Narayana Residential PU Girls College,
Next to Swar Sadhana School of Indian Music and Dance,
Behind Take Agro India Pvt Ltd., Bandapura Road, Avalahalli,
Bengaluru, Karnataka -560049.”
(viii)
The 4th respondent‟s addresses at Bangalore in
Karnataka mentioned in P2; were not given in F.C.O.P.No.201
of 2025 nor in F.C.O.P.No.207 of 2025.
(ix)
The petitioner on the face of the record had shown his
address as of respondent No.4 and against his name showed a
different address.
23.
Thus, an ex parte decree in both the cases were
obtained against the respondent No.4 by the writ petitioner.
24.
The basis of the writ petition is an ex parte order against
respondent No.4. It is so evident from the order itself. The
respondent No.4-mother has already applied for setting aside that
order of custody and the application is pending. So, at this stage,
the order of dated 05.06.2025 has not attained finality. From the
material on record, we are of the considered view that not only the
order of custody is an ex parte order but without notice to the
respondent No.4.
25.
We are satisfied that the address mentioned is not the
address of respondent No.4-mother, on which respondent No.4
could be served, as disclosed in the counter-affidavit but is the
same as disclosed in the petitions/applications filed by the father
(at page Nos.33 to 39) on the subject of the complaint.
26.
We make it clear that we are not making any final
observation with respect to the correct address of respondent No.4mother, but certainly prima facie on the own pleading of the
petitioner in F.C.O.P.No.201 of 2025 for divorce para No.4 of the
plaint the address of respondent No.4 i.e. her parental address,
must also have been mentioned to disclose the correct facts and
for due service on her in F.C.O.P.No.207 of 2025 in the Court of
the Judge, Additional Family Court-cum-XIV Additional District &
Sessions Judge, Vijayawada, as well, which was not done.
27.
The order dated 04.06.2025 is behind the back of
respondent No.4 and ex parte without notice. An application for
setting aside the order dated 04.06.2025 being pending before the
court concerned, a writ of Habeas Corpus cannot be issued based
on the order dated 04.06.2025.
28.
Section 43 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, reads as
under:
“43. Orders for regulating conduct or proceedings of
guardians, and enforcement of those orders .
(1) The Court may, on the application of any person interested or of
its own motion, make an order regulating the conduct or
proceedings of any guardian appointed or declared by the Court.
(2)Where there are more guardians than one of a ward and they are
unable to agree upon a question affecting his welfare, any of them
may apply to the Court for its direction, and the Court may make
such order respecting the matter in difference as it thinks fit.
(3)Except where it appears that the object of making an order under
sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) would be defeated by the delay,
the Court shall, before making the order, direct notice of the
application therefor or of the intention of the Court to make it, as the
case may be, to be given, in a case under sub-section (1), to the
guardian or, in a case under sub-section (2), to the guardian who
has not made the application.
(4)In case of disobedience to an order made under sub-section
(1) or sub-section (2), the order may be enforced in the same
manner as an injunction granted under section 492 or section
493 of the [Code of Civil Procedure, 1882 (14 of 1882)] [Now
see Order 32, Rule 1 and 2, Civil Procedure Code, 1908(5 of
1908).] in a case under sub-section (1), as if the ward were the
plaintiff and the guardian were the defendant, or, in a case
under sub-section (2), as if the guardian who made the
application were the plaintiff and the other guardian were the
defendant.
(5)Except in a case under sub-section (2), nothing in this section
shall apply to a Collector who is, as such, a guardian.”
29.
Section 43 of the Act, 1890 thus provides for the remedy for
enforcement in case of disobedience of the order of custody. So it
cannot be said that statute does not provide for remedy for
enforcement.
30.
Thus considered, we are not inclined to entertain this writ of
Habeas Corpus. The Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to
costs.
As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending if any, shall
stand closed.
____________________
RAVI NATH TILHARI, J
______________________
SUBHENDU SAMANTA, J
Date: 24.06.2026
Pab/GK
Whether the order is:
Speaking
Reportable
Reasoned
☑
Non-reportable
☑
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI NATH TILHARI
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUBHENDU SAMANTA
WRIT PETITION No.36437 of 2025
DATE: 24.06.2026
Pab
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