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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 8 April 2026
Pronounced on: 01 July 2026
+
W.P.(C) 2330/2014, CM APPLs. 18537/2018 & 51222/2022
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC
CO-OPERATION & CHILD
DEVELOPMENT AND ANR
.....Petitioners
Through: Dr. Monika Arora, CGSC with
Mr. Subhradeep Saha, Ms. Anamika Thakur
and Mr. Abhinav Verma, Advs.
versus
TEJINDER KAUR
Through:
.....Respondent
Respondent in person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
%
JUDGMENT
01.07.2026
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
A.
Facts, and the lis
1.
This is a truly peculiar case.
The Central Administrative
Tribunal1 has directed the respondent to be paid the pay and
emoluments of a post on which she was never appointed, and on
which she did not work even for a single day.
1 “the Tribunal” hereinafter
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2.
The respondent was appointed as Research Assistant2 in the
National Institute of Public Cooperation & Child Development3.
While she was so working, the respondent was directly recruited as
Joint Director4, following which she worked as JD and drew the pay
of JD. Though she was never appointed as Deputy Director5, the
Tribunal has, in the judgment under challenge, directed the respondent
to be paid, for her entire tenure as RA till she was appointed as JD, the
pay of DD.
3.
In so directing, the Tribunal has held that the NIPCCD
extracted, from the respondent, during her tenure as RA, “supervisory
work equivalent to that of DD”, without a single shred of material to
justify the finding.
4.
The impugned order is, therefore, clearly, totally unsustainable
on facts and in law.
5.
We may advert to the facts, now, in somewhat greater detail.
6.
Vide Memorandum dated 13/17 April 1989 issued by the
NIPCCD, the respondent was offered the post of RA. She accepted the
appointment vide letter dated 21 April 1989, which read thus:
“The Director
NIPCCD
New Delhi
2 “RA” hereinafter
3 “NIPCCD” hereinafter
4 “JD” hereinafter
5 “DD” hereinafter
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Respected Madam,
I hereby convey my acceptance for the post of Research
Assistant as per the terms and conditions mentioned in your
memorandum no. NI/III/50/88/Per./1327 dated 17.4.89.
As I understand informally, my posting has been earmarked
for Training Division. Even the vacancies in the C.D. Division do
not suit my field of specialisation and the nature of work I am
presently doing in C.D. Division. It is my humble request that my
case may be favourably considered in the light of the above facts
and the offer may please be kept open until any such opportunity is
available in the fields of Health or Nutrition.
Thanking you,
Yours faithfully,
Sd/(Tejinder Kaur)
Research Assistant (H)
21.4.89”
7.
Vide the following Office Order 221/90 dated 31 August 1990,
the respondent, whose tenure in the Project to which she was
appointed had expired, was relieved:
“No.NI/IX/4/88-Pers.
31 August, 1990.
OFFICE ORDER No.221/90
Consequent upon expiry of the present tenure of Ms.
Tajinder Kaur, Adhoc Research Assistant under the Project entitled
"Assessment of Female Health Workers knowledge in ICDS and
Non-ICDS Projects she is hereby relieved of her duties in the
Institute w.e.f. 31.8.90 (AN)
Sd/(P.K. BARUA)
Administrative Officer”
8.
The respondent was again appointed as temporary RA with
effect from 26 September 1990 vide the following Office Order
247/90 issued by the NIPCCD:
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“No. NI/III/22/90-Pers.
1/10/1990
OFFICE ORDER No. 247/90
Kum. Tejinder Kaur is hereby appointed as temporary
Research Assistant w.e.f. 26/9/90 at Rs. 1640 in the pay scale of
Rs. 1640-60-2600-EB-75-2900 in the Institute. Her appointment
will be governed by the terms and conditions as contained in this
office Memorandum No. NI/III/50/88-Pers. dated 17/4/89. Her
appointment in the Institute is provisional subject to the production
of medical fitness certificate from Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia
Hospital, New Delhi, within fifteen days from the date of receipt of
this order posting orders with follow.
Letter addressed to Superintendant, Dr. Ram Manohar
Lohia Hospital, New Delhi is attached herewith. A set of
attestation forms are also sent herewith which should be completed
and returned to the undersigned within a week.
This issues with the approval of the Competent Authority.
Sd/(P.K. BARUA)
Administrative Officer”
9.
By the following Office Order dated 8 October 1990, the
respondent was posted to the Women Development Division6 of the
NIPCCD:
“NI/III/22/90-Pers.
Dt. 8.10.90
OFFICE ORDER NO. 253/90
Ms. Tejinder Kaur, Research Assistant is hereby posted to
Women Development Division with immediate effect.
Sd/(P.K. Barua)
Administrative Officer”
6 “WDD” hereinafter
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10.
By the following communication dated 25 November 1991
issued by the Department of Women and Child Development7,
Ministry of Human Resource Development, the services of the
respondent were placed at the disposal of the Women’s Bureau of the
DWCD:
“Govt. of India
Ministry of Human Resource Development
Department of Women & Child Development
Shastri Bhawan
*****
New Delhi, dated: 26.11.91
In connection with work relating to monitoring of STEP
Programme the services of Ms. Tejinder Kaur, Research Assistant
of Women's Division of NIPCCD are placed at the disposal of
Women's Bureau of the Department of Women & Child
Development w.e.f. 1.11.91 till further, orders.
She will continue to draw her salary and allowances from
NEPCCD as earlier.
Sd/(S.R. Pandey)
Under Secretary to the Govt. of India”
11.
