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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 19TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
O.S.A.NO.6/2025
BETWEEN:
OFFICIAL LIQUIDATOR OF
M/S. KIRLOSKAR INVESTEMENTS
AND FINANCE LTD., (IN LIQUIATION) ,
‘CORPORATE BHAVAN,
12TH FLOOR, RAHEJA TOWERS,
NO.26-27, M.G.ROAD,
BENGALURU-560 001.
…APPELLANT
(BY SMT. KRUTIKA RAGHAVAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1.
MR.M.C.SOMASHEKAR,
S/O LATE P.M.CHANNABASAVANNA,
#14, KALIDASA ROAD,
MYSURU-570 002.
2.
MRS.M.C.SWARNALATHA,
D/O LATE P.M.CHANNABASAVANNA,
# B 204, WHISPERING MEADOWS,
1ST MAIN ROAD, DOLLARS COLONY,
RMV 2ND STAGE, BENGALURU-560 094.
3.
MRS.M.C.MOHANAKUMARI,
D/O LATE P.M.CHANNABASAVANNA,
#20, GAGANACHUMBI,
DOUBLE ROAD, KUVEMPUNAGAR,
MYSURU-570 023.
4.
MR.M.C.MALLIKARJUN,
S/O LATE P.M.CHANNABASAVANNA,
#53/A, II CROSS,
KALIDASA ROAD,
JAYALAXMIPURAM
MYSURU-570 012.
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. G.S. PRASANNA KUMAR, ADVOCATE R1 TO R4)
THIS OSA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 483 OF THE COMPANIES
ACT, 1956 READ WITH SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA HIGH
COURT ACT, 1961, AND RULES 6 AND 9 OF THE COMPANIES
(COURT) RULES 1959, PRAYING THIS HON’BLE COURT TO (A) SET
ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 18.09.2025 PASSED IN CA
326/2021 C/W CA 419/2022; (B) ALLOW THE PRAYERS SOUGHT BY
THE APPLICANT / APPELLANT IN CA 419/2022 BY DIRECTING THE
RESPONDENTS HEREIN TO CO-OPERATE IN THE MUTATION OF
TITLE IN FAVOUR OF THE COMPANY IN LIQUIADATION AND ETC.,
THIS OSA HAVING BEEN HEARD ON I.A.No.3/2025 FILED FOR
CONDONATION
OF
DELAY
ON
05.01.2026,
AND
RESERVED,
COMING ON FOR ORDERS ON I.A.NO.3/2025, THIS DAY, JAYANT
BANERJI J., MADE THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI
AND
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.M.NADAF
CAV ORDER
(PER: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JAYANT BANERJI)
ORDER ON IA NO.3/2025
Heard
learned
counsel
for
the
applicant
on
I.A.No.3/2025.
2.
The aforesaid appeal has been filed on 07.11.2025
under Section 483 of the Companies Act, 1956 read with
Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, and Rules 6
and 9 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959, seeking to (a)
set aside the impugned order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the
learned Single Judge in C.A. No.326 /2021 connected with C.A.
No.419/2021; and, (b) allow the prayers sought by the
applicant in C.A. no.419/2021 by directing the respondents to
cooperate in the mutation of title in favour of the Company in
liquidation.
3.
The office had raised objection, inter alia, that no
application had been filed for condonation of delay. The
counsel submitted before the Registry that I.A. for condonation
of delay is not required as per Chapter VI-A, Rule 6 of the High
Court of Karnataka Rules, 19591, the rules applicable to RFA
shall apply to OSA. As such, the period of limitation is 90 days
and the appeal/OSA has been filed within limitation. Therefore,
the matter was placed before the Court on 01.12.2025 for
orders on the office objections.
4.
On
01.12.2025
the
learned
counsel
for
the
respondents raised an objection of limitation stating that, in
view of the provision of Article 117 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963 read with Section 483 of the Companies
Act, 19562 in light of Chapter VI-A of the HCK Rules, the
period of limitation would be 30 days. The learned counsel for
the Official Liquidator3 sought adjournment to study the
matter.
5.
On 08.12.2025 an application was filed on behalf of
the OL seeking condonation of delay. It was supported by an
affidavit of the OL in which it has been stated that the appeal
was filed on 07.11.2025 being aggrieved by the impugned
order dated 18.09.2025 passed by the learned Company Judge
HCK Rules
Act, 1956
OL
in Company Application No.326/2021 connected with Company
Application No.419/2022.
