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Serial No.02
Supp. List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
CRP. No. 24 of 2022
Date of Order :24.11.2023
North Eastern Electric Power
Corporation Ltd.
Vs.
M/s. Delta Mechcons (India)
Ltd.
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice H.S.Thangkhiew, Chief Justice (Acting)
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) :
Mr. S.Jindal, Adv.
Ms. B.Jyrwa, Adv.
Mr. S.Rana, Adv.
For the Respondent(s)
Mr. K.Paul, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. K.Khanna, Adv.
Mr. S.Panthi, Adv.
Ms. B.Kharsahnoh, Adv.
:
i)
Whether approved for reporting in
Law journals etc:
Yes/No
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT AND ORDER
1.
The present petition has been filed under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India assailing the order dated 13-07-2022, passed by the
learned Commercial Court, Shillong in Commercial (Arb.) Case No. 6 of
2019, whereby the learned Court below, held that it had no jurisdiction to
adjudicate a petition that had been filed by the petitioner under Section 34
of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996, to challenge an Arbitral
Award dated 27-04-2019. The learned Court below went on to conclude
that it was the Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi, which had the exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate the said Section 34 petition filed by the
petitioner.
2.
The facts necessary are that the parties entered into a contract, which
was executed at Shillong on 17-07-1995, for certain works to be
undertaken at Dibrugarh, Assam. Thereafter, as disputes arose between the
parties, arbitration was invoked which was conducted in New Delhi, and
an award was then passed by the Arbitral Tribunal on 27-04-2019. Against
the award, the petitioner had filed an application under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the A&C
Act) before the Commercial Court, Shillong on 25-07-2019, and the same
was registered as Commercial (Arb.) Case No. 6 of 2019. Similarly, the
respondents herein also filed a Section 34 application before the High
Court of Delhi, being OMP (COMM) 351 of 2019 on 23-08-2019. Against
the Section 34 application filed by the petitioner, the respondents filed an
objection/preliminary written statement raising the issue of jurisdiction of
the Commercial Court at Shillong. The learned Commercial Court then by
its judgment dated 13-07-2022, concluded that the High Court of Delhi,
had exclusive jurisdiction and that the Courts in Shillong had no
jurisdiction to entertain the matter. The petitioner being aggrieved on the
ground that the contract agreement did not specify any such seat of
arbitration, or that the Arbitral Tribunal had determined any seat, is
therefore before this Court by way of this instant revision application.
3.
At the outset, it has been contended that the instant revision has been
preferred under Article 227 of the Constitution, as the impugned order
which has held that the Commercial Court in Shillong does not have the
jurisdiction to entertain the Section 34 application filed by the petitioner, is
not an appealable order under Order 43 CPC, nor covered by Section 37 of
the A&C Act. It is further submitted that the proviso to Section 13 (1A) of
the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 provides that an appeal shall lie to the
Commercial Appellate Division of a High Court, only against orders listed
in Order 43 CPC and Section 37 of the A&C Act. The impugned order, it
is
submitted,
not
being
covered
under
appealable
orders
as
aforementioned, only the present revision petition shall lie, and that this
Court had territorial jurisdiction, inasmuch as, the challenge in the present
petition is not against the contents of the said award, but only against the
impugned order. It has also been contended that the execution of the
contract agreement was also done in Shillong, and as such, it means that
the Courts in Shillong, including the Commercial Court and High Court,
will have territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the present matter.
4.
The most crucial issue in the instant case, is as to whether the
Arbitral Tribunal had determined the seat of arbitration, which is seriously
disputed by the petitioner, while the respondents seek to maintain that the
Arbitral Tribunal had infact, determined the seat and place of arbitration.
The parties have been at pains to support their respective stands, by
referring to the orders of the Arbitral Tribunal in seeking to interpret the
same as to their exact purport and import, which will be examined by this
Court while deciding the matter.
5.
Mr. S.Jindal, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to the
Contract wherein at Clause 58.2, it has been stipulated that the Courts at
Shillong “will have jurisdiction to entertain civil suits pertaining to the
contract”. He submits that Clause 58.2 grants exclusive jurisdiction to the
courts at Shillong even though the words „exclusive‟ or „sole‟ have not
been used, and has relied on the judgment rendered in Swastik Gases Pvt.