The respondent was further transferred and posted from the
WDD to the Resource Centre for Child8 and, once again reposted to
the WDD by the following Office Orders dated 30 September/7
October 1998 and 8 February 2011 issued by the NIPCCD:
Office Order No. 166/98 dated 30 September/7 October 1998
“No. N1/21/17/94-Pers/
Dated: 30.9.98
07/10
7 “DWCD” hereinafter
8 “RCC” hereinafter
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OFFICE ORDER No. 166/98
Kum. Tejinder Kaur, Research Assistant is hereby
transfered and posted from Women's Development Division to
Evaluation Division with Monitoring immediate effect vice Smt.
Shanta Gopalakrishnan, Research Assistant who has been
transfered and posted from RCC to RCC in the and Child
Development Division.
2.
This authority issues with approval of the competent
authority.
Sd/(P.K. Baura)
Deputy Director (Admn.)”
Office Order 172/2011 dated 8 February 2011
“No. NI/III/22/90-Pers.
Dated: 08.02.2011
OFFICE ORDER No.172/2011
Dr. (Ms.) Tejinder Kaur, Research Assistant is posted from
DCWC Unit to WD Division with immediate effect till further
orders. She is advised to report to Joint Director (WD)
immediately.
2.
This issues with the approval of the competent authority.
Sd/(S.K. Vashist)
Asstt. Admn. Officer (Pers.)”
12.
Following the recommendations of a Departmental Promotion
Committee convened on 25 November 2010, the respondent was
promoted as Assistant Director9 by Office Order dated 4 March 2011,
from which the following paragraph is relevant:
“No.NI/XI/33/2006-Pers.
Dated: 04.03.2011
OFFICE ORDER No.179/2011
9 "AD" hereinafter
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Consequent upon acceptance of the recommendations of the
Departmental Promotion Committee for Group 'A' post made in its
meeting held on 25.11.2010 by Secretary (MWCD)-cum-First
Vice-Chairman of Executive Council of the Institute, Dr. (Ms.)
Tejinder Kaur, Research Assistant is promoted to the post of
Assistant Director on ad-hoc basis until further orders and posted
in the Women's Development Division at NIPCCD Headquarters,
New Delhi on provisional basis, till such time Dr. (Smt.) Sandhya
Gupta, Assistant Director joins after availing leave, in PB-3
Rs.15600-39100 + Grade Pay Rs.5400/- with effect from the date
she assumes charge of her new post.”
13.
At this stage, the respondent instituted CWP 4563/1993 before
this Court, submitting that, though she was appointed as RA, she had
been discharging the duties of DD. The respondent, therefore, prayed
that she be considered for appointment/promotion as DD and also be
disbursed the salary payable to a DD even during the period she was
working as RA.
14.
During the pendency of the writ petition, the NIPCCD issued an
advertisement dated 7 May 1994, proposing direct recruitment to
various posts, including the post of DD. On 26 August 1994, the
NIPCCD made a statement, before this Court, that the respondent had
become eligible for being considered for direct recruitment as DD.
Accordingly, by order dated 26 August 1994, this Court held prayer
(a) in the writ petition to have been satisfied, and directed that the writ
petition would continue only vis-à-vis prayer (b) therein. The order
dated 26 August 1994 read thus:
“C.W.4563/93
Counsel for the respondents states that the petitioner is now
eligible to apply and being considered for direct recruitment. In
view of the fact that the petitioner is now eligible for being
appointed, the petitioner's application for direct recruitment should
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be entertained and her candidature be considered with other
candidates. This satisfies prayer (a) in the writ petition.
The present writ petition hereafter will be i.e., entitlement,
if confined only to prayer (b) any, of the petitioner to equal pay for
equal work for the work done in connection with Danish
International Development Agency Project.
Rule.
C.M. 8548/93
In view of the orders passed today, the application is
infructuous. Dismissed as such.”
15.
Alleging that she had not been considered for the post of DD
despite the order dated 26 August 1994, the respondent instituted CCP
316/1995 before this Court, for initiation of contempt proceedings
against the petitioner. The said Contempt Petition was dismissed by
this Court on 16 February 2010.
16.
The respondent proceeded to challenge the order dated 16
February 2010 before the Supreme Court by way of SLP (C)
16697/2010 which, consequent to grant of leave, was renumbered
Civil Appeal 10358/2014. In the said SLP, the Director of the
NIPCCD filed an affidavit, stating that the respondent had been
interviewed against one of the vacancies of DD on 15 February 1996,
19 November 1996 and 4 March 1999.
17.
While the SLP was pending, the respondent moved an
application for permission to amend the prayer clause in CWP
4563/1993. Vide order dated 14 March 2001, a learned Single Judge
dismissed the amendment application, against which the respondent
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preferred LPA 255/2001, which was allowed by a Division Bench of
this Court on 24 September 2001. However, thereafter, the
respondent, on 22 July 2004, withdrew CM 2837/2001 as being
defective. A learned Single Judge allowed the application to be
withdrawn with liberty to the respondent file a fresh amendment
application.
18.
The respondent, therefore, moved CM 9011/2004, once again
seeking to amend CWP 4563/1993.
19.
While the said application was pending, the proceedings were
transferred to the Tribunal by order dated 12 January 2009 of this
Court, and registered as TA 319/2009.
20.
The Tribunal, by order dated 27 August 2010, allowed the
amended writ petition filed by the respondent to be taken on record.
Admittedly, by the amendment, the respondent modified the prayer in
the writ petition and sought regularisation on the post of DD with
consequential benefits, including designation and pay scale of the post
of DD with effect from 26 September 1990.
21.
By the impugned judgment dated 9 January 2014, the Tribunal
has allowed TA 319/2009. Aggrieved thereby, the Union of India10
has approached this Court by means of the present writ petition.
10 “UOI” hereinafter
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22.
In view of the pendency of the present writ petition, the
Supreme Court, by order dated 11 November 2014, disposed of Civil
Appeal 10358/2014 in the following terms:
“6.
