Full Judgment Text
Text read from the judgment PDF published on the High Court's eCourts portal, through the
Indian High Court Judgments open data set (Dattam Labs,
CC BY 4.0).
The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 24th FEBRUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
NIKHIL KUMAR ANAND
Through:
.....Appellant
Mr. Ashish Mohan, Senior Advocate
with Ms. Sagarika Wadhwa, Adv, Ms.
Soumya Sannidhanam, Adv, Mr.
Auditor Mukherjee, Adv, Ms.
Sagarika Tanwar, Adv.
versus
HRIDEY VIKRAM BHATIA & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr.
Jeevesh
Nagrath,
Senior
Advocate with Mr. Sarthak Gupta,
Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1.
The instant appeal has been filed by the Appellant under Section
37(2)(b) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to
as “The Act”) for setting aside the Order dated 22.11.2025 (hereinafter
referred to as “Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Sole Arbitrator in
an application under Section 17 of the Act whereby a plea of interim
injunction with respect to the construction site situated at Sector 142, Plot
No. 6, Noida, Uttar Pradesh (‘Subject Land’) was rejected by the learned
Sole Arbitrator.
2.
The Appellant is a real-estate and infrastructure developer and
architect. He is also the Director of various real-estates and infrastructure
companies, including KRA Infrastructure and Developers Pvt. Ltd.
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
3.
Material on record discloses that Respondent No.2 was established as
a joint venture company (‘JVCo’), incorporated in the year 2002 under the
Companies Act, 1956. The JVCo was formed by the Respondent No.1 i.e.,
Hridey Vikram Bhatia and his wife i.e., Veenu Vikram Bhatia. The purpose
of establishing Respondent No.2 was for planning, construction,
development, operation, marketing, leasing and sale of units as well as
ownership and management for developing an IT Project at the subject land
admeasuring 40,315.80 sq. metres.
4.
On 27.02.2007, a Share Holding Agreement (hereinafter referred to
as “SHA”) was entered into between the Respondent No.1, wife of
Respondent No.1 and a Mauritius based Company called as Ireo Investment
Holding IX Limited („Ireo‟ which later changed to M/s Linspot Limited).
Under the said agreement, Linspot (erstwhile „Ireo‟) subscribed to around
49% compulsorily convertible non-cumulative preference shares of the
Respondent No.2 along with subscribing to existing equity shares of the
Respondent No.2.
5.
On 17.02.2006, vide Reservation Cum-Allotment letter, the
Respondent No. 2 was allotted the subject land by the New Okhla Industrial
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as “NOIDA”) for a period
of 90 years. The purpose of this allotment was the development of a
Software IT Unit/ L.T.E.S (hereinafter referred to as “the Project”)
6.
The Appellant evinced interest in taking over the Project and a Term
Sheet dated 29.03.2023 was executed between the Appellant, and the
Respondents. Vide the said Term Sheet, the Appellant would acquire 100%
of the shareholdings of Respondent No.2 for a consideration of Rs.
90,00,00,000/-. Clause 7(i) of the Term Sheet stipulated that the before the
execution of Definitive Agreements between the contracting parties, (The
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Appellant and the Respondents) Respondent No. 2 would acquire the
shareholding from Linspot, which was transferred to them vide the SHA. A
perusal of the entire Term Sheet would be necessary for a better
understanding of the case. The Term Sheet is reproduced as under:-
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
7.
On the same date of execution of the Term Sheet, the Appellant paid a
sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- to the Respondent No.2 by two cheques bearing
Cheque Nos. 241 and 242 dated 29.03.2023 drawn from Bandhan Bank as
an advance which was to be adjusted in the total purchase consideration of
Rs. 90,00,00,000/-
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
8.
Subsequently, certain modifications were carried out in the Term
Sheet and in April and May 2023, parties carried out numerous discussions
vide emails and in person meetings.
9.
On 15.05.2023, the Respondent apprehending that NOIDA may
cancel the Lease Deed of the Subject Land allotted to them, credited a sum
of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- back to the Appellant.
10.
The allotment of Subject Land to the Respondent No. 2 was cancelled
by NOIDA vide Order dated 26.06.2023. The Order dated 26.06.2023 is
reproduced hereunder:
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
11.
