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Serial Nos. 7-9
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Arb.A.No1/2019 with
Arb.A.No.2/2019
Arb.A.No.3/2019
Date of order: 22.03.2022
North Eastern Electric Power
Corporation Ltd. (NEEPCO)
Vs.
Patel-Unity Joint Venture
North Eastern Electric Power
Corporation Ltd. (NEEPCO)
Vs.
Patel Engineering Limited
North Eastern Electric Power
Corporation Ltd. (NEEPCO)
Vs.
Patel Engineering Limited
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellant
For the Respondent
: Mr. R Shankar, Adv with
Mr. S Jindal, Adv
: Mr. A Dholakya, Sr.Adv with
Mr. R Dangwal, Adv
Mr. K. Gaur, Adv.
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
These three appeals arise out of identical orders passed on three
independent petitions under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996 pertaining to the three packages forming parts of the same work
for the construction of a hydro-electric power project in the State.
2.
The primary prayer in the three petitions was as follows:
“Restrain the Respondent, its assign(s), its officers, employees or
representatives from fraudulently invoking the Bank Guarantees as
listed in para 26 of the present application and issued by the
Applicant in favour of the Respondent.”
3.
To begin on a lighter note, the prayer made may just as well have
been allowed for the mere asking. By the use of the word “fraudulently”
therein, the respondent herein only prayed that the invocation should not be
fraudulent but did not seek any injunction on the invocation otherwise. So
much for careless drafting and the daily rubbish that the Indian Judge is
subjected to.
4.
There is no dispute that the relevant bank guarantees were
unconditional in nature, in the sense that the bank unequivocally agreed to
pay the amounts covered by the relevant bank guarantees on the first
demand made by the beneficiary without reference to the respondent herein
and merely on the basis of the claim of the beneficiary without going into
the veracity thereof. It may do well to notice the identical key clause from
one of the bank guarantees:
“We, the said Bank, also do hereby agree to pay unequivocally and
unconditionally within Two working days on demand in writing from
the said Corporation (appellant herein) of any amount upto … to the
said Corporation for any purpose or cause or on any account
whatsoever under the provisions of the said contract (matrix
contract) in which respect the decision of the said Corporation shall
be final and binding on us.”
5.
As is elementary, bank guarantees stand on a different footing from
the matrix contract and the very purpose of furnishing of a bank guarantee
is to insulate the subject-matter thereof from the disputes or differences that
may arise between the parties to the principal or matrix contract. Indeed, a
bank guarantee is a contract between a bank and the beneficiary and the
other party to the matrix contract is not a party to the bank guarantee
despite the bank guarantee being furnished at the instance of such other
party to the matrix contract. Generally, as here, a bank guarantee is quite
independent of the matrix contract and is a stand-alone document under
which a bank is obliged to make payment to the beneficiary strictly in
accordance therewith.
6.
In the present case, the bank agreed to pay “unequivocally and
unconditionally” upon the appellant herein making a demand “for any
purpose or cause or on any account whatsoever” under the provisions of the
matrix contract. The last limb of the clause even provides for the decision
or opinion of the beneficiary to be binding as to whether the demand is in
accordance with the provisions of the matrix contract. The terms of the
guarantee do not allow any discretion or latitude to the bank and do not
envisage any notice being issued to the respondent herein before the
payment in terms thereof is released.
7.
Bank guarantees, like letters of credit, form the life-blood of
commercial activities and have to be strictly construed on the basis of the
letter of the document. Whatever may be the prejudice that is suffered by
the person at whose behest the bank guarantee is issued, unless the terms of
the bank guarantee permit its interdiction, Courts are not permitted to
interfere in the invocation of a bank guarantee or the payment thereunder.
High authorities instruct accordingly that unless a case of egregious fraud
in the making of the bank guarantee or at the inception of the contract is
made out or there is some special equity or irretrievable damage, the Court
will be slow in interfering with a bank guarantee or any payment
thereunder.
8.
The appellant herein first refers to the ad-interim order that was
passed on the petitions under Section 9 of the Act. It is evident that two
considerations weighed with the Commercial Court in passing the adinterim orders of status quo with respect to the bank guarantees: that a case
of fraud had been pleaded in the petition; and, that clause 29 of the matrix
contract was under consideration of this High Court in some ancillary
matter. The relevant ad-interim order of February 22, 2019 did not meet the
rudimentary tests for the grant of any injunction and it did not even pay lip
service to comply with the preconditions for the grant of an interlocutory
injunction. No prima facie case appears to have been made out and there is
no reflection in the order of any consideration as to the balance of
convenience.