6.
It is stated that the delay in filing the appeal was
due to the time taken in procuring and collating the additional
documents, as the records are very voluminous and it was
very difficult to trace the relevant files and the documents
surrounding the present matter. The order for winding up of
the Company in liquidation was passed by this Court on
24.12.2010 and tracing and retrieving the relevant files
required considerable time in preparing the instant OSA.
There are, approximately 45000 deposit holders to whom the
Company in Liquidation is indebted and the OL is duty bound
to protect the interest of those stakeholders.
7.
It has been contended by the learned counsel for
the OL that, it was a practice of the OL to file an appeal before
this Court
relying upon the Article 116 of the Schedule to the
Limitation Act, 1963, and accordingly the appeal was filed
believing the limitation to be 90 days. It is stated that earlier,
in view of the limitation prescribed under Article 116, it was
the practice of the OL to file such appeals within 90 days.
Therefore the Official Liquidator was under the bona fide belief
that the period of limitation would be 90 days from the date of
the decree or order and not 30 days.
8.
However, the learned counsel for the OL conceded
that, given the objection being raised by the learned counsel
for the respondent, and after thorough study of the matter, it
would be Article 117 of the Limitation Act that would apply to
proceedings under Section 483 of the Act, 1956.
9.
In the statement of objections filed on behalf of the
respondents to the aforesaid Interlocutory Application seeking
condonation of delay, it has been stated that no due diligence
has been shown by the appellant after passing of the
judgment. The appellants have taken it in a very casual
manner and therefore they are not entitled for condonation of
delay. It is stated that the judgment was pronounced by the
learned Single Judge on 08.09.2025 and the judgment was
scanned on 23.09.2025. The respondent received the copy on
24.09.2025 itself.
It is stated that, on the contrary, the
appellants applied for the copy on 04.11.2025 and obtained a
copy on 06.11.2025. As such, there is more than 41 days of
delay in preferring the above appeal. It is stated that
therefore, the application seeking 20 days delay condonation,
is not in accordance with law. It is stated that obtaining a
certified copy after limitation is unexplained in the affidavit of
the Official Liquidator. Non-availability of additional documents
would not come in the way of obtaining certified copy of the
impugned order.
10.
It is stated that the number of cases being handled
by the OL cannot be a reason for condonation of delay; the
appeal memo was not accompanied by any application seeking
condonation of delay in view of Order 41 Rule 1(3)4 read with
Rules 7 & 8 in Chapter VI of the HCK Rules. In the absence of
such an application, the appeal itself is not maintainable in law
and consequently, the I.A. for stay is also not maintainable.
The subsequent filing of an application for condonation of
delay would also not cure the defect in non-filing along with
the appeal.
It is stated that the present application for
condonation of delay is only an attempt to cure the defect
which goes to the root of the appeal.
11.
Learned counsel for the respondent opposes the
aforesaid I.A. on the ground that under the provisions of
Article 117 of the Limitation Act, the period for filing the OSA
Karnataka amendment
under Section 483 of the Act, 1956, would be 30 days from
the date of the decree or order. It is stated that there is no
explanation given in the affidavit filed in support of the
aforesaid I.A., as to why there was a delay in applying for the
certified copy of the impugned judgment dated 18.09.2025,
after nearly a period of two months on 04.11.2025.
12.
It is further stated that non-availability of additional
documents has been cited as a reason for not preferring the
appeal within time, whereas I.A.No.1/2025, which is an I.A.
for filing additional documents, does not enclose any of the
documents cited therein. Another submission of the learned
counsel for the respondent is that, in view of the provisions of
Chapter VI, Rule 7 and 8 of the HCK Rules, read in conjunction
with Sub-rule (3) (Karnataka Amendment) of Rule 1 of Order
XLI, of the CPC as well as Rule 3A of Order XLI, there exists a
mandate for filing of an application for condonation of delay
along with the appeal. His contention is that there being a
delay in filing the appeal, there is no appeal unless the delay is
condoned and therefore the date of filing the application for
condonation of delay i.e., I.A.No.3/2025 would be the relevant
date on which the appeal would be deemed to have been filed.