The Respondents subsequently again refunded Rs. 1,00,00,000/- on
two occasions, i.e., on 12.07.2023 (Rs. 50,00,000) and 13.07.2023 (Rs.
50,00,000) respectively. Hence, the Respondents refunded the entire amount
of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- back to the Appellant.
12.
Steps were taken by the Respondent because of which the cancellation
order was revoked and the Respondent started the project with some other
party. After the project was restored, the Appellant approached this Court by
filing a petition being O.M.P.(I) (COMM.) 171/2024 under Section 9 of the
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Act. On 28.05.2024, the said petition was disposed of, wherein this Court
did not grant any interim relief. However, the Court appointed a sole
arbitrator for adjudication of disputes between the parties, and granted
liberty to the parties to file an application under Section 17 of the Act.
13.
The Arbitral Tribunal was constituted. The Appellant filed an
application under Section 17 of the Act seeking interim relief. Relief as
sought by the Appellant under Section 17 Application is reproduced
hereunder:
“(a) Pass appropriate orders injuncting the
Respondents to launch and execute the project, namely
„ONYX – The Only Gem‟ or any other name on the
Subject Land;
(b) Pass appropriate orders restraining the
Respondents or its agents or its assignees from
commencing construction on the subject land, i.e., plot
of land spread over an area of 40,315.80 sq. meters
situated at Sector 142, Plot No. 6, Noida, Uttar
Pradesh;
(c) Pass appropriate Orders restraining the
Respondents or its agents, assignees from collecting
any money or booking any units on the project/ site in
question and to deposit any monies, if already
collected/ received, before this Hon‟ble Arbitral
Tribunal;
(d)
Pass appropriate Orders restraining the
Respondents or its agents, assignees from creating any
third party interest in the Subject Land;
(e) Pass any such order(s) as this Hon‟ble Arbitral
Tribunal may deem fit and proper in the interest of
justice”
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
14.
By the Impugned Order, the Arbitral Tribunal refused to grant any
injunction restraining the Respondents from launching and executing the
Project with other parties. The Tribunal held that prima facie, the Term
Sheet contained only broad terms of understanding and facets such as
Definitive Documents which were yet to be worked out. The Tribunal did
not make any observations regarding the contingent nature of the Term
Sheet and stated that the issue of contingent nature of the term sheet,
wrongdoings of the respondents and uncertainty with respect to the
consideration paid are contentions left open for trial.
15.
The following arguments were advanced on behalf of the parties in the
Arbitration proceedings.
16.
It was the case of the Appellant that Respondent No.1 without any
prior discussion
and
intimation,
refunded
the
entire
amount
of
Rs.2,00,00,000/- to the Appellant. A sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- was returned
on 15.05.2023 and the balance amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/- was returned
back by a bank transfer on two different dates i.e., a sum of Rs.50,00,000/on 12.07.2023 and Rs.50,00,000/- on 13.07.2023. This was in violation of
Clause 15(a) of the Term Sheet as per which only the Appellant had the right
to terminate the Term Sheet.
17.
It was submitted that the Term Sheet was a concluded contract
between the parties, which had been signed by all the parties and contained
specific obligations, terms and guidelines. Further, the Respondents acted on
the Term Sheet by sharing approved building plans, development
agreements, etc.
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
18.
The Appellant further stated before the learned Arbitrator that it was
always ready to perform their part of the contract. The Appellant in fact paid
a sum of Rs. 2,00,00,000/-, towards the fulfilment of the conditions of the
Term Sheet which has been refunded. It was the case of the Appellant that
since the Term Sheet was a concluded document, the Respondents could not
have unilaterally cancelled it, scrapped the project and re-launched under a
new name. It was alleged that the Respondents were taking advantage of
their own wrongs without there being any cogent reason whatsoever to
terminate the contract.
19.
Subsequent argument raised by the Appellant before the Tribunal was
that despite the Term Sheet being a concluded contract the Respondent
launched the Project on the subject land under the name „Splendour Gem of
Noida‟. Thereafter the Respondent no. 2 scrapped the erstwhile project and
launched a new project on the subject land by the name „ONYX, the only
Gem‟ which was launched in March 2024 and registered under UP RERA.
