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IN THEHIGH COURTOF DELHIAT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 02.07.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 24.08.2026
RFA 459/2009 & CM APPL. 22037/2026 (For Directions)
NIRMAL @ NIRMALA & ANR
Through:
.....Appellants
Mr. S.S. Tomar, Advocate.
versus
RAM CHAND
.....Respondent
Through:
Mr. J.K. Chawla, Advocate.
Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj, with
Mr. Amit Kumar Rana,
Advocate for UOI/L&DO.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Regular First Appeal1filed under Section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 19082, has been preferred by the Appellants
assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 31.08.20093 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Delhi 4 , in Suit No. 123/2008
titled Smt. Nirmala &Another vs. Ram Chand.
2.
Though the Appeal, as originally instituted, assailed the
findings returned by the learned Trial Court on various issues,
however, during the course of oral arguments, learned counsel
Appeal
CPC
Impugned Judgment
Trial Court
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appearing on behalf of the Appellants confined the challenge solely to
the findings recorded on Issue Nos. 6 and 11 in the Impugned
Judgment.
3.
Accordingly, the present Appeal is required to be examined
only to the limited extent of determining whether the learned Trial
Court was justified in holding that the Defendant was inducted in the
premises as a tenant and not as alicensee as claimed by the Appellants.
4.
For the sake of convenience and to avoid any ambiguity, the
parties shall hereinafter be referred to in accordance with their
nomenclature in the present Appeal.
BRIEF FACTS:
5.
The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present Appeal
are set out hereinbelow:
(a) The Appellants instituted a suit seeking possession of the suit
premises, i.e., rear portion of shop no.70, Sarojini Nagar,
New Delhi5, along with mesne profits and permanent injunction,
asserting that the Respondent had been permitted to use a portion
of the suit shop merely as a licensee on payment of licence fee at
the rate of Rs. 1,000/- per day.
(b) The Respondent contested the suit by denying the existence of
any licence arrangement and asserted that he had been inducted
into the suit shop as a tenant with effect from 01.10.1996 at a
monthly rent of Rs. 1,000/-. It was further contended that, by
virtue of the landlord-tenant relationship, the suit was barred
under the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
(c) Upon completion of pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed
Suit Shop
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the necessary issues and, after recording the evidence adduced by
the parties, proceeded to decide the suit by the Impugned
Judgment.
(d) While deciding Issue Nos. 6 and 11, the learned Trial Court held
that the Appellants had failed to establish the alleged licence
arrangement and further concluded that the Respondent had
succeeded in proving that he was inducted into the suit shop as a
tenant. Consequently, the said issues were decided against the
Appellants and in favour of the Respondent.
(e) Aggrieved by the aforesaid findings returned by the learned Trial
Court on Issue Nos. 6 and 11, the Appellants have preferred the
present Appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
6.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants would
submit that the learned Trial Court has failed to discharge its judicial
function in accordance with law while deciding Issue Nos. 6 and 11.
7.
He would submit that, instead of evaluating the evidence led by
both sides in a holistic manner, the learned Trial Court has confined
its discussion almost entirely to the perceived shortcomings in the
Appellants' case, while failing to subject the Respondent's plea of
tenancy to the same degree of judicial scrutiny.
8.
He would submit that the Respondent, despite asserting the
existence of a landlord-tenant relationship, has failed to produce any
rent agreement, rent receipts or any other documentary evidence to
establish the alleged tenancy. He would contend that the learned Trial
Court has erred in accepting the plea of tenancy in the absence of any
cogent documentary evidence.
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9.
In support of the aforesaid submission, learned counsel would
place reliance upon Prem Pal Singh v. Jugal Kishore Gupta 6 and
Shri Viney Kumar Mahajan v. Smt. Vishambhari Devi7, to contend
that where tenancy is disputed, the burden lies upon the person
asserting such tenancy to establish the same by reliable documentary
evidence.
10.
Learned counsel would further submit that the learned Trial
Court has misdirected itself in construing the Partnership Deed
dated 13.10.1996 (Ex. PW1/1) 8 . He would submit that, instead of
appreciating the document in its proper perspective, the learned Trial
Court erroneously treated it as a camouflage, despite the Respondent
having denied its execution.
11.
He would further submit that the Respondent was merely a
licensee permitted to use a portion of the suit shop on payment of a
licence fee of Rs.1,000/- per day, whereunder Rs.150/- was paid to
Appellant No.2 and the remaining Rs.850/- was paid towards
discharge of his liabilities to various creditors.
12.
He would submit that the learned Trial Court has discarded the
said arrangement solely on the ground that the creditors were not
examined, while overlooking the fact that there was no effective
challenge to the receipt of Rs.150/- per day by Appellant No. 2 during
the relevant period.
13.
