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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment reserved on: 08.07.2026
Judgment pronounced on:18.08.2026
+
O.M.P. (COMM) 386/2016 & I.A. 10038/2016
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. A. P. Singh and Mr. Naman
Saraswat, Advs.
versus
ORIENTAL STRUCTURAL ENGINEERS PVT LTD
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Anil K. Airi, Sr Adv. with
Mr. Ravi K Chandna, Mr. Vishal
Tyagi, Mr. Shayuk Kumar, Mr.
Harsh Gautam, Mr. Sadlma
Sharma, Ms. Jasrain, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE OM PRAKASH SHUKLA
JUDGMENT
18.08.2026
%
INTRODUCTION
1.
The present petition has been instituted under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 by National Highways
Authority of India2 assailing the arbitral award dated 18.04.2016
rendered by a three-member Arbitral Tribunal3 comprising Shri Surjeet
Singh, Presiding Arbitrator, Shri V.K. Tyagi and Shri R.S. Rana, CoArbitrator. The disputes arose out of the Contract for the rehabilitation
and upgradation of NH-25 from Km. 50.000 to Km. 91.000 into a four-
“the Act”, hereinafter
“NHAI”, hereinafter
“Tribunal or AT”, hereinafter
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lane highway in the States of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh under
Contract Package EW-II (MP/UP-1). NHAI was the Respondent before
the Tribunal, while OSE was the claimant.
2.
By the impugned award, the learned Arbitral Tribunal allowed
all four claims preferred by the Respondent, M/s Oriental Structural
Engineers Pvt. Ltd. (“OSE”). While Claim Nos. 1, 2 and 4 came to be
allowed unanimously, Claim No. 3 was allowed by majority. Shri R.S.
Rana, Co-Arbitrator gave his dissenting opinion on Claim No.3.
3.
The present petition, as originally instituted, assailed the award
in respect of Claim Nos. 1, 2 and 3. However, by order dated
04.01.2017, NHAI withdrew its challenge to Claim No.1, and Claim
No.4. Therefore, the challenge now survives only in respect of Claim
Nos. 2 and 3. The present judgment is accordingly confined to
examining the sustainability of the impugned award qua the aforesaid
claims and Claims 1 and 4 are discussed only where necessary to
understand the overall contractual arrangement.
4.
The matter also involves later legal developments. Although the
Award was passed on 18.04.2016, during the pendency of this
challenge, the Supreme Court and this Court have interpreted similar
NHAI price adjustment clauses. This Court’s role under Section 34 is
limited to examining whether the Award suffers from any legal defect
warranting interference, while also applying the binding legal principles
subsequently laid down by higher courts.
FACTS
5.
The facts of the present petition can be traced back to the time
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when Government of India entrusted NHAI with the rehabilitation and
upgrading of NH-25 from Km. 50.00 to Km. 91.00 to a four-lane
configuration in the States of Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh under
Contract Package EW-II (MP/UP-1).
6.
Pursuant to the bidding process and Addendum/Corrigendum
dated 04.02.2005, NHAI accepted the bid submitted by the Respondent
and issued a Letter of Acceptance4 dated 27.07.2005. Thereafter, the
parties executed a Contract Agreement dated 29.09.2005 for a contract
value of Rs.150,03,08,429/-. The work commenced on 11.10.2005 and
was scheduled to be completed by 10.04.2008. The project, however,
ultimately came to be completed on 10.04.2009.
7.
The Contract was an item-rate contract governed by the Bill of
Quantities5, Technical Specifications, General Conditions of Contract6
and other documents executed between the parties. During the
execution of the contract, disputes arose between the parties in relation
to certain terms of contract. In accordance with the dispute resolution
mechanism contained in the Contract Agreement, the disputes were
referred to arbitration.
8.
Before the Arbitral Tribunal, the Respondent preferred four
claims, namely: (i) reimbursement of additional cost arising from
increase in Entry Tax on High Speed Diesel in the State of Madhya
Pradesh; (ii) payment of price adjustment in accordance with the
“LOA” hereinafter
“BOQ”, hereinafter
“GCC” hereinafter
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Contract based upon proper determination of the variable factors x, y
and z; (iii) exclusion of price adjustment amounts from discount; and
(iv) reimbursement of additional expenditure incurred owing to
enhancement of royalty on sand, aggregates and other minor minerals.
No counterclaims were preferred by NHAI in the said arbitral reference.
9.
By the impugned award dated 18.04.2016, the Arbitral Tribunal
unanimously allowed Claim Nos.1, 2 and 4. Insofar as Claim No.3 was
concerned, the same was allowed by a majority comprising the
Presiding Arbitrator and Shri V.K. Tyagi, whereas Shri R.S. Rana
rendered a dissenting opinion rejecting the said claim. The operative
part of the award records that Claim No.1 was awarded for
Rs.1,71,27,112/- along with 10 % p.a. compound interest, Claim No.2
for Rs.4,05,95,805/- together with 10% p.a. compound interest, Claim
No.3 for Rs.7,87,76,490/- together with 10% p.a. compound interest,
and Claim No.4 for Rs.10,15,885/- with simple interest at 10% p.a.
10.
Aggrieved by the findings returned by the majority Tribunal,
NHAI instituted the present petition under Section 34 of the Act
challenging the impugned award. Although the petition originally
questioned the findings rendered on Claim Nos.1, 2 and 3, the
proceedings before this Court was subsequently narrowed principally
to Claim Nos.2 and 3.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL
11.
Upon disputes arising between the parties during the execution
of the Contract, the same were initially referred to the Dispute
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Adjudication Board7 in terms of the dispute resolution mechanism
stipulated under the Contract. As the decisions rendered by the DAB
were not acceptable to the respective parties in relation to certain
disputes, the arbitration agreement was invoked. Consequently, the
disputes came to be adjudicated by a three-member Arbitral Tribunal
comprising Shri Surjeet Singh, Presiding Arbitrator, Shri V.K. Tyagi
and Shri R.S. Rana, Co-Arbitrators.
12.
Before the Arbitral Tribunal, OSE preferred four claims arising
out of the Contract. By the impugned majority award dated 18.04.2016,
the Presiding Arbitrator and Shri V.K. Tyagi allowed all four claims
preferred by OSE. Shri R.S. Rana rendered a dissenting opinion only in
respect of Claim No. 3.
13.
The award proceeds claim-wise and undertakes an independent
examination of the terms of contract governing each dispute. In respect
of Claim Nos. 1 and 4, the Tribunal principally examined whether the
increase in Entry Tax on High Speed Diesel and the increase in royalty
payable on minor minerals constituted the consequence of ‘subsequent
legislation’ within the meaning of Clause 70.7 of the Conditions of
Particular Application8, and whether the additional financial burden
imposed upon OSE had already been factored into the price adjustment
mechanism based on the Wholesale Price Index9.The Tribunal
concluded that Entry Tax and royalty were local statutory levies, the
increase whereof had not been captured in the WPI-based escalation
“DAB”, hereinafter
“COPA”, hereinafter
“WPI”, hereinafter
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formula, and consequently held OSE entitled to reimbursement of the
additional expenditure incurred on both counts.
14.
Claim No. 2 required the Tribunal to interpret the formula
governing price adjustment under Clause 70 of COPA. The controversy
centred on the determination of the variables x , y and z, representing
the percentage cost of bitumen, cement and steel respectively, as well
as the identification of the relevant indices and prices to be adopted for
computation of the escalation payable under the Contract.
15.