13.
Learned counsel for the respondent in support of
his contention has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of
the High Court of Jharkhand in Tax Appeal No.14/2020 dated
09.07.2024 and High Court of Karnataka in ILR 1993 KAR
1323 to contend that subsequent filing of the appeal, an
application for condonation of delay cannot cure the defect of
not filing the delay condonation application along with the
appeal memo.
14.
The provisions of Articles 116 and 117 of the
Limitation Act are as under:-
Description of suit
Period of
limitation
Time from which period
begins to run
116. Under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908)—
(a) to a High Court from any
decree or order.
Ninety days.
The date of the decree or order.
(b) to any other court from any
decree or order.
Thirty days.
The date of the decree or order.
117. From a decree or order of any High
Court to the same Court.
Thirty days.
The date of the decree or order.
__________________________________________________
15.
Chapter VI-A of the HCK Rules relates to OSA. Rule
6 therein provides that subject to the provisions of this
Chapter, the Rules applicable to Regular First Appeals and the
provisions of Order 41 and 41-A
of the CPC shall, as far as
may be, apply to OSAs.
Order 41 Rule 1, sub-Rule (3)
[Karnataka High Court Amendment] reads as follows:
“ORDER XLI
APPEALS FROM ORIGINAL DECREES
1. Form of appeal. What to accompany memorandum:
(1) & (2)
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
(3) When an appeal is presented after the period of
limitation prescribed therefore it shall be accompanied by
an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts
on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he
had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within
such period, and the Court shall not proceed to deal with
the appeal in any way (otherwise than by dismissing it
either under rule 11 of this Order or on the ground that it is
not satisfied as to the sufficiency of the reason for the
delay) until notice has been given to the respondent and his
objections, if any, are heard."
The aforesaid sub-Rule (3) of High Court Amendment was
added by notification dated 16.10.1959.
16. Rule 3-A was inserted in Order 41 CPC by the 1976
Amendment, which reads as follows:“3A. Application for condonation of delay.
(1)
When a appeal is presented after the expiry of
the period of limitation specified therefor, it shall
be accompanied by an application supported by
affidavit setting forth the facts on which the
appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal
within such period.
(2)
If the Court sees no reason to reject the
application without the issue of a notice to the
respondent, notice hereof shall be issued to the
respondent and the matter shall be finally
decided by the Court before it proceeds to deal
with the appeal under rule 11 or rule 13, as the
case may be.
(3)
Where an application has been made under subrule (1) the Court shall not made an order fact
the stay of execution of the decree against which
the appeal is proposed to be filed so long as the
Court does not, after hearing under rule 11,
decide to hear the appeal.”
17.
Therefore, sub-Rule (3) of Karnataka High Court
Amendment to Rule 1 of Order 41, and Rule 3-A of Order 41
are largely pari materia. The provision requires that an appeal
presented after the period of limitation specified therefor, shall
be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit
setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy
the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the
appeal within such period.
18.
Though the word ‘shall’ is used in the aforesaid
provisions, the same will have to be seen in the light of the
facts and circumstances of a particular case. In the judgment
of M.V. “Vali Pero” v. Fernandeo Lopez5, the Supreme
Court has observed as follows:“18. Rules of procedure are not by themselves an end but
the means to achieve the ends of justice. Rules of
procedure are tools forged to achieve justice and are not
hurdles to obstruct the pathway to justice. Construction
of a rule of procedure which promotes justice and
prevents its miscarriage by enabling the court to do
justice in myriad situations, all of which cannot be
envisaged, acting within the limits of the permissible
construction, must be preferred to that which is rigid and
negatives the cause of justice. The reason is obvious.
Procedure is meant to subserve and not rule the cause of
justice. Where the outcome and fairness of the procedure
adopted is not doubted and the essentials of the
prescribed procedure have been followed, there is no
reason to discard the result simply because certain
details which have not prejudicially affected the result
have been inadvertently omitted in a particular case. In
our view, this appears to be the pragmatic approach
which needs to be adopted while construing a purely
procedural provision. Otherwise, rules of procedure will
become the mistress instead of remaining the handmaid
(1989) 4 SCC 671
of justice, contrary to the role attributed to it in our legal
system.