This, as per the Appellant, amounts to a breach of clause 7(iii) of the Term
Sheet where the affiliate of the Appellant was agreed to be the sole and
exclusive contractor for the development of the Project, and Clause 9 where
the 100% shareholding of the Respondent No. 2 was agreed to be transferred
to the Appellant.
20.
With respect to the cancellation of allotment of the Subject Land to
the Respondent No. 2, it was argued that the cancellation was on account of
the Respondent‟s continued non-compliance with the terms of the allotment
and the Respondents cannot rely on their own failure to evade contractual
obligations under the Term Sheet. This cancellation took place on account of
the violation of the Office Order dated 10.09.2020 which prohibited the
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
transfer of more than 49% of the shareholdings of the Respondent No.2. In
addition to this, it is the case of the Appellant that it was the primary
responsibility of the Respondent to satisfy all regulatory approvals which it
had failed to do.
21.
Per Contra, it was the case of the Respondents that as soon as it
anticipated the cancellation of the allotment of the Subject Land, it informed
the Appellant of the same. Thereafter, it was agreed between the parties that
the amount of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- should be refunded. Following this, the
Respondent immediately refunded an amount of Rs. 1,00,00,000/-. An
additional refund of Rs.1,00,00,000/- was made by the Respondents after
receiving the official intimation regarding plot cancellation and forfeiture of
deposits. This cancellation in turn led to the frustration of the Term Sheet.
22.
On the question of the Term Sheet being a concluded one or not, it
was the case of the Respondent that the term sheet was tentative, conditional
and non-binding. It was mere exploratory in nature and was to be followed
by execution of definitive terms/ agreements, which were not executed
between the parties.
23.
It was submitted by the Respondents that the Term Sheet was a
contingent contract dependent on acquisition of Respondent No.2
shareholding from M/s Linspot Limited and obtaining regulatory approval.
As these condition precedents were not fulfilled, it was not a concluded
contract.
24.
It was further stated by the Counsel for the Respondents that as the
Appellant has accepted the refund of Rs. 2,00,00,000/- without any protest, it
reflects that the Appellant has accepted the termination of the Term Sheet.
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Further reliance was place on subsequent communications between the
parties to state the Term Sheet was terminated mutually.
25.
It was submitted on behalf of the Respondents that after a lot of
efforts, the allotment was restored subject to the completion of the Project by
17.12.2025. On account of the restoration of the Project, the Respondent has
moved for registration under UP RERA and third party rights had already
been created inasmuch as out of 550 allottees, 375 units have already been
sold and an Agreement to Sell was also entered into between the allottees.
Hence any relief at this stage would jeopardise these rights and breach
regulatory timelines in the completion of the Project.
26.
After hearing the parties in the arbitration proceedings, the learned
Arbitrator vide the Impugned Order dated 22.11.2025 came to a conclusion
that the Term Sheet does not contain any term to the effect that it is
„binding‟ or „non-binding‟. Rather, the header carries the words “For
Discussion Purposes Only”. The learned Arbitrator also noted that the Term
Sheet contains only “broad terms of understanding” and facets such as the
Definitive Documents were yet to be worked out. The transaction was
subject to certain conditions precedents which included acquisition of entire
shareholding of Respondent No. 2 from M/s Linspot Ltd and obtaining
regulatory approval. Relying on the observations made in a judgment of a
Division Bench of Karnataka High Court in Azeem Infinite Dwelling (India)
Pvt. Ltd. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2024) SCC OnLine Karnataka 10320,
the Tribunal refused to grant any interim relief on the basis of the Term
Sheet.
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
27.
The Learned Senior Counsels for both the parties advanced the
following submissions before this Court.
28.
Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant states
that vide Clause 15 (a) of the Term Sheet, only the Purchaser, i.e., the
Appellant, had the right to terminate the contract and therefore, the contract
in its nature was not determinable at the instance of the Respondents. The
contract being of such nature, could only be specifically enforced at the
instance of the Appellant. Reliance has been placed on Section 14 (d) of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963.
29.
It is also contended by learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
the Appellant that the present case is not one where the contract could not be
performed at all. Attention of this Court has been drawn to Clause 7 of the
Term Sheet which provides conditions precedent which were to be
performed only by the Respondents, inter-alia, acquisition of shareholding
back from Linspot to Respondent No. 2 Company and procuring regulatory
approvals. Learned Counsel states that on performing the conditions
precedent which were only attributable to the Respondents, Definitive
Documents were to be entered into which were defined in Clause 8 of the
Term Sheet.
