Noel Harper & Ors. vs Union of India & Anr.

Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 – Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2020 – Legislative history culminating with the 2010 Act, as amended in 2020 – Adoption of strict regime for prohibiting “transfer” of foreign contribution and insistence of “utilisation” thereof by the recipient himself/itself – Discussed.

Policy – Judicial Review – Scope – Held: It is not for the Court to consider relative merits of the different political theories or economic policies including that an economic legislation may be troubled with crudities, inequities, uncertainties or the possibility of abuse cannot be the basis for striking it down.

Policy – Just law made by the Parliament – On mere plea of individual hardships, Court cannot interfere with policy matters. Legislation – Amended provisions – Role of the Parliament – Democratic accountability – Judicial review – Held: There is presumption that the Parliament understands and reacts to the needs of its own people as per the exigencies and experience gained in the implementation of the law – The Parliament is supreme and has a final say in matters of legislation when it reflects on alternatives and choices with inputs from different quarters, with a check in the form of democratic accountability and a further check by the Courts which exercise the power of judicial review – The Courts however ought not to adopt a doctrinaire approach in construing the amended provisions and undermine the legislative intent. Words and Phrases – Expression “foreign contribution” – Meaning of – Distinction between foreign contribution and foreign investment – Held: By its very nature, foreign contribution is a donation accepted from a foreign source purportedly for definite cultural, economic, educational, religious or social programme and to serve the cause of humanity – The expression “foreign contribution” has been defined in s.2(1)(h) of the 2010 Act to mean donation, which can be in the form of delivery or transfer made by any foreign source of any article, currency, security, etc. – Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 – s.2(1)(h). Words and Phrases – Transfer and utilization of foreign contribution – Expressions “transfer” and “utilisation” – Meaning of – Discussed – Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010. Disposing of the writ petitions, the Court

HELD:

Validity of Section 7 of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation), 2010, as amended vide the 2020 Act

1. The amended provision completely rules out transfer of foreign contribution by the person who has received/accepted the same in the first place. That does not prevent the recipient from utilising the foreign contribution “itself” for the purposes for which he has been granted a certificate of registration or obtained prior permission under the Act. [Para 44][958-D-E]

2. There is no restriction regarding utilisation of foreign contribution, leave alone complete prohibition. The rationale of Section 7 as amended, inter alia, is that the donor (foreign source) is made fully aware of the definite purposes already declared by the recipient and permitted by the competent authority and corresponding obligation upon the recipient regarding utilisation of the funds itself for stated purposes and none else. [Para 46][959C]

3. The legislative intent for which the amendment has been effected is to introduce strict dispensation qua the recipient of foreign contribution to utilise the same “itself” for the purposes for which it has been permitted as per the certificate of registration or permission granted under the Act by the Central Government. In addition, by the same Amendment Act, utilisation of foreign contribution for administrative purpose by the recipient has been lowered to twenty per cent only with a view to ensure maximum spending on the purposes for which the foreign contribution has been accepted by the recipient having certificate of registration. Absent such stringent provision, some of the recipient organisations were reportedly indulging in successive chain of transfers to other organisations, thereby creating a layered trail of money and also utilisation of funds towards administrative costs of successive transfers upto fifty per cent leaving very little funds for spending on the purposes for which it was permitted. Hence, providing complete restriction on transfer simplicitor, was the just option to fix accountability of the recipient organisation and maximise utilisation for the permitted purposes. Such being the avowed objective and purpose of the amendment, the challenge to the amended Section 7 must fail. [Paras 50 and 51][961-H; 962-A-D]

4. The fact that earlier transfer of foreign contribution was permitted as per the unamended provision, that by itself cannot be the basis to challenge the validity of the amended provision. For, it is open to the Parliament to change the benchmark of restriction from higher standard to lower standard or vice versa on the basis of the exigencies and experience gained during the implementation of the applicable provision at the relevant time. [Para 52][962-D-E]

5. Indubitably, foreign contribution is qualitatively different from foreign investment. Receiving foreign donation cannot be an absolute or even a vested right. No one can be heard to claim a vested right to accept foreign donation, much less an absolute right. This is so because the theory of possibility of national polity being influenced by foreign contribution is globally recognised. For, foreign contribution can have material impact in the matter of socioeconomic structure and polity of the country. The foreign aid can create presence of a foreign contributor and influence the policies of the country. It may tend to influence or impose political ideology. Such being the expanse of the effect of foreign contribution coupled with the tenet of constitutional morality of the nation, the presence/inflow of foreign contribution in the country ought to be at the minimum level, if not completely eschewed. The influence may manifest in different ways, including in destabilising the social order within the country. [Paras 53 and 54][962-E-F, H; 963-A-C]