The Tribunal construed the terms of contract to hold that the cost
of materials was required to include all allocable expenditure, including
transportation, overheads and local taxes, though excluding profit, and
further held that the applicable indices were those prevailing twentyeight days prior to the last day of the relevant Interim Payment
Certificate10, as expressly stipulated in the Contract. On such
interpretation, the Tribunal substantially accepted OSE’s computation
of price adjustment, subject to exclusion of the profit component from
the calculation.
16.
Claim No. 3 involved the principal controversy between the
parties regarding the effect of the additional rebate of 7.75% offered by
OSE at the bidding stage. OSE contended that the rebate was offered
only on the overall contract price and was never intended to alter the
quoted unit rates or affect the formula for price adjustment under Clause
70 of COPA. NHAI, on the other hand, asserted that the rebate stood
“IPC”, hereinafter
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incorporated into the quoted unit rates and was therefore liable to be
accounted for while computing escalation. The majority of the Tribunal
accepted OSE’s interpretation, holding that the rebate of 7.75%
operated only upon the contract price and could not be imported into
the computation of the “R” value under the price adjustment formula.
The majority further held that the LOA could not unilaterally alter the
nature of the rebate offered by OSE and that the price adjustment
mechanism contemplated adjustment with reference to the quoted rates
and prices.
17.
Shri R.S. Rana, however, dissented from the majority insofar as
Claim No. 3 was concerned and held that the rebate was liable to be
factored into the computation of price adjustment, thereby rejecting the
said claim.
18.
Consequently, by the majority award dated 18.04.2016, the
Tribunal allowed all four claims preferred by OSE, whereas the
dissenting opinion was confined solely to Claim No. 3. The claims
preferred by OSE and the findings returned by the Arbitral Tribunal are
tabulated below:CLAIM PARTICULARS AMOUNTS
NO
CLAIMED
1.
Additional cost Rs.1,71,27,112/due to increase in
the rates of Entry
Tax on High
Speed Disel in the
State of Madhya
Pradesh
2.
Price adjustment Rs.5,02,05,552/based
on (As revised before
determination of the Tribunal by the
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MAJORITY
DISSENTING
AWARD
AWARD
Rs.1,71,27,112/- with 10 % p.a
compounded
interest
Rs 4,05,95,805/- with 10% p.a
compounded
x,y and z factors
3.
4.
19.
Claimant to Rs. interest
4,05,95,805 )
Price escalation Rs.7,87,76,490/Rs.7,87,76,490/amounts
not
with
prebeing subjected to
reference
the
contractual
interest @10 %
rebate/ discount
p.a compounded
monthly
Additional cost Rs.10,15,885/due to increase in
the
rates
of
royalty on sand,
stone aggregates
and other minor
minerals
Rs.10,15,885/with
%
simple interest
Allowed
by
Majority
Dissented by
Shri S S Rana,
learned
Arbitrator-
In addition to the aforesaid monetary awards, the majority
Arbitral Tribunal granted pre-reference, pendente lite and future interest
on Claim Nos. 1 to 3 in accordance with the terms of contract, while
awarding simple interest on Claim No. 4. The Tribunal further directed
that, in the event the awarded amounts were not paid within sixty days,
OSE would be entitled to future interest at the rate of 12% per annum
on the aggregate amount awarded.
SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THIS COURT
20.
Mr. A.P. Singh, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner,
NHAI, submits that although the present petition originally assailed the
impugned award in its entirety, the challenge, as presently pressed, is
confined only to Claim Nos. 2 and 3. Claim Nos. 1 and 4, relating
respectively to reimbursement of additional Entry Tax and enhanced
royalty on minor minerals, are no longer pressed in view of the
subsequent judicial pronouncements governing the said issues. The
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controversy before this Court is, therefore, confined to the findings
returned by the Arbitral Tribunal on Claim Nos. 2 and 3.
21.
It is further submitted that the findings returned by the Arbitral
Tribunal suffer from patent illegality apparent on the face of the award,
as the Tribunal has ignored the express stipulations contained in the
Contract and has instead substituted its own commercial interpretation
thereof, contrary to the terms agreed between the parties.
22.
According to NHAI, the award proceeds on an interpretation
which is not merely erroneous but directly contrary to the express terms
of contract governing price adjustment, thereby travelling beyond the
terms of the Contract and attracting interference under Section 34 of the
Act.
23.
Learned Counsel further contends that the Arbitral Tribunal has
altogether failed to adjudicate the issue of limitation, despite the same
having been specifically urged before it.
24.
It is submitted that the cause of action, if any, arose when the first
IPC was certified in December 2005. OSE, however, continued to
execute the Contract without protest, raised as many as forty-one IPC,
accepted payments made thereunder and invoked the dispute resolution
mechanism only after completion of the Project in June 2009.
Arbitration itself came to be invoked on 02.07.2012. It is, therefore,
urged that the claims, at least insofar as they relate to the period
preceding 03.07.2009, were ex facie barred by limitation. The omission
of the Tribunal to render any finding on this jurisdictional objection,
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according to NHAI, constitutes a material infirmity, vitiating the
impugned award.
25.
Insofar as Claim No. 2 is concerned, learned Counsel submits
that the Tribunal has fundamentally misconstrued Clause 70 of the
COPA governing the mechanism for determination of price adjustment.
It is urged that the Tribunal has erroneously accepted OSE’s
interpretation that the variables x, y and z, representing the percentage
cost of bitumen, cement and steel respectively, were required to be
computed on the basis of the prevailing current prices, including local
taxes, transportation charges and overheads.
26.
According to NHAI, such an interpretation is directly contrary to
the Addendum/Corrigendum dated 04.02.2005, which unequivocally
stipulates that the prices of bitumen, cement and steel are to be reckoned
with reference to the base prices prevailing in the month immediately
preceding the last date for submission of bids. It is submitted that the
Tribunal has ignored the specific contractual amendment and instead
relied upon the general definition of “cost” contained in Clause 1.1(g)(i)
of the GCC, which stands contrary to the settled principle that a specific
contractual provision must prevail over a general one.
27.
Learned Counsel further submits that the Tribunal has committed
a manifest error in permitting inclusion of transportation costs, local
taxes and overheads while determining the cost of bitumen, cement and
steel for the purposes of price adjustment under the contract.
28.
It is contended that escalation on account of local taxes and
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transportation is already compensated through separate terms of
contract mechanisms, whereas the factor of 0.85, expressly
incorporated in the formula under Clause 70.3, excludes overheads and
profit from the adjustable component. The Tribunal, by awarding an
additional 10% towards overheads, has, according to NHAI, conferred
a double benefit upon OSE in complete disregard of the contract.
29.
Reliance is placed upon the judgment of this Court in National
Highways Authority of India v. Hindustan Construction Company11,
wherein the significance of the 0.85 factor incorporated in Clause 70.3
has been considered and explained.
30.
NHAI further submits that the interpretation adopted by the
Tribunal stands impliedly overruled by the subsequent decision of the
Supreme Court in National Highways Authority of India v.
Progressive-MVR (JV)12.
31.
According to learned Counsel, the Supreme Court has
authoritatively held that price adjustment mechanism under Clause 70
is intended to neutralise escalation with reference to the base prices
prevailing at the bidding stage and not with reference to the current
market prices at the time of execution. The judgment further clarifies
that the expression “actual” occurring in Clause 70.3(xi) refers to the
percentage composition of the materials and not to their prevailing
market value. It is accordingly urged that the impugned award, being
directly contrary to the binding ratio laid down by the Supreme Court,
2015:DHC:5019
(2018) 14 SCC 688
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cannot be sustained.
32.
