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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 26.02.2026
Judgment delivered on: 10.03.2026
C.A.(COMM.IPD-TM) 28/2025, I.A. 15577/2025 & I.A. 22984/2025
NVENIA LLC
.....Appellant
versus
THE CONTROLLER GENERAL OF
PATENTS, DESIGNS AND TRADEMARKS
.....Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner :
Mr. Ranjan Narula, Advocate.
For the Respondent :
Ms. Nidhi Raman, CGSC with Mr. Om Ram and
Mr. Arnav Mittal, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
JUDGMENT
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
1.
Present appeal has been filed under Section 91 of the Trade Marks
Act, 1999 (hereafter referred to as “the Act”) seeking setting aside of the
Order dated 17.04.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “impugned order”)
passed by the Registrar of Trade Marks whereby the Registrar has declared
the appellant’s application bearing no.5390410 in Class 07 for the mark
“FISCHBEIN” as abandoned despite being intimated of pending opposition
proceedings against a conflicting mark cited in the Examination Report and
seeking an adjournment on account thereof.
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
CA(COMM.IPD-CR)28/2025
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2.
Facts germane to the issue at hand are as under:
a. Appellant claims to have adopted and commenced the use of the
mark “FISCHBEIN” in the United States of America (USA) in the year
1918 for manufacture of goods in Class-07. Appellant also claims to
have commenced use of the mark “FISCHBEIN” in India on or about
31.12.1989 for manufacture of goods in Class-07.
b. It is stated that the appellant gained the knowledge of a publication in
the Trade Marks Journal dated 30.08.2021 of existence of an identical
mark “FISCHBEIN” under application no.4814199 in Class-07 in the
name of Mr. Naresh Behl, trading as Citizen Udyog. Alarmed by the
alleged dishonest and malafide adoption and use of the identical mark,
the appellant instituted opposition proceedings on 06.10.2021. The
primary ground of opposition being that the impugned mark is identical
to the plaintiff’s prior-adopted mark “FISCHBEIN” which enjoys not
only prior use, but also extensive use globally.
c. In order to assert its right and protect the trademark “FISCHBEIN”
adopted by it, the appellant filed an application on 30.03.2022 for
registration of the said mark in Class-07 vide application no.5390410
for “Packaging machines; bag forming machines; bag sealing
machines; bagging machines; conveyors being machines; filling
machines; industrial sealing machines; labeling machines; loading and
unloading machines; palletizers, namely machines that sort, transfer,
and stack items on pallets; robotic palletizing machines; palletizing
machines; sewing
machines;
stacking
machines”
goods.
The
Examination Report dated 31.05.2022 was furnished by the respondent
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wherein objection on relative grounds of refusal under Section 11 of the
Act citing the existence of a prior conflicting trademark namely, the
impugned mark filed by Mr. Naresh Behl in application bearing
no.4814199.
d. In response thereto, vide the reply dated 23.06.2022, the appellant
submitted that it is the prior adopter and the user of the mark
“FISCHBEIN”, and that the conflicting mark was adopted dishonestly
and was identical to the mark of the appellant. The appellant also claims
to have informed the Trade Marks Registry that it had initiated
opposition proceedings against the said mark of Sh. Naresh Behl.
e. It is claimed that during the hearing on 06.08.2024, the Trade Marks
Registry raised an objection as to the user claim not being substantiated,
and pursuant thereto, the appellant claims to have filed various
documents including written submissions to show the bona fide
adoption and use of the said mark “FISCHBEIN”. It is claimed by the
appellant that though a number of opportunities were provided by the
Trade Marks Registry on the written request of the appellant, however,
in respect of the last notice of hearing dated 17.02.2025 fixing the
hearing for 19.03.2025, despite the appellant seeking extension of time
vide letter dated 20.02.2025, no such extension was acceded to. It is
stated that without providing an opportunity of hearing to the appellant,
vide order dated 17.04.2025, the Registrar had rejected the application
on the ground that it had abandoned the application.
f. Aggrieved by the refusal of the Registrar on the ground of
abandonment of the trademark application, the present appeal is
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instituted.
3.
Mr. Ranjan Narula, learned counsel appearing for the appellant
submitted that the impugned order is a classic case of violation of
Principles of Natural Justice, and ought to be set aside on that score alone.