Learned counsel would, therefore, submit that the Impugned
Judgment proceeds on an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on
record and applies unequal standards while evaluating the respective
1993 SCC OnLine Del 48
2010:DHC:2857
Partnership Deed
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cases of the parties. He would accordingly pray that the findings
returned by the learned Trial Court on Issue Nos. 6 and 11 be set
aside, and the present Appeal be allowed.
14.
Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent would support the Impugned Judgment and submit that
the learned Trial Court has returned well-reasoned findings upon a
comprehensive appreciation of the oral as well as documentary
evidence led by the parties. He would submit that no ground
warranting interference in the present Appeal is made out.
15.
He would submit that the Respondent has consistently asserted
and established that he was inducted into the suit shop as a tenant with
effect from 01.10.1996 at a monthly rent of Rs.1,000/-. He would
further submit that the learned Trial Court has rightly appreciated the
evidence on record and correctly concluded that the Appellants had
failed to establish the alleged licence arrangement.
16.
Learned counsel would further submit that the Partnership Deed
did not govern the nature of the Respondent's possession and the
learned Trial Court has rightly held that the said document could not
be treated as determinative of the relationship between the parties. He
would submit that the findings returned by the learned Trial Court in
this regard do not warrant interference.
17.
He would submit that the Appellants have failed to produce any
documentary evidence to substantiate their plea that the Respondent
was liable to pay licence fee at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per day or that
payments were being made towards discharge of Appellant No.2's
liabilities. He would further submit that even the alleged creditors,
who were stated to have received such payments, were not examined,
thereby rendering the Appellants' case wholly unsubstantiated.
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18.
Learned counsel would also submit that the findings recorded
by the learned Trial Court are pure findings of fact based upon
appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity or
illegality warranting interference by this Court in the present Appeal.
ANALYSIS:
19.
This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and carefully perused the pleadings, oral and documentary
evidence, and the entire record.
20.
As noticed hereinabove, the controversy involved in the present
Appeal lies within a narrow compass. The Appellants have confined
their challenge exclusively to the findings returned by the learned
Trial Court on Issue Nos. 6 and 11, whereby it was held that the
Respondent had succeeded in establishing the existence of a landlordtenant relationship in respect of the suit premises and that the
Appellants had failed to prove their plea that the Respondent was
merely a licensee. Consequently, the principal question which falls for
consideration before this Court is whether the findings so returned are
borne out by the oral and documentary evidence available on record
and warrant interference in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under
Section 96 of the CPC.
21.
Before adverting to the rival submissions and examining the
evidence on record, it would be apposite to briefly recapitulate the
nature and scope of the jurisdiction exercised by a First Appellate
Court under Section 96 of the CPC.
22.
It is well settled that a first appeal is a valuable statutory right.
Unless expressly curtailed by statute, the entire case, both on facts and
law, is open for reconsideration before the First Appellate Court. The
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appellate court is not confined to examining errors of law alone but is
under a duty to independently assess the pleadings, appreciate the oral
and documentary evidence, consider the submissions advanced by the
parties, and arrive at its own findings supported by cogent reasons.
23.
At the same time, it is equally well settled that where the
findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based upon a proper
appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, particularly after
evaluating the credibility and demeanour of witnesses who have
deposed before it, such findings ordinarily deserve due weight and
deference. Interference with such findings is justified only where they
are shown to be perverse, contrary to the evidence on record, based on
an erroneous application of law, or are such that no reasonable judicial
mind could have arrived at the conclusions reached by the Trial Court.
24.
The aforesaid principles have been consistently reiterated by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari9,
Madhukar v. Sangram 10 , H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith 11 ; and
several other decisions. These principles were comprehensively
restated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MalluruMallappa v.
Kuruvathappa 12 , wherein the Court succinctly explained the scope
and ambit of a first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, the obligation
of the appellate court to independently evaluate the evidence and
record reasons in compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC,
while simultaneously recognizing that where the appellate court
concurs with the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court, it need
not unnecessarily restate the entire evidence or reiterate every reason
(2001) 3 SCC 179
(2001) 4 SCC 756
(2005) 10 SCC 243
(2020) 4 SCC 313
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recorded by the Trial Court. The relevant observations as made in the
said Judgment read as under:
“10. Section 96CPC provides for filing of an appeal from the
decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the
court authorised to hear the appeals from the decisions of such
courts. In the instant case, the appeal from the decree passed by the
trial court lies to the High Court. The expression “appeal” has not
been defined in CPC. Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn.) defines an
appeal as “a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered
by bringing it to a higher authority”. It is a judicial examination of
the decision by a higher court of the decision of a subordinate court
to rectify any possible error in the order under appeal. The law
provides the remedy of an appeal because of the recognition that
those manning the judicial tiers too commit errors.
11. In Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963
SC 698 it was held that a right of appeal carries with it a right of
rehearing on law as well as on fact, unless the statute conferring a
right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as has been done
in second appeal arising under CPC.
12. InShankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya
Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74 it was held thus: (SCC pp. 77-78, para 5)
“5. … In the well-known work of Story on
Constitution (of United States), Vol. 2, Article 1761, it is
stated that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is
that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted and does not create that cause. The
appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of
forms and, indeed, in any form in which the legislature
may choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762, the
most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at
least those which are most known in the United States, are
by a writ of error, or by an appeal, or by some process of
removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a
process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely
subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a
retrial.”
13. It is a settled position of law that an appeal is a continuation of
the proceedings of the original court. Ordinarily, the appellate
jurisdiction involves a rehearing on law as well as on fact and is
invoked by an aggrieved person. The first appeal is a valuable right
of the appellant and therein all questions of fact and law decided by
the trial court are open for reconsideration. Therefore, the first
appellate court is required to address itself to all the issues and
decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must
record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well
as fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by
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the parties. The judgment of the first appellate court must display
conscious application of mind and record findings supported by
reasons on all issues and contentions [see: Santosh
Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari,
(2001)
SCC
179,
Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756, B.M. Narayana
Gowda v. Shanthamma, (2011) 15 SCC 476, H.K.N.
Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 andSri Raja Lakshmi
Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC 259.
14. A first appeal under Section 96 CPC is entirely different from a
second appeal under Section 100. Section 100 expressly bars
second appeal unless a question of law is involved in a case and the
question of law so involved is substantial in nature.
15. Order 41 Rule 31 CPC provides the guidelines for the appellate
court to decide the matter. For ready reference Order 41 Rule 31
CPC is as under:
“31. Contents, date and signature of judgment. - The
judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and
shall state(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied,
the relief to which the appellant is entitled;
and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and
dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”
16. InVinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 this Court
has reiterated the principles to be borne in mind while disposing of
a first appeal, as under: (SCC p. 395, para 15)
“15. Again inB.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy,
(2010) 13 SCC 530, this Court taking note of all the
earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the
aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 53031, paras 3-4)
„3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed
of by the appellate court/High Court has been
considered by this Court in various decisions.
Order 41CPC deals with appeals from original
decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31
mandates that the judgment of the appellate court
shall state:
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or
varied, the relief to which the appellant is
entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse
or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first
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appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless
restricted by law, the whole case is therein open
for rehearing both on questions of fact and law.
The judgment of the appellate court must,
therefore, reflect its conscious application of
mind and record findings supported by reasons,
on all the issues arising along with the
contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties
for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a
court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High
Court
[H.V.
Sreenivasa
Murthy v. B.V.
Nagesha, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 837] to deal
with all the issues and the evidence led by the
parties before recording its findings. The first
appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a
right to be heard both on questions of law and on
facts and the judgment in the first appeal must
address itself to all the issues of law and fact and
decide it by giving reasons in support of the
findings. (VideSantosh Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179, SCC p. 188, para 15
andMadhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756,
SCC p. 758, para 5.)‟”
17. InShasidhar v. Ashwini Uma Mathad, (2015) 11 SCC 269, it
was held as under: (SCC p. 277, para 21)
“21. Being the first appellate court, it was, therefore, the
duty of the High Court [Shasidhar v. Ashwini Uma
Mathad, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8774] to decide the first
appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on
it under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 of the
Code mentioned above. It was unfortunately not done,
thereby, causing prejudice to the appellants whose
valuable right to prosecute the first appeal on facts and law
was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived them of a
hearing in the appeal in accordance with law.”
18 It is clear from the above provisions and the decisions of this
Court that the judgment of the first appellate court has to set out
points for determination, record the decision thereon and give its
own reasons. Even when the first appellate court affirms the
judgment of the trial court, it is required to comply with the
requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 and non-observance of this
requirement leads to infirmity in the judgment of the first appellate
court. No doubt, when the appellate court agrees with the views of
the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or
reiterate reasons given by the trial court. Expression of a general
agreement with the reasons given by the trial court would
ordinarily suffice.”
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25.
Having noticed the scope of the present Appeal and the
principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, this Court
now proceeds to examine the challenge laid by the Appellants to the
findings recorded on Issue Nos. 6 & 11. Before undertaking such an
examination, it would be appropriate to first advert to the reasoning
which persuaded the learned Trial Court on the said issues. The
relevant findings recorded by the learned Trial Court on Issue Nos. 6
& 11 are reproduced hereunder:
“31.ISSUE 6: Whether the plaintiff no. 2 had allowed the
defendant to use a portion of the suit shop on license basis @
1,000/- per day as alleged in para-2 of the plaint? OPP
And
ISSUE NO. 11: Whether the defendant is a tenant in the suit
shop? OPD
These two issues are being taken up together since they are inter se
connected. The shop no. 70 was admittedly owned by plaintiff no.
2 which was sold on 05.03.1997 to Sh. J.L Jidani. The plaintiff no.