Turning to Claim No. 3, learned Counsel submits that the
Tribunal has erred in disregarding the unequivocal terms of the LOA
dated 27.07.2005.
33.
It is contended that while OSE may initially have offered separate
rebates of 5% and 7.75%, the LOA, which culminated in the concluded
contract, expressly provided for a combined rebate of 12.3625% on the
quoted rates of all items. OSE accepted the LOA without demur,
executed the formal Agreement, raised all forty-one IPCs by
consistently applying the combined rebate, and accepted payments
calculated on the said basis throughout the execution of the Contract,
and questioned the methodology only after completion of the Project. It
is, therefore, contended that the Tribunal failed to consider the parties’
subsequent conduct and the terms of the final contract while accepting
OSE’s interpretation.
34.
It is further submitted that the Tribunal committed a
jurisdictional error in assigning precedence to the language employed
in OSE’s bid while disregarding the hierarchy of contractual documents
expressly stipulated under Clause 5.2 of COPA.
35.
Learned Counsel submits that the Contract Agreement and the
LOA enjoy precedence over the bid documents. Consequently, once the
LOA unequivocally recorded the combined rebate was applicable to the
quoted rates, the Tribunal could not have rewritten the bargain by
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reverting to the language employed in the original bid submitted by
OSE.
36.
According to NHAI, the Tribunal, by adopting such an approach,
thereby substituted the contract entered into between the parties with
one which the parties themselves never agreed upon. Such an
interpretation amounts to rewriting the contract and renders the award
vulnerable to interference under Section 34.
37.
Lastly, learned Counsel assails the award of compound interest.
It is submitted that Clause 60.8 of the Contract contemplates payment
of interest only on amounts certified by the Engineer and payable under
an Interim Payment Certificate. The claims awarded by the Tribunal, it
is urged, never formed part of any certified IPC and were never
admitted as payable by the Engineer. The Tribunal, therefore, lacked
any basis to award compound interest under Clause 60.8.
38.
Reliance is also placed on the judgments of the Supreme Court
in National Highways Authority of India v. Hindustan Construction
Company13 and M/S Hindustan Construction Company v National
Highways Authority of India14, wherein the grant of compound interest
under similar contractual provisions has not been approved.
39.
On the aforesaid grounds, it is submitted that the findings
returned by the Arbitral Tribunal in respect of Claim Nos. 2 and 3 suffer
from patent illegality, are contrary to the express terms of the Contract,
ignore binding contractual terms as well as subsequent authoritative
Civil Appeal NO.3593/2017
Civil Appeal 4658 of 2023
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pronouncements of the Supreme Court, and consequently warrant
interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section
34 of the Act.
40.
Per Contra Mr. Anil K. Airi, learned Counsel appearing on
behalf of OSE submits that the present petition is wholly devoid of
merit and is liable to be dismissed in limine.
41.
It is contended that the challenge mounted by NHAI is confined
to Claim Nos. 2 and 3, NHAI having consciously accepted the findings
returned by the Arbitral Tribunal in respect of Claim Nos. 1 and 4, as
recorded by this Court in its order dated 04.01.2017.
42.
According to OSE, the petition does not disclose any of the
statutorily recognised grounds for interference under Section 34 of the
Act and, in substance, merely seeks a re-appreciation of the provisions
of the contract and the evidence considered by the Arbitral Tribunal. It
is submitted that such an exercise is wholly impermissible in
proceedings under Section 34, which do not confer appellate
jurisdiction upon this Court.
43.
It is urged that the Tribunal has meticulously examined the terms
of contract, the pleadings, documentary evidence and the rival
submissions before arriving at its conclusions. The interpretation
adopted by the Tribunal , according to OSE, represents a plausible and
reasonable interpretation, which cannot be substituted merely because
another interpretation is possible. It is submitted that NHAI’s challenge
proceeds on the erroneous assumption that this Court may reassess the
interpretation of the contract adopted by the Tribunal, which is contrary
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to the settled principles governing judicial review of arbitral awards.
44.
Insofar as Claim No. 2 is concerned, learned Counsel submits
that the dispute essentially relates to the determination of the variables
x, y and z under the price adjustment formula and the identification of
the relevant indices applicable for computation thereof. It is contended
that the Tribunal has correctly construed Clause 70.3 of the COPA by
holding that the variable percentages were required to be determined on
the basis of the actual cost of bitumen, cement and steel used in
execution of the works.
45.
The Tribunal, while interpreting the expression “cost”, rightly
relied upon Clause 1.1(g)(i) of the Contract, which defines “cost” as all
expenditure properly incurred, including overheads and other allocable
charges, while expressly excluding profit. On that basis of the said
definition, the Tribunal correctly concluded that transportation charges,
local taxes and overheads formed part of the cost of materials, whereas
the element of profit stood excluded from the computation.
46.
OSE further emphasises that the Tribunal had, in fact,
specifically rejected its own contention to the extent it sought inclusion
of profit in the computation, thereby demonstrating that the award was
not based on an arbitrary or one sided interpretation but represents a
balanced and reasoned interpretation of the contract.
47.
It is further submitted that the Tribunal rightly rejected NHAI’s
contention that the variable percentages were required to be computed
on the basis of ex-source prices. According to OSE, the Contract does
not employ the expression “ex-source price” and, therefore, the
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interpretation canvassed by NHAI amounts to importing words into the
Contract which the parties themselves never agreed upon. Equally, the
Tribunal correctly held that, under Clause 70.3, the applicable indices
are those prevailing twenty-eight days prior to the last day of the
relevant IPC, which constitutes the specific contractual stipulation
governing price adjustment and, consequently, prevails over the more
general provision contained in Clause 70.5.
48.
Learned Counsel further submits that the findings returned by the
Tribunal in relation to Claim No. 2 stand fortified by the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Progressive-MVR (JV) (supra). It is contended
that the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the price adjustment
mechanism is relatable to the base rates quoted by the successful bidder
and that such adjustment necessarily has to be worked out with
reference to the base price reflected in the bid.
49.
According to OSE, the Tribunal has adopted precisely the same
approach by determining the price adjustment with reference to the
quoted base rates while excluding the element of profit from the
computation. The objection raised by NHAI, therefore, proceeds on a
complete misreading of both the terms of contract and the judgment of
the Supreme Court.
50.
In respect of Claim No. 3, learned Counsel submits that the
controversy is no longer res integra. It is urged that the Tribunal, after
an elaborate consideration of the documents and the bid submissions,
correctly held that the additional rebate of 7.75% offered by OSE
constituted a discount on the overall bid price and not a reduction in the
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quoted item rates. Consequently, while the first rebate of 5% operated
upon the quoted rates, the additional rebate of 7.75% was merely a
concession in the aggregate bid price and had no bearing upon the
mechanism governing price adjustment. Since price adjustment is
computed with reference to the value of work executed on the quoted
rates contained in the Bill of Quantities and does not itself constitute a
quoted rate, the Tribunal rightly concluded that the additional rebate of
7.75% could not be extended to price adjustment amounts.
51.
Learned Counsel further submits that the aforesaid issue stands
squarely concluded by the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court
in National Highways Authority of India v. Oriental Structural
Engineers Pvt. Ltd15, arising out of an arbitral award concerning the
same contractual arrangement. The Division Bench affirmed the
interpretation adopted by the Arbitral Tribunal and categorically held
that price adjustment is not a rate quoted in the BOQ but is merely
computed on the basis of the quoted rates and, consequently, the
additional rebate of 7.75% was held to be inapplicable thereto. It is
submitted that the present dispute pertains to the companion contract
awarded pursuant to the very same bidding process and governed by
identical contractual provisions. Therefore, the ratio of the said
judgment applies to the controversy involved herein and leaves no
scope for further challenge on this issue.