Ltd. vs. IOCL, (2013) 9 SCC 32, where the Supreme Court has held
therein that, by making a provision that the agreement is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Courts at Kolkata, the parties have impliedly excluded
the jurisdiction of other courts. Learned counsel has also pointed out that
Clause 58.2, cannot be read divorced from Clause 71, which is the
arbitration clause in the contract agreement. By reading the two clauses
together, he submits, it will show that the only civil suit that would be
possible, will be the proceedings arising out of the A&C Act, and that by
the operation of Section 8, even if a civil suit should be filed by either of
the parties, they would be relegated to arbitration, which would in turn
ultimately be before the Civil Court in Section 34 proceedings of the A&C
Act. It has been contended that the contract agreement in question being
executed in 1995, is in the old format based on the old Arbitration Act of
1940, which clearly would mean that civil suits in Clause 58.2 referred to
proceedings under the Arbitration Act, wherein an award had to be
confirmed as a decree of a civil court, which confirmation would obviously
be by way of a civil suit.
6.
The learned counsel while elaborating on the same point, has
highlighted that Clause 58.2, provides that the Courts in Shillong will have
jurisdiction to entertain civil suits pertaining to the contract, and submits
that the usage of the words „pertaining to‟, reflects that the parties have
contemplated that all disputes arising out of, or connected to the contract
will be adjudicated by the Courts in Shillong. An examination of the
dispute between the parties and the nature of the claim raised before the
Arbitral Tribunal it is submitted, will reflect that each and every claim is
connected to the underlying contract between the parties, and since the
present dispute between the parties is connected to, and arising from the
contract, the same will be governed by Clause 58.2. Learned counsel in
support of these arguments has placed reliance on the following
judgments:
(i)
M/s. Doypack Systems Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India (1988)
2SCC 299.
(ii)
The State Wakf Board, Madras vs. Abdul Azeez Sahib &
Ors. AIR 1968 Mad 79.
7.
The learned counsel submits that no seat or venue of arbitration was
ever agreed or decided by the Arbitral Tribunal, or by the parties and that
the conduct of the proceedings in New Delhi, was purely on account of
convenience since the arbitrators were from Delhi. It is also submitted that
there is no specific order of the Arbitral Tribunal clearly and
unambiguously fixing New Delhi as the „venue‟ of the arbitration, and that
even if it is assumed that the „venue‟ had been decided by the Arbitral
Tribunal, it would have no relevance, since it is the „seat‟ which has to be
chosen or determined to confer jurisdiction. The implications sought to be
drawn by the respondents he contends, to the fact that, as the Arbitral
Tribunal had held all its sittings in Delhi and that the award was passed in
Delhi, the seat of arbitration had been determined is incorrect, inasmuch
as, determination requires more than an inference by implication. The
learned counsel has referred to the definition of determination as defined in
a Law Lexicon which he submits that determination is given as signifying
an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute
by some authority, and has placed the judgment of the Union of India vs.
Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc. (2019) 13 SCC 472,
wherein the Supreme Court
has held that the word „determination‟
requires a positive act to be done.
8.
Learned counsel submits that the learned Commercial Court while
holding that the seat/place of arbitration had been determined through
implication by the Arbitral Tribunal, as also the respondents, had referred
to Section 31(4) of the A&C Act to support the point that the seat had been
determined by the Arbitral Tribunal through implication. Learned counsel
submits that the said provision contemplates a certain chronology of which
the first component is that the place of arbitration has to be stated in the
award as determined in accordance with Section 20, and that under Section
20(2) of the A&C Act, it is the Arbitral Tribunal which has to determine
the seat, should the parties not have decided the same under Section 20(1),
which however, is not present as there has been no such determination of
seat by the Arbitral Tribunal in the present case. It is further submitted that
once the seat has been determined, the other component under Section
31(4) is that the award can be deemed to have been made at that place. It is
contended that the learned Commercial Court by only looking at the
award, and noticing that the same had been passed in New Delhi, and
deemed that the seat of arbitration had been determined by the Arbitral
Tribunal to be in New Delhi, and as such, has misread Section 31(4), by
reversing the chronology in holding that, first since there is a place
mentioned in the award, it can be deemed that the Arbitral Tribunal had
determined the seat. The entire basis of the impugned order therefore he
submits, being erroneous, the same is liable to be interfered with by this
Court. In this event, it is further submitted, the only guiding factor for
locating the seat of arbitration will be Clause 58.2 of the contract
agreement which grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Courts in Shillong.