1 on the same day i.e 05.03.1997 bought the rear portion of the said
shop. The area bought by plaintiff no.1 in shop no.70 has not been
specified by the plaintiffs. No sale deed has been proved on record.
The plaintiffs have no where in the pleadings set out the
measurement of the area occupied by the defendant. DW1 has
testified that he was always in exclusive possession of the rear
portion measuring 17‟x10 1/2 i.e the suit shop since 1.10.1996. It is
claimed by the plaintiffs that a portion of the suit shop was given
on license to the defendant @ Rs 1000/- per day since October
1996. While as per the defendant he was inducted as a tenant
01.10.1996.
32. Plaintiff no.1 has claimed to be the owner of the suit property
and so she would have been the best person to have the deposed as
to whether the defendant was inducted as a tenant or licencee
.However she has not stepped into the witness box to testify qua
this averment. In fact no document has been produced to show her
ownership of the suit shop and her stand is corroborated by the
mere testimony of her husband (PW1). There is also no document
produced to show the attornment of the plaintiff no.1 as the alleged
licensor. PW-1 has admitted in his cross examination that no notice
of purchase of the shop was given to the defendant.
33. Plaintiff no.2 (PW-1) in his examination-in-chief has testified
that as per the mutual discussion between the defendant and him
the defendant agreed to pay a sum of Rs 1,000/- per day as licence
fee for the user of a portion of the rear portion of his shop 70,
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Sarojini Nagar Market. The defendant on his part as DW-1 has
testified in his affidavit in evidence that the plaintiff no.2 let out the
suit shop to him w.e.f 01.10.1996 on a monthly rent of Rs 1,000/-.
PW-1 admits that there was no document executed except that the
"partnership deed was prepared by the defendant to satisfy me".
34. PW -1 has proved the Partnership Deed dated 13.10.1996 (Ex
PWl/1) entered into between plaintiff no.2 and the defendant. The
Partnership Deed dated 13.10.1996 (ExPW1/1) although claimed
by the plaintiff to have been entered into between the plaintiff no.2
and the defendant to safeguard the interest of the plaintiffs seems to
be entered into for the purpose of circumventing a stay order
restraining the plaintiff no.2 from creating third party interest in the
property. In Ex. PW1/1 it is stated that there was a status quo order
in relation to the entire shop in a suit for recovery filed by one Sh.
Narain Das against plaintiff no.2 who was occupying the rear
portion of the shop and against Sh Gurmukh Das who was running
his shop in the front portion which was as on date in possession of
Sh. Jagdish Lal Jidani. This deed admittedly being more of a
camouflage to overcome the restrictions imposed vide an injunction
order and cannot be relied upon for determining the terms agreed to
between the parties.
35. It is the word of the plaintiff no.2 against that of defendant. The
plaintiff no.2 (PW-1) has testified in his examination-in-chief that
after taking the rear portion of his shop on licence basis defendant
paid him Rs 1000/- per day as license fee. This amount was alleged
to have been paid in a particular manner in that the defendant paid
Rs 150 to him and Rs 850 to his creditors in the market every day
as per his instructions from October 1996 to 05.06.1997. He has
further testified that the defendant paid Rs 300/- to Sh. Kanhaiya
Lal of shop no. 86 Sarojini Market, Rs 300/- to Harish Chander of
Shop no. 82 Sarojini Market and Rs. 250/- per day to Sh. Swaraj
Kapoor a resident of Jangpura Delhi. After 06.06.1997 the
defendant stopped paying licence fees to him and filed a false suit
of injunction against him on the ground that he was a tenant of the
premises. As per PW-l there was no change in the licence post sale
of the shop.
36. PW-l claims that the licence money of Rs. 1,000/- was to be
paid partly to him and partly to his creditors as mentioned aboveon
a daily basis. Significantly, none of the creditors have been named
in the plaint and their names havebeen mentioned for the first time
in the examination-in-chief of PW-l. Morever none of the creditors
have been examined in support of his claim that a licence fees of
Rs 1000/- per day was being paid by the defendant or that they
were receiving Rs. 850/- per day out of the same, making the claim
of license fees of Rs. 1,000/- per day being paid by the defendant
difficult to believe. Also no books of account have been produced
or proved in evidence to show receipt of the said amount.
37. PW-1 has categorically testified that “The terms of the licence
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were settled orally and this fact was well within the knowledge of
Sh. Kanhiya Lal, Harish, Deepak Kumar, Gurmukh Das, Swaraj
Kapoor.” He also testified that the persons except Sh Swaraj
Kapoor had given affidavits which he had filed in the Court in
another case. Although copies of affidavits were filed neither these
persons who were allegedly creditors were examined as witnesses
nor their affidavits which the plaintiff no.2 had claimed were filed
by him in some other proceedings were proved.