30.
Learned Senior Counsel on behalf of the Appellant placed reliance on
Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. He states that the entire contract
could not be performed due to a bar in transfer of 100% shares of
Respondent No. 2 Company to the Appellant, as per the Office Order issued
by NOIDA. He states that even otherwise, the Contract be enforced to the
extent possible, i.e., 49% of the shareholding can be acquired by the
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Appellant and the remaining portion could be compensated in terms of
damages which is a matter of trial before the Tribunal. In this context, the
learned Arbitrator ought to have restrained the Respondents from proceeding
ahead with the Project during the pendency of the arbitration.
31.
The sum and substance of the contention of the learned Senior
Counsel for the Appellant is that an existence of a Term Sheet should bind
the parties and be enforced in terms of the correspondence exchange
between the parties. Reliance has been on the judgments of the Apex Court
in Trimex International FZE Limited v. Vedanta Aluminium Limited, India,
(2010) 3 SCC 1, York Tech Pvt. Ltd. v. Delhi Development Authority,
(2022) SCC OnLine Del 3564 and a judgment by the Division Bench in
Delhi Development Authority v. York Teck Pvt. Ltd., (2023) SCC OnLine
Del 3796, affirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge.
32.
It is reiterated that since the Appellant is prepared to perform his part
of the contract, the relief in the performance of the contract is no longer a
discretionary relief. He states that Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act is to
be construed and interpreted in a purposive manner to direct specific
performance by the defaulting party. It is the case of the Appellant that a
reading of the Term Sheet and communications between the parties goes on
to prove that the Respondents who were party to the contract deliberately
tried to frustrate the contract by way of an abrupt and un-explained refund.
Therefore, a direction of specific relief may be granted against the
Respondents and in favour of the Appellant to the extent possible, and
damages be granted to the part of the contract that has to be left
unperformed. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex Court
in B. Santoshamma And Another v. D. Sarala And Another, (2020) 19 SCC
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
80 and Parswanath Saha v. Bandhana Modak (Das) and Another, (2024)
SCC OnLine SC 3834.
33.
It was further reiterated that the Respondents were only taking
advantage of its own default by not performing their part of the contract on
arbitrary grounds. Reliance has been placed on the judgments of the Apex
Court in Kusheshwar Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar And Others, (2007) 11
SCC 447, Haryana Financial Corporation And Another v. Rajesh Gupta,
(2010) 1 SCC 655.
34.
Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondents contends that the application under Section 17 was only an
abuse of process of law. He states that the interference by the Court under
Section 37 (2)(b) of the Act is permissible only if the Impugned Order
suffers from patent illegality or is completely questionable under the law or
in fact. He further contends that the Court while deciding an Appeal under
Section 37(2)(b) cannot substitute its own conclusion as drawn by the
learned Arbitrator as the jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) is extremely
narrow.
35.
In any event under the Term Sheet, Clause 7 stipulates the execution
of the Definitive Documents/Agreement which are further described in
Clause 8 of the Term Sheet. From the perusal of the record, it was clear that
the parties were in continuous meetings and negotiations for the execution of
these documents. Despite several meetings, the parties did not end up
executing these Definitive Documents/Agreements as enumerated in Clause
7 read with Clause 8. Reliance has been placed on a judgment of the Apex
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Court in Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi, (1990) 3 SCC 1 wherein it was
observed as under:“18. The specific performance of a contract is the
actual execution of the contract according to its
stipulations and terms, and the courts direct the party
in default to do the very thing which he contracted to
do. The stipulations and terms of the contract have,
therefore, to be certain and the parties must have been
consensus ad idem. The burden of showing the
stipulations and terms of the contract and that the
minds were ad idem is, of course, on the plaintiff. If the
stipulations and terms are uncertain, and the parties
are not ad idem, there can be no specific performance,
for there was no contract at all. Where there are
negotiations, the court has to determine at what point,
if at all, the parties have reached agreement.
Negotiations thereafter would also be material if the
agreement is rescinded.”
36.