9.
The learned counsel has next referred to the Shashoua Principle that
states that, in the absence of designation of a seat of arbitration, the venue
of the arbitration itself can be considered to be a seat of arbitration, in the
absence of any other significant contrary indica. Learned counsel submits
that this aspect is relevant for the reason that as there is no designation of
the seat, the question therefore would be whether the Shashoua Principle
can be applied to hold that the venue, that is Delhi, would also be the seat
of arbitration. In this context, learned counsel has referred to para 61 of the
BGS SGS Soma judgment, which he submits, it has been laid down that,
where there is an express designation of a venue, and no designation of any
alternative place as the seat, and no other significant contrary indica, the
conclusion is that the stated venue is actually the seat of the arbitral
proceeding. In the present case, he submits, there is no expressed
designation of venue and as such, the Shashoua Principle can be applied to
hold that Delhi is also the seat of arbitration. He also contends that even if
it is to be assumed that the venue has been designated through the action of
the parties in holding attending the sittings of the Arbitral Tribunal in
Delhi, even then, the Shashoua Principle will not be applicable due to the
presence of another significant contrary indica, which is Clause 58.2,
whereby the exclusive jurisdiction has been granted to the Courts in
Shillong. Learned counsel has also referred to the judgment of the
Allahabad High Court in the case of Hasmukh Prajapati vs. Jai Prakash
Associates, AIR 2022 All 121, which he submits, the facts of which are
almost similar to the present case. Reference has also been made to a case
of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Homevista Décor & Furnishing
Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. vs. Connect Residuary Pvt. Ltd. 2023 SCC Online Cal
1405, which he submits, a comprehensive analysis of all available
judgments on the issue of seat versus venue, including from the Supreme
Court and various High Courts have been discussed. Reference has also
been made to the following judgments:
(i)
Torrent Power Ltd. vs. Dakshinanchal Vidyut Vitaran
Nigam Ltd., 2022 SCC Online All 883.
(ii)
Meenakshi Nehra Bhat vs. Wave Megacity Centre Pvt. Ltd.,
2022 SCC Online Del 3744.
10.
Learned counsel then concludes his arguments by submitting that, in
no reading of the matter, can venue be considered as granting exclusive
jurisdiction, and that the learned Commercial Court itself, by holding the
venue of arbitration as the determinative factor in locating jurisdiction, has
rendered a majority of the Section 34 applications pending before it, as
being bereft of jurisdiction, for the reason that in most of these pending
cases, the venue of arbitration is invariably outside Shillong. As such, it is
submitted that the impugned order being unsustainable and is liable to be
set aside.
11.
Mr. K. Paul, learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. K. Khanna,
learned counsel for the respondents apart from raising objections with
respect of the maintainability of the instant Revision Application under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has submitted that the impugned
order of the learned Commercial Court, Shillong is a legally tenable and a
well-reasoned order passed after due consideration of merits. The learned
Senior counsel submits that, though no place, venue or seat has been
defined under the arbitration clause in the contract, the petitioner has
conceded to the fact that, all the proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal were
conducted in Delhi, coupled with the fact that the Award was passed and
stamped at New Delhi itself. Section 31(4) of the A&C Act, he submits
requires that an arbitral award shall state its State and place of arbitration,
as determined in accordance with Section 20, and that the award shall be
deemed to have been made at that place. He therefore submits that the fact
that, the petitioner submitted to jurisdiction of the New Delhi Courts for
about 14(fourteen) years and the fact that, the proceedings were conducted
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court, since the seat of
arbitration was not provided in the contract, the Delhi High Court would
naturally have jurisdiction in the proceedings under Section 34 of the A&C
Act.
12.