38. PW -1 in his cross examination has claimed that the alleged
license fee of Rs 1,000/ - per day was paid from 13.10.1996 to
06.06.1997 in cash and that all the above mentioned three persons
came every day except Monday to collect the money from the
defendant. The alleged creditors to whom the alleged license fee
amount was paid on a daily basis would have been the best persons
to corroborate the claim of the plaintiff that the defendant was a
licensee and paying Rs.1,000/- per day as licence fee. However
they were not produced despite the claim of PW-1 in his crossexamination that "I knew Harish Chander and Kanhiya Lal since
1988 and they are my good friends". This makes his version
regarding the premises having been given on a licence fees of
Rs.l000/- per day difficult to believe .
39. PW-l in his cross-examination admitted that there was no
agreement or settlement in writing between him, the aforesaid three
persons and the defendant that the defendant would pay a monthly
amount to them for the suit shop. He admitted in his cross
examination that no receipt was either given by him or these three
persons to the defendant. PW-l admitted that there was no
document to show the settlement of the loan amount as to how
much money was left and due to his creditors after various
payments were made by the defendant. PWl also admitted that no
notice was given by his wife to the defendant that she had become
the owner and that he had to pay a sum of Rs. 1,000/ - per day to
her. All this makes his claim difficult to believe.
40. When questioned about the loan taken from the three alleged
creditors, PW-1 in his cross examination could not give any
satisfactory answers qua the loan amounts (towards the satisfaction
of which the alleged licence fees was paid). He could not remember
the month in which he had taken the loans. He claimed that he took
the loan at an interest rate of 2% per month. However he could not
tell when he paid the interest to the creditors and how much was
paid. He could not even tell how much interest he paid in a month.
He claimed he did not take any receipt in writing from these
persons for the interest paid which is difficult to believe. He
admitted that none of the alleged three creditors had taken any legal
action against him. The testimony of PW-1 reveals the falsity of his
claim.
41. The brother of plaintiff no.2 and the defendant Shri Gurmukh
Das (PW-2) claimed to be in the know of every thing however
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when questioned about the loan amounts taken from various
creditors by plaintiff no.2 he also could not tell the same. He
admitted that "I cannot even give an approximate figure of the loan
amount". He admitted having no personal knowledge about the
loans taken from these persons and that the fact about the taking of
loans was told to him by plaintiff no.2. Although he claimed to
have worked in the front portion of shop no. 70, he could not tell
the date, month or year when the three creditors came to the
defendant to collect money. He claimed that they came every day
however later in his cross examination he admitted that no payment
was made to the creditors in his presence. If he was admittedly
running his business in the same shop as the plaintiff no.2 it is
unlikely that he would not have seen the creditors who were paid
by the defendant everyday, as alleged.
42. No creditors having been produced nor any receipt having been
proved and no cogent reason having been given for the same makes
the claim of PW-1 that the defendant was paying him Rs. 1,000/per day as license fee difficult to believe. PW-1 although claimed
to have received money from the defendant no bank account
statement were proved to show deposit of Rs. 30,000/- in any
month. The testimony of the PW-l does not evoke confidence.
43. The defendant (DW-l) on his part has testified that he was
paying rental of Rs 1000 per month which he deposited directly in
the bank account of PW-l. Plaintiffs in their replication have
admitted that the defendant had deposited Rs 1000/- per month for
five to six months in the loan account of plaintiff no. 2 of which
defendant was a guarantor. However he claimed that this was done
without his knowledge. As per directions of my predecessor the
defendant filed the ITR of Kamal Jewellers for the assessment year
1998-99. The profit and loss account filed there with showed Rs.
6,000/- paid as rent for the period October 1996 till the end of the
assessment year i.e 31.03.1997 (six months). In his crossexamination DW1 has categorically denied the suggestion that he
did not take the suit shop on rent nor paid any rent to the plaintiff.
The testimony of the defendant remains unshattered and
convincing.
44. As held in issue no.7, the plaintiff was given exclusive
possession of the suit shop. In his cross examination PW-1
categorically admits that "it is correct that the defendant got
additions and alterations made in his portion in order to suit the
shop to his jewellery business. Voltd. He did it after 13.10.1996"
He admits to the defendant making alterations by putting sunshades
and making shelves in the shop. It is also an admitted position that
the defendant is in possession of the keys to the locks of the suit
shop. The plaintiff having failed to prove that he was ever in
possession of the suit shop after 13.10.1996, also in view of
admissions of PW1 that the defendant got alterations made in the
suit shop to shift his business and was in possession of the keys of
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BHATIA
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the suit shop, goes to corroborate the claim of the defendant that he
was a tenant and not a licencee.
45. In the light of the above observations it is held that the
defendant was inducted in the premises as a tenant and not as a
licence as claimed by the plaintiffs. In view thereof it is held that
the plaintiff no. 2 had not allowed the defendant to use a portion of
the suits hop on license basis @ 1,000/- per day as alleged in para-2
of the plaint and the defendant was inducted as a tenant. In view of
my above observations Issue no. 11 is decided against the plaintiffs
and in favour of the defendant.”