9.
It is trite law that when a suitor seeks an order, it is for such suitor
to affirmatively establish a right to obtain such order. At the interlocutory
stage, a strong prima facie case has to be made out. The mere pleading of
an allegation is not a substitute for the prima facie satisfaction of the Court
being reached as to the right of the suitor to obtain an ad-interim order.
Similarly, merely because an issue is pending consideration before a higher
forum, it does not imply that it operates as an injunction, unless there is a
specific injunction which is in place requiring the relevant provision that
has fallen for consideration to not be implemented. The Commercial Court
was clearly wrong in passing the ad-interim order as it took irrelevant
considerations into account and failed to apply the high tests required when
an injunction against a bank guarantee is sought.
10.
The same trend continued in the final order of June 21, 2019 which
has given rise to the present appeals. The Commercial Court referred to
certain averments in the affidavit filed on behalf of the appellant herein
and, though such averments did not amount to any concession or admission
nor entitle the Commercial Court to pass any injunction in respect of the
bank guarantees, the bank guarantees were interdicted. The primary
grounds furnished in the judgments and orders impugned are found at
paragraphs 4 and 7 of the impugned judgments that culminated in the three
directions issued at paragraph 10 thereof. Paragraphs 4, 7 and the directions
from paragraph 10 are set out:
“4) The Ld. Counsel for the Respondent does not dispute with regard
to the statement made in para 16, 17, 26 and 33 of the show cause,
however, the Ld. Counsel for Respondent resists to the prayer for
issuance of notice before invocation of the bank guarantee and
submits that if notice is issued before the invocation of the bank
guarantee it would amount to adding conditions in the bank
guarantees which otherwise is unconditional. That it would be
necessary for this Court to examine the statement made by the
Respondent in para 16, 17, 26 and 33. For easy reference the relevant
extract is reproduced;
That in para 16 (g) the Respondent has stated
“… the Arbitral verdict and order in his case, overlaps the
clause 29 of the contract agreement and is under hearing before
the High Court of Meghalaya by filing the present application
and in the guise of the same seeking judicial review of clause 29,
the Applicant is abusing the process of law and is attempting to
create situation in which there could be diversion of judicial
opinion on the same issue”.
That in para 16 (h) the Respondent has stated
“….the Applicant has also got two more Arbitral awards related
to revision of the rates for Package-II and package-III which are
the subject matter of challenge under Commercial Arbitration
case No. 10, 11, 12, 13 of 2018 where again issue relating to
judicial review of clause 29 of the conditions of contract is under
consideration”.
That in para 17 the Respondent has stated
“….the clause 29 of the contract agreement is sub-judice before
the Hon’ble High Court of Meghalaya as well as before this
Court therefore it is requested that this Court hold its hands in
reaching any judicial conclusion in the said clause 29 further any
event it is the stated intention of the application to seek injunction
against invocation of the bank guarantee in question the said
clause 29 has no nexus to the execution or invocation of the said
bank guarantee. The Respondent in para 17 page 23 has stated
“The extra work and escalation amount are not susceptible to the
adjustment on account of quantity variation”.
“7) That on examining the response of the Respondent which is
stated above in the light of the contention raised by the Applicant in
his Application u/s 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
this Court finds that in view of the statement made by the
Respondent in the show cause discussed above the apprehension and
the grievances of the Applicant does not survive for adjudication as
the Respondent in very clear terms has held that the bank guarantee
and cash security deposit, if at all is invoked the same shall be
invoked in terms of clause 4 of the agreement, as such, this
application can be disposed off base on the admission made by the
Respondent.”
“10) ... a) The Respondent will not invoke the bank guarantee or
adjust the cash security deposit provided by the Applicant to the
Respondent under clause 29 of the contract in question i.e. packageI, package-II, package-III as the said clause 29 cannot be acted
upon, being subjudiced. The invocation of bank guarantee and
adjustment shall not be contrary to the clause 4 of the contract in
question package-I, package-II, package-III.
b) There shall be no diversion of funds from package-II, package-III
for adjustment of vendor of package-I balance amount shall be
adjusted from pending payment and R/A Bills.
c) That in case the Respondent proposed to invoke or encash the
bank guarantee and adjust security deposit the Respondent shall give
indication the intention to encash bank guarantee and cash security
deposit”.
11.