In a fact situation of this nature, we are of the considered
opinion that if we direct the present a respondent-institution to pay
sum of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs only) during the
pendency of the Writ Petition, it can satisfy the interest of the
appellant.
7.
In view of the above, without going into the other details of
the appeal filed by the appellant, we dispose of the appeal as under:
The Director, NIPCCD is directed to a pay a sum of Rs.20,00,000/(Rupees twenty lakhs only) to the appellant herein within 15 days'
time from today and the said amount will be subject to the result of
the Writ Petition. If, for any reason, the respondent do not comply
with our order, the appellant is at liberty to make an appropriate
application before us.
8.
With these observations, the appeal is disposed of.
No costs.”
B.
The Impugned Judgment
23.
Paras 12, 14 and 15 of the impugned judgment contain its
reasoning:
“12. We have carefully gone through the facts and judgments
placed before us by both sides and heard the matter at length. It
appears clearly that the applicant is an outstanding worker and
highly qualified. This encouraged the respondents to take work
directly from her by the Joint Directors and Directors and initially
the Deputy Secretary. In the year 1994, the respondents advertised
to fill up four posts of Deputy Director in which they did not
consider her application. She had to run to the Court to get the
department acknowledge that she was eligible and that she should
be interviewed and considered but nothing happened. To frustrate
the process, as has been observed both by the Hon'ble High Court
and the Hon'ble Supreme Court, an interview was held for a post
which was not in her line and declared her Ineligible and that the
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applicant had to enforce the order of the Hon'ble High Court
through the Contempt Petition. Her successive CRs indicate that
she has never reported to a Deputy Director but at least to a Joint
Director or Deputy Secretary. In fact, we have pointed out earlier
that on two or three successive occasions, the Joint Directors and
Director have observed that she has Independently handled the
work, confirming her assertion that she was doing the job of
Deputy Director. This is also substantiated by the fact that she did
not get her CRS written by any Deputy Director and the
observation in the official noting that the job requires higher skill
of a senior person. The objection to this evidence by the
respondents is misplaced because this is definitely material fact to
show that her job was Indeed of supervisory nature. In fact, as
stated by the applicant, this substantiated by the fact that while she
was considered for the post of Joint Director, the respondents did
teat her period in the organization as that of a Supervisor.
*****
14.
We are convinced that the department has indeed extracted
supervisory work from the applicant equivalent to that of Deputy
Director and, therefore, she deserves to be benefited under the
principle of "equal pay for equal work". The argument of the
respondents that there are several other Research Assistants who
have been doing such type of work is of no consequence as we
don't have the facts of those cases before us whereas the applicant's
case is crystal clear. In fact, had the department honourably
considered her application for the post of Deputy Director when it
was advertised and implemented the High Court's order with all
due honesty, perhaps all this litigation could have been avoided.
We also find it strange that the espondents found the applicant fit
to hold the post of Joint Director but did not find her suitable for
the post of Deputy Director.
15.
We, therefore, conclude that the OA has merit and it is thus
allowed. The respondents are directed to issue necessary orders to
give the applicant pay and all other consequential benefits
including honorarium (Rs.21000/-) attached to the post of Deputy
Director from 26.09.1990, within a period of two months from the
receipt of a certified copy of this order. No costs.”
C.
Rival Contentions
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24.
The petitioners have advanced the preliminary objection that the
Tribunal has ruled on the basis of the amended prayers in the writ
petition without the application for amendment having been allowed
in the first instance. We, however, do not intend to enter into this
aspect as, to our mind, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is
fundamentally flawed. Moreover, ordinarily, an application to amend
the prayers in a writ petition has to be allowed, as it is the prerogative
of a writ petitioner to decide as to the relief that he seeks. The rigours
of Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC do not mutatis mutandis apply to writ
petitions.
25.
On merits, the writ petition asserts that the reasons adduced
therein do not justify a direction to pay, to the respondent, the pay of
DD, during the period she worked as RA.
26.
We are constrained to observe that the writ petition has been
most unsatisfactorily drafted, with no ground worth the name.
However, we have heard oral arguments of Ms. Monika Arora,
learned CGSC for the petitioners and the respondent, who appears in
person. Written submissions have also been tendered by both sides.
27.
Ms. Arora seeks to point out that the respondent had joined the
services of the NIPCCD as RA on 26 September 1990 and that there is
no order either posting her as DD or even requiring her to discharge
the duties of DD. She submits that the RA, as well as the AD, worked
under the supervision of the DD. The respondent had been promoted
as AD on ad hoc basis with effect from 7 March 2011 vide Office
Order dated 4 March 2011, which she accepted without demur. The
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post of DD, she appoints out, is even above the post of AD. The
respondent, she submits, seeks the pay of DD with effect from the date
when she was appointed as RA, which is ex facie unacceptable.
28.
The pay of the respondent as AD had in fact been fixed in terms
of FR 22(I)(a)(1)11. There was no basis on which the respondent could
be granted the pay of DD. Ms. Arora submits that the respondent has
not discharged a single day’s duty as DD. Moreover, submits, Ms.
Arora, the pay of RA is a Group D post, whereas the post of DD is a
Group A post.
11 22 (I)
The initial pay of a Government servant who is appointed to a post on a time scale of pay is
regulated as follows:
(a)(1)
Where a Government servant holding a post, other than a tenure post, in a substantive or
temporary or officiating capacity is promoted or appointed in a substantive temporary or officiating
capacity, as the case may be, subject to the fulfillment of the eligibility conditions as prescribed in
the relevant Recruitment Rules, to another post carrying duties and responsibilities of greater
importance than those attaching to the post held by him, his initial pay in the time-scale shall be
fixed by giving one increment in the level from which the Government servant is promoted and he
or she shall be placed at a cell equal to the figure so arrived at in the level of the post to which
promoted or appointed and if no such cell is available in the level to which promoted or appointed,
he shall be placed at the next higher cell in that level.
