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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of decision: 20.01.2026
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025
NUPUR GARG
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Abhishek Wadhwa, Mr. Somyaa
Gurung & Mr. Saurabh Yadav, Advs.
with appellant in person.
versus
DWARKESH AHUJA
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. Dhiraj Bhiduri, Adv. with
respondent present through VC.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIVEK CHAUDHARY
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
JUDGMENT
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1.
The present appeal has been filed under Section 19 of the Family Court
Act, 1984 read with Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”)
against the Order dated 09.12.2025 passed by the learned Judge, Family
Court-02, South District, Saket Courts, Delhi (“Family Court”) in HMA No.
1821 of 2025, whereby the appellant’s application under Section 14 HMA
seeking leave to present a joint petition for divorce by mutual consent under
Section 13-B (1) HMA prior to expiry of one year from the date of marriage,
was dismissed, and consequentially, the main petition was also held to be not
maintainable.
2.
The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 30.03.2025 at
Arya Samaj Mandir, Khirki Village, New Delhi. Subsequently, the marriage
was registered on 02.04.2025 before the Office of the District Magistrate,
Signed By:PRATIBHA
KUMARI
03:56:16
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025
South, New Delhi. It is an admitted position that the parties never cohabited
even for a single day, the marriage was never consummated, and immediately
after the marriage, both parties continued to reside separately at their
respective parental homes.
3.
Thereafter, owing to irreconcilable differences and complete
incompatibility discovered immediately after marriage, the parties jointly
decided to seek dissolution of marriage by mutual consent.
4.
Since the joint petition under Section 13-B(1) HMA was presented
within seven months of marriage, an application under Section 14 HMA was
filed seeking leave of the Court to present the petition prior to expiry of one
year.
5.
By the impugned order, the learned Family Court declined to grant
leave under Section 14 HMA, holding that the parties had failed to establish a
case of “exceptional hardship” warranting relaxation of the statutory bar.
Further, it held that they had not made sufficient or sincere efforts to preserve
and save the marriage, and that the subsequent registration of the marriage
shortly after its solemnization militated against and diluted their claim of
exceptional hardship.
6.
Learned counsel for the parties submits that the respondent is presently
residing in Canada, whereas the appellant is residing in India. It is further
submitted that the appellant is required to take care of her aged parents and is
neither willing nor in a position to relocate, while the respondent is similarly
not willing or able to relocate to India. These circumstances, though
unfortunate, are stated to be unavoidable and beyond the control of the
parties, and have resulted in their continued separation, with no realistic or
Signed By:PRATIBHA
KUMARI
03:56:16
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025
practical possibility of resumption of matrimonial life, thereby giving rise to
exceptional hardship.
7.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
record.
8.
At the outset, it is pertinent to note the Section 13-B(1) HMA, which
reads as under:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act a petition for
dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce may be
presented to the district court by both the parties to a
marriage together, whether such marriage was solemnized
before or after the commencement of the Marriage Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1976 (68 of 1976), on the ground that they
have been living separately for a period of one year or more,
that they have not been able to live together and that they
have mutually agreed that the marriage should be
dissolved.”
9.
Section 14 HMA provides as under:
“(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, it shall
not be competent for any court to entertain any petition for
dissolution of a marriage by a decree of divorce, unless at the
date of the presentation of the petition one year has elapsed
since the date of the marriage:
Provided that the court may, upon application made to it in
accordance with such rules as may be made by the High
Court in that behalf, allow a petition to be presented before
one year has elapsed since the date of the marriage on the
ground that the case is one of exceptional hardship to the
petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the
respondent, but if it appears to the court at the hearing of the
petition that the petitioner obtained leave to present the
petition by any misrepresentation or concealment of the
nature of the case, the court may, if it pronounces a decree,
Signed By:PRATIBHA
KUMARI
03:56:16
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025
do so subject to the condition that the decree shall not have
effect until after the expiry of one year from the date of the
marriage or may dismiss the petition without prejudice to
any petition which may be brought after expiration of the
said one year upon the same or substantially the same facts
as those alleged in support of the petition so dismissed.
(2) In disposing of any application under this section for
leave to present a petition for divorce before the expiration of
one year from the date of the marriage, the court shall have
regard to the interests of any children of the marriage and to
the question whether there is a reasonable probability of a
reconciliation between the parties before the expiration of
the said one year.”
10.
Learned counsel for the parties have drawn our attention to the
judgment passed by the Full Bench of this Court in MAT.APP. (F.C.)