6. One fails to understand as to how such a provision (amended Section 7) can be regarded as discriminatory or so to say vague or irrational much less manifestly arbitrary. The restriction therein applies to a class of persons who are permitted to accept foreign donation for being utilised by themselves for the definite purposes, without any discrimination and it is so done to uphold the objective of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010. Thus, there is clear intelligible differentia with a direct nexus sought to be achieved with the intent of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010. Such strict regime had become inevitable because of the experience gained by the concerned authorities over a period of time, including about the abuse of the earlier dispensation under the unamended provision. [Para 57][963-H; 964-A-B]

7. The restriction inevitably fixes the accountability of the recipient organisation and mandating maximum utilisation by itself for permitted purposes. This is the procedure established by law. It can neither be said to be arbitrary nor discriminatory much less manifestly arbitrary — within the meaning of Article 14 or impinging upon Article 21 of the Constitution. As a matter of law, since the subject Act deals with a distinct class of persons (accepting/receiving foreign contribution) and it is founded on an intelligible differentia having object sought to be achieved by the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, it fulfils the test predicated in Shayara Bano. For the same reason, the amended provision under challenge is neither capricious, irrational or lacking determining principle, nor suffers from the vice of excessiveness and being disproportionate. [Para 58][964-D-F]

8.1. There is presumption that the Parliament understands and reacts to the needs of its own people as per the exigencies and experience gained in the implementation of the law. Mere plea of inconvenience is not enough to attract the constitutional inhibition. The Courts ought not to adopt a doctrinaire approach in construing the amended provisions and undermine the legislative intent of strengthening the regulatory mechanism concerning foreign contribution. The legislature enjoys considerable latitude while exercising its wisdom on the basis of inputs collated from different quarters. There is intrinsic evidence to indicate that the change effected by the amendments is to serve the legitimate Government purpose and has a rational nexus to the object of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation), 2010 and the amendments, and that the pre-amendment dispensation (unamended Section 7) was not sufficient to effectively regulate the acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution as predicated by the Foreign Contribution (Regulation), 2010. [Para 59][964F-G; 965-A-B]

8.2. While examining the issue as to whether the amended provision is a reasonable restriction, the Court cannot be oblivious to the concern of the Parliament/Legislature backed by the past experiences including cancellation of registration of substantial number of registration certificates after due inquiry and for tangible reasons owing to abuse and misutilisation of foreign contribution (donation); and especially when receipt or acceptance of foreign exchange or be it foreign contribution, is otherwise understood to be ordinarily prohibited. The subject enactment is essentially conceived in the interests of public order and also general public as the intent is to prevent misuse and misutilisation of foreign contribution coming from foreign sources to safeguard the values of a sovereign democratic republic. [Para 63][966-DE; 967-G-H]

8.3. The restriction or complete prohibition on transfer to third party, by no standards deprive acceptance of foreign contribution and utilisation thereof in the manner permitted for definite purposes, such as cultural, economic, educational or social programme. Such a provision must be understood as being procedure established by law in the interests of the general public and in the interests of sovereignty and integrity of the country, including public order. Resultantly, there is no infraction even of Article 19(1)(c) or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution as urged by the writ petitioners, including Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Consistent with this view, the challenge to the amended Section

7 must be rejected on all counts. [Para 65][967-B-D]

8.4. For the same reason, the argument of the writ petitioners about lack of rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Principal Act much less the Amendment Act, must also fail. The rationale is of larger public interests and more particularly to obviate adverse impact on the economy, public order, sovereignty and integrity of the country. Such amendment has been necessitated because of the past experience consequent to implementation of the unamended Section 7 of the 2010 Act. It is so highlighted in the objects and reasons and the introduction of the Amendment Act. It can also be culled out from the debates in the Parliament whilst considering the Amendment Bill in the respective Houses. To overcome the mischief and to enhance transparency and accountability regarding acceptance and also utilisation of foreign contribution which is quite substantial every financial year having proliferating effect on the economy of the nation, it had become necessary to enact amended Section 7. In other words, there is a clear rationale behind the amendment which is consistent with the purpose of the Principal Act and the object sought to be achieved under the enactments. The fact that unamended provision was less restrictive, cannot be the basis to test the constitutional validity of the provision on the touchstone of Article 19(1)(c) or 19(1)(g) or Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The amended Section 7, being plain and clear and having nexus with the object sought to be achieved and is necessitated because of sovereignty and integrity of India or security of the State, public order and in the interests of the general public. It is unfathomable as to how the amended provision can be regarded as unconstitutional on any parameter. [Para 66][967-D-H; 968-A-B]