At the outset, a preliminary objection is taken on behalf of the
respondent to the effect that the appeal is not maintainable. A facetious
submission is made by referring to Section 37(1)(b) of the Act that it is
only the grant or the refusal to grant any measure under Section 9 of the
Act which is appellable under Section 37 thereof. According to the
respondent, no measure has been granted under Section 9 of the Act by the
order impugned. Such submission has to be rejected out of hand. There is a
right and proper injunction in place and by no stretch of imagination can it
be said that the order impugned or the directions quoted above do not
amount to an injunction. Even when the exercise of a right is hedged with a
condition introduced by an order, such order amounts to an injunction or an
interim measure under Section 9 of the Act.
12.
It is further submitted on behalf of the respondent, again as a
preliminary objection, that the appeals are of no further relevance because
the work under the several packages have been completed and, except in
the odd case, the defect period is over and certificates in such regard have
also been furnished. This aspect is as relevant in the present context as may
be the weather outside at the moment.
13.
On merits, it is submitted on behalf of the respondent that the
Commercial Court did not go into the issues raised in the petitions and the
Commercial Court merely issued the impugned directions upon its
interpretation of the contents of the affidavits filed by the appellant herein.
It is the respondent’s further contention that since no claim has been made
by the appellant till date nor any attempt made to invoke the bank
guarantees since the passing of the impugned orders, now that the work is
over, the appellate court should not get into the appeals on merits or pave
the way for the invocation of the bank guarantees which would be
fraudulent.
14.
The respondent has referred to a judgment reported at (2016) 11
SCC 720 (Gangotri Enterprises Limited v. Union of India) for the law
declared therein at paragraphs 38 to 41 of the report. In that case, two
independent contracts were issued by Northern Railway to the appellant
before the Supreme Court. In respect of the first contract that pertained to a
segment near Agra, the Supreme Court recorded that due to the delay in
handing over the site on account of a farmers’ agitation and the like, the
contract stood terminated and a fresh contract was subsequently awarded by
Northern Railway. The second contract was described in the report as
Anand Vihar works and, upon such second contract being successfully
completed, the performance bank guarantee furnished in connection with
the second contract was sought to be invoked and the running account bills
pertaining to the work performed under the second contract were sought to
be withheld by Northern Railway upon Northern Railway perceiving that it
had suffered a substantial loss in the contractor failing to execute the Agra
contract.
15.
It was in such context that the Supreme Court noticed clause 62 of
the general conditions then governing railway contracts that provided as
follows:Page 9 of 15
“The amounts thus to be forfeited or recovered may be deducted
from any monies then due or which at any time thereafter may
become due to the contractor by the Railways under this or any
other contract or otherwise.”
16.
While dealing with such clause and the right of Northern Railway to
invoke the bank guarantee pertaining to an altogether different contract, the
Supreme Court referred to the principle enunciated in the judgment
reported at (1974) 2 SCC 231 (Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry), not
for the purpose of assessing the right of Northern Railway to pursue a claim
pertaining to a different contract, but only on the ground that an
unliquidated claim in damages is not enforceable till it is adjudicated upon.
In Gangotri Enterprises Ltd, it was held that a mere claim of unliquidated
damages, which had not been ascertained, adjudicated or quantified, would
not justify withholding an admitted debt due in terms of clause 62 of the
general terms then governing railway contracts. Such principle has no
manner of application in the present case where there is no claim on
account of unliquidated damages and, indeed, the petitions under Section 9
of the Act were in the nature of quia timet actions and before any
invocation of any bank guarantee had been made.
17.
In any event, it is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the
judgment reported at (2020) 2 SCC 540 (State of Gujrat v. Amber Builders)
has held Gangotri Enterprises Ltd to be per incuriam. Even the dictum in
Raman Iron Foundry, which was relied upon in Gangotri Enterprises Ltd,
had long been overruled, but such aspect was not noticed in Gangotri
Enterprises Ltd. Paragraph 21 of the report in Amber Builders is apposite in
the context:
“21. In our opinion, the judgment rendered in Gangotri Enterprises
Ltd. is per incuriam because it relies upon Raman Iron Foundry
which has been specifically overruled by the three-Judge Bench in
H.M. Kamaluddin Ansari (1983) 4 SCC 417).”
18.
The respondent asserts that there was egregious fraud in this case
since the ultimate value of the work turned out to be more than 400 per cent
of the value indicated in the bid documents by the employer. The
respondent says that clause 29 of the matrix contract between the parties, in
essence, provides that upon the value of the work exceeding the value or
the price of the contract, by every 25 per cent, the rates payable to the
contractor would be discounted progressively. According to the respondent,
a huge amount of security that was furnished by the respondent to the
appellant is being withheld in addition to the bills against the completed
work not being released despite the employer having no claim against the
contractor, whether on account of the quality of the work, or any defect
pertaining thereto or any delay in the performance thereof.