26.
Having perused the findings recorded by the learned Trial
Court, this Court proceeds to independently examine the evidence led
by the parties in the backdrop of the challenge raised by the
Appellants. The principal grievance urged before this Court is that the
learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on
record, erroneously rejected the Appellants' case that the Respondent
was merely a licensee, misread the Partnership Deed, and accepted the
Respondent's plea of tenancy despite the absence of any cogent
documentary evidence establishing the existence of a landlord-tenant
relationship. It is, therefore, these aspects which fall for consideration
in the present Appeal.
27.
The principal contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants
is that the Respondent was a licensee in the suit shop and he has failed
to establish the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship by any
documentary evidence and that the learned Trial Court committed an
error in accepting the plea of tenancy in the absence of a rent
agreement, rent receipts or any contemporaneous document
evidencing payment of rent. In support thereof, reliance has been
placed upon the decisions in Prem Pal Singh (supra) and Shri Viney
Kumar Mahajan (supra).
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:32:54
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28.
This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid submission in the
manner canvassed by the Appellants, as there can be no quarrel with
the proposition that documentary evidence, where available,
constitutes the best evidence to establish a contractual relationship of
tenancy. Likewise, the burden to establish such relationship initially
rests upon the party asserting its existence. Sections 101 to 103 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872 13 embody this principle by casting the
burden of proof upon the party seeking the Court to believe in the
existence of a fact. The aforesaid sections of the IE Act are
reproduced hereinbelow:
“101. Burden of proof. – Whoever desires any Court to give
judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the
existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts
exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it
is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.
102. On whom burden of proof lies. – The burden of proof in a
suit or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence
at all were given on either side.
103. Burden of proof as to particular fact. –The burden of proof
as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to
believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the
proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.”
29.
A conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it manifest
that the burden of proving a fact rests upon the party who asserts its
existence and seeks a finding thereon. In the present case, the
Appellants instituted the suit by asserting that the Respondent was
merely a licensee in respect of the suit shop and that his occupation
was under a distinct arrangement. The burden, therefore, squarely
rested upon the Appellants to establish the existence of the said
arrangement by leading cogent and reliable evidence. The
Respondent's plea of tenancy, raised in defence, would necessarily fall
IE Act
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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for consideration only upon the Appellants discharging the burden
cast upon them in accordance with law.
30.
It is noted that the reliance placed by the Appellants upon the
aforesaid decisions is, however, misconceived in the facts of the
present case. In Prem Pal Singh(supra), the plea of tenancy was
rejected in the absence of any documentary or other satisfactory
evidence establishing the relationship of landlord and tenant. In the
present case, however, the learned Trial Court has not proceeded
solely on the Respondent's oral assertion but has taken into
consideration the documentary material available on record, including
the Income Tax Returns, the deposits made in the loan account of
Appellant No.2 and the surrounding circumstances emerging from the
evidence while returning its findings.
31.
Similarly, the decision in Shri Viney Kumar Mahajan (supra)
arose in an entirely different factual context concerning the nature of
possession between an employer and a servant, where the principles
governing the occupation of the premises were materially distinct.
Apart from the factual distinction, that case also turned upon the
absence of satisfactory evidence establishing tenancy. The said
decision, therefore, does not advance the Appellants' case and cannot
be mechanically applied to the facts of the present dispute.
32.
At the same time, the mere failure of the Appellants to establish
the licence arrangement pleaded by them would not, by itself, result in
the Respondent's plea of tenancy being accepted. The existence of a
landlord-tenant relationship is equally a question of fact to be
determined upon an overall appreciation of the oral and documentary
evidence, viewed in the light of the conduct of the parties and the
surrounding circumstances attending the transaction.
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
15:32:54
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33.
Consequently, the absence of a written rent agreement or rent
receipts, though undoubtedly a relevant circumstance, cannot by itself
be regarded as conclusive where the remaining evidence on record is
capable of disclosing the true nature of the Respondent's possession.
34.
In view of the aforesaid, this Court proceeds to examine
whether the evidence led by the parties, when appreciated in its
entirety and in the light of the surrounding circumstances, supports the
Appellants' plea that the Respondent was merely a licensee or the
Respondent's assertion that he occupied the suit shop as a tenant.
35.
The Appellants have sought to explain the Respondent's
occupation of the suit shop by asserting that he was merely permitted
to use a counter space on the rear side of the suit shop upon payment
of licence fee at the rate of Rs.1,000/- per day, whereunder a sum of
Rs.150/- was allegedly paid directly to Appellant No.2 and the
remaining Rs.850/- was paid towards discharge of the liabilities owed
by Appellant No.2 to various creditors.
36.
A careful appreciation of the evidence, however, reveals that
the aforesaid arrangement has remained largely unsubstantiated. Apart
from
the
oral
assertions
of
PW-1,
Appellant
No.2,
no
contemporaneous record evidencing payment of licence fee,
maintenance of accounts or acknowledgement of such payments has
been brought on record.
