The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
16. There is no merit in the grounds urged by the writ petitioner. The appeal succeeds. The writ petitioner should join his transferred place of posting by November 15, 2022 which would be two months from the date of communication of the last reconsidered decision of the employer. Indeed, the date should be counted when his original representation was disposed of, but because orders of Court intervened, the writ petitioner is given the benefit of two months’ time from September 15, 2022.
17. In view of this order, the writ petition itself, WP(C) No. 423 of 2022, is disposed of. The interim order impugned dated October 18, 2022 is set aside.
18. WA No. 38 of 2022 is disposed of as indicated.
19. There will be no order as to costs. (W. Diengdoh) Judge (Sanjib Banerjee) Chief Justice Meghalaya
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Serial No.01
Supplementary List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
WA No.38/2022
In WP(C) No.423/2022
Date of order: 01.11.2022
North Eastern Electric Power
Vs.
Bidul Goswami
Corporation Ltd (NEEPCO) & ors
Coram:
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice
Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge
Appearance:
For the Appellants
:
Mr. V.K. Jindal, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. S. Rana, Adv.
For the Respondent
:
Mr. P.J. Saikia, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. P. Deka, Adv.
Mr. A.P. Kharsahnoh, Adv.
i)
Whether approved for
reporting in Law journals etc.:
Yes
ii)
Whether approved for publication
in press:
Yes/No
JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral)
The appeal is directed against an interim order passed on a writ
petition challenging an order of transfer. Quite inexplicably, the order
impugned requires status quo to be maintained, effectively stalling the
transfer.
2.
It is too late in the day to emphasise that the High Court’s
authority to interfere in matters of transfer is very limited and unless a
case of egregious mala fides is made out, the High Court must yield to
the administrative reasoning of the employer. Indeed, once an employer
cites administrative exigencies for the transfer of an employee who holds
a transferable job, it is almost the end of the matter and the High Court
ought not to interfere therein.
3.
In this case, the writ petitioner-respondent was issued a transfer
order on or about June 10, 2022 after serving in and around this area for
nearly 16 years. The transferred place of posting is Tawang. Shortly upon
receipt of the transfer order, the writ petitioner made a representation,
citing the ill-health of his aged mother as a ground to allow him to
continue in his present place of posting. The representation was disposed
of by a terse order and a release order of June 29, 2022 followed.
4.
The writ petitioner challenged the entire lot by way of an initial
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution that was disposed of by this
Court by an order of July 29, 2022. The Court, at that stage, found that
the representation had not been adequately dealt with and merely required
the representation to be reconsidered.
5.
Upon reconsideration of the matter, a speaking order followed
from the employer on August 5, 2022, which again was supplemented by
a further reconsidered order of September 15, 2022. The decision
remained the same. Another letter was issued by the employer on
September 16, 2022 requiring the writ petitioner to immediately join his
transferred place of posting. A third writ petition came to be instituted.
By the interim order impugned dated October 18, 2022, the employer was
directed to file an affidavit clarifying certain matters. In the meantime,
status quo was directed to be maintained with regard to the movement of
the writ petitioner. It is the sting of the status quo in the tail of the interim
order that the employer is aggrieved by.
6.
The clarification that the Court required follows the observation
at paragraph 7 of the impugned order:
“7. On perusal of the said impugned order, it indicates that the
respondent Corporation while making reference to the order
passed by this Court has however, referred to the letter dated
05.08.2022, which on the said date was no longer in existence.
Further, it is noted that the respondent Corporation has also stated
therein that the joining to the new place of posting by the
petitioner will be subject to the outcome of the final disposal of
the writ petition pending before this Court. Again on the date of
the said order i.e. dated 16.09.2022, there was no writ petition
pending, inasmuch as, the writ petition has been disposed of on
12.09.2022, as evident from the records annexed as Annexure-M
to the writ petition.”
7.
With respect, the substance of the matter was the transfer of an
employee and the perceived anomalies noticed were incidental and too
insignificant to be given any credence in the larger context.
8.