52.
OSE also places reliance upon the judgments of this Court in
National Highways Authority of India v. M/s Hindustan Construction
2018 SCC OnLine Del 10120
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Company16, as affirmed by the Division Bench of this Court17, wherein
an identical interpretation of the provisions contained in the contract
governing price adjustment has been upheld, which further reinforce the
correctness of the view adopted by the Tribunal.
53.
On the question of interest, learned Counsel submits that the
award of interest is strictly in accordance with the contract. Reliance is
placed upon Clause 60.8 of COPA read with the Appendix to Bid,
which expressly provides for payment of interest at the rate of 10% per
annum, compounded monthly.
54.
It is further submitted that NHAI has itself accepted the award of
compound interest in relation to Claim No. 1 and, therefore, cannot
selectively assail the grant of identical interest in respect of Claim Nos.
2 and 3. Such a selective challenge, according to OSE, is wholly
untenable.
55.
OSE further relies upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in
State of Haryana v. S.L. Arora & Co18. and M/s D. Khosla & Co. v.
Union of India19 to contend that where the contract expressly provides
for compounding of interest, the Arbitral Tribunal is bound to give
effect to such contractual stipulation. It is also pointed out that postaward interest has been awarded only at the simple rate of 12% per
annum in accordance with the operative directions contained in the
award and no interference is warranted on that count.
O.M.P. No. 274 of 2015
National Highways Authority of India v v.M/s Hindustan Construction Company;
2016:DHC:1309-DB
(2010)3SCC690
(2010)3SCC690
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56.
On the aforesaid grounds, learned Counsel submits that the
impugned award discloses a careful and reasoned interpretation of the
contract, is consistent with the law laid down by the Supreme Court as
well as this Court in analogous disputes arising out of NHAI contracts,
and does not suffer from any patent illegality, perversity or
jurisdictional error warranting interference under Section 34 of the Act.
Thus, the present petition according to OSE is nothing but an
impermissible attempt by NHAI to invite this Court to sit in appeal over
a plausible view and well-reasoned findings returned by the Tribunal
and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed.
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
57.
Before embarking upon claim-wise evaluation of the impugned
arbitral award, it is imperative to appreciate the contours of this Court’s
jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
58.
Section 34 Court does not sit as a Court of appeal over the
findings rendered by an arbitral tribunal. The scope of judicial review
is limited and Section 34 does not permit a roving inquiry or a reappreciation of evidence, nor does it empower this Court to substitute
its own view for that of the tribunal merely because another view of the
contract may be possible or even preferable. The Court is concerned
only with examining whether the award suffers from any of the limited
infirmities recognized under Section 34 of the Act.
59.
The limits of judicial intervention under Section 34 have been
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authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions,
including Associate Builders v. DDA20, Ssangyong Engg. &
Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI21 and Delhi Airport Metro Express (P)
Ltd. v. DMRC22.
60.
Casual and cavalier interference with arbitral awards, and
proscription from interfering on the ground that a better, alternative
view was possible, stands firmly foreclosed. The autonomy of the
Arbitral Tribunal is required to be respected and interference with
arbitral awards on factual aspects firmly eschewed.23
61.
Further the principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 34, particularly where an award is assailed on the ground
of “patent illegality” under Section 34(2A) or as being in conflict with
the “public policy of India” under Section 34(2)(b)(ii), stand
comprehensively restated in the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
in OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions
(India) (P) Ltd24 and Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies
Ltd.25. These decisions reaffirm the consistent judicial approach that
arbitral awards are entitled to a high degree of deference and judicial
interference remains the exception rather than the rule, warranted only
where the award falls within the narrowly circumscribed statutory
grounds.
(2015) 3 SCC 49
(2019) 15 SCC 131
(2022) 1 SCC 131
National Highways Authority of India v. Unitech-NCC (JV),2025 SCC OnLine Del 4280
(2025) 2 SCC 417
(2025) 7 SCC 1
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62.
It is also worthy to reproduce the line in NDMC v. R & T
Enterprises 26 wherein the Single Bench of this Court analysed the
contours of Section 34 of the Act and observed thus:
“55. The decisions on the scope of Section 34 of the 1996 Act are
too numerous to justify any paraphrasing, but the position is, by
now, certain. UHL Power Co. Ltd. v. State of H.P.28 and Dyna
Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd.29 hold that the
jurisdiction of the Court under Section 34 cannot be likened to
normal appellate jurisdiction. Casual and cavalier interference with
arbitral awards, and proscription from interfering on the ground
that a better, alternative view was possible, stands clearly foreclosed
by Ssangyong
Engineering
&
Construction
Co.
Ltd. v. N.H.A.I.30 and Parsa Kente Collieries Ltd. v. Rajasthan
Rajya Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd.31. The autonomy of the Arbitral
Tribunal was required to be respected and interference with arbitral
awards on factual aspects firmly eschewed. At the same time, if the
award was found to be perverse, or that the interpretation of the
contractual covenants by the Arbitral Tribunal was one which could
not possibly be accepted, the Court was bound to interfere32.
Instances where the construction of the contractual clauses, by the
Arbitral Tribunal, was found to be so unacceptable as to justify
interference, are South East Asia Marine Engineering &
Constructions Ltd. v. Oil India Ltd.33 and Patel Engineering
Ltd. v. North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd.34.
56.
“Perversity”, as would justify interference with an arbitral
award, connotes a situation in which the finding of fact, by the
Arbitral Tribunal, was arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant
material, or by taking into consideration irrelevant material, or
where the finding is so outrageously in defiance of logic as to suffer
from the viced of irrationality35. Associate Builders v. D.D.A.36 also
placed especial reliance, on the concept of “perversity”, on the
following clarification, provided in Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner
of Police37:
“10. A broad distinction has, therefore, to be maintained
between the decisions which are perverse and those which
are not. If a decision is arrived at on no evidence or
evidence which is thoroughly unreliable and no
reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be
perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is
acceptable and which could be relied upon, howsoever
compendious it may be, the conclusions would not be
2024 SCC OnLine Del 5436
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treated as perverse and the findings would not be
interfered with.”
63.
It is now firmly settled that the Arbitral Tribunal is the final
arbiter of facts. The Tribunal is the sole judge of the quality, sufficiency
and probative value of the evidence placed before it. A finding of fact
cannot be reopened merely because this Court may have drawn a
different inference from the same material. Equally, the interpretation
of contractual terms is primarily a matter for the Arbitral Tribunal.
Where the contract is reasonably capable of more than one
interpretation and the Tribunal adopts one such interpretation after
considering the provisions and the rival submissions of the parties, the
Court cannot supplant its own construction in exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 34. An erroneous interpretation of a clause, by itself,
remains an error within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and not a ground
for interference.
64.
The autonomy accorded to an arbitral tribunal, however, is not
unqualified. The Tribunal derives its authority from the contract and is
statutorily bound by Section 28(3) of the Act to decide the dispute in
accordance with its terms. The distinction between an erroneous
interpretation of a contract and an interpretation contrary to the contract
must constantly be borne in mind. While the former ordinarily falls
within the exclusive domain of the Arbitral Tribunal, the latter amounts
to a jurisdictional error, as the Tribunal, being a creature of the contract,
cannot confer upon itself authority to disregard, modify or rewrite the
bargain voluntarily entered into by the parties.
65.