Validity of Section 12(1A) and Section 17(1) of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation), 2010, as amended vide the 2020 Act

9. Section 12(1A) has been inserted by Act 33 of 2020, which envisages that every person who makes an application under subSection (1) of Section 12 is obliged/required to open FCRA account in the manner specified in Section 17 and mention details of such account in his application. Section 17, in particular sub-Section

(1) as amended, mandates that every person who had been granted certificate or prior permission under Section 12 shall receive foreign contribution only in an account designated as FCRA account in the specified bank. The unamended Sections 12 and

17 did not impose such restriction. Notably, as per the new regime foreign remittances are being received through SWIFT platform by international banking wherein certain mandatory fields are required to be captured apart from other details transaction wise. Further, foreign remittances do not have structured framework, including disclosures regarding purposes. All these deficiencies will stand resolved thereby enhancing the monitoring mechanism in real-time basis, remittance wise by adopting the new dispensation predicated in the amended provisions. Once again, the need to strictly regulate the inflow of foreign funds and to oversee utilisation thereof for the purposes for which it has been received having been recognised and being the rationale behind the Amendment Act, including owing to the experience regarding abuse of the regime under the unamended provision, the challenge to such amendment cannot be taken forward. [Paras

68 and 69][968-D-H; 969-A]

10. Section 17 came to be amended in the aftermath of realisation of clear and discernible lacunae having cropped in due to the presence of FCRA accounts of scores of registered organisations, in different scheduled banks across the country. The challenge became more pronounced due to doubling of foreign contribution inflow in the last decade which had impacted the efficiency of monitoring and achieving the object of the Principal Act. The amended provision now mandates that FCRA accounts of all the registered persons/organisations are required to be opened in one particular branch in the country providing for essential information and fields, thereby ensuring a complete and transparent check on the inflow and utilisation of foreign contribution towards a single point source on real-time basis. [Para 70][969-B-C]

11. The fact that earlier FCRA account could be opened in any scheduled bank, cannot preclude the Parliament from legislating a law which requires inflow of foreign contribution in some other manner specified by law. Merely because the framework of acceptance of foreign contribution had been changed cannot be the basis to question the validity of the amended provisions. Introducing change for the betterment of governance is the prerogative and wisdom of the Parliament. The FCRA account operators cannot claim right of continuity of a deficient and flawed framework. Ordinarily, convenience of business and persons engaged in doing business must be uppermost in the mind of the Parliament/Legislature — to effectuate the goal of ease of doing business. However, the strict regime had become essential because of the past experience of abuse and misutilisation of the “foreign contribution” and cancellation of certificates of as many as 19,000 registered organisations on the ground of being grossly noncompliant. A fortiori, it would certainly justify the need to have a holistic approach to ensure that the objective of the Principal Act is fulfilled, namely, of strict regulation of the inflow and utilisation of foreign contribution for the purposes for which it is so permitted, such as only cultural, economic, educational or social programme. [Para 71][969-D-H; 970-A-B]

12. In fact, the Parliament must be credited with for having taken recourse to corrective dispensation for eradicating the mischief, which any sovereign country can ill-afford. The Parliament is supreme and has a final say in matters of legislation when it reflects on alternatives and choices with inputs from different quarters, with a check in the form of democratic accountability and a further check by the Courts which exercise the power of judicial review. It had become necessary for the Parliament to step in and provide a stringent regime for effectively regulating the inflow and utilisation of foreign contribution. Hence, there had been legitimate goal for amending the subject provisions of acceptance of funds through one channel. Concededly, despite the requirement of opening FCRA account in the designated bank, it is open to the organisation to utilise the amount so received in the FCRA account through multiple accounts in the scheduled branches. In that sense, it is a balanced approach. [Para 72][970-B-D]

13. A priori, opening of main FCRA account in the designated bank as per the law made by the Parliament in that regard, cannot be brushed aside on the specious argument of some inconvenience being caused to the registered associations. Assuming that some inconvenience is likely to be caused to few applicants, but the constitutionality of a statute cannot be assailed on the basis of fortuitous circumstances and more so when it being only a one-time exercise to ensure inflow of foreign contribution through one channel only, being a precondition for grant of permission. [Para 73][970-E-G]

