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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 06.01.2026
+
W.P.(CRL) 4238/2025
NEELAM JOSHI
Through:
.....Petitioner
Ms.Urvashi Bhatia, Mr.Bharat
Bhushan
Bhatia,
Mr.Jatin
Khatri, Mr.Gaurav Pachauri,
Mr.Mathew
Philip
and
Mr.Utkarsh Dwiwedi, Advs.
Petitioner in person
versus
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr.Sanjay
Lao,
Standing
Counsel (Crl.) with Insp.
Paramjit, PS Burari and Insp.
Surender Kumar, PS Chhawla.
Ms.Swati Rathi, Ms.Chetishtha
Malik, Mr.Phool Kumar and
Mr.Prem Sood, Advs. for R-4
to R-8 along with Respondent
no.4 in person
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
NAVIN CHAWLA, J. (ORAL)
1.
The present Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, read with Section 528 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking issuance of a Writ of Habeas
Corpus, directing the respondents to produce the body of the two
minor daughters of the petitioner, one aged 12 months and the second
aged about 4 years and 9 months, respectively.
Digitally Signed
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By:REYMON VASHIST
17:30:49
2.
Briefly stated, the petitioner herein was married to the
respondent no. 4 according to the Hindu rites and customs in Delhi on
10.03.2019. Pursuant to their marriage, matrimonial dispute arose
between the said parties and the petitioner filed a written complaint to
the Women’s Commission and the P.S. Chhawla, Delhi, on
30.09.2019, against the respondent nos.4 to 8. The respondent no. 4 is
the husband of the petitioner; the respondent nos.5 and 6 are the
father-in-law and the mother-in-law of the petitioner respectively;
while respondent nos. 7 and 8 are the brothers-in-law of the petitioner.
The said dispute was, however, settled and the petitioner states that
she did not pursue it any further based on the assurance given by the
respondent no. 4.
3.
The first child was born on 22.03.2021, whereafter matrimonial
dispute again arose between the parties, leading to the petitioner filing
an application under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, against the respondent nos.4 to 8 on
08.11.2021. The dispute was referred to the Delhi Mediation Centre,
Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi, where the same was settled again
between the parties vide the Settlement dated 19.05.2022 and both the
parties decided to live together as husband and wife along with their
minor daughter at the matrimonial home.
4.
The second child was born to the parties, that is, the petitioner
and the respondent no.4, on 18.09.2023. However, unfortunately, the
child passed away on 20.05.2024.
5.
The parties, thereafter, were blessed with their third child on
10.12.2024, in respect of whose custody also the present petition has
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W.P.(CRL) 4238/2025
By:REYMON VASHIST
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been filed.
6.
The petitioner herein claims that on 21.07.2025, the respondent
nos.4 to 6 asked the petitioner to visit her paternal home for a few
days, while insisting that the minor daughters be left back at the
matrimonial home with respondent nos. 4 to 6. Upon her return,
however, she was not allowed to enter her matrimonial home and the
children remained in the custody of the respondent nos.5 to 8, that are,
the parents-in-law and the brothers-in-law of the petitioner.
7.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint, bearing DD no. 373
dated 06.08.2025, before the CAW Cell at P.S. Subzi Mandi against
the respondents nos. 4 to 8 and an application under Section 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi, on 29.08.2025. It is alleged that while the petitioner had
consented for settlement through mediation and was appearing for the
same, however, the respondents nos. 4 to 8 have not been appearing
for the same.
8.
The petitioner had also moved an application under Section 21
of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 before
the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts,
Delhi, on 15.09.2025, seeking custody of her minor daughters. The
said application is pending adjudication and is listed for service of
summons on the remaining parties.
9.
It is the case of the petitioner that the respondent no.4 is a
Hawaldar in the Accounts Department in the Indian Army and was
earlier posted in Bengal, thereafter in Patiala, and is presently posted
Digitally Signed
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By:REYMON VASHIST
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in Kupwara, Kashmir. The children are, therefore, in the custody of
the parents-in-law and the brothers-in-law of the petitioner.
10.
The petitioner on the above facts, and claiming herself to be the
natural guardian, has filed the present petition seeking custody of the
minor children.
11.
On the other hand, the respondent no.4 claims that the petitioner
left her matrimonial home of her own volition, leaving the children
behind. He, however, admits to him remaining away from Delhi due
to his postings at various places and that the children are in the
custody of his parents and brothers. He submits that for his children he
can return back to Delhi.