The Constitution Bench in Gayatri Balasamy (supra) has further
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clarified that while Section 34 does not confer a general power of
appellate review or modification of arbitral awards, the Court is not
denuded of all corrective jurisdiction. Where the offending portion of
an award is severable from the remainder, or where correction of
clerical, computational or similar errors is warranted, the Court may
exercise a limited power of modification consistent with the statutory
framework. Beyond these narrowly circumscribed situations, however,
the Court cannot rewrite or recast the award under the guise of
exercising jurisdiction under Section 34.
66.
The present petition must, therefore, be examined against the
aforesaid settled principles. The question before this Court is not
whether this Court would have interpreted the provisions differently
had it been sitting as the arbitral tribunal. The limited enquiry is whether
the impugned award, insofar as it concerns Claim Nos. 2 and 3,
discloses any patent illegality, travels beyond the contractual
framework agreed between the parties, or otherwise falls within any of
the limited grounds for interference recognised under Section 34 of the
Act.
CLAIM 2
67.
The challenge to the award under Claim No. 2 essentially rests
on the premise that the Tribunal has interpreted Clause 70 of the COPA
in a manner contrary to the contract, governing price adjustment. It is
therefore necessary to examine whether the Tribunal has merely
preferred one among two possible constructions of the Contract, or
whether, in the guise of interpretation, it has travelled beyond the
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bargain consciously entered into by the parties.
68.
Under Claim No. 2, the primary controversy between the parties
centres upon the mathematical and methodology adopted for
determining the variable percentage weightages denoted as x, y and z
under Sub-Clause 70.3 of the COPA representing Bitumen, Cement,
and Steel respectively, for the purpose of computing price escalation.
69.
Clause 70 of COPA provides a comprehensive mechanism for
price adjustment to neutralize inflation during the execution of the
works. Sub-Clause 70.3(xi) contains a crucial note governing the
determination of x,y,z which stipulates:
“Note: x,y,z are the actual percentage of cost of bitumen cement
and steel respectively used for execution of works as per the Interim
Payment Certificate for the month”
70.
The formula under Sub-Clause 70.3 incorporates a fixed factor
of 0.85 to exclude non-adjustable elements (overheads and profit) and
assigns a residual component for “Other Materials” expressed as (50(x+y+z)).
71.
OSE relied heavily on Clause 1.1(g)(i) of GCC, which defines
“Cost” as “all expenditure properly incurred or to be incurred whether
on or off the Site, including overheads and other charges properly
allocable thereto but does not include any allowance for profit”.
72.
OSE contended before the Arbitral Tribunal that “cost” in Sub-
Clause 70.3(xi) must be read with GCC Clause 1.1(g)(i) to mean the
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actual landed cost at site. OSE argued that transportation charges, local
taxes, and 10% allocable overheads must be loaded onto the basic exsource prices of Bitumen, Cement, and Steel to calculate the respective
weightages represented by x, y and z.
73.
Conversely, NHAI submitted that x, y and z represent the input
composition of key materials valued strictly at base prices/ex-source
rates prevailing 28 days prior to bid submission. NHAI urged that
loading transportation, taxes, and overheads into x, y and z distorts the
formula, causing the residual factor (50- (x+y+z)) to yield a negative
figure and conferring an unauthorized double benefit of overheads upon
the contractor.
74.
By a majority award dated 18.04.2016, the Arbitral Tribunal
accepted OSE’s interpretation of “cost” by invoking GCC Clause
1.1(g)(i).
75.
The reasoning of the majority Tribunal proceeds on the premise
that, since Clause 1.1(g)(i) defines the expression “Cost”, the same
definition necessarily governs the expression “actual percentage cost”
occurring in the Note appended to Clause 70.3. On that basis, the
Tribunal concluded that transportation charges, taxes and allocable
overheads form part of the cost of bitumen, cement and steel and must
therefore be included while computing the variables x,y and z. The
Tribunal held that freight, taxes, and 10% allocable overheads fell
within the definition of “Cost” and were required to be loaded onto the
base prices of key materials, thereby awarding OSE a differential sum
of Rs. 4,05,95,805/- along with pre-reference interest @ 10% p.a
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compounded monthly.
76.
The approach adopted by the Tribunal undoubtedly constitutes
an exercise in contractual interpretation. It cannot be said that the
Tribunal has ignored Clause 70 or decided the claim dehors the
Contract. The Tribunal has referred to the relevant provisions and
assigned reasons for accepting the interpretation canvassed by OSE.
Ordinarily, such an exercise would fall within the exclusive province of
the Arbitral Tribunal and would not warrant interference under Section
34 merely because another interpretation appears to be preferable.
77.
The matter, however, does not rest there. Section 28(3) of the Act
obligates the Tribunal to decide the disputes in accordance with the
terms of the Contract. The Court must therefore examine whether the
interpretation adopted by the Tribunal accords with the scheme
governing Clause 70 or whether it effectively alters that scheme.
78.
In this context, the decision of the Supreme Court in.
Progressive-MVR (JV) (supra) assumes significance. The Supreme
Court authoritatively construed the very same provisions and held that
Clause 70 constitutes a self-contained mechanism for price adjustment.
It further explained that the expression “actual” occurring in the Note
appended to Clause 70.3 refers to the actual proportion of bitumen,
cement and steel incorporated in the work and does not warrant loading
transportation charges, taxes or allocable overheads into the
computation of the variables x, y and z.
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79.
The significance of Progressive-MVR (JV) (supra) lies not
merely in the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court but in the
analysis undertaken therein in the interpretation of contract. The
judgment explains the architecture of Clause 70 and demonstrates that
the escalation formula is intended to operate on predetermined baseprice components. The interpretation adopted by the Tribunal, by
importing the general definition of “Cost” into the specialised formula
contained in Clause 70, departs from as what stands recognised by the
Supreme Court. Consequently, the Tribunal’s approach cannot be
sustained merely as a plausible alternative interpretation of the
Contract.
80.
It is true that the award in the present case preceded the decision
in Progressive-MVR (JV) (supra). Equally, however, the question
before this Court is not whether the Tribunal acted in disregard of that
judgment. The question is whether the award, viewed in the light of the
law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the
Constitution, can be sustained as an interpretation rendered in
accordance with the terms of the Contract. Once the Supreme Court has
authoritatively explained the Clause/contract, this Court cannot ignore
such binding declaration while examining whether the award suffers
from patent illegality under Section 34(2A).
81.
The Supreme Court held that the price adjustment mechanism
under Clause 70 is founded upon the base prices prevailing 28 days
prior to the submission of bids and not upon the current or landed cost
of the materials incurred by the contractor during execution of the
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works. It was observed that the very object of the escalation formula is
to neutralise fluctuations in prices with reference to the “base” and not
to substitute the formula with one based upon the contractor’s actual
expenditure.
82.
The Court further clarified that the expression “actual” occurring
in the Note appended to Sub-Clause 70.3(xi) qualifies the percentage
composition of bitumen, cement and steel incorporated in the work
during the relevant IPC and not the prevailing cost of such materials.
The variables x, y and z are therefore intended to reflect the actual
proportion of the specified materials incorporated in the executed work,
while their valuation continues to be anchored to the base-price
mechanism as given in the contract.
83.
The Supreme Court also noticed that if the contractor's
interpretation were to be accepted and transportation charges, taxes and
overheads were loaded onto the material cost while determining x, y
and z, the aggregate of the said variables could exceed the contractual
limit of 50%, resulting in the residual component for “Other Materials”,
namely (50 – (x + y + z)), becoming negative. Such a consequence, the
Court held, would be wholly inconsistent with the structure of the
formula and would defeat the commercial scheme consciously adopted
by the parties.