14. As a matter of law, the validity of the amendments must be tested on the touchstone of tenets underlying Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The permission is a precondition for acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution. Such persons are a separate class and engage in specified activity. It cannot be a usual or ordinary business for everyone and anyone wanting to accept foreign contribution. Permitting inflow of foreign contribution, which is a donation, is a matter of policy of the State backed by law. In this case, it is governed by the 2010 Act as amended. It is open to the State to have a regime which may completely prohibit receipt of foreign donation, as no right inheres in the citizen to receive foreign contribution (donation). [Para 74][971-A-C]

15. The provision such as Section 12(1A) and Section 17(1) introduced by the Amendment Act, is a holistic approach adopted by the Parliament to provide for strict regulatory measure and for ensuring transparency and accountability in the matter of foreign contribution. Notably, there was unanimity amongst the members of both the Houses cutting across party lines to have such a strict regime as indiscriminate receipt/inflow and more so utilisation of foreign contribution had been threatening the sovereignty and integrity of the country itself. Being a matter of security of the State, public order and in the interests of the general public, it is not open to question the validity of such a law on the touchstone of Article 19(1)(c) or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. It is not a provision to completely prohibit forming of the associations or engaging in business of charity as such. It is a provision for regulating the manner of doing business more importantly, concerning foreign contribution. The provision became necessary for efficient regulation of foreign contribution on real-time basis, hence, it can neither be said to be manifestly arbitrary nor irrational much less without legitimate objective of the State. Accordingly, the challenge to these provisions as being violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution is negated. [Paras 75 and 80][971-C-F; 973-E-F]

16. The fact that the registered associations were already complying with the statutory formalities of furnishing of accounts, intimation, audit and disposal of assets to the satisfaction of the concerned Authorities, it would not follow that the Parliament/Legislature is denuded of its power of changing the regulatory mechanism or framework to make it more effective and to make it real-time regarding the inflow or receipt of foreign contribution and utilisation thereof for the purposes for which it has been so permitted. [Para 81][973-F-H]

Validity of Section 12A of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation), 2010, as amended vide the 2020 Act

17. Section 12A, which was inserted vide the Amendment Act of 2020, mandates that the person concerned who seeks prior permission or prior approval under Section 11, or makes an application for grant of certificate under Section 12, including for renewal of certificate under Section 16, to provide as identification document, the Aadhaar number of all its office bearers or Directors or other key functionaries. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Amendment Act are testimony about the past experience of abuse of foreign contribution receipts and spending on activities not connected with the purposes for which it was so permitted. It had been noticed that the inflow of foreign contribution had almost doubled between the years 2010 and 2019 and many of the registered associations had failed to comply with basic statutory formalities necessitating cancellation of certificates of registration of more than 19,000 registered organisations. This is a staggering (substantial) number indicative of gross violations by large number of registered associations. More so, this amendment had been necessitated to safeguard the sovereignty and integrity of the country, and public order, including in the interests of the security of the State and of the general public. It is a law made by the Parliament which is competent to make such a law concerning the activities related to foreign donations and more particularly about its acceptance in prescribed manner and utilisation for the purposes defined in the certificate/permission granted by the competent authority. It has a legitimate purpose and nexus sought to be achieved with the objective underlying the Principal Act and the subject amendment. It is not open to argue that associations desirous of obtaining certificate of registration under this Act need not furnish official identification document pertaining to its key functionaries. [Para 83][974-C-H; 975-A]

18. Regardless of the above, the provision (Section 12A) envisages that a copy of the Passport can also be provided as identification document of all its office bearers or Directors or other key functionaries or Overseas Citizen of India Card, in case of a foreigner. The underlying purpose of this provision is merely to identify the key functionaries of the registered association so that they can be made accountable for violations, if any. As the Passport in case of a foreigner is accepted as sufficient identification document, there is no reason why such Passport of Indian national cannot be relied upon for the same purpose. Thus understood, the challenge to this provision is unreasonable. Whereas, the provision needs to be construed as permitting furnishing of the Indian Passport of the key functionaries of the applicant who are Indian nationals, for the purpose of their identification. [Para 84][975-B-D]