Save in cases of appointment on deputation to an ex cadre post or to a post on ad hoc
basis or on direct recruitment basis, the Government servant shall have the option, to be exercised
within one month from the date of promotion or appointment, as the case may be, to have the pay
fixed under this rule from the date of such promotion or appointment or to have the pay fixed
initially at the next higher cell in the level of the post to which he or she is promoted on regular
basis and subsequently, on the date of accrual of next increment in the level of the post from which
Government Servant is promoted, his pay shall be re-fixed and two increments (one accrued on
account of annual Increment and the second accrued on account of promotion) shall be granted in
the level from which the Government Servant is promoted and he or she shall be placed at a cell
equal to the figure so arrived, in the level of the post to which he or she is promoted; and if no such
cell is available in the level to which he or she is promoted, he or she shall be placed at the next
higher cell in that level.
In cases where an ad hoc promotion is followed by regular appointment without break,
the option is admissible from the date of initial appointment or promotion to he exercised within
one month from the date of such regular appointment.
In cases where an officer has retired as ad hoc before being regularised to that post and
later on has been assessed during the process of regularisation and found fit by the competent
authority along with his or her juniors, who are still in service and are eligible to avail of the option
facility from a date on which the retired employee was still in service, the same option facility shall
also be extended to the retired employee, to be exercised within three months from the date when
his or her junior became eligible to avail of option facility and in cases where such retired employee
was himself the junior most, he or she may exercise the option facility within three months from the
date when his or her immediate senior became eligible to avail of option facility:
Provided that where a Government servant is immediately before his promotion or
appointment on regular basis to a higher post, drawing pay at the maximum of the level of the lower
post, his initial pay in the level of the higher post shall be fixed at the cell equal to the figure so
arrived at in the level of the post to which promoted or appointed by increasing his pay in respect of
the lower post held by him on regular basis by an amount equal to the last increment in the level of
the lower post and if no such cell is available in the level to which he is promoted or appointed, he
shall be placed at the next higher cell in that level.
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29.
Ms. Arora further disputes the finding of the Tribunal that the
petitioners’ ACRs were never forwarded to the DD. In fact, submits
Ms. Arora, for 15 years, the respondent’s ACRs were written by the
DD.
30.
Ms. Arora, therefore, submits that there is no basis for the
directions issued by the Tribunal.
31.
Responding to Ms. Arora, the respondent, who appears in
person, relies on the following official noting dated 20 November
1991:
“1.
It seems RA(TK) has enough tine at her disposal to keep
submitting notes seeking to malign individuals, without taking any
action on work assigned to her, that she was requested to submit
last on 11.10.91 on note. Since RA(TK) is invariably not to be
found in her seat over the past 4 months, and has been coming and
going out of the Division, presumably work in the Department
related to STEP, since 26.10.91 hence her contention that she
received the said note on 31.10.91 is irrelevant, especially since
she has taken no action on the same.
2.
The kit material identified by undersigned and Consultant
(G) was handed over to Mr. Goyal of PSIPA on 28.10.91 itself. RA
(TK)s comments about Consultant (G)s involvement at para (2) are
highly objectionable and rude. As JS(P) is aware, it was at her
behest and instructions that Ms. Geeta Unnikrishnan was involved
in the Sensitization programme at Punjab and its
technical/substantive sessions. Consultant(G) has been involved in
the programme from preparatory stages itself, including
discussions regarding programme schedule, resource persons, kit
material etc. I see no reason in comments of RA(TK) in para 6,
since it is not at her discretion or on her decision that individuals
are involved in programmes. RA(TK) had infact tried to hamper
work on the programme thorugh her insolent and obstructive
behaviour and rude remarks. to undersigned and others, including
the Steno/Typists and peons and withholding of papers and the
publication on 'Gender Roles' (which has not been handed over to
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date); Consultant (C) has been associated in the preparatory work
and in the conduct of the programme in Chandigarh and has
contributed significantly to it’s the successful execution. I have no
reason or inclination. to malign anyones reputation or career. It
appears that RA(TK) has tried to distract from own lapses of
deliberately withholding and obstructing work for the programme
and insolent behaviour by making such uncalled for remarks about
Consultant(G) and undersigned in her note.
3.
It is not understood why RA(TK) should choose to procure
reading materials for the Chandigarh programme only on 17.10.91,
the last working day before the UP Sensitization Programme when
she had been asked to do this as early as 8-10-91 and again on
10.10.91 apart from impeding the undersigned work on other
assignments.
4.
It may be noted that at no time was RA(TK) the
Programme Associate for the Sensitization Program in Chandigarh.
As research assistant she was required to assist in the programme.
While she was involved in preliminary discussions with Mr. Goyal
of PSIPA and has prepared the draft for the programme design, she
has in fact hindered work for the programme by refusing to p/u the
draft programme schedule and kit material thereafter, despite my
having clearly discussed sessionwise details of kit and sources for
procurement materials. Hence, the hard and sincere labour' referred
to may have been in the preliminary stages, but in fact it was the
lack of cooperation from RA(TK) which necessiated the
undersigned completing the tasks of preparing final programme
schedule, sending letters to resource persons and compiling kit
materials myself in consultation with Consultant (G).
5.
It was in any case not considered necessary for any person
to assist in the programme at Chandigarh since all logistic
arrangements and financial disbursements were the responsibility
of PSIPA. This was discussed with and approved by DIS(WD) as
authorised by JS(P). RA(TK), by not completing work assigned to
her or submitting the same had infact disassociated herself from the
programme. She is in no way equipped or in a position to comment
on association of any other person or faculty in the programme in
view of her own unwillingness to do as directed to assist in the
programme.
6.