The learned Senior counsel has referred to an order dated
02.11.2006, passed by the Arbitral Tribunal, wherein on an oral
submission by the petitioner for fixing the next date of hearing at Shillong,
the Arbitral Tribunal had observed that such change of venue can only be
considered upon the presentation of a proper application, which was never
done by the petitioner. This he submits, establishes the fact that Delhi was
the venue for the arbitration and as the petitioner never made any such
application for change of venue, the proceedings were held throughout for
14(fourteen) years at Delhi. He further submits that subsequent orders
passed by the Tribunal, also reflect this position as it is recorded that on
each occasion it is mentioned „same venue‟, which means Delhi, and the
fact that the petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction of Delhi Courts. It
is contended that the award dated 25.04.2019, being signed at Delhi,
stamped at Delhi and published on 27.04.2021, at Delhi, the requirements
of law as per Section 31(4) and Section 20 of the A&C Act, have been
met.
13.
In support of the above noted arguments, the learned Senior counsel
on the point that the venue of arbitration would mean the seat of
arbitration, unless the seat is mentioned specifically, has placed reliance on
the following judgments.
(i)
BGS SGS SOMA JV vs. NHPC Limited reported in
2020 (4) SCC 234.
(ii)
Bharat Aluminium Company vs. Kaiser Aluminium
Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552.
(iii)
Hinduja Leyland Finance Ltd. vs. Debdas Routh &
Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Cal 16379.
(iv)
Antrix Corporation Ltd. vs. Devas Multimedia Pvt.
Ltd., passed in FAO(OS)(COMM.) 67/2017, dated
30.05.2018.
Learned Senior counsel has also submitted that, the parties by
agreeing that the venue of the arbitral proceedings have agreed that the
juridical seat of arbitration is in New Delhi, and therefore, the High Court
at Delhi will have exclusive jurisdiction to decide the instant case.
Reference has also been made to the application of the Shashoua Principle,
as it has been applied in the case of Brahmani River Pellets Ltd. vs.
Kamachi Industries Ltd. (2020) 5 SCC 462.
14.
It has been contended by the learned Senior counsel that Clause –
58.2, only expressly provides that Courts at Shillong, would have
exclusive jurisdiction to try any civil suit in connection with disputes
arising out of the agreement and therefore, there is a clear distinction
between the „subject matter of arbitration‟ and „subject matter of a suit‟.
An examination of Clause 58.2, with regard to jurisdiction in a civil suit as
opposed to the arbitration clause at Clause 71, he submits has clearly
defined the scope of disputes which are arbitrable and to be referred to an
Arbitral Tribunal. Clause 58.2, is contended is not all encompassing and
applicable to the entire agreement, as it has been suggested by the
petitioner, but rather it would be applicable specifically only to the
disputes not covered under Clause 71, and as such, only determines the
jurisdiction of Courts while preferring a civil suit and cannot be construed
to be seat of arbitration.
15.
The learned Senior counsel in concluding his submissions has
reiterated that, the Supreme Court as held in BGS SGS SOMA JV(supra),
has made it clear that once the parties designate the seat of arbitration, only
the Courts governing the seat have exclusive jurisdiction to govern such
arbitration proceedings, and jurisdiction of all other courts stands ousted,
and as such, the Courts of Shillong, in the light of this legal position would
not possess any jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Section 34. He
therefore submits, the instant Revision Application is not tenable in law
and in facts, and the same is liable to be dismissed.
16.
Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on examination
of the materials as presented before this Court, it is seen that the only
question that is to be determined, is whether on account of the arbitration
proceedings being conducted in Delhi, the same is to be considered to be
the seat which will therefore decide the jurisdictional issue that has been
raised. The learned Commercial Court it is noted, has concluded that the
fact that the sittings were conducted and the award passed in Delhi itself,
has determined that Delhi be the seat of arbitration and had gone on to rely
upon the judgment of the BGS SGS Soma JV (supra) case to hold that the
High Court in Delhi possessed exclusive jurisdiction.
17.