12.
Given the above facts, we explored the possibility of the parties,
that is, the petitioner and the respondent no.4, arriving at an amicable
settlement and even interacted with them.
13.
From our interaction with the parties, we find that presently, the
parties are not in a position to amicably settle their disputes. There are
allegations and counter-allegations being made against each other. The
fact, which also appears from such interaction, is that there is no
serious allegation made by the respondent no.4 against the petitioner
at least as far as her suitability for the custody of the children is
concerned.
14.
Similarly, it is an admitted position that, as on today, due to the
posting of the respondent no.4, the custody of the children is with the
grandparents, that are, respondent nos. 5 and 6. The age of the
children are not in dispute, which we have already mentioned above.
15.
In the above facts, the learned counsel for the respondent no.4
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submits that the petitioner should be left to avail her remedies in
accordance with law and specifically the Hindu Minority and
Guardianship Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the, ‘HMG Act’).
She submits that the petitioner should not be allowed to short-circuit
the process of law by filing the present petition to seek the custody of
the minor children, especially where the custody is with the
respondent no.4/the legal guardian, that is, the father.
16.
In support of her submissions and the above objections, she
places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Nirmala v.
Kulwant Singh & Ors., (2024) INSC 370; of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Veerpal Kaur v. State of Punjab & Ors.,
2025:PHHC:113490; and of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Nazma Bi v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., (Order dated
25.05.2023 passed in Writ Petition No.4165/2023).
17.
On the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioner,
placing reliance on Section 6 of the HMG Act, submits that given the
age of the children, the fact that the children are minor girls, and that
the respondent no.4 is not in Delhi but posted in Kashmir, leaving the
custody of the minor children with the grandparents, the petitioner is
the natural guardian of the children.
18.
Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Tejaswini Gaud & Ors. v. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari & Ors.,
(2019) 7 SCC 42; and of this Court in Monika Tiwari v. Govt. of NCT
of Delhi & Ors., 2025:DHC:7608-DB, she submits that this would,
therefore, be a fit case for exercise of the extraordinary powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India by this Court to hand over the
Digitally Signed
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By:REYMON VASHIST
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custody of the minor children to the petitioner.
19.
We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties.
20.
As would be evident from the above, the minor children are
presently aged about 4 years 9 months and 12 months, respectively.
They both are minor girl child. The respondent no.4, due to his present
posting, is not in Delhi but is situated in Kashmir and the custody of
the minor children is presently with the grandparents, that is,
respondent nos.5 and 6. The petitioner was in custody of the children
till 21.07.2025, when she went to her parental home, and whereafter
she is not being allowed to enter her maternal home.
21.
While it is the case of the petitioner that the custody of the
minor children was illegally kept with the respondent nos.5 and 6, it is
the case of the respondent no.4 that the petitioner, on her own volition,
left the matrimonial home, leaving the minor children behind. We
would not like to go into this controversy and disputed question of fact
in our discretionary and summary jurisdiction.
22.
We are further mindful of the fact that no serious allegation, in
fact, no allegation at all, has been made by the respondent no.4 against
the petitioner on her motherhood or on her suitability to have the
custody of the minor children.
23.
In these facts and keeping in view the provisions of Section 6 of
the HMG Act, as against the grandparents, that are, respondent nos. 5
and 6, the petitioner, in absence of respondent no. 4 is not only the
natural guardian of the children, but also entitled to their custody. The
custody of the children with the respondent nos. 5 and 6, therefore,
Digitally Signed
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By:REYMON VASHIST
17:30:49
can be said to be illegal.
24.
In Tejaswini Gaud (supra), the Supreme Court held that a Writ
of Habeas Corpus, though being a summary jurisdiction and an
extraordinary remedy, is warranted where the custody of the minor
children is not with the natural guardian. The welfare of the child is
the paramount consideration of the Court. The Court held that such a
Writ can be issued where the detention of the minor child is illegal and
without any authority of law. We quote from the judgment as under:
“14. Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative
process for securing the liberty of the subject
by affording an effective means of immediate
release from an illegal or improper detention.
The writ also extends its influence to restore
the custody of a minor to his guardian when
wrongfully deprived of it. The detention of a
minor by a person who is not entitled to his
legal custody is treated as equivalent to illegal
detention for the purpose of granting writ,
directing custody of the minor child. For
restoration of the custody of a minor from a
person who according to the personal law, is
not his legal or natural guardian, in
appropriate cases, the writ court has
jurisdiction.
xxxxxx
19. Habeas corpus proceedings is not to
justify or examine the legality of the custody.