It is the case of the Respondents that based on the record and
submissions of the parties, the Tribunal held that whether the Term Sheet
and negotiations with respect to the Term Sheet were indicative of a
concluded contract or not would be a matter of trial and it could not be said
that a prima facie case was in favour of the Appellant warranting an
injunction. Further, since the Definitive Agreements were not entered into, it
could not have been said that the terms of the contract had been crystallized
demonstrating a meeting of minds.
37.
The learned Counsel for the Respondents further states that in view of
the fact that the transfer of 100% shareholding was contrary to the Office
Order dated 10.09.2020 issued by NOIDA which prohibited transfer of more
than 49% of the shares, they have refunded the money because the Term
Sheet had become completely unenforceable. He further states that the Lease
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Deed was indeed cancelled after the first sum of money i.e., Rs.1,00,00,000/was refunded back by the Respondents to the Appellant.
38.
Heard the learned Senior Counsels for the parties and perused the
documents on record.
39.
This Court in Perfect Diesel Sales and Service and Another v. Power
HF India Private Limited, (2025) SCC OnLine Del 916, while dealing with
the power of the Court under Section 37 (2)(b) placed reliance on the
judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in World Window
Infrastructure Private Limited v. Central Warehousing Corporation, (2021) 3
HCC Del 731 and observed as under:“66. The scope of interference, in appeal, against
orders passed by arbitrators on applications under
Section 17 of the 1996 Act is limited. This Court has
already
opined
in Dinesh
Gupta v. Anand
Gupta [Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta, 2020 SCC
OnLine Del 2099] , Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97
Communication Ltd. [Augmont Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97
Communication Ltd., (2021) 4 HCC (Del) 642]
and Sanjay
Arora v. Rajan
Chadha [Sanjay
Arora v. Rajan Chadha, (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 654] that
the restraints which apply on the court while
examining a challenge to a final award under Section
34 equally apply to a challenge to an interlocutory
order under Section 37(ii)(b). In either case, the court
has to be alive to the fact that, by its very nature, the
1996 Act frowns upon interference, by courts, with the
arbitral process or decisions taken by the arbitrator.
This restraint, if anything, operates more strictly at an
interlocutory stage than at the final stage, as
interference with interlocutory orders could
interference with the arbitral process while it is
ongoing, which may frustrate, or impede, the arbitral
proceedings.
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
67. Views expressed by arbitrators while deciding
applications under Section 17 are interlocutory views.
They are not final expressions of opinion on the merits
of the case between the parties. They are always
subject to modification or review at the stage of final
award. They do not, therefore, in most cases,
irreparably prejudice either party to the arbitration.
Section 17 like Section 9 is intended to be a protective
measure, to preserve the sanctity of the arbitral
process. The pre-eminent consideration, which should
weigh with the arbitrator while examining a Section 17
application, is the necessity to preserve the arbitral
process and ensure that the parties before it are placed
on an equitable scale. The interlocutory nature of the
order passed under Section 17, therefore, must
necessarily inform the court seized with an appeal
against such a decision, under Section 37.
Additionally, the considerations which apply to Section
34 would also apply to Section 37(ii)(b).”
40.
Another Co-ordinate Bench in Lava International Limited v.
Mintellectuals LLP, (2024) SCC OnLine Del 6908 has laid the law with
regards to scope of interference under Section 37(2)(b) and has observed as
under:“(i) Scope of interference under Section 37(2)(b)
12. Before dealing with these contentions, it may be
noticed that the scope of interference with orders
passed under Section 17 of the Act is limited. This
Court has had occasion to examine the width of the
appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) of the Act,
and held that a discretionary interim order of an
arbitral tribunal ought to be interdicted only if it is
perverse or manifestly arbitrary2. These conclusions
rest both on the overarching principles of party
autonomy and minimal curial intervention, which
inform interpretation of the Act, and upon general
principles governing the exercise of appellate power
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
against discretionary orders, as explained by the
Supreme Court in Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd.