He would submit that no doubt the Registrar had afforded number of
opportunities to the appellant in the past, however, on the crucial date when
the appellant sought an extension for production of relevant material in
support of its application seeking registration of the mark “FISCHBEIN”,
no such further opportunity was granted, and rather impugned order was
passed on a frivolous ground of abandonment. He would submit that once
the appellant has filed a number of documents in support of its application
seeking registration and even on the last occasion, in answer to the hearing
notice dated 17.02.2025, had sought a short accommodation vide letter
dated 20.02.2025, the Registrar could not have rejected/refused the
application on the ground of abandonment at all. He contended that
abandonment would constitute wilful or intentional lack of bona fide in
pursuing the trademark application. He would stoutly contend that in the
present case, the records would reveal the petitioner was duly represented
by its agent, and was consciously and diligently pursuing the said
application.
4.
Learned counsel would next invite attention of this Court to the
trademark application at page 53 of the paperbook to submit that though the
date of application was 30.03.2022, the user detail was declared as
31.12.1989. The proprietor’s name and the address with the details of goods
and services in Class-07 was also clearly mentioned. Thus, the appellant
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ought to have been afforded an opportunity to prove the prior use by
adequate documents by the Registrar.
5.
Learned counsel for the appellant invite attention of this Court to the
impugned order dated 17.04.2025 to submit that the said order being bereft
of any reasons, prima facie, deserves to be quashed and set aside. He
contended that other than stating that none had appeared, and that the
evidence filed is not satisfactory, there is no reasoning or even a material
objection based whereon the impugned order notes the decision of
“abandonment”. He would also contend that the Registrar has not even
noted that the appellant had filed an adjournment application. He would
submit that it is trite that in case of refusal to grant registration of a mark,
the Registrar is mandated to give adequate reasons, if not cogent one.
6.
Mr. Narula also contended that the rejection on the basis that
evidence filed is not satisfactory to claim the user since 1989 cannot
withstand the scrutiny of law for the reason that no such objection at all was
raised in the Examination Report dated 31.05.2022. In support of the
aforesaid contention, learned counsel referred to the Examination Report
dated 31.05.2022 whereby the only objection raised therein was on the
ground of Section 11(1) of the Act as the mark of the appellant is identical
with or similar to an earlier mark in respect of identical or similar
description of goods and services. Other than this, no objection, which is
now noted in the impugned order, was raised at all. In the absence of such
objection in the Examination Report, it could not be perceived by the
appellant that any such objection in respect of prior user would form the
basis of rejection on the grounds of abandonment by the Registrar in the
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final proceeding. Learned counsel stated that in case, such an objection did
come to the notice of the Registrar, unless a notice in that regard raising
such objection was furnished to the appellant, the order impugned could not
have been passed. He would submit that the law in this regard is fairly well
settled.
7.
Another ground of attack put forth by learned counsel for the
appellant is in respect of numerous invoices filed by the appellant on
record. He would submit that on the one hand the Examination Report did
not raise any objection which was raised by the Registrar for the first time
in the impugned order, while on the other hand the documents (invoices)
which were placed on record by the appellant, were not considered at all.
He would submit that the authorities cannot non-suit the appellant on a
ground not raised in the Examination Report in the first place, and find the
appellant lacking in documents proving user, for the first time in the
impugned order. Learned counsel forcefully contended that the statutory
authorities are mandated to be fair and transparent, which, according to the
learned counsel, is lacking in the case.
8.
In view of the above, learned counsel would submit that the
impugned order having violated the Principles of Natural Justice in more
than one context, may be set aside, and the matter may be remitted for de
novo consideration by the Registrar after affording the appellant an
opportunity to place on record additional documents, if so required, in
support of its trademarks application.
9.
Per contra, Ms. Nidhi Raman, learned CGSC appearing for the
Registrar vehemently refutes the submissions of the appellant. She would
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contend that in the present case, the appellant’s conduct clearly points out
to the gross negligence and the lackadaisical attitude and the approach of
the appellant in pursuing its trademark application seeking registration of
the mark “FISCHBEIN”.
10.