As regards para 7. of her note by withholding required
material and refusing to p/u the programme schedule and kit
material RA(TK) had infact hindered the preparatory work of the
programme. It became impossible for undersigned to assign her
any work on this or any programme in which she had been
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assisting the undersigned due to the above reason and her
misbehaviour on 17.10.91.
7.
I have already requested that RA(TK) be removed from my
charge in view of her insolent and objectionable behaviour, JS(P)
may take whatever action that she considers fit to deal with the
matter, and in the interest of discipline in the Women's
Development Division.
For consideration pl.
(Soma K Parthasaratthy)
D.D.(Trg.)”
32.
She also seeks to point out that some of her ACRs were written
by the Deputy Secretary, and not by the DD. She places reliance on
the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay
in
Dr.
Sakhaullah
v.
Visvesveraya
Regional
College
of
Engineering12.
33.
The respondent further relies on the following office noting
dated 31 March 1993, assigning duties to various officers:
“NIPCCD
(M.D. DIV1SION)
NI/WD/II-/92-93
31.3.93
Consequent, on the departure of Ms. Geeta Unnikrishnan
from the Division w.e.f.. 1.4.93 the following activities under the
DANIDA Package will be handled by the faculty member
mentioned hereunder:Gender Concerns
a)
National Level Sensitisation Programme
Ms. Ila Verma Consultant
Dr. Alka Arya, Research Assistant
b)
Regional Level Sensitisation Programme for the North
East, West Bengal and Bihar:
12 1999 LAB I.C. 991
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Ms. Ila Verma, Consultant
Ms. Putul Bose, Research Assistant
c)
Organisation and Programmes
Ms. Tejinder Kaur, Research Assistant
d)
Preparation of Resource Book on Institutions conducting
Gender relating Training at the National and the Regional Level:
Ms. Ila Verma Consultant
Ms. Daljeet Kaur, Research Investigator
Banking
a)
Training of Trainers (Bank Trainers):
Mr. B.R. Siwal, Research Assistant
b)
Media Campaign and Information Dissemination on Credit
for Women Entrepreneurs
Mr. O. R. Singh, Research Assistant
Mr. M.S. Yadav, Research Assistant
Ms. Geeta Unniskrishnan may please hand over the concerned file
to these faculty members and explain the follow up action that is
required on each of these activities.
For future guidance the undersigned may be contacted, if required.
(T.KAUR)
PROJECT DIRECTOR
31-3-93”
34.
The respondent has further drawn our attention to the job
descriptions of RA and DD, as officially issued by the NIPCCD:
“JOB DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH ASSISTANTS
The Research Assistants will be attached to one of the Units in the
Institute and will undertake assignments entrusted to him/her by
the Unit Head.
I.
TRAINING
(i)
Will assist in planning, conducting and any other work in
connection with the training courses/workshops/seminars.
(ii)
Will deliver talks it training courses and act as resource
person the group discussions, repporteuring in various
seminars/workshops
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(iii) Will
participate
and
contribute
in
training
courses/workshops/seminars organised by other organisation.
(iv)
Will assist in developing training material, teaching aids,
manuals, guide books, bibliography etc.
II.
RESEARCH
(i)
Will, assist is formulation of Research/survey projects,
collection of dart and analysis, preparation of draft chapters of
report and any other work pertaining to research/survey.
(ii)
Will assist in writing research based papers and other
materials.
III.
EXTENSION/DEMONSTRATION SERVICES
Will assist in the running of demonstrations/extension services
within and outside the Institute's campus.
IV.
CONSULTANCY
Will assist in the consultancy services provided by the respective
Unit
V.
MISCELLANEOUS.
(i)
(ii)
Will assist in the proper maintenance of records and files.
Will undertake any other work assigned from time to time.”
*****
“JOB DESCRIPTION OF SPECIALISTS
The specialists shall be as the Head of his/her unit and be
responsible for all the assignments gives to his/her unit.
I.
TRAINING
(i)
Will be responsible for planning, organising and directing
training/orientation courses, workshops and seminars assigned to
his/her unit.
(ii)
Will plans and direct field work placement.
(iii) Will deliver talks/arrange demonstration in the field of
his/her specialisation in training courses and write papers for and
act as Repporteur in various seminars/workshops etc.
(iv)
Will
participate
and
contribute
in
training
courses/workshops/seminars organised by other agencies
(v)
Will develop training material, teaching aids, manuals,
guide books etc.
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(vi)
Will be responsible for necessary follow up action.
II.
RESEARCH
(i)
Will be responsible in all matters concerning research
projects directly undertaken by him/her.
(ii)
Will be responsible for all supervision of research projects
undertaken by his/her unit members.
(iii) Will associate with inner-disciplinary research projects in
relation to his/her field of specialisation.
(iv)
Will monitor documentation of research projects conducted
in his/her field of specialization.
(v)
Will contribute research based papers and other materials in
his/her area of specialisation.
(vi)
Will be responsible for necessary follow up action.
III.
EXTENSION DEMONSTRATION SERVICES
Will plan, organize/direct such demonstration services within and
outside the Institute's campus so as to generate field knowledge and
have relevance for Institute’s training and research programmes
IV.
CONSULTANCY:
(i)
Will provide technical advice/comments/suggestion on all
matters relating to his/her field of specialisation.
(ii)
Will provide consultancy services in his/her field of
specialisation to governmental and voluntary organizations.
V.
ADMINISTRATION
(i)
Will be responsible for proper maintenance of registers,
records and files pertaining to his/her unit.
(ii)
Will be responsible for maintaining discipline within
his/her unit and facilitate efficient functioning of unit.\
(iii) Will discharge such administrative functions and
responsibilities as are assigned.
VI.
MISCELLANEOUS:
(i)
To help promote development of library in his/her area of
specialization.
(ii)
Will undertake any other work assigned from time to time.”
35.
