The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
19. In view of the exposition of law, as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, and in conjunction with the provisions of the 1996 Act, it is clear that the application under Section 34(3) of 1996 Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the present appellant was rightly rejected. The same was highly belated having been filed after an elapse of more than 9 months from the passing of the award by the learned Arbitrator. After relying upon the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, 16 2026:HHC:16400 learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the applicant was aware of the passing of the award by the learned Arbitrator. Though, it was stated that they received a copy of the award on
15. 03.2023, the period of 3 months expired on 14.06.2023 and the additional 30 days expired on 03.07.2023, however, in the present case, the application for condonation of delay was filed on 08.04.2024, which is beyond the extended period of limitation of 30 days. Therefore, the learned District Judge, Mandi, after applying ratio as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, vide impugned order dated 01.08.2024 has rightly dismissed the application under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the objections under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. This Court sees no infirmity or illegality or jurisdictional error in the same.
20. In view of aforesaid discussion, and exposition of law, as noted above, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed, and the same is accordingly dismissed along with pending application(s), if any. ( Romesh Verma ) Judge May 05, 2026 (vt)
Full Judgment Text
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The court's own copy is the authoritative text.
2026:HHC:16400
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Arb. Appeal No.181 of 2026
Decided on: 05.05.2026
National Highway Authority of India
….Appellant
Versus
Baldev Singh & others
...Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge
Whether approved for reporting?
For the appellant:
Mr. Sumeet Raj Sharma, Advocate.
For the respondents:
Mr.Gaurav
Chaudhary
and
Mr. Ruchirangad Singh, Advocates.
Romesh Verma, Judge (Oral)
The present appeal arises out of the order as passed
by learned District Judge, Mandi, District Mandi, H.P. dated
01.08.2024, whereby application under Section 34(3) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, “1996 Act”) read
with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was dismissed.
2.
The facts of the case are that the land belonging to
the respondents was acquired by the present appellant for the
construction of Ner Chowk-Pandoh Section of National Highway
(four-lane road). The competent authority passed an award dated
09.12.2016 and a supplementary award dated 15.05.2018 in
favour of the present respondents. The competent authority, by
2 2026:HHC:16400
passing the award, assessed the market value of the acquired
land at the rate of Rs.50,000,00/- per bigha and further the
valuation of the structure was done separately, as per the award.
3.
Feeling
dissatisfied,
the
claimants/respondents
invoked the provisions of Section 3G(5) of the National Highways
Act against the award dated 9.12.2016 and the supplementary
award dated 15.05.2018. Learned Arbitrator, vide its award dated
24.01.2023, partly allowed the application under Section 3G(5) of
National Highways Act as filed by the claimants/respondents. The
learned Arbitrator granted compensation for the structure along
with statutory benefits under Section 30(1) and Section 30(3) of
the 1996 Act with interest @ 9% per annum for the first year and
15% per annum thereafter, in favour of the respondents.
4.
Against the award, as passed by learned Divisional
Commissioner exercising the powers of an Arbitrator under the
National Highways Act, dated 24.01.2023, the present appellant
filed an application under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act read with
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, before the learned District
Judge, Mandi, who vide its impugned order dated 01.08.2024,
dismissed the application under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act
read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
3 2026:HHC:16400
5.
Feeling aggrieved against the impugned order
passed by learned District Judge Mandi, the National Highway
Authority of India has filed the instant appeal, invoking the
provisions of Section 37 of the 1996 Act.
6.
It is contended by Mr. Sumeet Raj Sharma, learned
counsel for the appellant, that the impugned order as passed by
the learned District Judge, Mandi, is erroneous and liable to be
quashed and set aside. He further submits that the appellant has
furnished sufficient reasons, which are reasonable and plausible,
for non-filing of the application under Section 34 of the 1996 Act
within the prescribed period of limitation, therefore, the learned
District Judge has wrongly dismissed the application under
Section 34(3) read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act for
condonation of delay in an illegal manner.
7.
On the other hand, Mr. Gaurav Chaudhary, learned
counsel for the respondents, contended that as per the mandate
as laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court, especially in view of the
provisions of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act and the proviso
thereto, 90 days plus 30 days period cannot be extended. In the
present case, the objection under Section 34 of the 1996 Act was
admittedly filed by the present appellant on 08.04.2024 which is
4 2026:HHC:16400
more than 9 months after the passing of the award by the learned
Arbitrator.