Two principal grounds have been urged by the writ petitioner in
resisting his transfer. The first ground is that even if his representation is
rejected, there is a period of 60 days which is permitted to the employee
before he has to join the transferred place of posting. The writ petitioner
claims that in the communication of September 16 2022, the employer
acted in breach of Rule 17 of the applicable transfer rules by calling upon
the writ petitioner to immediately report to the transferred post. The
second ground urged is that the transfer rules require a certain committee
to be constituted to look into the representation of an employee who has
been served an order of transfer and seeks to resist the same. According
to the writ petitioner, such board contains a member from the medical
fraternity who is best able to gauge the medical condition of the
concerned employee or any close relative if a ground in such regard is
cited to resist the transfer. The writ petitioner says that the constitution of
the committee in this case was inappropriate and it is not clear as to
whether any committee was constituted at all for the purpose of going
into the merits of the writ petitioner’s representation.
9.
There is no doubt that Rule 17 of the NEEPCO transfer policy
allows a transferred employee two months’ time from the date of the
administrative order rejecting his representation to join the transferred
post. Equally, Rule 15.2 of the said transfer policy requires a committee
to be constituted to consider the special grounds, if cited.
10.
In this case, the writ petitioner’s representation following the
receipt of the transfer order indicated that the writ petitioner’s mother,
aged 70, was suffering from partial paralysis following her cardiac arrest
in the year 1990. The writ petitioner also indicated the nature of treatment
that the writ petitioner’s mother required. It was a long-term ailment and
not a rare condition.
11.
This was not a case of any extraordinary ground for resisting the
transfer as the writ petitioner’s mother was aged and infirm and suffered
from a permanent disability. It is not the writ petitioner’s case that there
would not be adequate medical facility in the transferred place of posting,
should the writ petitioner be required to take his mother along with him.
12.
At any rate, Rule 15 of the transfer policy merely recognises that
certain special grounds may be cited to resist an order of transfer. These
special grounds include education of children, aged parents, employment
of spouse and the medical conditions as defined in NEEPCO Medical
Attendance Rules. Further, Rule 15.1 clearly stipulates that the functional
criticality or requirement of the employer would have overriding priority
over anything else.
13.
Apart from the fact that no special medical condition in terms of
NEEPCO Medical Attendance Rules had been cited by the writ petitioner
and the only ground cited was infirmity of an aged parent, the employer
must be deemed to be aware of the rules. Accordingly, the refusal by the
employer to accede to the writ petitioner’s request would imply that the
functional criticality or the administrative requirement of transferring the
writ petitioner outweighed other considerations. When so much authority
is given to the employer in freely transferring an employee, the rather
flippant ground cited by the writ petitioner should not have weighed
much with the Court to arrest a routine process in course of public
employment.
14.
Transfers cannot be stopped on the flimsy ground of age or
infirmity of elderly parents of government employees. It is but natural
that with advanced age, a person would be suffering from some form of
disability and it is not an extraordinary situation that the writ petitioner
was faced with. There is no doubt that the employer considered the writ
petitioner’s case and even reconsidered the same following the orders of
the Court, but found nothing special for the writ petitioner to be retained
in his present place of posting.
15.
Once so much appears to the Court that it was in the usual course
that an employee was sought to be transferred by the public employer and
the employee’s representation against the order of transfer had been
considered, the Court should refrain from interfering in the matter. There
is no doubt that the writ petitioner in the present case has abused the
process to obtain undeserving orders of status quo to stall his transfer and
the time of joining his transferred place of posting.
16.
There is no merit in the grounds urged by the writ petitioner. The
appeal succeeds. The writ petitioner should join his transferred place of
posting by November 15, 2022 which would be two months from the date
of communication of the last reconsidered decision of the employer.
Indeed, the date should be counted when his original representation was
disposed of, but because orders of Court intervened, the writ petitioner is
given the benefit of two months’ time from September 15, 2022.
17.
In view of this order, the writ petition itself, WP(C) No. 423 of
2022, is disposed of. The interim order impugned dated October 18, 2022
is set aside.
18.
WA No. 38 of 2022 is disposed of as indicated.
19.
There will be no order as to costs.
(W. Diengdoh)
Judge
(Sanjib Banerjee)
Chief Justice
Meghalaya
01.11.2022
“Lam DR-PS”
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