37.
More importantly, the three creditors, namely Shri Swaraj
Kapoor, Shri Harish Chander and Shri Kanhiya Lal, to whom
substantial payments are alleged to have been made by the
Respondent on behalf of Appellant No.2, and who were admittedly
aware of the terms of the arrangement between PW-1 and the
Respondent, have admittedly not been examined. The said witnesses,
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:32:54
RFA 459/2009
in the considered opinion of this Court, would have been the most
material witnesses to corroborate the Appellants' version regarding the
alleged financial arrangement, and their non-examination materially
weakens the evidentiary foundation of the Appellants' case. The
relevant testimony of PW-1 is extracted hereinbelow:
“After taking the rear site portion of my shop on licence basis deft.
has paid me Rs.1000/-per day licence money in the manner that he
1s to pay Rs.150/- cash to me and Rs.850/- to my creditor in the
market as per my instructions. He used to pay Rs.300/- to Sh.
Kanhiya Lal shop No. 86 Sarojini Nagar market. He used to pay
Rs.300 /- to Harish Chander shop No. 81, Sarojini Nagar market.
He used to pay Rs.250/- per day to one Sh.Swaraj Kapoor I/o
Jangpura, N.Del. This practice continued till 6.6.97.
xxxxxxx
I have never leased out /rented out the shop in question to the
deft. The terms of the licence were settled orally and this fact
was well within the knowledge of Sh. Kanhiya Lal, Harish,
Deepak Kumar, Gurmukh Dass, Swaraj Kapoor.”
38.
This Court also finds that the evidence of PW-1 does not
satisfactorily explain the manner in which the alleged licence
arrangement was implemented over the relevant period. Despite
asserting that the substantial amounts were being paid daily towards
discharge of his liabilities, no books of account, receipts, ledger
entries or any other contemporaneous material has been produced by
him which could lend assurance to such assertion. Therefore, the said
assertion rests substantially upon oral testimony unsupported by any
independent evidence.
39.
It is well settled that while a party is not required to examine
every conceivable witness, the failure to produce the best available
evidence on a material aspect of the case is a circumstance which the
Court is entitled to take into consideration while appreciating the
probabilities of the rival versions.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:32:54
RFA 459/2009
40.
The aforesaid principle embodied in Illustration (g) to Section
114 of the IE Act, as explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Gopal Krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif 14 , recognizes that
where material evidence, which is within the power of a party to
produce, is withheld without any satisfactory explanation, the Court
may legitimately draw an adverse inference. In the present case, the
omission to examine the very persons through whom the alleged
licence
arrangement
was
admittedly
implemented
assumes
considerable significance while evaluating the credibility of the
Appellants' case.
41.
The testimony of PW-2, Shri Gurmukh Das, also does not lend
any meaningful corroboration to the case set up by the Appellants.
Though PW-2 professed to be aware of the arrangement between the
parties, his cross-examination reveals that he had no personal
knowledge regarding the loans allegedly taken by Appellant No.2,
was unable to state the amount of such liabilities and admitted that no
payments were ever made to the alleged creditors in his presence. His
testimony, therefore, remains largely hearsay and falls short of
independently corroborating the version put forward by PW-1. The
relevant testimony of PW-2 is extracted hereinbelow:
“He has come as a licencee on the licence fee of Rs.1000/-perday.
Terms of licence were oral. However, he has got one partnership
deed prepared himself tosatisfy Nand Lal but in reality no
partnership was created in between Plaintiff no.2 and deft.The
deft. has been paying Rs.150/-per day to Nand Nal and balance of
Rs. 850/- to the creditors in the market i.e. Kanhiya Lal, Harish Kr.
and one Swaraj Kapoor. This money was paid to this creditor by
Nand Lal as per instructions of pltff. no.2.
Xxxxx
It is wrong to suggest that the plaintiff No.2 had inducted the
defendant as tenant in the suit shop. The plaintiff No.2 had
AIR 1968 SC 1413
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:32:54
RFA 459/2009
inducted the defendant in the suit shop as a brother and he was
charging from the deft. Rs. 1,000/- per day for his user of the said
shop. The shop which the plaintiff No.2 allowed the deft to use at
the said rate is shown in red colour in the site plan Ext. Pw1/2. I
was present when the plaintiff No.2 and the deft. entered into
an agreement for user of the said shop by the deft., but no
agreement was executed in writing. None else other than
myself, plaintiff No.2 and deft., was present when the said
agreement was arrived at.
xxxxx
I was not present when the said three persons had advanced the
said loan amounts to the pltf. No.2. All the aforesaid facts about
taking of loan were told to me by the plaintiff No.2.
xxxxx
I cannot say about the dates, months or year as to when the
said/persons came to pltf.No.2 to collect the said amounts. I
cannot tell the date, month and year on which the said three
people used to come to the defendant to take money in my
presence, Vol. They used to come daily.”