19.
Finally, the respondent refers to a judgment reported at (2018) 2
SCC 602 (State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.) to place
paragraphs 63 to 68 thereof. According to the respondent, such judgment
instructs that a Court of appeal cannot look into a matter as the Court of
first instance in exercise of is appellate authority. But the paragraphs from
the report relied upon do not lay down the proposition that the respondent
canvasses; as it cannot, in view of the plenary powers of an appellate court
as recognised in Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when the
scope of the appeal is not confined to only questions of law. The appellate
authority conferred by Section 9 of the Act does not confine it to only
questions of law. However, what appears from the paragraphs cited is that
the Supreme Court upheld the principle that was enunciated in the
judgment reported at [1905] A.C. 369 (The Colonial Sugar Refining
Company, Limited v. Irving) and followed in the judgment reported at AIR
1953 SC 221 (Hoosein Kasam Dada v. State of M.P.) and, again, in the
judgment reported at AIR 1957 SC 540 (Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah
Choudhry). The principle is that since an appeal is a creature of statute, a
right of appeal inheres in the litigant if such right is available at the start of
the lis; and the subsequent abolition of the right of appeal will not affect the
right of a litigant who had entered the adjudication process prior to the right
of appeal being removed, erased or altered. Such principle, obviously, has
no manner of application in the present case.
20.
There is no doubt that the case carried by the respondent to the
Commercial Court may not have been appropriately assessed. However, the
respondent has not proffered any appeal from the impugned orders. Further,
the grounds urged by the respondent here and the grounds indicated in the
petition under Section 9 of the said Act, even if accepted at face value,
would not constitute grounds for interfering with an unconditional bank
guarantee. In short, the best arguable case of the respondent does not entitle
the respondent to an injunction or any form of interdiction in respect of the
subject unconditional bank guarantees.
21.
The orders impugned amount to the Commercial Court rewriting
the conditions of the bank guarantees or the contract between the parties,
which the Court had no jurisdiction to do. If an unconditional bank
guarantee permits the beneficiary to receive the payment thereunder on its
first demand and without any reference to or concurrence of the person at
whose behest the guarantee had been furnished, the Court cannot introduce
clauses to make the invocation conditional. Indeed, the directions issued
amount to the conversion of an unconditional bank guarantee into a
conditional one, which the Court plainly lacks the authority to do.
22.
The arguments of fait accompli that the appellate court has been
presented with by the respondent are of no relevance. Merely because no
claim has been made or there is no attempt at invocation of the bank
guarantees since the making of the impugned orders, it does not follow that
the orders have to be continued. The contention in such regard is akin to an
injunction being issued in respect of a residential property in favour of a
stranger merely because the owner of the house does not intend to sell the
house. When an injunction is sought against a bank guarantee or a letter of
credit or the like, serious considerations should go into the adjudication;
and only in the rare case may an injunction issue. There is no doubt that
there is an element of prejudice that the respondent has suffered or is likely
to suffer; but that is not a ground for an unconditional bank guarantee to be
interdicted or interfered with. There is no case of fraud at the inception that
has been made out. The only case run by the respondent is that large sums
of money due to it from the appellant remain unpaid and, as such, it would
be inequitable for the appellant to be left free to invoke the bank
guarantees. Even if it is so, it is a completely irrelevant consideration in the
matter of assessing whether the nature of order sought in respect of the
bank guarantees ought to be passed.
23.
For the aforesaid reasons, the judgments and orders dated June 21,
2019 are found to be without basis and completely flawed. No reason is
indicated therein to interfere with the invocation or encashment or payment
under any of the unconditional bank guarantees. The Commercial Court,
clearly, failed to take relevant considerations into account and apply the law
in such regard that it was obliged to.
24.
Considering the facts that the respondent came to Court with, it may
not have been unfair to expect the respondent not to urge its claim beyond a
point at this appellate stage or merely seek some other concession that the
appellant may have acceded to. But the vigour and gusto with which the
respondent sought to justify the completely baseless orders was an affront
to the institution.
25.
Accordingly, Arb.A.No.1 of 2019, Arb.A.No.2 of 2019 and
Arb.A.No.3 of 2019 are allowed by setting aside the impugned judgments
and orders dated June 21, 2019 and dismissing altogether the petitions
under Section 9 of the Act. The respondent will pay costs assessed at Rs.3
lakh for the proceedings in the Commercial Court below and in these
appeals for the hopelessly unmeritorious cause that it sought to assert and
defend.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
22.03.2022
“Lam DR-PS”
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