13. Reference may be made to the judgment of this
Court in Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta4, wherein this
Court considered the matter with reference to Section 5
of the Act, and the generally limited nature of the
Court's power in relation to arbitration proceedings, to
conclude as follows:
“60. In the opinion of this Court, another
important, and peculiar, feature of the 1996 Act,
which must necessarily inform the approach of the
High Court, is that the 1996 Act provides for an
appeal against interlocutory orders, whereas the
final award is not amenable to any appeal, but
only to objections under Section 34. If the
submission of Mr. Nayar, as advanced, were to be
accepted, it would imply that the jurisdiction of
the Court, over the interlocutory decision of the
arbitrator, would be much wider than the
jurisdiction against the final award. Though,
jurisprudential, perhaps, such a position may not
be objectionable, it does appear incongruous, and
opposed to the well settled principle that the
scope of interference with interim orders, is,
ordinarily much more restricted than the scope of
interference with the final judgment.
xxx
64. There can be no gainsaying the proposition,
therefore, that, while exercising any kind of
jurisdiction, over arbitral orders, or arbitral
awards, whether interim or final, or with the
arbitral process itself, the Court is required to
maintain an extremely circumspect approach. It is
always required to be borne, in mind, that
arbitration is intended to be an avenue for
“alternative dispute resolution”, and not a means
to multiply, or foster, further disputes. Where,
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
therefore, the arbitrator resolves the dispute, that
resolution is entitled to due respect and, save and
except for the reasons explicitly set out in the
body of the 1996 Act, is, ordinarily immune from
judicial interference.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
66. In my opinion, this principle has to guide,
strongly, the approach of this Court, while
dealing with a challenge such as the present,
which is directed against an order which, at an
interlocutory stage, merely directing furnishing of
security, by one of the parties to the dispute. The
power, of the learned Sole Arbitrator, to direct
furnishing of security, is not under question;
indeed, in view of sub-clause (b) of Section
17(1)(ii) of the 1996 Act, it cannot. The arbitrator
is, under the said sub-clause, entirely within his
jurisdiction in securing the amount in dispute in
the arbitration. Whether, in exercising such
jurisdiction, the arbitrator has acted in
accordance with law, or not, can, of course,
always be questioned. While examining such a
challenge, however, the Court has to be mindful
of its limitations, in interfering with the decision
of the arbitrator, especially a decision taken at the
discretionary level, and at an interlocutory stage.
14. In Sanjay Arora v. Rajan Chadha6, the Court went
on to hold as follows:
“19. This Court has already opined, in Dinesh
Gupta v. Anand Gupta (Supra) and Augmont Gold
(P) Ltd. v. One97 Communication Ltd. (Supra).
that the considerations guiding exercise of
appellate jurisdiction under Section 37(2)(b) are,
fundamentally, not really different from those
which govern exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
20. It is only, therefore, where the order suffers
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
from patent illegality or perversity that the court
would interfere with the order of the learned
Arbitral Tribunal, under Section 37(2)(b). This is
because, unlike appeals under other statutes or
under the CPC, appeals against orders of Arbitral
Tribunal are subject to the overarching
limitations contained in Section 5 of the 1996 Act,
read with the Preamble thereto, which proscribes
interference, by courts, with the arbitral process,
or with orders passed by learned Arbitral
Tribunal, save and except on the limited grounds
envisaged in the 1996 Act itself.”
41.
Further reliance can be placed on a judgment of the Co-ordinate
Bench in R.K. Associates and Hoteliers Pvt. Ltd. v. Indian Railway Catering
and Tourism Corporation Limited (IRCTC), (2026) SCC OnLine Del 212
which observed as under:“6. At the outset, this Court notes the settled position
of law that in case the view taken by the Arbitral
Tribunal is plausible and free from perversity,
interference under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration
Act, is not warranted. The scheme of the Arbitration
Act emphasizes minimal judicial intervention and
Courts do not substitute their opinions for that of the
Arbitral Tribunal, limiting the interference of the Court
only in cases where the impugned order is perverse,
patently illegal or suffers from jurisdictional infirmity.
Thus, this Court in the case of Databit Technologies
Pvt. Ltd. v. Red Fort Finance Company Pvt. Ltd., ARB.
A. (COMM.) No. 1 of 2026, order dated 6-1-2026
(Del), held as follows:
“xxx
xxx
xxx
7. It is well settled that the scope of interference
under Section 37 is limited. The appellate court
does not act as a court of first instance and
cannot re-appreciate evidence or substitute its
own discretion over that of the arbitral tribunal.