Conclusion

19. The amended provisions vide the 2020 Act, namely, Sections 7, 12(1A), 12A and 17 of the 2010 Act are intra vires the Constitution and the Principal Act. As regards Section 12A, the said provision is to be read down and construed as permitting the key functionaries/office bearers of the applicant (associations/NGOs) who are Indian nationals, to produce Indian Passport for the purpose of their identification. That shall be regarded as substantial compliance of the mandate in Section 12A concerning identification. [Para 87][975-F-H]

Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530; R.K. Garg v. Union of India & Ors. (1981) 4 SCC 675 : [1982] 1 SCR 947; Ombalika Das v. Hulisa Shaw (2002) 4 SCC 539 : [2002] 2 SCR 902; Shayara Bano v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 1 : [2017] 9 SCR 797; Dr. Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India & Anr. (2020) 13 SCC 585 : [2019] 12 SCR 30; Laxmi Khandsari & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1981) 2 SCC 600 : [1981] 3 SCR 92 and All India Council for Technical Education v. Surinder Kumar Dhawan & Ors. (2009) 11 SCC 726 : [2009] 3 SCR 859 – relied on.

Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : [2015] 5 SCR 963; K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired) & Anr. (AADHAAR) v. Union of India & Anr. (2019) 1 SCC 1: [2018] 8 SCR 1 and Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 637 : [2020] 1 SCR 812 – distinguished.

Indian Social Action Forum (INSAF) v. Union of India AIR 2020 SC 1363 – clarified.

Public Union for Civil Liberties v. State of T.N. & Ors. (2004) 12 SCC 381 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 64; K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo & Ors. v. State of Orissa AIR 1953 SC 375 : [1954] SCR 1; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR; Ajay Hasia & Ors. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Ors. (1981) 1 SCC 722 : [1981] 2 SCR 79; Indra Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1992) 3 Supp SCC 217; T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. (2002) 8 SCC 481; Natural

Resources Allocation, In Re, Special Reference No.1 of 2012, (2012) 10 SCC 1 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454; Modern Dental College and Research Centre & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (2016) 7 SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR 579; Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 1 : [2018] 7 SCR 379; Distribution of Essential Supplies Services During Pandemic 2021 SCC OnLine SC 339; Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat (2018) 2 SCC 372 : [2017]

12 SCR 774; Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. (1977) 1 SCC 677 : [1977] 2 SCR 611; Rajeev Suri v. Delhi Development Authority & Ors. 2021 SCC Online 7; State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Himachal Pradesh Nizi Vyavsayik Prishikshan Kendra Sangh (2011) 6 SCC 597 : [2011] 5 SCR 533; Ravindra Ramachandra Waghmare v. Indore Municipal

Corporation & Ors. (2017) 1 SCC 667 : [2016] 9 SCR 373; State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Satpal Saini (2017) 11 SCC 42 : [2017] 1 SCR 658; Union of India v. Indian Radiological & Imaging Association & Ors. (2018) 5 SCC 773 : [2018] 3 SCR 649; Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Limited & Anr. v. Reserve Bank of India (1992) 2 SCC 343 : [1992] 1 SCR 406; Premium Granites & Anr. v. State of T.N. & Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 691 : [1994] 1 SCR 579; Delhi Science Forum & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr. (1996)

2 SCC 405 : [1996] 2 SCR 767; BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC

333 : [2001] 5 Suppl. SCR 511; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan & Anr. (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443; Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India & Ors. AIR 1951 SC 41 : [1950] SCR 869; The State of Bombay & Anr. v. F. N. Balsara AIR 1951 SC 318 : [1951] SCR 682; Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra AIR 1952 SC 123 : [1952] SCR 435; Gurbachan Singh v. State of Bombay & Anr. AIR 1952 SC 221 : [1952] SCR 737; The State of Punjab v. Ajaib Singh & Anr. AIR 1953 SC 10 : [1953] SCR 254; Habeeb Mohamed v. The State of Hyderabad AIR 1953 SC 287 : [1953] SCR 661; Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal AIR 1953 SC 404 : [1954] SCR 30; Baburao Shantaram More v. Bombay Housing Board & Anr. AIR 1954 SC 153 : [1954] SCR 572; Harman Singh & Ors. v. Regional Transport Authority, Calcutta Region & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 190 : [1954] SCR 371; Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa AIR 1955 SC 166 : [1955] 1 SCR 1004; Budhan Choudhry & Ors. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 191 : [1955] 1 SCR 1045; D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat & Anr. AIR 1955 SC 334 : [1955] 1 SCR 1215; Hans Muller of Nurenburg v. Superintendent, Presidency Jail, Calcutta & Ors. AIR 1955 SC 367 : [1955] 1