8.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
scanned the case file.
9.
The only point to be determined by this Court is
whether the application under Section 34/objection as filed by the
present appellant was filed within a period of limitation or not.
10.
The provisions of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act read
as follows:
“(3) An application for setting aside may not be
made after three months have elapsed from the
date on which the party making that application
had received the arbitral award or, if a request had
been made under section 33, from the date on
which that request had been disposed of by the
arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that
the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application within the said period
of three months it may entertain the application
within a further period of thirty days, but not
thereafter.”
11.
A perusal of the provisions of Section 34(3) of the
1996 Act shows that the objector is required to file an objection
within three months from the date the party received the arbitral
award. In the event, the aggrieved party provides a plausible
5 2026:HHC:16400
explanation by filing an appropriate application, the said three
months period can be extended for further 30 days, but not
thereafter.
12.
The
provisions
are
specifically
clear
and
unambiguous. In the event of an objector failing to file the
objection within a period of three months after the receipt of
arbitral award, further 30 days’ period cannot be extended
automatically. Such an extension can be granted only on the filing
of an application and to the satisfaction of the Court by assigning
the reasons. Thereafter, the Court does not have the power to
extend the time of limitation in any manner under the provisions of
the 1996 Act.
13.
2025, titled
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.336 of
My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt.
Ltd. & Anr. vs. M/S Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., has
reiterated the provisions of the Act in the following manner:
“17.
Admittedly, as the period of limitation
prescribed for filing a petition under Section 34 of
the A & C Act expired on 29.05.2022 whereas the
petition was preferred on 04.07.2022 much
beyond the period of limitation prescribed and the
condonable period of 30 days stipulated under the
proviso to Section 34(3) of the A & C Act, the
petition under Section 34 of the A & C Act was
beyond time and the delay could not have been
6 2026:HHC:16400
condoned. Accordingly, there is no error or
illegality on part of the High Court in dismissing
the petition under Section 34 of the A & C Act as
barred by limitation.
18.
It would not be out of context for me to
mention on the basis of my experience that
practically
all
new/recent
enactments
are
deviating from the prescribed period of limitation
as per the Schedule of the Limitation Act and are
generally prescribing its own period of limitation
as under the A & C Act itself. At the same time,
statutes further provide that the delay beyond a
certain period cannot be condoned by the court.
This is obviously in deviation to what is prescribed
by Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
19.
xx xx xx xx
20.
This deviation and restriction create
confusion and ordinarily even a lawyer at times
fails to notice that a different period of limitation
has been prescribed for preferring an appeal
under a particular statute. Moreover, there may be
genuine cases where the litigant may not be able
to approach the court in time for cogent reasons
beyond his control. For example, in arbitration
matters where an award is passed on a particular
date and a copy of it is also served upon the
litigating party but that party happens to be
seriously ill and hospitalised for months together
and as such is unable to prefer a petition under
Section
within
the
period
of
limitation
prescribed. If the delay in challenging the award is
not condoned beyond the period of 30 days, he
7 2026:HHC:16400
would suffer great prejudice and may lose the
remedy on a technical ground even though he
may be having a good case on merit. There may
also be a situation where a litigant is facing
proceedings by the law enforcement agencies like
the Enforcement Directorate, Central Bureau of
Investigation, etc., and is taken into custody and
as such is unable to take the legal remedy within
the period of limitation prescribed. He avails the
remedy only after he is out of custody; months
after
the
service
of
the
order.
In
such
circumstances, in my opinion, the legislature
ought not to confine condoning the delay only for
a prescribed period and not beyond it. Rather it
should follow the principle of condoning the delay
as enshrined under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
This would not only avoid a good case to be
thrown out on the ground of limitation but at the
same time would bring about uniformity in law.”
14.
An identical issue came up for consideration before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs M/s Popular
Construction Company
(2001) 8 SCC 417, wherein it was
observed as under:
“11.
Thus, where the legislature prescribed a
special limitation for the purpose of the appeal and
the period of limitation of 60 days was to be
computed after taking the aid of Sections 4, 5 and
12 of the Limitation Act, the specific inclusion of
these sections meant that to that extent only the
8 2026:HHC:16400
provisions of the Limitation Act stood extended and
the
applicability
of
the
other
provisions,
by
necessary implication stood excluded.4
12.