In support of her contentions she took this Court through the number
of hearing notices that were issued to the appellant commencing from the
first notice which was issued on 22.05.2024, to which an adjournment
application was submitted by the appellant in order to place additional
documents on record. The said request was acceded to by the Trade Marks
Registry. Similarly, for the second, the third, the fourth and the fifth hearing
notices, the appellant instead of diligently collating documents and
submitting the same to the Registrar kept seeking adjournment after
adjournment on the lame excuses of filing additional documents. She would
submit that it is only on the fifth hearing notice that the reason for seeking
extension was based on the applicant’s opposition filed against the cited
mark in the name of Mr. Naresh Behl trading as Citizen Udyog. This
application too was indulged with by the Registrar and an adjournment was
indeed granted.
11.
The last hearing notice was issued on 17.02.2025 for the hearing
scheduled on 19.03.2025. Despite having received this notice, neither the
appellant appeared nor filed any document in support of the Trademark
application. She contended that in such circumstances, the Registrar had no
choice and was constrained to pass the impugned order refusing the
application on the ground of abandonment.
12.
Additionally, in respect of the invoices which the appellant is now
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referring to and pertaining to the year 2015, she would submit that it would
be relevant to note that those are not in the name of the appellant. In that
regard, she referred the Trademark application of the appellant to submit
that while the name of the appellant is “nVenia LLC” the name in the
invoices dated 02.06.2015 and others is “Fischbein Packaging (Singapore)
Pte Ltd.”, which are two different entities. Clearly, the invoices do not
pertain to the appellant and as such the observation of the Registrar that
“evidence filed is not satisfactory to claim user since 1985” cannot be
found fault with.
13.
She also drew attention to the reply filed to the Examination Report;
the submissions and additional submissions filed by the appellant before the
Trade Marks Registry, to submit that though at one place the appellant has
stated its original adoption from the year 1918, while at another the
appellant claimed adoption since the year 1910. According to her, this
inconsistency demonstrates that even the appellant is unsure about the date
of adoption of the trademark “FISCHBEIN”.
14.
She next referred to the domain name of the Singapore company
from the website “WHOIS” registered as “fischbein.com”, which was
registered on 30.09.1996. She submits that this document clearly depicts
that there is a doubt as to when the name “FISCHBEIN” was adopted even
by the Singapore company namely Fischbein Packaging (Singapore) Pte
Ltd.
15.
Another pertinent argument raised by Ms. Raman was with respect to
the non-mentioning of the relationship between the appellant, the Fischbein
Packaging (Singapore) Pte Ltd. and Duravant LLC, which is claimed to be
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
CA(COMM.IPD-CR)28/2025
20:11:05
the original US entity which adopted the mark “FISCHBEIN” in the year
1918. She would contend that in the absence of such crucial collateral
documents including any assignment deed in favour of the appellant, in any
case the Registrar could not have ascertained with conviction that the
appellant is a legally entitled entity conferred with the license to use or is
permitted in any other manner to use the mark “FISCHBEIN”.
16.
Thus, according to her, the appellant having not only been callous
and negligent in the manner as narrated above but also having not placed
relevant documents despite having been afforded five adjournments at its
request, does not deserve any leniency and the appeal should be dismissed
with costs so as to set an example.
17.
She would stoutly contend that the bogie of violation of Principles of
Natural Justice is false to the knowledge of the appellant and has no
substance in it. In fact, according to her, the appellant was afforded more
than adequate opportunity to prove and support its trademark application,
which it miserably failed to do so.
18.
Thus, in the above circumstances, Ms. Raman would contend that the
appeal be dismissed being bereft of merits.
19.
In rejoinder, Mr. Ranjan Narula, learned counsel for the appellant,
submitted that unless the Registrar had afforded an opportunity in the
absence of the objection having been raised in the Examination Report, the
appellant could not have any opportunity to submit relevant documents
before the impugned order was passed. In the said context, learned counsel
submitted that relevant documents of assignment flowing to the appellant
from the original US entity are enclosed with the present appeal, which
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would clearly depict and demonstrate the appellant as the assignee of the
trademark in question.
20.
He would submit that if an opportunity is afforded to the appellant to
place before the Registrar, these crucial documents alongwith other
documents of assignment or merger with the predecessor entities, the
appellant would be able to demonstrate and evidence the necessary aspects
to overcome the objection now contained in the impugned order, which was
hithertobefore never put forth to the appellant. He prays that the order be
quashed and the appeal be remitted for reconsideration.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
21.