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Interference is warranted only where the
impugned order is perverse, patently illegal, or
suffers from a jurisdictional infirmity. Mere
disagreement with the view taken by the tribunal
or the possibility of an alternative view is not a
ground for interference. The power exercised by
the arbitral tribunal under Section 17 is
discretionary and is guided by settled principles
governing grant of interim measures, namely,
the existence of a prima facie case, balance of
convenience, and likelihood of irreparable
prejudice.
8. It is equally well settled that interlocutory
orders are, by their very nature, discretionary
and the scope of interference, in judicial review,
with discretionary orders is limited. Where the
discretion exercised is towards direction for a
deposit, the court has to be additionally
circumspect, as the issue of whether a deposit
ought, or ought not, to be directed, so as to secure
the sanctity of the arbitral proceedings and ensure
that they proceed to fruition, is essentially a
matter to be assessed by the learned Arbitral
Tribunal. Unless such assessment is perverse or
suffers from manifest illegality, the approach of
the court, ordinarily, should be one of restraint
[refer: Dinesh Gupta v. Bechu Singh, (2021) 3
HCC (Del) 763 : 2021:DHC:4400].
xxx
xxx
xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
7. Likewise, holding that scope of interference in
appeal against orders passed by Arbitrators on
applications under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, is
limited and the restraints which apply on the Court
while examining the challenge to a final award under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, equally apply to a
challenge under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
Act, this Court in the case of World Window
Infrastructure Private Limited v. Central Warehousing
Corporation, (2021) 3 HCC (Del) 731, held as follows:
“xxx
xxx
xxx
66. The scope of interference, in appeal, against
orders passed by arbitrators on applications
under Section 17 of the 1996 Act is limited. This
Court has already opined in Dinesh Gupta v.
Anand Gupta [Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta,
2020 SCC OnLine Del 2099], Augmont Gold (P)
Ltd. v. One97 Communication Ltd. [Augmont
Gold (P) Ltd. v. One97 Communication Ltd.,
(2021) 4 HCC (Del) 642] and Sanjay Arora v.
Rajan Chadha [Sanjay Arora v. Rajan Chadha,
(2021) 3 HCC (Del) 654] that the restraints
which apply on the court while examining a
challenge to a final award under Section 34
equally apply to a challenge to an interlocutory
order under Section 37(ii)(b). In either case, the
court has to be alive to the fact that, by its very
nature, the 1996 Act frowns upon interference,
by courts, with the arbitral process or decisions
taken by the arbitrator. This restraint, if
anything, operates more strictly at an
interlocutory stage than at the final stage, as
interference with interlocutory orders could
interference with the arbitral process while it is
ongoing, which may frustrate, or impede, the
arbitral proceedings.
67. Views expressed by arbitrators while deciding
applications under Section 17 are interlocutory
views. They are not final expressions of opinion
on the merits of the case between the parties.
They are always subject to modification or
review at the stage of final award. They do not,
therefore, in most cases, irreparably prejudice
either party to the arbitration. Section 17 like
Section 9 is intended to be a protective measure,
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
to preserve the sanctity of the arbitral process.
The preeminent consideration, which should
weigh with the arbitrator while examining a
Section 17 application, is the necessity to
preserve the arbitral process and ensure that the
parties before it are placed on an equitable scale.
The interlocutory nature of the order passed
under Section 17, therefore, must necessarily
inform the court seized with an appeal against
such a decision, under Section 37. Additionally,
the considerations which apply to Section 34
would also apply to Section 37(ii)(b).
xxx
xxx
xxx
82. That the province of Section 9 jurisdiction of
the court, and of Section 17 jurisdiction of the
arbitrator, are co-equal, stands settled by the
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Arcelor
Mittal Nippon Steel India Ltd. v. Essar Bulk
Terminal Ltd. [Arcelor Mittal Nippon Steel India
Ltd. v. Essar Bulk Terminal Ltd., (2022) 1 SCC
712 : AIR 2021 SC 4350]
xxx
xxx
xxx”
(Emphasis Supplied)
8. Similar view has been taken by this Court in the
cases of GLS Foils Products Pvt. Ltd. v. FWS Turnit
Logistic Park LLP, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 3904 and
Dinesh Gupta v. Anand Gupta, 2020 SCC OnLine Del
2099.