Though the second document shown to us by the respondent
refers to the “job description of specialists”, the respondent submits
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that specialists were redesignated as DD, for which purpose she relies
on para 6 of the report of the “Committee on Re-organization of the
NIPCCD”, submitted in February 1988, which reads thus :
“6.
The Committee recommends that designation of the senior
level staff at the headquarters and at the regional offices be
changed as shown below:-
36.
Present designation
Proposed designation
1.
2.
3.
Joint Director
Deputy Director
Assistant Director”
Deputy Director
Specialist
Research Associate
The respondent seeks to compare the job profile of RA and DD
vis-à-vis her job profile, as contained in her resume for the period 1
October 1991 to 31 March 1992, which reads thus:
“Brief Resume of the work of Tejinder Kaur, Research Assistant,
for the period 1.10.91 to 31.3.92.
Research and Monitoring:
1.
Scrutiny of about 200 old project proposals pending with
desk ‘Step’, for assessing their viability and suit-ability for
financial assistance under STEP Progranne.
2.
Monitoring of action projects being implemented under the
STEP Programme of Deptt. Women & Development-including
both physical and financial targets achieved. Putting up Quarterly
Progress Reports for perusal of Senior Officers of the Deptt.
organizing quarterly Review Meetings for STEP Projects.
3.
Coordination of activities related to Bench mark survey of
the ongoing and the newly sanctioned STEP Projects.
Training:
4.
Involved in incorporation of gender concerns in training
programmes conducted for STEP Projects, with a special focus on
strengthening of the "Women in Development" (WID) component.
Assessment of capability of the implementing agencies to
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implement the WID component and the need for Gender specific
training programmes in STEP Projects. Modification of Feedbackschedule for training programmes.
5.
Training Programme for Sensitisation of officers of Punjab
State to Gender FERRE Issues.
a)
Finalisation of Programme schedule and background
material for the programme (10.10.92) with DD (Trg)
b)
Submission of draft Programme Schedule (14.10.92)
c)
Submission of copies of documents to be included in the kit
for the programme (24.10.91) as identified with DD (Trg) on
10.10.92
Documentation:
6.
Assisted JD(M) in drafting the write-up for women’s
Bureau's portion of the Annual Report for 1991-92.
7.
Preparation of briefs, notes and reference papers for use by
senior officers of the Deptt, during meetings and tours, on
employment sectors being covered under STEP.
8.
Preparation of proposal for revision of financial sanction
for printing the STEP Dairying Training Manual for Women in
Hindi and English.
9.
STER Project Sanctioning Committee Meeting and
disbursement of grants urgent STEPH
a,
appraisal of 6 of the 9 project proposals considered by the
Committee & obtaining comments of Govt. Deptts, concerned.
b,
drafting the minutes of the STEP Project Sanctioning
Committee Meeting held on 3.3.92 and dissemination of of the
Minutes.
c,
reworking of the components including budgetary details
for releases of grants and finalisation of the outlay of the newly
sanctioned projects. Drafting of sanction letters,
The entire allocation under STEP Program, during 1991-92, of Rs.
8.50 crores, was disbursed as grant-in-aid.”
37.
Without prejudice to her contentions, the respondent submits
that, in any case, it would not be permissible for the petitioners to
recover any payment of the post of DD, made to her at this stage, in
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view of the following Office Memorandum dated 2 March 2016
issued by the Department of Personnel and Training13 which, in turn,
relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v.
Rafiq Masih14:
“F.No.18/03/2015-Estt. (Pay-I)
Government of India
Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances & Pensions
Department of Personnel & Training
New Delhi, the 2nd March, 2016
OFFICE MEMORANDUM
Sub: Recovery of
Government servants.
wrongful/excess
payments
made
to
The undersigned is directed to refer to this Department's OM
No.18/26/2011-Estt (Pay-1) dated 6th February, 2014 wherein
certain instructions have been issued to deal with the issue of
recovery of wrongful/excess payments made to Government
servants in view of the law declared by Courts, particularly, in the
case of Chandi Prasad Uniyal And Ors. vs. State of Uttarakhand
And Ors., 2012 AIR SCW 4742, (2012) 8 SCC 417. Para 3(iv) of
the OM inter-alia provides that recovery should be made in all
cases of overpayment barring few exceptions of extreme hardships.
2.
The issue has subsequently come up for consideration
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab &
Ors vs Rafiq Masih (White Washer) etc in CA No.11527 of 2014
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.11684 of 2012) wherein Hon'ble Court
on 18.12.2014 decided a bunch of cases in which monetary
benefits were given to employees in excess of their entitlement due
to unintentional mistakes committed by the concerned competent
authorities, in determining the emoluments payable to them, and
the employees were not guilty of furnishing any incorrect
information / misrepresentation /fraud, which had led the
concerned competent authorities to commit the mistake of making
the higher payment to the employees. The employees were as
innocent as their employers in the wrongful determination of their
inflated emoluments. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in its judgment
dated 18th December, 2014 ibid has, inter-alia, observed as under:
13 “DOPT” hereinafter
14 AIR 2015 SC 696
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"7.
Having examined a number of judgments rendered
by this Court, we are of the view, that orders passed by the
employer seeking recovery of monetary benefits wrongly
extended to employees, can only be interfered with, in
cases where such recovery would result in a hardship of a
nature, which would far outweigh, the equitable balance of
the employer's right to recover. In other words, interference
would be called for, only in such cases where, it would be
iniquitous to recover the payment made. In order to
ascertain the parameters of the above consideration, and the
test to be applied, reference needs to be made to situations
when this Court exempted employees from such recovery,
even in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India. Repeated exercise of such power,
"for doing complete justice in any cause" would establish
that the recovery being effected was iniquitous, and
therefore, arbitrary. And accordingly, the interference at the
hands of this Court."