Before this Court adverts to the arguments of learned counsel for the
parties, it would be appropriate to extract the impugned order hereunder:
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
CA(COMM.IPD-CR)28/2025
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Three things are clear from a perusal of the impugned order, (i) that
the Registrar noted “none appeared”; (ii) evidence filed is not satisfactory
to claim the user since 1985 as the present applicant and the applicant as
per invoices are different, and (iii) no clarification has been sought, hence
the application has been taken to be “abandoned”.
22.
It would be relevant to appreciate as to whether the said objections or
findings recorded by the Registrar are found to have been raised in the
Examination Report by the Trade Marks Officer. In that context, the
Examination Report dated 31.05.2022 is reproduced hereunder:
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
CA(COMM.IPD-CR)28/2025
20:11:05
A perusal of the Examination Report brings to fore that the Trade
Marks Office raised an objection only under Section 11(1) of the Act,
regarding a conflicting mark being identical or similar in respect of
identical or similar description of goods and services which may create
likelihood of confusion in the minds of the public. The reference to any
objection other than the one raised under Section 11(1) of the Act, is
conspicuous by its absence. In other words, whether evidence filed in
support of the application by the applicant is satisfactory or not to the user
claim of the year 1985 or that the invoices filed on record by the appellant
are not in the name of the appellant but some other entity and that no
clarification in that regard has been issued by the appellant has not been
raised in the Examination Report so as to enable the appellant to give
clarification at all in the first place. In the absence thereof, it is intriguing as
to how the Registrar would expect the appellant to respond without notice
of the said objections and still reject the application on the grounds of
abandonment based on the non-existing objections.
23.
Yet another relevant aspect for consideration of this Court is that the
appellant in response to the Examination Report submitted its reply vide
communication dated 23.07.2022 whereby the objection raised under
Section 11(1) of the Act was answered or responded to in the manner to
overcome the said objection. This Court is of the opinion that the said
response needs to be reproduced herein for clarification.
“Submissions:
We submit that the above objection does not hold good and ought to be waived.
Our submissions vis-à-vis the said objection are provided below:
At the outset, we wish to submit that the adoption of the cited mark is in bad faith
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by cited entity especially as the FISCHBEIN mark/name is of foreign origin and
has no meaning or association with sewing machines or in any of the Indian
languages. In other words, the cited entity has blatantly copied an identical
mark. The Applicant has vehemently opposed this cited mark under number
DEL- 1126221. In the said opposition, the Applicant has contended bad faith
and dishonesty in adoption of an identical mark, FISCHBEIN for identical set of
goods while highlighting Applicant’s worldwide proprietary rights subsisting in
the subject mark.
In this regard, we wish to highlight the bonafide adoption of the trademark
FISCHBEIN by the Applicant in the year 1918 and use thereof in 130
jurisdictions worldwide including India. We also aver that the Applicant is also
the registered proprietor of the said trademark in class 7 in several jurisdictions
(Argentina, Brazil, Canada, EU, Italy, Mexico, Australia, USA, France, etc.)
with the earliest registration dating back to the year 1950 in Canada and USA.
We also wish to highlight that the Applicant’s trademark FISCHBEIN is a
trusted brand for openmouth bag sewing and sealing systems. Today,
FISCHBEIN has become the worldwide reference for designing and
manufacturing machines to close "open mouth" bags and serves customers
worldwide in agriculture, animal feed, seed, pet food, chemical, mineral, milling,
and food industries. The details of Applicant’s extensive business activities and
FISCHBEIN trademark are available on its websites www.nvenia.com,
www.duravant.com, www.fischbein.com, www.hamerfischbein.com, and social
media websites which are accessible in India. The domain names
www.fischbein.com, www.hamer-fischbein.com have been registered since 1996
and 2015.
The aforesaid reiterates the Applicant’s bonafide and proprietary rights in the
said trademark as envisaged under the provisions of section 18(1) of the Act.
Taking into consideration the aforesaid, we request the learned Registrar to
waive the objection raised under Section 11 of the Act and accept the application
for publication in the Trademarks Journal.