19. In this case, none disputes the correctness and
authenticity of the depositions recorded on commission
but there is omission of witness' signature thereon. The
question is: does reception of these depositions in
evidence violate Rule 4 ibid in a manner which is
impermissible or this omission can be overlooked as
insignificant since correctness and authenticity of the
depositions is undisputed ? We have no doubt that cause
of justice would be served instead of being thwarted and
the avowed object of Rule 4 ibid achieved by treating it
to be an insignificant omission in the present case.
20. The consequence of failure to comply with any
requirement of Rule 4 ibid is not provided by the statute
itself. Accordingly, the consequence has to be determined
with reference to the nature of the provision, the purpose
of its enactment and the effect of the non-compliance.
Rule 4 uses the word “shall” even while requiring the
signature of the witness as it uses the word “shall” in
respect of the other requirements of the rule. Ordinarily,
the word “shall” used at several places in Rule 4 must be
given the same meaning at all places. However, it is also
settled that this is not an invariable rule and even though
the word “shall” is ordinarily mandatory but in the
context or if the intention is otherwise it may be
construed
to
be
merely
directory.
In
short,
the
construction ultimately depends on the provision itself
keeping in view the intendment of the enactment and the
context in which the word “shall” has been used.
21. It would suffice, to refer only to the decision in
Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta
[(1985) 3 SCC 53]. The word “shall” was used therein in
connection with the court's power to strike off the
defence against ejectment in a suit for eviction of tenant
in case of default in payment of rent. This Court
construed the word “shall” in that context as directory
and not mandatory since such a construction would
advance
the
purpose
of
enactment
and
prevent
miscarriage of justice. In taking this view, this Court was
impressed by the fact that the default attracting the
drastic consequence of striking out defence may be only
formal or technical and unless the provision was treated
as directory, it would render the court powerless even
where striking out the defence may result in miscarriage
of justice. We may refer to a passage from Crawford on
Statutory Construction [1940 Edn., Article 261, p. 516]
which was quoted with approval in Govindlal Chagganlal
Patel v. Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhra
[AIR 1976 SC 263] and relied on in this decision. The
quotation is as under:
“The question as to whether a statute is mandatory
or
directory
depends
upon
the
intent
of
the
legislature and not upon the language in which the
intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the
legislature must
govern,
and these
are to be
ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the
provision, but also while considering its nature, its
design, and the consequences which would follow
from construing it the one way or the other.”
22. It cannot, therefore, be doubted that the word “shall”
used in the expression “deposition shall be signed by
witness” in Rule 4 ibid has to be given the meaning
keeping in view the intention of the legislature, the
purpose of the enactment and the consequence which
would follow from construing it as mandatory or directory.
23. If the word “shall” used in this expression is construed
as mandatory, non-compliance of which nullifies the
deposition, drastic consequence of miscarriage of justice
would ensue even where omission of the witness' signature
is by inadvertence and correctness of the deposition as
well as its authenticity is undisputed. On the other hand, if
the word “shall” used in this expression is treated as
directory, the court will have power to prevent miscarriage
of justice where the omission does not cause any prejudice
and the defect is only technical. The object of the provision
being merely to obtain acceptance of the witness to the
correctness of the deposition, that object would be
advanced by taking this view and thereby empowering the
court to avoid the drastic consequence of nullifying the
deposition where the correctness and authenticity is
undisputed. In a case where the correctness has been
disputed, it would be permissible for the court to examine
the effect of omission of the witness' signature and to
reject the deposition only if it does not accept the
correctness and authenticity thereof on the available
material.”
19.
In the case of Union of India v. A.K. Pandey6, ,
the Supreme Court held as follows:-
(2009) 10 SCC 552
“15. The principle seems to be fairly well settled that
prohibitive or negative words are ordinarily indicative of
mandatory
nature
of
the
provision;
although
not
conclusive. The Court has to examine carefully the purpose
of such provision and the consequences that may follow
from non-observance thereof. If the context does not show
nor demands otherwise, the text of a statutory provision
couched in a negative form ordinarily has to be read in the
form of command. When the word “shall” is followed by
prohibitive or negative words, the legislative intention of
making the provision absolute, peremptory and imperative
becomes loud and clear and ordinarily has to be inferred as
such. …………”.
20.