"10. In view of the afore-stated constitutional mandate,
equity and good conscience, in the matter of livelihood of
the people of this country, has to be the basis of all
governmental actions. An action of the State, ordering a
recovery from an employee, would be in order, so long as it
is not rendered iniquitous to the extent, that the action of
recovery would be more unfair, more wrongful, more
improper, and more unwarranted, than the corresponding
right of the employer, to recover the amount. Or in other
words, till such time as the recovery would have a harsh
and arbitrary effect on the employee, it would be
permissible in law. Orders passed in given situations
repeatedly, even in exercise of the power vested in this
Court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, will
disclose the parameters of the realm of an action of
recovery (of an excess amount paid to an employee) which
would breach the obligations of the State, to citizens of this
country, and render the action arbitrary, and therefore,
violative of the mandate contained in Article 14 of the
Constitution of India."
The issue that was required to be adjudicated by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court was whether all the private respondents,
against whom an order of recovery (of the excess amount) has been
made, should be exempted in law, from the reimbursement of the
same to the employer. For the applicability of the instant order, and
the conclusions recorded by them thereinafter, the ingredients
depicted in paras 2&3 of the judgment are essentially
indispensable.
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The Hon'ble Supreme Court while observing that it is not
possible to postulate all situations of hardship which would govern
employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have
mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their
entitlement has summarized the following few situations, wherein
recoveries by the employers would be impermissible in law:(i)
Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III
and Class-IV service (or Group 'C' and Group 'D' service).
(ii)
Recovery from retired employees, or employees
who are due to retire within one year, of the order of
recovery.
(iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess
payment has been made for a period in excess of five years,
before the order of recovery is issued.
(iv)
Recovery in cases where an employee has
wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher
post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should
have rightfully been required to work against an inferior
post.
(v)
In any other case, where the Court arrives at the
conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee,
would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent,
as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the
employer's right to recover.
The matter has, consequently, been examined in
consultation with the Department of Expenditure and the
Department of Legal Affairs. The Ministries / Departments are
advised to deal with the issue of wrongful / excess payments made
to Government servants in accordance with above decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in CA No.11527 of 2014 (arising out of
SLP (C) No.11684 of 2012) in State of Punjab and others etc vs
Rafiq Masih (White Washer) etc. However, wherever the waiver of
recovery in the above-mentioned situations is considered, the same
may be allowed with the express approval of Department of
Expenditure in terms of this Department's OM No.18/26/2011-Estt
(Pay-I) dated 6th February, 2014.
In so far as persons serving in the Indian Audit and
Accounts Department are concerned, these orders are issued with
the concurrence of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
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Hindi version will follow.
(A.K. Jain)
Deputy Secretary to the Government of India”
38.
The respondent has further submitted that, given the work that
she was discharging, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in applying
the principle of equal pay for equal work, and directing that she be
paid the pay and emoluments payable to a DD during the time she was
working as RA. She has also relied on the following order dated 30
July 2013 passed by the Supreme Court in SLP (C) 16697/2010:
“After Mrs. Tejinder Kaur, petitioner in person, made her
submissions, Shri Siddharth Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor
General gave out that if she makes representation even at the stage,
he will ensure that her case is fairly considered for the post of
Deputy Director as in 1995.
Mrs. Tejinder Kaur agreed to the suggestion of the learned
Additional Solicitor General and gave out that she will hand over
copy of the representation to the learned Additional Solicitor
General today itself by the evening.
Put up on 21.08.2013.”
39.
Finally, the respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Ramakant Shripad Sinai Advalpalkar v. Union
of India15.
40.
In rejoinder, Ms. Arora merely submits, apropos the ACRs of
the respondent, that they were written by the Deputy Secretary only
for one year after 1991 and were otherwise written by the DD, as the
Reporting Officer.
D.
Analysis
15 1991 Supp (2) SCC 733
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41.
It is hardly necessary for us to enter into the respective
submissions of both sides to decide the writ petition.
42.
A person is only entitled to the pay of the post to which she, or
he, is appointed. There is no principle of service law which entitles a
person, who is substantively appointed to a particular post in a
particular pay scale, to the pay scale of a higher post. The only
situations in which the law entitles a person substantively appointed to
a post in a particular pay scale to a higher pay, are those envisaged by
FR 49, which only apply where a person is formally appointed to hold
charge of the duties of a higher post. No order, formally appointing
the respondent to hold charge, or even discharge, the duties of DD,
has ever been issued.
43.
The learned Tribunal has proceeded on a principle unknown to
service jurisprudence, that a person substantively appointed to a post
in a particular pay scale can be granted the pay scale of a higher post,
because she, or he, was discharging the duties of the said post. There
is no such principle known to law.
44.
Even on facts, there is nothing to indicate that the respondent
was discharging the duties of DD, during her tenure as RA. Rather, we
have taken the pains of reproducing various Office Orders issued with
respect to the respondent, during the period when she was working as
RA, all of which refer to her as RA. Even the Office Order dated 4
March 2011, which promotes her as AD, refers to her as RA. The
ACRs on which the respondent relies, also referred to her as RA.
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45.
The respondent accepted her promotion as AD in full
knowledge of the fact that she was being promoted from the post of
RA to the post of AD. She never chose to challenge the said order at
that point of time on the ground that she was in fact discharging the
duties of DD and therefore, could not have been promoted as AD.
46.
It is not necessary for us to enter on the aspect of the officer
who wrote the respondent’s ACRs, though the record seems to
indicate that, for a large portion, they were written by the DD. In any
event, the entitlement of the respondent to the pay of the post of DD
cannot be decided on the basis of the reporting officer who wrote her
ACRs.
47.