84.
The Court further forms the opinion that the expression “actual”
relates to the percentage of material incorporated in the work and that
the base price, and not the current or landed cost, constitutes the correct
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basis for applying the escalation formula.
85.
Significantly,
the
Supreme
Court
also
considered
the
applicability of its interpretation to pending proceedings wherein, the
Court held that the interpretation placed upon Clause 70 would govern
all cases where the arbitral award had not attained finality and judicial
proceedings remained pending. The Court observed that the principle
of issue estoppel would apply only to matters which had attained
finality and that, in all pending challenges to arbitral awards involving
this issue, the interpretation declared therein would govern the outcome.
86.
When a Section 34 Court adjudicates a challenge to an arbitral
award, it is bound to apply the law prevailing on the date of
adjudication. The timing of the award does not grant immunity against
setting aside an award that stands directly in the teeth of a binding
declaration of law.
87.
In the present case, the majority Tribunal proceeded on the
premise that the expression “actual percentage cost” occurring in the
Note to Sub-Clause 70.3(xi) necessarily derives its content from the
general definition of “Cost” contained in Clause 1.1(g)(i) of the GCC.
On that basis, the Tribunal directed inclusion of transportation charges,
taxes and allocable overheads while determining the variables x, y and
z. The interpretation adopted by the Tribunal, therefore, proceeds on a
premise fundamentally inconsistent with the construction subsequently
and authoritatively placed upon the same contractual provisions by the
Supreme Court.
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88.
This Court is conscious that the impugned award preceded the
decision in Progressive-MVR (JV)(supra). Nevertheless, the said
judgment expressly clarifies that the interpretation declared therein
governs all pending challenges where the award has not attained
finality. This Court is, therefore, bound to examine the validity of the
impugned award in the light of the law declared by the Supreme Court
under Article 141 of the Constitution.
89.
Once the interpretation placed upon Clause 70 by the Supreme
Court is applied, the methodology adopted by the majority Tribunal
cannot be sustained. By importing into the escalation formula elements
which the contract itself does not contemplate, the Tribunal departed
from the framework governing price adjustment. Such a departure is
not merely an erroneous interpretation of the contract but a failure to
decide the dispute in accordance with the terms of the contract as
mandated by Section 28(3) of the Act.
90.
This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the
majority Tribunal, by importing into Clause 70 elements altered the
methodology agreed between the parties for computation of price
adjustment. The award, to that extent, cannot be regarded as a mere
erroneous interpretation of the Contract. It amounts to a departure from
the lines of Contract itself and consequently falls foul of Section 28(3)
of the Act. The resultant infirmity goes to the root of the award and
attracts the ground of patent illegality under Section 34(2A).
91.
Accordingly, the award insofar as it allows Claim No. 2 for an
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amount of Rs. 4,05,95,805/- is set aside. Consequently, the aggregate
amount payable under the award shall stand reduced to that extent and
the interest payable shall be recomputed accordingly in terms of
direction contained in the award.
CLAIM 3
92.
Claim No. 3 raises a pure question of interpretation or
construction of the contract. The controversy is not with respect to the
mathematical computation of price adjustment under Clause 70 of the
COPA but whether the additional rebate of 7.75%, offered by OSE in
its bid in the event of being awarded more than one contract, was
intended to operate only upon the bid price, or whether it also extended
to the price adjustment/escalation amounts becoming payable during
execution of the works.
93.
The answer to the aforesaid question depends upon a harmonious
construction of the bid documents, the LOA dated 27.07.2005, the
Contract Agreement, the hierarchy of documents under Clause 5.2 of
the COPA and the price adjustment mechanism embodied in Clause 70.
The dispute is therefore one of interpretation.
94.
There is no dispute that OSE, while submitting its bid, offered
two separate and distinct rebates. The first was a general rebate of 5%
on the quoted rates. Separately, OSE declared:
“We are bidding for Contract No.(s) EW-II (MP/UP-I & EW-II (UP3).In the event we are awarded more than one contract, we will offer
an additional discount of 7.75% percent over and above the quoted
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Bid Price for all the contracts awarded to us.”
95.
Equally, there is no dispute that the LOA subsequently recorded
a combined discount of 12.3625% on the quoted rates of all the items,
thereby treating the additional rebate of 7.75% as operating upon the
quoted item rates themselves. It is this apparent divergence between the
language employed in the bid and the language adopted in the LOA
which forms the genesis of the present dispute.
96.
According to OSE, the two rebates were consciously structured
differently. Whereas the first rebate expressly operated upon the quoted
rates, the second rebate was offered only upon the overall bid price.
Consequently, according to OSE, the “R” value under Clause 70,
representing the value of work executed during the relevant month for
the purpose of price adjustment, continued to be computed on the
quoted rates, subject only to the first rebate of 5%. The second rebate
of 7.75%, it was contended that, it merely reduced the overall contract
consideration and was never intended to dilute the statutory and
contractual entitlement to price adjustment under Clause 70.
97.
NHAI, on the other hand, contended that once the LOA expressly
incorporated a combined rebate of 12.3625% on the quoted rates of all
items, and the Contract Agreement came to be executed on that basis,
the rates themselves stood reduced. Consequently, every running
account bill, every IPC and every price adjustment had necessarily to
proceed on the reduced contractual rates.
98.
NHAI further submits that OSE accepted all forty-one IPCs over
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a period of nearly four years without demur, raised every running bill
after applying the combined rebate, and questioned the applicability of
the second rebate to price adjustment only after completion of the
works. The challenge, according to NHAI, is therefore contrary to the
contractual documents and is, in any event, barred by acquiescence,
waiver and limitation.
99.
The primary legal issue raised by NHAI under Claim No. 3 is no
longer res integra. In relation to the companion contract awarded under
the exact same tender process and governed by identical provisions, a
Division Bench of this Court in M/s Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt.
Ltd. (supra), held that :10.
In this court's opinion, what NHAI argues, is to invite the
court, in the guise of saying that the contract conditions were
ignored, to substitute its reasons for the reasons given in the award.
When the law is clear, that the interpretation of contract is the
primary task - or within the exclusive domain of an arbitral tribunal,
the court cannot, by a sleight of reasoning, by saying that the
reasons are contrary to the contract, upset the award. In P.R.
Shah v. B.H.H. Securities, (2012) 1 SCC 594 it was held that:
“21. A court does not sit in appeal over the award of an
Arbitral Tribunal by reassessing or reappreciating the
evidence. An award can be challenged only under the
grounds mentioned in Section 34(2) of the Act. The Arbitral
Tribunal has examined the facts and held that both the
second respondent and the appellant are liable. The case as
put forward by the first respondent has been accepted. Even
the minority view was that the second respondent was liable
as claimed by the first respondent, but the appellant was not
liable only on the ground that the arbitrators appointed by
the Stock Exchange under Bye-law 248, in a claim against
a non-member, had no jurisdiction to decide a claim
against another member. The finding of the majority is that
the appellant did the transaction in the name of the second
respondent and is therefore, liable along with the second
respondent. Therefore, in the absence of any ground under
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Section 34(2) of the Act, it is not possible to re-examine the
facts to find out whether a different decision can be arrived
at.”
100. Thus, price adjustment under Clause 70 is calculated on the value
of work done based on BOQ rates. Extending an overall bid discount to
lower the base BOQ rates for escalation formula purposes would
amount to imposing a double deduction on the contractor, which is not
contemplated by the contract scheme.