Section 20 of the A&C Act, 1996 does not define the terms, „seat‟ or
„venue‟ but only refers to the place of arbitration. Venue more often would
mean a convenient location for conduct of the arbitral proceedings whereas
the term „seat‟ carries much more weight. The use of „seat‟ and „venue‟
interchangeably has led to much confusion in these matters. In the instant
case, the arbitral proceedings were conducted in Delhi, and the award also
was stamped and dated in Delhi. This appears to be the yardstick adopted
by the Commercial Court to hold that the „seat‟ had been determined by
implication, even though there has been no such determination of „seat‟ by
the Arbitral Tribunal. It is to be noted that the determination of a venue has
to be specific and as per Section 20(2) of the A&C Act, 1996 it is the
Arbitral Tribunal which is to determine the „seat‟ should the parties have
not decided on the same. In the instant case, there has been no specific
determination, apart from the fact that the Arbitral Tribunal had indicated
that the proceedings, as reflected in the order dated 02-11-2006, that the
matter would be taken up at the same venue on 23-01-2007. Though it was
consistently thereafter indicated that the venue for the next sitting of the
Arbitral Tribunal would be in Delhi, there is no order that conclusively
designated Delhi as the venue for all time to come. As submitted by
learned counsel for the petitioner, which this Court is inclined to accept,
the very fact that the Law Officer of the petitioner, had made a prayer for
the venue of the next sitting to be at Shillong, would indicate that there
was no prior expressed or implied agreement between the parties that the
venue would permanently be in New Delhi. It therefore, can be
conclusively inferred that there has been no specific determination of
venue.
18.
The Supreme Court in the case of BGS SGS Soma JV (supra) had
held that whenever there was a designation of a place of arbitration as
being the venue of arbitration proceedings, the same would mean that the
venue is really the „seat‟ of the arbitral proceedings as the expression
arbitration proceedings would not just mean an individual or a particular
hearing, but would mean that all the proceedings including the making of
an award at that place. In the instant case, there has been no express
designation of a „venue‟ nor any determination of the „seat‟ of arbitration
under Section 20(2) of the A&C Act by the Arbitral Tribunal, to enable a
logical conclusion as to whether Delhi is the juridical seat of the arbitration
proceedings. Coupled with this fact, is the presence of Clause 58.2 of the
Contract Agreement which has provided that the Courts at Shillong will
have jurisdiction to entertain civil suits pertaining to the contract. Though
in the same contract, Clause 71 provides for arbitration, in the considered
view of this Court both these Clauses cannot be read in isolation, but are to
be construed in a harmonious manner as to give an effective meaning to
the contract agreement. Another factor which cannot escape consideration
in the matter is that the purport of Clause 58.2 has to be seen in the light of
its application in the old format based on the old Arbitration Act of 1940,
wherein an award had to be confirmed as a decree of the civil court which
confirmation obviously would be by way of a civil suit.
19.
The Shashoua Principle as has been referred to by the parties is also
relevant in this discourse, inasmuch as, Clause 58.2 in this context will
have to be taken to be significant contrary indica, which in the considered
view of this Court will operate as the reason that Delhi be not considered
the
„seat‟
of
arbitration,
notwithstanding
the
other
prevailing
circumstances, such as the proceedings being conducted and the award
passed and stamped in New Delhi. As such, the view taken by the learned
Commercial Court that the arbitral proceedings having been conducted in
Delhi, by implication the same would amount to the parties having agreed
that the juridical seat of arbitration is New Delhi, thereby investing
exclusive jurisdiction on the High Court at Delhi does not seem to be
correct. The reference therefore to Section 31(4) of the A&C Act in para
38 of the impugned judgment that the „seat‟ had been determined by the
Arbitral Tribunal by implication cannot be accepted, and this finding is
overruled. The situation being such, wherein this Court is satisfied that the
Arbitral Tribunal had not determined the „seat‟ or „venue‟ of arbitration,
and the only other indicator available from the contract agreement is
Clause 58.2, which grants jurisdiction to the Courts at Shillong, the
inescapable conclusion therefore, without further examining or discussing
the other judgments placed by the parties, is that the Courts in Shillong
where jurisdiction has been granted is to be treated as the „seat‟.
20.
In the facts and circumstances of the case therefore, in view of the
conclusion arrived at above, the impugned order being flawed, the same is
set aside.
21.
The instant civil revision petition accordingly stands allowed and is
disposed of.
22.
There shall be no order as to costs.
Chief Justice (Acting)
Meghalaya
24.11.2023
“Samantha PS”
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