The learned Tribunal has also sought to justify the direction to
grant, to the respondent, of the pay of DD, by applying the principle of
“equal pay for equal work”. In this context, the only observation by
the Tribunal is that the petitioner made her work in a supervisory
capacity. There is nothing to indicate that the respondent worked in a
supervisory capacity or, at least, that she had discharged the duties,
which, as per the job profile of various posts in the NIPCCD, were to
be discharged by a DD.
48.
The respondent sought to draw our attention to the job profiles
of RA and DD vis-à-vis her job profile as contained in her resumé.
She also drew attention to certain file notings. We have reproduced all
these documents earlier in the judgment. Without burdening this
judgment by a copious reference thereto, suffice it to state that the
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resumé of the respondent, when seen, does not tally with the job
profile of DD in the office of the NIPCCD. Neither is there any
material on record to indicate that the respondent was discharging all
the duties of DD, as envisaged in the job profile of DD, in the
organizational structure of the NIPCCD.
49.
We may also note, in passing, that, even if a person holding a
particular post is made, by her or his employer, to do the work of a
higher post, that by itself does not ipso facto entitle the person to the
pay of the higher post, in the absence of any formal order. The
circumstances in which higher emoluments can be granted are
outlined in FR 49 and, outside those, there is no right to any pay
higher than that which relates to the post which is substantively held.
50.
In so far as the principle of equal pay for equal work is
concerned, the view of the Tribunal is contrary to a line of authorities
by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has, in various decisions,
laid down the factors which have to be borne in mind while granting
parity of pay on the ground of equal pay for equal work. The Tribunal,
with respect, appears to have proceeded on the basis of a fundamental
misconception of the principle. The principle of equal pay for equal
work applies where the pay of a particular post is directed to be
equated to the pay of another post, on the ground that the two posts,
when compared, satisfy all the ingredients which justify equation of
their pay scales.
51.
The principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be pressed
into service to direct the person, who is substantively appointed to a
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particular post, in a particular pay scale, to be granted the scale of a
higher post. The very application of the principle of the “equal pay for
equal work” is, therefore, fundamentally flawed.
52.
Besides, pay scales of posts are fixed, in the government, as per
Delhi Veterinary Association v. Union of India16, on a variety of
considerations, including “the degree of skill, strain of work,
experience involved, training required, responsibility undertaken,
mental and physical requirements, disagreeableness of the task, hazard
attendant on work and fatigue involved” apart from “the method of
recruitment, the level at which the initial recruitment is made in the
hierarchy of service or cadre, minimum educational and technical
qualifications prescribed for the post, the nature of dealings with the
public, avenues of promotion available and horizontal and vertical
relativity with other jobs in the same service or outside”.
53.
There is no material on record to indicate satisfaction of the
afore-noted criteria, as laid down by the Supreme Court in Delhi
Veterinary Association, on the basis of which the petitioner could be
entitled to the pay of DD.
54.
In any case, it was never the respondent’s case, before the
Tribunal, that the scales of pay of DD and RA should be equalized.
The principle of “equal pay for equal work” has, therefore, no
application at all.
16 (1984) 3 SCC 1
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55.
If the principle of equal pay for equal work were to apply in a
case such as the present, it would result in equation of the pay scale of
RA and DD, which is obviously absurd.
56.
The very invocation of the equal pay for equal work doctrine
was, therefore, unjustified.
57.
The
respondent
relies
on
Ramakant
Shripad
Sinai
Advalpalkar. The decision, if anything, defeats her case. In para 5 of
the report, the Supreme Court has held thus:
“5.
The arrangements contemplated by this order plainly do not
amount to a promotion of the appellant to the post of Treasurer.
The distinction between a situation where a government servant is
promoted to a higher post and one where he is merely asked to
discharge the duties of the higher post is too clear to require any
reiteration. Asking an officer who substantively holds a lower post
merely to discharge the duties of a higher post cannot be treated as
a promotion. In such a case he does not get the salary of the higher
post; but gets only what in service parlance is called a “charge
allowance”. Such situations are contemplated where exigencies of
public service necessitate such arrangements and even
consideration of seniority do not enter into it. The person continues
to hold his substantive lower post and only discharges the duties of
the higher post essentially as a stop-gap arrangement.”
Thus, even in a case where a person, substantively holding a lower
post, is formally asked to discharge the duties of a higher post, the
Supreme Court has clarified that she, or he, would not ipso facto be
entitled to the pay of the higher post. The only entitlement would be
to a charge allowance. In the present case, there is no order even
asking the respondent to discharge the duties of the post of DD, at any
point of time.
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58.
We are, therefore, completely convinced that the respondent
was not entitled to be treated as a DD or to be entitled to the pay scale
and other emoluments available to a DD at any point in her service
career as, she was never promoted as DD, and did not work as DD
even for a single day.
59.
The respondent has also sought to invoke the principle in Rafiq
Masih along with the DOPT OM dated 2 March 2016 supra to
contend that no recoveries can be made from her.
60.
The said principle can have no applicability in the present case
in view of the order dated 11 November 2014 passed by the Supreme
Court which, even while directing ad hoc payment of ₹ 20 lakhs to be
paid to the respondent, has made the payment subject to the outcome
of the present writ petition. Once the Supreme Court has so ordered,
there can be no question of the respondent holding on to the said
amount even after we have found no merit in the writ petition.
61.
However, we permit the respondent to repay the amount of ₹ 20
lakhs, as paid to her pursuant to the order dated 11 November 2014 of
the Supreme Court in ten bi-monthly instalments commencing 31 July
2026, i.e., at the rate of ₹ 2 lakhs every two months.
E.
Conclusion
62.
We, therefore, find that the impugned judgment of the Tribunal
is completely unsustainable on facts as well as on law. It is,
accordingly, quashed and set aside.
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63.
The writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms with no
orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
JULY 01, 2026/yg/aky
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