42.
Moving further, this Court has independently examined the
Partnership Deed, upon which the Appellants have placed
considerable reliance. Although the Respondent has disputed the
execution and evidentiary value of the said document, the same forms
part of the record and has, therefore, been duly considered by this
Court. Significantly, even the testimony of PW-2 does not
unequivocally support the Appellants' reliance on the said document,
as he himself deposed that the Partnership Deed had merely been
prepared to satisfy Appellant No.2 and that, in fact, no partnership
ever came into existence between the parties.
43.
In such circumstances, even assuming the document to form
part of the evidentiary record, it neither unequivocally establishes the
Respondent as a licensee nor conclusively determines the juridical
nature of his possession. The true character of the Respondent's
occupation must necessarily be gathered from the substance of the
transaction, the conduct of the parties and the evidence led during the
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BHATIA
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RFA 459/2009
course of trial, rather than from the nomenclature or isolated recitals
contained in a single document.
44.
Having found that the Appellants have failed to establish the
licence arrangement pleaded by them, this Court now proceeds to
independently examine the Respondent's plea of tenancy. It is trite that
the weakness of the Appellants' case cannot, by itself, result in
acceptance of the Respondent's defence. The Respondent's evidence
must therefore stand or fall on its own merits.
45.
In this regard, the evidence on record indicates that the
Respondent has consistently asserted induction as a tenant with effect
from 01.10.1996 at a monthly rent of Rs.1,000/-. His testimony is
supported by circumstances noticed during trial, including the entries
reflected in the Income Tax Returns, the deposits made in the loan
account of Appellant No.2, and the nature of possession enjoyed by
the Respondent over the suit premises. These are all circumstances
which, though not individually conclusive, lend support to the
Respondent's version when viewed cumulatively.
46.
In view of the aforesaid independent appreciation of the
evidence, this Court now proceeds to examine the Appellants'
contention that the learned Trial Court failed to properly discharge its
judicial function while deciding the suit.
47.
The Appellants have urged that the learned Trial Court failed to
perform its judicial function by subjecting the Appellants' case to strict
scrutiny while readily accepting the Respondent's plea of tenancy.
Having independently re-appreciated the entire evidence on record,
this Court is unable to subscribe to the said contention.
48.
A reading of the Impugned Judgment demonstrates that the
learned Trial Court has examined the oral as well as documentary
Digitally Signed
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BHATIA
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RFA 459/2009
evidence led by both sides and has recorded reasons for accepting one
version over the other. Merely because the conclusions ultimately
recorded are adverse to the Appellants would not, by itself, justify the
inference that the evidence was not judicially appreciated. The
function of a Court is not to count the number of witnesses examined
by either side, but to assess the quality and probative value of the
evidence led before it.
49.
It is necessary to bear in mind that civil proceedings are decided
on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The Court is not
required to determine whether one version has been established
beyond all possible doubt, but whether, on an overall assessment of
the evidence, one version appears more probable than the other.
Consequently, each circumstance emerging from the record cannot be
viewed in isolation; rather, the cumulative effect of the entire evidence
has to be considered while determining the probabilities of the rival
cases.
50.
Viewed in the aforesaid backdrop, this Court finds that the
Appellants have not been able to satisfactorily establish the license
arrangement pleaded by them. The evidence led in support thereof
leaves material aspects unsubstantiated and falls short of displacing
the Respondent's version on a preponderance of probabilities.
CONCLUSION:
51.
Upon an independent re-appreciation of the entire material on
record, including the pleadings, the oral and documentary evidence
led by the parties, the testimonies of the witnesses and the surrounding
circumstances emerging from the record, this Court is satisfied that
the Appellants have failed to establish their plea that the Respondent
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BHATIA
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RFA 459/2009
was merely a licensee in respect of the suit shop. The alleged licence
arrangement has remained unsupported by cogent and reliable
evidence and falls short of the standard required to discharge the
burden cast upon the Appellants in law.
52.
Even then, this Court finds that the Respondent's plea of
tenancy cannot be accepted merely because of the failure of the
Appellants' case. However, upon an independent appraisal of the
evidence, including the Respondent's testimony, this Court is satisfied
that the Respondent has succeeded in projecting his defence on the
touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. The cumulative effect of
the evidence lends greater assurance to the Respondent's version than
to the case projected by the Appellants.
53.
Consequently, this Court finds no infirmity in the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court on Issue Nos. 6 and 11. The
impugned findings neither suffer from perversity, illegality, nor any
material misreading or misappreciation of the evidence so as to
warrant interference in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under
Section 96 ofCPC.
54.
Accordingly,
the present
Appeal, along
with
pending
Application(s), if any, stands dismissed in the aforesaid terms.
55.
No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 24, 2026/m/jk
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:32:54
RFA 459/2009
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