111/2025, titled Shiksha Kumari v. Santosh Kumar, decided on 17.12.2025,
wherein the Court held as under:
“57. We may summarise our conclusions in response to the
questions posed, as follows:
57.1. The statutory period of 01-year prescribed under
section 13B(1) of the HMA as a pre-requisite for presenting
the first motion, can be waived, by applying the proviso to
section 14(1) of the HMA;
57.2. The waiver of the 01-year separation period under
section 13B(1) of the HMA does not preclude waiver of the
06-month cooling-off period for filing the second motion
under section 13B(2); and waiver of the 01-year period
under section 13B(1), and the 06-month period under section
13B(2), are to be considered independently of each other;
57.3. Where the court is satisfied that the 01-year period
under section 13B(1) and the 06-month period under section
Signed By:PRATIBHA
KUMARI
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MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025
13B(2) of the HMA deserve to be waived, the court is not
legally mandated to defer the date from which the divorce
decree would take effect, and such decree may be made
effective forthwith;
57.4. Such waiver is not to be granted merely for the asking
but only upon the court being satisfied that circumstances
of ‘exceptional hardship to the petitioner’ and/or
‘exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent’ exist,
while also testing the case on the anvil of the considerations
set-out in Pooja Gupta;
57.5. Waiver, as above, can be granted both by the Family
Court as well as the High Court; and
57.6. As contemplated in the proviso to section 14(1) of the
HMA, where a court finds that the waiver of the 01-year
period under section 13B(1) has been obtained by
misrepresentation or concealment, the court may defer the
date on which the divorce would take effect, as may be
considered appropriate; or may dismiss the divorce petition,
at whichever stage it is pending, without prejudice to the
right of the parties to present a fresh petition under section
13B(1) of the HMA after expiration of the 01-year period, on
the same or substantially the same facts as may have been
pleaded in the petition so dismissed.”
(emphasis added)
11.
In the present case, the admitted facts demonstrate that the parties never
cohabited, the marriage was never consummated, and they have lived
separately since the very inception of the marriage. There are no children
from the wedlock, nor is there any reasonable probability of their living
together in future. These facts are not in dispute and strike at the very
foundation of a subsisting matrimonial relationship.
Signed By:PRATIBHA
KUMARI
03:56:16
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025
12.
In such circumstances, insisting upon continuation of a marriage which
exists only in law, and not in substance, would amount to compelling the
parties to endure a relationship devoid of any matrimonial foundation, thereby
causing avoidable hardship rather than advancing the object of the statute.
13.
With respect to the reasoning adopted by the learned Family Court that
registration of marriage negates the claim of hardship cannot be sustained.
Registration of marriage is merely a statutory mandate, and by itself, cannot
be determinative of matrimonial harmony, intention to cohabit, or the
viability of the marital relationship.
14.
Likewise, the observation that the parties did not make adequate efforts
to save the marriage requires reconsideration. Where the marriage has never
been acted upon by the parties through cohabitation, the question of saving
such a marriage does not meaningfully arise.
15.
Therefore, as per Section 14 HMA, this Court is required to examine
whether the present case discloses “exceptional hardship” and whether there
exists any reasonable probability of reconciliation between the parties. In
view of the undisputed position that the marriage has never been
consummated, the parties have lived separately since inception, reside in
different countries, and there is no material to indicate any possibility of
resumption of matrimonial life, coupled with the fact that the health condition
of the appellant’s aged parents does not presently permit her to relocate to
Canada, while the respondent is also unable to relocate to India, insisting
upon adherence to the statutory period of one year would serve no meaningful
purpose. On the contrary, it would only result in prolonging a marriage that
exists merely in law and not in substance, thereby causing exceptional
hardship within the meaning of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the HMA.
Signed By:PRATIBHA
KUMARI
03:56:16
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025
16.
This Court is, therefore, satisfied that the present case squarely falls
within the exception carved out under Section 14 of the HMA.
17.
Accordingly, the Order dated 09.12.2025 passed by the Family Court is
set aside.
18.
The application under Section 14 HMA is allowed, and leave is granted
to the parties to present their joint petition for divorce by mutual consent
under Section 13-B (1) HMA forthwith without waiting for expiry of one year
from the date of marriage.
19.
The matter is remanded to the learned Family Court concerned to
proceed with the petition under Section 13-B HMA in accordance with law,
expeditiously.
20.
The appeal stands allowed in the above terms.
VIVEK CHAUDHARY
(JUDGE)
RENU BHATNAGAR
(JUDGE)
JANUARY 20, 2026
nc
Signed By:PRATIBHA
KUMARI
03:56:16
MAT.APP.(F.C.) 443/2025
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