101. Claim No. 3 presents a controversy distinct in character from
Claim No. 2. Unlike Claim No. 2, which concerns the interpretation of
the mathematical formula prescribed under Clause 70.3 of the COPA,
the present dispute centres upon the true construction of the contract
entered into between the parties and, more particularly, the scope and
operation of the additional rebate of 7.75% offered by OSE in its bid.
102. There is no dispute between the parties that Clause 70 entitles the
contractor to price adjustment in respect of increase or decrease in the
cost of labour, materials, fuel and other specified inputs during
execution of the works. Equally, there is no dispute that OSE, while
submitting its bid, offered two separate concessions:(i) a general rebate
of 5% on the quoted rates; and(ii) an additional rebate of 7.75% in the
event both contract packages were awarded to it.
103. The controversy lies in determining whether the additional rebate
of 7.75% was confined to the bid price/contract price or whether it also
operated upon the amounts becoming payable towards price adjustment
under Clause 70 during execution of the contract.
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104. The answer to this question does not merely depend upon the
language employed in one isolated clause. It requires a harmonious
construction of the Bid, the LOA dated 27.07.2005, the Contract
Agreement dated 29.09.2005, the order of precedence prescribed under
Clause 5.2 of the COPA, the mechanism of price adjustment under
Clause 70, and the conduct of the parties during performance of the
contract. The dispute is, therefore, fundamentally one of contractual
interpretation.
105. Moving on to the interpretation which is under dispute in claim
3, the bid submitted by OSE contained two distinct concessions. The
first was a general rebate of 5% on the quoted rates. The second was
worded in the following terms:
“We are bidding for Contract No.(s) EW-II (MP/UP-1) & EW-II
(UP-3). In the event we are awarded more than one contract, we will
offer an additional discount of 7.75 per cent over and above the
quoted Bid Price for all the contracts awarded to us.”
The phraseology employed in the second rebate constitutes the genesis
of Claim 3.
106. Upon both contract packages being awarded to OSE, the LOA
dated 27.07.2005 recorded that the contract price included:
“(a) corrections for arithmetic errors; and
(b) general discount of 5% together with combination discount of
7.75%, i.e. a combined discount of 12.3625% on the quoted rates
of all the items.”
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107. NHAI asserts that the LOA crystallised the bargain and
converted both rebates into a combined reduction applicable to the
quoted rates of every BOQ item. OSE, on the other hand, contends that
the LOA merely quantified the overall contract price and did not alter
the essential character of the second rebate, which, according to OSE,
continued to operate only upon the bid price and not upon the
independent mechanism of price adjustment.
108. It is this divergence which ultimately found expression before the
Arbitral Tribunal.
109. The majority Tribunal examined the language employed in the
bid documents, the LOA and the terms governing price adjustment. It
noticed that the first rebate was expressly offered “on the quoted rates”,
whereas the second rebate was offered “over and above the quoted bid
price” in the event both contracts were awarded to OSE. The Tribunal
observed that these were not identical expressions and that the
distinction between them could not be rendered otiose.
110. The Tribunal further noticed that although the LOA referred to a
combined rebate of 12.3625% on the quoted rates, such expression was
not found in the original offer made by OSE. Proceeding on that
premise, the Tribunal invoked Sections 7 and 13 of the Indian Contract
Act, 187227 and reasoned that acceptance must correspond to the
proposal; if the LOA introduced a material variation, it could not
unilaterally alter the bargain originally offered by the contractor. It
“Contract Act”, hereinafter
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therefore concluded that the additional rebate of 7.75% was never
intended to alter the quoted unit rates forming the basis of the price
adjustment formula under Clause 70.
111. The Tribunal’s reference to Sections 7 and 13 of the Contract Act
cannot, in itself, be characterised as legally erroneous. The question
whether the LOA constituted an acceptance of the offer as made or
introduced a variation therein was a question of contractual construction
which fell within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. While NHAI may have a
plausible basis for contending, on the strength of the subsequent
conduct of the parties, that the LOA reflected the concluded bargain
between them, that circumstance does not render the contrary
construction adopted by the Tribunal perverse or patently illegal. This
Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 34, cannot substitute its
own preferred construction for a construction which is reasonably
possible on the contractual record.
112. The Tribunal also drew a distinction between the contract price
and the price adjustment payable under Clause 70. According to the
majority, price adjustment is not itself a rate quoted in the BOQ but
represents an independent entitlement under the contract computed in
accordance with the formula prescribed under Clause 70 to neutralise
fluctuations in input costs during execution. On that reasoning, the
Tribunal held that the additional rebate, though relevant while
determining the contract price, could not be extended to the amounts
payable towards price adjustment.
113.
Upon accepting the aforesaid interpretation, the Tribunal relied
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upon the computation placed by OSE in CD/8. Recording that since
NHAI had not demonstrated any specific arithmetical error or infirmity
in the said computation, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.
7,87,76,490/- together with interest @ 10% p.a. compounded monthly.
114. NHAI’s principal submission was that the Tribunal ignored the
hierarchy of documents prescribed under Clause 5.2 of the COPA. It is
contended that once the parties executed the Contract Agreement
pursuant to the LOA dated 27.07.2005, the contract stood crystallised
and the Tribunal could not revert to the language employed in the
original bid for the purpose of determining the scope and effect of the
rebate.
115. The aforesaid submission undoubtedly deserves careful
consideration. The LOA records that the contract price includes a
combined rebate of 12.3625% on the quoted rates of all the items.
Equally, Clause 5.2 of the COPA accords precedence to the Contract
Agreement and the LOA over the Bid in the event of any inconsistency.
Read in isolation, these circumstances lend considerable support to the
contention urged by NHAI that the concluded contract contemplated
application of the combined rebate to the quoted rates.
116. The question, however, is not whether this interpretation is
plausible. The question is whether it is the only interpretation
reasonably available as per the contract.
117. A careful reading of the majority award reveals that the Tribunal
has not ignored either the LOA or Clause 5.2 of the COPA. On the
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contrary, both documents have been specifically noticed. The Tribunal
was alive to the language employed in the LOA. Nevertheless, after
examining the bid, the LOA and the provisions governing price
adjustment, it concluded that the second rebate retained a character
distinct from the general rebate of 5%.
118. The majority Tribunal attached significance to the distinction in
the language consciously employed by OSE while submitting its bid.
The first concession was unequivocally described as a “discount on
quoted rates”. The second concession, however, was couched in
materially different language and referred to an additional discount
“over and above the quoted Bid Price.” The Tribunal proceeded on the
premise that if the parties intended both rebates to operate identically,
there was no discernible reason to employ two different expressions in
the bid itself.
119. It is difficult to hold that such reasoning is wholly irrational or
unsupported from the record. Whether the distinction ultimately
persuades this Court is not determinative. The Tribunal has assigned
intelligible reasons for construing the two rebates differently. It cannot
therefore be said that the Tribunal ignored the language in the contract
or substituted the contract with one of its own making.
120. NHAI has strongly relied upon Clause 5.2 of the COPA to
contend that the LOA overrides the Bid. The submission, though
attractive at first blush, overlooks the fact that the Tribunal did not hold
the Bid to prevailed over the LOA. Rather, it attempted to harmonise
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the two documents by holding that while the LOA quantified the
contract price after taking into account the second rebate, it did not
necessarily alter the independent terms governing price adjustment
under Clause 70. Whether this construction is ultimately preferable is
beside the point. It undoubtedly constitutes a process of interpretation
of contract.
121. The distinction between interpreting a contract and rewriting a
contract assumes significance in this context. A tribunal rewrites a
contract where it ignores an express stipulation or substitutes a new
contractual term in place of one consciously agreed by the parties.