As far as the language of Section 34 of the
1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not
thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In
our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express
exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation
Act,
and
would
therefore
bar
the
application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did
not need to go further. To hold that the Court could
entertain an application to set aside the Award
beyond the extended period under the proviso,
would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly
otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify
such a result.
Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act
support the conclusion that the time limit prescribed
under Section 34 to challenge an Award is absolute
and unextendable by Court under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill,
1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of
its main objectives the need "to minimise the
supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process".6
This objective has found expression in Section 5 of
the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial
intervention in no uncertain terms :
"5.
Extent
of
judicial
intervention.
-
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, in matter
governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall
intervene except where so provided in this Part."
9 2026:HHC:16400
15.
Further, in case titled as State of H.P. vs. Himachal
Techno Engineers (2010) 12 SCC 210, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court while dealing with the provisions of Section 34(3) of the
1996 Act observed as under:
“Having regard to the proviso to section 34(3) of
the Act, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 will not apply in regard to petitions under
section 34 of the Act. While section 5 of the
Limitation Act does not place any outer limit in
regard to the period of delay that could be
condoned, the proviso to sub-section (3) of section
34 of the Act places a limit on the period of
condonable delay by using the words "may
entertain the application within a further period of
thirty days but not thereafter." Therefore, if a
petition is filed beyond the prescribed period of
three months, the court has the discretion to
condone the delay only to an extent of thirty days,
provided sufficient cause is shown. Where a
petition is filed beyond three months plus thirty
days, even if sufficient cause is made out, the
delay cannot be condoned.”
16.
Similar issue came up before the Hon’ble Apex Court
in Simplex Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Union of India, (2019) 2
SCC 455 and it was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
10 2026:HHC:16400
1963, has no application to an application challenging an arbitral
award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The relevant paras read
as under:
“11.
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 deals
with the extension of the prescribed period for any
appeal or application subject to the satisfaction of
the court that the appellant or applicant had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or
making the application within the prescribed
period. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has
no application to an application challenging an
arbitral award under Section 34 of the 1996 Act.
This has been settled by this Court in its decision
in
Union
of
India
v
Popular
Construction
Company7, where it held as follows –
12.“As far as the language of Section 34 of the
1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are
“but not thereafter” used in the proviso to subsection (3). In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within the
meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act,
and would therefore bar the application of
Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to
go further. To hold that the court could entertain
an application to set aside the award beyond
the extended period under the proviso, would
render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly
otiose. No principle of interpretation would
justify such a result.
11 2026:HHC:16400
Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act
support the conclusion that the time-limit
prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an
award is absolute and unextendible by court
under Section 5 of the Limitation Act… ”
12. Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides
thus:
“14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in
court without jurisdiction. — (1) In computing
the period of limitation for any suit the time
during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting
with due diligence another civil proceeding,
whether in a court of first instance or of appeal
or revision, against the defendant shall be
excluded, where the proceeding relates to the
same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good
faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction
or other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any
application, the time during which the applicant
has been prosecuting
with
due
diligence
another civil proceeding, whether in a court of 7
(2001) 8 SCC 470 at para 12 and 14 first
instance or of appeal or revision, against the
same party for the same relief shall be
excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted
in good faith in a court which, from defect of
jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is
unable to entertain it.
12 2026:HHC:16400
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule
2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of sub-section
(1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit
instituted on permission granted by the court
under Rule 1 of that Order, where such
permission is granted on the ground that the
first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the
jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like
nature.
Explanation. —For the purposes of this section,
—
(a) in excluding the time during which a former
civil proceeding was pending, the day on which
that proceeding was instituted and the day on
which it ended shall both be counted;
(b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal
shall
be
deemed
to
be
prosecuting
a
proceeding;
(c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action
shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature
with defect of jurisdiction.
14.
The position of law is well settled with
respect to the applicability of Section14 of the
Limitation Act to an application filed under Section
34 of the 1996 Act. By applying the facts of the
present case to the well settled position of law, we
need to assess whether the learned Single Judge
of the High Court was justified in condoning the
13 2026:HHC:16400
delay for filing an application under Section 34 of
the 1996 Act.”