SCR 1284; Kishan Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1955 SC 795 : [1955] 2 SCR 531;

P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1958 SC

232 : [1958] SCR 1052; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors. AIR 1958 SC 538 : [1959] SCR 279; Express Newspaper (Private) Ltd., & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1958 SC 578 : [1959] SCR 12; Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Incometax Officer, Kasaragod & Anr. AIR 1963 SC 591 : [1963] 3 SCR 809; Raja Bira Kishore Deb, Hereditary Superintendent, Jagannath Temple v. The State of Orissa AIR 1964 SC 1501 : [1964] 7 SCR 32; Ganga Ram & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1970) 1 SCC 377 : [1970] 3 SCR 481; Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1975) 2 SCC 175 : [1975] 3 SCR 220; Mohan Kumar Singhania & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1992) 1 Supp SCC 594 : [1991] 1 Suppl. SCR 46; Venkateshwara Theatre v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (1993) 3 SCC 677 : [1993] 3 SCR 616; Dharam Dutt & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2004) 1 SCC

712 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 151; Basheer @ N.P. Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004) 3 SCC 609 : [2004]

2 SCR 224; O. K. Ghosh & Anr. v. E. X. Joseph AIR 1963 SC 812 : [1963] Suppl. SCR 789; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 728 : [1955]

1 SCR 707; Babulal Parate v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. AIR 1961 SC 884 : [1961] 3 SCR 423; Daya v. Joint Chief Controller of Imports & Exports & Anr. AIR 1962 SC 1796 : [1963] 2 SCR 73; Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa & Ors. AIR 1963 SC 1047 : [1963] 2 Suppl. SCR 691; Municipal Committee, Amritsar & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. (1969) 1 SCC 475 : [1969] 3 SCR 447; Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Monghyr & Ors. (1970) 3 SCC 746 : [1971] 2

SCR 711; Daruka & Co v. Union of India & Ors. (1973)

2 SCC 617 : [1974] 1 SCR 570; Md. Serajuddin & Ors. v. State of Orissa (1975) 2 SCC 47 : [1975] Suppl. SCR 169; Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Ors. v. Jan Mohammed Usmanbhai and Anr. (1986) 3 SCC 20 : [1986] 2 SCR 700; Sushila Saw Mil v. State of Orissa and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 615 : [1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 426; Krishnan Kakkanth v. Government of Kerala & Ors. (1997) 9 SCC 495 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 487; Laxmikant v. Union of India & Ors. (1997) 4 SCC 739 : [1997] 3 SCR 861; Indian Handicrafts Emporium & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (2003) 7 SCC 589 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 43; Om Prakash & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2004) 3 SCC

402 : [2004] 2 SCR 900; People’s Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. v. Union of India (2004) 9 SCC 580 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 860; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat & Ors. (2005) 8 SCC 534 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 582; Kerala Bar Hotels Association & Anr. vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (2015)

16 SCC 421; K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569; Gobind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. (1975) 2 SCC 148 : [1975] 3 SCR 946; Chintamanrao & Anr. v. The State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1951 SC 118 : [1950] SCR 759; The State of Madras v. V.G. Row AIR 1952 SC

196 : [1952] SCR 597; Teri Oat Estates (P) Ltd. v. U.T., Chandigarh & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 130 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 1235; Ramlila Maidan Incident, In re (2012) 5 SCC 1 : [2012] 4 SCR 971; Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited & Ors. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India & Anr. (2012) 10 SCC 603 : [2012] 12 SCR 256; Excel Crop Care Limited v. Competition Commission of India & Anr. (2017) 8 SCC 47 : [2017]

5 SCR 901; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27 : [1950] SCR 88; and Manohar Lal Sharma v. Union of India & Ors. [2021] 6 SCR 1006 – referred to.

Joseph Lochner v. People of the State of New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905); New State Ice Company v. Ernest A. Liebmann 285 U.S. 262 (1932); West Coast Hotel Company v. Ernest Parrish 300 U.S. 379 (1937); United States of America v. Carolene Products Company 304 U.S. 144 (1938); American Federation of Labor, Arizona State Federation of Labor et al. v. American Sash & Door Company et al. 335 U.S. 538 (1949) and Ferguson v. Skrupa 372 U.S. 726 (1963) – referred to.