9. Thus, the position of law is clear that the Court is
possessed with the power of only limited interference
under Section 37(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act, only in
cases where the impugned order passed by the Arbitral
Tribunal suffers from patent illegality or perversity.”
42.
Applying the law to the facts of this case, this Court does not find any
infirmity with the order of the Tribunal on the basis of the material placed
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
before it has observed that the Term Sheet notes that its header states „For
Discussion Purposes Only‟. Further, even the title of the Term Sheet
enumerates as follows:
“This Term Sheet capturing the broad terms of
understanding between the Sellers (as defined below),
the Purchaser (as defined below) and the Company
(collectively referred to as the "Parties" and
Individually as a "Party") in respect of the Transaction
(as defined below) is executed at New Delhi on this
29th day of March, 2023 ”
43.
A perusal of the Term Sheet clearly establishes that the purpose of
drafting this document was to come to an understanding between the parties,
execute the necessary documents as stipulated under the various clauses of
the Term Sheet. A binding contract would have only come into existence
after the successful execution of all the conditions as stipulated in the Term
Sheet.
44.
The Tribunal vide the Impugned Order has come to a prima facie
conclusion only after taking into account the various clauses in the Term
Sheet and the simultaneous discussions and negotiations held between the
parties.
45.
The Tribunal rightly held that the Term Sheet contained only broad
terms of understanding, and facets, such as the definitive documents as
stipulated under Clause 8 of the Term Sheet, were yet to be worked out.
Therefore, the Tribunal refrained from making any observations with respect
to the contingent nature of the Term Sheet, or as to whether the Respondents
took advantage of their own wrong by not fulfilling the terms, or that the
Term Sheet stood frustrated. These contentions are left open for trial. These
observations, therefore, does not require interference at this stage.
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
46.
As far as the argument of the Appellant with regards to his bonafide
intention for execution of the contract in lieu of the deposit of Rs.
2,00,00,000/- made to the Respondents is concerned, the said money has
been refunded to the Appellant. No documentary evidence has been placed
to show any protest/objections by the Appellant to the return of the said
deposit. There was no written communication advanced from the Appellant
to the Respondents after 28.06.2023 with regards to the Project.
47.
The Appellant has approached this Court nearly after a year of the
return of deposits and when the Project was finally revived under a new
name by the Respondents. It is pertinent to note that the Respondents have
already created third party rights in 375 units of the Project, and there are a
total of 550 allottees.
48.
The considerable delay on the part of the Appellant in seeking interim
relief from this Court clearly demonstrates the absence of any genuine
urgency in the matter. Furthermore, grant of an injunction at this stage
would result in substantial prejudice to the allottees of the Project and would
impede the timely completion of the Project within the revised deadline
stipulated by NOIDA.
49.
It is well settled that a party claiming interim relief has to pass the
triple test of establishing a prima facie case that the balance of convenience
lies in granting the relief and that irreparable loss would be caused to the
party if the interim relief, as prayed for, is not granted. As observed earlier,
there was complete silence on the part of the Appellant for about one year.
The Appellant had taken the money and only when the project re-started, the
Appellant started taking steps to prevent the Respondents from proceeding
with the project. The Appellant has, therefore, failed to prove a prima facie
case in his favour which is sufficient to deny the Appellant any interim stay.
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
In any event, the Appellant has made an alternate claim of Rs.50 crores. In
the facts of the present case, this Court is of the opinion that the balance of
convenience is in the favour of the Respondents as they have already
allotted 375 units of the project to the individual purchasers and any kind of
interim relief at this juncture would affect the interest of those purchasers
who have invested their hard-earned money in the project.
50.
In view of the above, the Appellant has failed the triple test and
therefore, is not entitled to the interim relief, as prayed for. This Court is,
therefore, of the opinion that the Order of the Tribunal does not warrant any
interference from this Court.
51.
Accordingly, the Appeal is dismissed, along with pending
application(s), if any.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
FEBRUARY 24, 2026
Prateek/MT
Digitally Signed
By:PRATEEK
20.00.17
ARB. A. (COMM.) 4/2026
This page is for informational and research purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
Consult a qualified advocate for advice specific to your situation.
Is your name in this judgment and should it be masked, or is something on this page wrong?
Request a review