17.
Thereafter, similar issue came up before Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs.
M/s Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd. Air 2021 Supreme Court
2493, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court, after placing reliance in
M/s Popular Construction Company (supra) and Simplex
Infrastructure Ltd. (supra), observed as under:
“35.
The date on which the signed award is
provided to the parties is a crucial date in arbitration
proceedings under the
Indian Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996. It is from this date that:
35.1 The period of 30 days’ for filing an application
under Section 33 for correction and interpretation of
the award, or additional award may be filed;
35.2
The arbitral proceedings would terminate as
provided by Section 32(1) of the Act;
35.3
The period of limitation for filing objections
to the award under Section 34 commences
36.
Section 34 provides recourse for judicial
scrutiny of the award by a Court, upon making an
application under sub-sections (2) and (3) for setting
aside the award. The period of limitation for filing the
objections to the award u/S. 34 commences from
the date on which the party making the application
has “received” a signed copy of the arbitral award,
as required by Section 31(5) of the 1996 Act.
Section 34(3) provides a specific time limit of three
months from the date of “receipt” of the award, and
14 2026:HHC:16400
a further period of thirty days, if the Court is satisfied
that the party was prevented by sufficient cause
from making the application within the said period,
but not thereafter.
37.
In Union of India v. Popular Construction,12
this Court held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 would not apply to applications filed under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. It was held that :
“12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the
1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but
not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3).
In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an
express exclusion within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar
the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament
did not need to go further. To hold that the court
could entertain an application to set aside the award
beyond the extended period under the proviso,
would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly
otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify
such a result.” 12 (2001) 8 SCC 470. In Simplex
Infrastructure v. Union of India,13 this Court held
that the phrase “but not thereafter” provided under
Section 34(3) of the Act makes it evident that the
statutory period of limitation for filing an application
for setting aside is three months, which is
extendable by thirty days, if sufficient cause is made
out. No further period of time can be granted for the
filing of an application under Section 34.”
18.
case
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in recent judgment in
titled
Gayatri
Balasamy
vs.
M/S
Isg
Novasoft
15 2026:HHC:16400
Technologies Ltd., (2025) 7 SCC 1, has laid down the exposition
of law in the following manner:
“30. Section 34(2-A) stipulates that an award may
be set aside when it is vitiated by patent illegality
appearing on the face of the award. The proviso
clarifies that such determination shall not be made
solely because there is an erroneous application of
law
or
through
reappreciation
of
evidence.
Section34(3) provides timelines which needs to be
adhered to while filing an application under Section
34. Section 34(4) stipulates the court’s power of
remanding an award to the arbitral tribunal. We have
addressed this remand power in Part VI of our
Analysis.
Section
34(5)
outlines
notice
requirements, while Section 34(6) mandates the
expeditious disposal of Section 34
applications,
setting a hard outer limit of one year from the date of
service of notice on the other party under Section
34(5)."
19.
In view of the exposition of law, as laid down by
Hon’ble Supreme Court, and in conjunction with the provisions of
the 1996 Act, it is clear that the application under Section 34(3) of
1996 Act read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed by the
present appellant was rightly rejected. The same was highly
belated having been filed after an elapse of more than 9 months
from the passing of the award by the learned Arbitrator. After
relying upon the law as laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court,
16 2026:HHC:16400
learned District Judge came to the conclusion that the applicant
was aware of the passing of the award by the learned Arbitrator.
Though, it was stated that they received a copy of the award on
15.03.2023, the period of 3 months expired on 14.06.2023 and
the additional 30 days expired on 03.07.2023, however, in the
present case, the application for condonation of delay was filed
on 08.04.2024, which is beyond the extended period of limitation
of 30 days. Therefore, the learned District Judge, Mandi, after
applying ratio as laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court, vide
impugned order dated 01.08.2024 has rightly dismissed the
application under Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act read with Section
5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the
objections under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. This Court sees no
infirmity or illegality or jurisdictional error in the same.
20.
In view of aforesaid discussion, and exposition of law,
as noted above, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed,
and the same is accordingly dismissed along with pending
application(s), if any.
( Romesh Verma )
Judge
May 05, 2026
(vt)
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