In the event the foregoing premise does not meet the official requirements, we
request the learned Registrar that an opportunity of being heard be accorded in
line with the rules of natural justice and equity, to present the case personally
before any adverse action is taken in respect of the instant application.”
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
CA(COMM.IPD-CR)28/2025
20:11:05
It is clear from the reply that the appellant had submitted its
response, right or wrong, to the objection raised in the Examination Report.
At that stage, it could not be expected from the appellant to give any
clarification or file any further documents to an objection which was not
even raised in the Examination Report. Therefore, the argument on behalf
of the respondent in this context is unfathomable and is unmerited.
24.
It is the bounden duty of the Trade Marks Office while examining the
application to place all objections before the applicant so as to enable the
applicant to know and be aware of the objections which are to be addressed.
It is those very objections alone that the applicant can be expected to
respond to at that stage. In the present case, the impugned order proceeds as
if the refusal of the application on the grounds of rejection contained
therein were already in the know of the appellant. This is contrary to the
facts on record. Thus, in that view of the matter, the contention of the
respondent is untenable.
25.
Another contention which was raised by Ms. Raman in respect of the
conduct of the appellant in seeking innumerable adjournments on frivolous
grounds. The same, no doubt reflects poorly on the appellant, however,
does not obviate the necessity of the Trade Marks Office or even the
Registrar at the time of hearing to put the appellant on notice regarding
objections not raised hithertobefore in the Examination Report. Bereft of
such a mandate being followed by the authorities including the Registrar,
the conduct of the appellant as stated above, though may reflect poorly on
the appellant, however, does not remove the mandate of Principles of
Natural Justice, which inhere in every quasi judicial proceedings and orders
Digitally Signed
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passed by such authorities. Thus, the said argument is unpersuasive and
untenable.
26.
Though, the appellant has filed certain documents whereby it
attempts to establish assignment of the trademark “FISCHBEIN” in its
favour, the document which confer such right is executed on 25.07.2023
with effect from 01.08.2023, which is after the Examination Report dated
31.05.2022 issued by the Trade Marks Office. To the query raised by this
Court in regard to such documents, Mr. Narula submitted that the entities
through which the assignment was conferred upon the appellant including
the appellant are or were sister companies or entities of the main US
company “Duravant LLC”, and such transfer has not happened strictly by
way of an Assignment Deed but by way of merger of entities. Thus, he
submitted that when two entities under the same holding company are
merged, the transfer of rights in such property would flow on merger and
not assignment, and the right which accrues therein would relate back to the
original date of adoption of the holding company itself. Therefore, the
appellant would be entitled in law to seek rights of a prior user to the year
1985.
27.
Since the aforesaid issue was not brought to the notice of the
Registrar having regard to the lack of objection raised by the Trade Marks
Office in the Examination Report dated 31.05.2022, this Court deems it
appropriate not to make any observations or record any findings in that
regard, lest the same may cause prejudice to either of the parties.
28.
Having regard to the overall conspectus, both factual as also on law,
this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order 17.04.2025
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passed by the Registrar is unsustainable. However, since a lot of factual
issues, objections etc., have neither been raised nor dealt with, nor even an
opportunity was afforded to the appellant, it would be in the fitness of
things to set aside the impugned order and remand the matter back for a de
novo consideration after issuing a fresh hearing notice to the appellant
raising all objections and providing an ample opportunity to the appellant to
present its response by way of documents etc. Needless to state an
opportunity of hearing also needs to be accorded to the appellant.
29.
Ergo, in view of the aforesaid analysis, the impugned order dated
17.04.2025 is set aside. The Registrar is directed to issue a fresh hearing
notice specifying grounds of objection qua the trademark application of the
appellant; provide an opportunity to appellant to place on record all relevant
documents in support of its application; afford an opportunity of personal
hearing or further hearings as may be desired and pass appropriate speaking
orders thereon.
30.
The aforesaid exercise shall be carried out within a period of four
months from the date of the receipt of this order.
31.
The appeal is allowed in view of the aforesaid directions and
disposed of with all pending applications without any order as to costs.
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
FEBRUARY 12, 2026/rl
Digitally Signed
By:YASHRAJ
CA(COMM.IPD-CR)28/2025
20:11:05
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