Habeas corpus proceedings is a medium
through which the custody of the child is
addressed to the discretion of the Court.
Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is
an extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued
where in the circumstances of the particular
case, ordinary remedy provided by the law is
either not available or is ineffective; otherwise
a writ will not be issued. In child custody
matters, the power of the High Court in
granting the writ is qualified only in cases
Digitally Signed
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By:REYMON VASHIST
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where the detention of a minor by a person
who is not entitled to his legal custody. In view
of the pronouncement on the issue in question
by the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in
our view, in child custody matters, the writ of
habeas corpus is maintainable where it is
proved that the detention of a minor child by a
parent or others was illegal and without any
authority of law.”
25.
In Monika Tiwari (supra), this Court found that the child was in
the custody of the grandparents and not the father. The Court
emphasizing that though for the normal psychological, physical and
emotional growth and overall wellbeing of a child, the child should be
living in the custody of both the parents, however, in cases of
matrimonial disputes, the temporary/permanent custody may have to
be given to either of the parents taking in view the welfare of the
child.
26.
In Nirmala (supra), the Supreme Court was confronted with a
fact where the father of the child had initiated proceedings before the
Child Welfare Committee and the Appellate Court therein had held
that the CWC had passed an order granting him the custody of the
children without jurisdiction. In spite of the same, in a Writ of Habeas
Corpus filed by the father, the High Court had directed the
grandmother therein to hand over the custody of the child to the father.
The Court, considering the judgment in Tejaswini Gaud (supra), held
that no hard and fast rule can be laid down insofar as the
maintainability of a Habeas Corpus petition in matters of custody of
minor child is concerned. The Court in the peculiar facts of that case
further held that the High Court should not have interfered with the
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custody of the child as a detailed inquiry, including welfare of the
minor child and his preference would be involved.
27.
In Veerpal Kaur (supra), the Court was confronted with the
facts wherein there were matrimonial disputes between the parents of
the child, resulting in various proceedings being filed by them against
each other. The Court in those facts, held as under :
“16. As a sequitur to the above rumination,
the following postulates emerge:
I.
The High Court’s jurisdiction to issue a
writ of Habeas Corpus in minor child custody
matter is predicated on the basic jurisdictional
fact, namely, the minor child’s custody is
demonstrably illegal/unlawful. In appropriate
cases, the High Court may relax this
jurisdictional prerequisite, in the interest of
welfare of minor child.
II.
The writ of Habeas Corpus is not a
substitute for the comprehensive and evidence
based procedures available under applicable
guardianship statutes (such as Hindu Minority
and Guardianship Act, 1956; Guardians and
Wards Act, 1890 etc.). As a matter of general
judicial principle, the writ Court ought to
ordinarily exercise restraint and defer
dispute(s) to statutory forums unless
accentuating circumstances necessitate such
intervention by High Court.
III. In all matters relating to the custody of
minor child, the paramount consideration is
the welfare of such child. In exercise of its
parens patriae jurisdiction; the High Court
may, in appropriate cases, upon a holistic
examination of facts, take an inquisitional role
to ensure that the custodial arrangement
serves the best interest of the child,
superseding the adversarial claims of the
parties.
IV. In furtherance of a minor child’s
welfare, the writ Court may issue interim
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order(s) concerning custody and other
incidental aspects as warranted by exigencies
of the situation, ensuring that the minor child’s
well being remains the ultimate determinant of
justice and thereafter refer parties to
remedy(s) before statutory forum(s) for
final/further determination of the lis.
V.
The High Court, in its writ jurisdiction
has unbridled, unfettered and plenary powers.
No inflexible and comprehensive guidelines
can conceivably be enumerated governing the
exercise of these intrinsic powers. There is no
gainsaying that the nature, mode and extent of
such exercise of this jurisdiction by the High
Court shall depend upon the judicial
discretion exercised by the High Court in the
facts and circumstances of a given case.”
28.
In Nazma Bi (supra), the custody of the child was with the
father. The Court, therefore, held that it could not be said that the
custody of the child was illegal.
29.