In the context of the aforesaid cited cases, the
aforesaid provisions of sub rule (3) (Karnataka amendment) of
Rule 1 of Order 41 of the CPC, as well as the provision of
Order 41 Rule 3 of the CPC are to be seen. The word “shall”
followed by the words “be accompanied by an application
supported by an affidavit….” appearing in the provisions is not
followed by prohibitive or negative words. The consequence of
failure of the appeal being accompanied by an application
supported by an affidavit is not provided by the CPC itself. The
consequence that would be meted out for not demonstrating
‘sufficient cause’ is set out in Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
21.
However, there can be a case where an aggrieved
party may file a defective appeal, that is to say an appeal filed
beyond the prescribed period of limitation, and the matter is
kept
pending
indefinitely
without
any
notice
to
the
Respondents for want of an appropriate application supported
by an affidavit for satisfying the court that she had sufficient
cause for not filing the appeal within limitation. In such a case,
the Respondent would be without any information about
pendency of the appeal. The Respondent may even alter his
position during the period between filing of the defective
appeal,
and,
filing
of the
application/affidavit
explaining
sufficient cause. Such cannot be the intent of the procedure
provided for filing the required application/affidavit along with
an appeal presented after the expiry of the period of limitation
under sub-Rule 3 (Karnataka amendment) of Rule 1 of Order
41 CPC or of Rule 3-A of Order 41 CPC. Apparently, the
provisions were made with the intention so that an appeal filed
beyond the limitation provided, should not be kept in the
docket of the appellate court indefinitely as a defective appeal
for want of the prescribed application supported by an
affidavit. The aforementioned provisions of Order 41 CPC find
echo in Rules 7 and 8 of Chapter VI of the HCK Rules.
22.
Therefore any leeway or concession if provided to a
party whose defective appeal is not accompanied by the
prescribed
application/
affidavit
to
file
such
application/
affidavit subsequently, may lead to misuse and abuse of the
procedure prescribed. Thus the procedure in Order 41 CPC
that an appeal presented after the expiry of the period of
limitation specified therefor, ‘shall’ be accompanied by an
application supported by an affidavit setting forth the facts on
which the Appellant relies to satisfy the court that she had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such
period, should be given its full effect. However, that does not
mean that in case such an appeal which is filed after the
prescribed period of limitation without it being accompanied by
the requisite application/affidavit envisaged under Rule 1 and
Rule
3-A
of
Order
CPC,
should
meet
the
drastic
consequence of being rejected for non-compliance of a
procedural requirement. As noted above, the consequences
are meted out by Section 3 of the Limitation Act.
23.
The question that now crops up is that what would
be the consequence of delay in filing of the aforesaid
application/affidavit. Is such a defect curable? Learned counsel
for the respondent has argued that the appeal would be
deemed
to
have
been
filed
on
the
day
when
such
application/affidavit is filed. However, we do not intend to go
into the aspect of whether any legal fiction is to be construed.
What is of importance is that the reason for the delay in filing
the application with affidavit should be explained therein to the
satisfaction of the court that there was sufficient cause for not
preferring the appeal or making an application within the
prescribed period. This is the intendment of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act.
24.
As
noted
above,
admitted
and
evidently,
the
impugned order was pronounced by the learned Single Judge
on 18.09.2025 and the certified copy of the impugned order
was applied 04.11.2025. Therefore, given the provision of
Article 117 of the Limitation Act, even the application for the
certified copy of the impugned order was made well after thirty
days of the date of order. There is no explanation for this
delay. The discretionary power of a court to condone delay
may not be exercised where there is negligence or
want of
due diligence. Section 5 can be construed liberally provided
‘sufficient cause’ in not filing the appeal/application within the
prescribed period is shown to the satisfaction of the court. [See
Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs v. Special Deputy Collector
(LA)7 and Shivamma (dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board8]
25.
In view of the aforesaid, we are not satisfied with
the explanation offered to demonstrate sufficient cause for
condoning the delay in filing the appeal.
26.
The
application
for
condonation
of
delay
I.A.
No.3/2025 is therefore, rejected. Since the I.A. is rejected the
proposed appeal is consigned.
Sd/(JAYANT BANERJI)
JUDGE
Sd/(T.M.NADAF)
JUDGE
KGR
(2024) 12 SCC 336
2025 SCC Online SC 1969
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