From the above, it would be evident that the jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India being discretionary and
extraordinary in nature, the Court has developed principles of selfrestraint especially in matters of child custody where disputed
questions of fact and determination of the welfare of the child are
involved and there are equally efficacious statutory remedies available
to the parties. This, however, does not mean that the Court is denuded
of its jurisdiction or powers under Article 226 of Constitution of India
to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus and to hand over the custody of the
child to a natural guardian, where the custody of the children is not in
the hands of the natural guardian and such transfer of custody is found
to be in the welfare of the children. Ultimately, it is the welfare of the
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By:REYMON VASHIST
17:30:49
children that will govern the exercise or refusal to exercise the said
jurisdiction by the Court.
30.
The Supreme Court in Rajeswari Chandrasekhar Ganesh v.
State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2023) 12 SCC 472, has held that in a
petition seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus in a matter relating to a
claim for custody of a child, the principal issue which should be taken
into consideration is as to whether from the facts of the case, it can be
stated that the custody of the child is illegal. It was held that the Writ
of Habeas Corpus is a prerogative Writ and an extraordinary remedy.
It is a writ of right and not a writ of course and may be granted only
on reasonable ground or probable cause being shown. The exercise of
such jurisdiction would, therefore, be seen to be dependent on the
jurisdictional fact where the applicant establishes a prima facie case
that the detention is unlawful. The principal duty of the court dealing
with a petition seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus in the context of a
claim relating to the custody of a minor child is to ascertain whether
the custody of the child is unlawful and illegal and whether the
welfare of the child requires that the present custody should be
changed and be handed over to any other person. It was held that the
Court, while considering issuance of such a Writ, acts under its
inherent equitable jurisdiction, independent of any statutory provision,
and with the State acting as parens patriae. We quote from the
judgment as follows:
“99. Thus, it is well established that in issuing
the writ of habeas corpus in the case of
minors, the jurisdiction which the Court
exercises is an inherent jurisdiction as distinct
from a statutory jurisdiction conferred by any
Digitally Signed
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particular provision in any special statute. In
other words, the employment of the writ of
habeas corpus in child custody cases is not
pursuant to, but independent of any statute.
The jurisdiction exercised by the court rests in
such cases on its inherent equitable powers
and exerts the force of the State, as parens
patriae, for the protection of its minor ward,
and the very nature and scope of the inquiry
and the result sought to be accomplished call
for the exercise of the jurisdiction of a court of
equity. The primary object of a habeas corpus
petition, as applied to minor children, is to
determine in whose custody the best interests
of the child will probably be advanced. In a
habeas corpus proceeding brought by one
parent against the other for the custody of
their child, the Court has before it the question
of the rights of the parties as between
themselves, and also has before it, if presented
by the pleadings and the evidence, the question
of the interest which the State, as parens
patriae, has in promoting the best interests of
the child.”
31.
In the present case, as has been highlighted hereinabove, the
children are of the age of 4 years and 9 months and 12 months,
respectively. They both are minor daughters. The respondent no. 4 is
admittedly not in Delhi and, therefore, the minor children are not in
his custody, but in the custody of the grand-parents. There are no
allegations against the petitioner regarding her not being a suitable
mother or transfer of the custody of the children to her not being in the
welfare of the minor children. While granting custody of a girl child,
we need to also keep in mind that in her formative years, the child
needs the support and love of her mother.
32.
Given the above facts, we direct that the respondent nos. 4 to 8
shall hand over the custody of the minor children to the petitioner
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By:REYMON VASHIST
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forthwith.
33.
At the same time, the respondent no. 4, while being in Delhi,
cannot be denied the benefit of extending his love and affection to the
minor children. Therefore, the petitioner shall allow the respondents
nos. 4, 5 and 6 to meet the minor children on every alternate day, for
at least 2 hours, between 3 P.M. and 5 P.M. at the Children’s Room,
Family Courts, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
34.
The petitioner shall bring the minor children for such visitation
and shall be entitled to take them away after such visitation hours.
35.
Once the respondent no. 4 rejoins his duties and is not in Delhi,
the respondent nos. 5 and 6 would also be entitled to such visitation
rights over the minor children once a week at the same time and at the
same venue.
36.
We make it clear that the above arrangement is only temporary
in nature and the parties shall be entitled to avail of their remedies in
accordance with law with respect to the custody and the visitation
rights over the minor children.
37.
In case such remedy is availed, it shall be decided by the
Competent Court remaining uninfluenced by any observation made by
us herein or the interim arrangement that we have made in the present
petition.
38.
With the above directions, the present petition is disposed of.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J
JANUARY 6, 2026/gs/sg/as
Digitally Signed
W.P.(CRL) 4238/2025
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:30:49
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