Conversely, where the tribunal examines two apparently competing
contractual provisions and attempts to reconcile them through a process
of construction, it remains within the legitimate bounds of
interpretation. The majority award, in the considered opinion of this
Court, falls within the latter category.
122. Learned Counsel for NHAI has also placed considerable
emphasis upon the dissenting opinion of Shri S.S.Rana, Co-Arbitrator.
There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the dissent presents a
cogent and well-reasoned interpretation of the contract. The dissent
accords primacy to the LOA and concludes that once the Contract
Agreement stood executed and acted upon, the initial bargain could not
thereafter be tested with reference to the pre-contractual offer.
123. The dissent undoubtedly represents a plausible construction of
the contract. However, the mere existence of a persuasive dissent does
not, by itself, render the majority award vulnerable under Section 34.
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Were the Court to interfere merely because the dissent appears more
convincing, it would effectively convert proceedings under Section 34
into a statutory appeal on merits an approach consistently deprecated
by the Supreme Court.
124. Indeed, the very existence of two reasoned but conflicting
interpretations within the Tribunal itself demonstrates that the
documents were capable of more than one construction. Once the
majority has adopted one of the reasonably possible interpretations after
considering the provisions and the rival submissions, this Court cannot
substitute its own view merely because the dissent appears to present a
more attractive or commercially preferable interpretation. The
jurisdiction under Section 34 does not permit the Court to choose
between competing interpretations of a contract, but only to determine
whether the interpretation adopted by the Tribunal falls within the
bounds of permissible contractual construction.
125. There is yet another aspect which, in the considered opinion of
this Court, substantially narrows the scope of judicial review in the
present case. During the course of hearing, learned Counsel appearing
for OSE placed considerable reliance upon the judgment of the Division
Bench of this Court in Oriental Structural Engineers Pvt. Ltd (supra).
The said decision arose out of a challenge to an arbitral award rendered
between the same parties and involved substantially similar contractual
provisions governing the rebate offered by OSE and the mechanism of
price adjustment under Clause 70.
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126. NHAI sought to distinguish the said decision by contending that
each arbitral award must stand or fall on its own reasoning and that this
Court is required to independently examine whether the majority
Tribunal, in the present case, has exceeded the limits imposed by
Section 28(3) of the Act. There can be no quarrel with the aforesaid
proposition. An earlier arbitral award cannot, by itself, bind another
Tribunal or determine the outcome of an independent challenge under
Section 34.
127.
Equally, however, where a Division Bench of this Court has
already examined substantially identical contractual provisions and
upheld an arbitral interpretation thereof while exercising appellate
jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act, such pronouncement
undoubtedly
possesses
considerable
precedential
value
while
examining a subsequent challenge founded on the same contractual
language.
128. A careful reading of the Division Bench judgment reveals that
the controversy before the Court was materially similar to the one
arising in the present proceedings. NHAI had contended before the
Division Bench that the additional rebate of 7.75% necessarily reduced
the rates forming the basis for computation of price adjustment and that
the Tribunal had erred in holding otherwise.
129. The Division Bench noticed the reasoning of the arbitral tribunal
that price adjustment was not itself a rate quoted in the BOQ but
constituted an amount computed under Clause 70 upon the basis of the
formula, and that the additional rebate offered on the quoted bid price
could not automatically be applied to the separate price-adjustment
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formula prescribed under Clause 70. The Division Bench found no
infirmity in such reasoning and declined to interfere with the award.
130. The significance of the aforesaid judgment lies not merely in the
ultimate conclusion reached by the Division Bench but in the principle
applied by it. The Court recognised that the arbitral tribunal had
undertaken an exercise of construction and that the interpretation
adopted, even if another view were possible, could not be characterised
as one warranting interference under Section 34. The said principle
applies with equal force in the present proceedings.
131.
In other words, the Division Bench treated the dispute as falling
within the legitimate domain of arbitral interpretation rather than
constituting a jurisdictional departure from the contract.
132. The present case stands on substantially the same footing. The
provisions relied upon before this Court are materially similar. The rival
submissions advanced by NHAI are also, in substance, the same as
those considered in the proceedings before the Division Bench.
133.
The principal grounds urged by NHAI namely, that the LOA
transformed the second rebate into a rebate on quoted rates, that the
Tribunal ignored the hierarchy under Clause 5.2 and that the Tribunal
rewrote the contract, were also canvassed before the Division Bench.
The fact that these submissions did not find favour with the Division
Bench constitutes a relevant circumstance while examining whether the
present award discloses patent illegality under Section 34 of the Act.
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134. Learned Counsel for NHAI was unable to point out any material
distinction in the terms of contract governing the present contract visa-vis those considered by the Division Bench. Nor has it been shown
that the contract language presently under consideration materially
departs from that considered in the said case. In these circumstances,
this Court finds no reason to adopt an approach inconsistent with the
one already approved by the Division Bench in respect of substantially
identical contractual provisions.
135. Now while addressing the contention of NHAI as to IPC; it was
contended that OSE itself prepared all forty-one IPCs as well as the
corresponding price variation bills after applying the combined rebate
of 12.3625%, accepted payments made thereunder throughout the
execution of the works, and raised the present dispute only after
completion of the project.
136. According to NHAI, such conduct not only demonstrates
acceptance of its interpretation of the contract, but also renders the
claim barred by limitation and acquiescence.
137. The submission, however, overlooks the essential nature and
purpose of an IPC. An IPC is, by its very nature and purpose is, interim
in character. It is a mechanism for facilitating periodic payments during
the subsistence of the contract and does not, in itself, constitute a final
adjudication of the parties’ respective entitlements.
138. The same contractual scheme has been considered by this Court
in National Highways Authority of India v. Ssangyong Engineering
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& Construction Co. Ltd28, wherein the Court observed that the monthly
statements and IPCs were “plainly interim in nature” and did not finally
foreclose the right of either party to seek further amounts found due
under the Contract. This Court specifically noticed the existence of the
mechanism of the Final Statement, under which the contractor could
claim further sums considered due under the Contract.
139. The principle emerging from Ssangyong Engineering &
Construction Co. Ltd (supra) is therefore material. The mere fact that
a contractor has accepted payments pursuant to IPCs cannot, without
more, be treated as a final abandonment or waiver of a contractual
claim. Nor can every omission to raise a particular component in an
interim statement be converted into a complete bar against its
subsequent adjudication.
140. Accordingly, the acceptance of the IPCs and the payments made
thereunder do not, in the facts of the present case, furnish a sufficient
ground to interfere with the award under Claim No. 3 on the grounds of
waiver, acquiescence or limitation.
141. Thus, having examined the award in the light of the rival
submissions, the documents and the governing precedents, this Court is
unable to subscribe to the contention that the majority Tribunal has
rewritten the contract. The Tribunal has adopted a construction that is
supported by reasons and the contractual record.
142. The dissenting opinion undoubtedly presents another plausible
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construction; however, the existence of a persuasive dissent cannot
convert the jurisdiction under Section 34 into an appellate forum for
choosing between competing contractual interpretations. The limited
question is whether the interpretation adopted by the majority Tribunal
falls within the realm of permissible contractual construction. In the
present case, it does.
143. Now as to the question of interest under Claim No. 3. The
Tribunal awarded Rs.7,87,76,490/- as the principal amount, together
with pre-reference interest at 10% per annum, compounded monthly,
calculated from the respective due dates up to 15.07.2014 at
Rs.7,15,19,945/-, and thereafter interest at the same rate up to the date
of the award.
144. The basis for the aforesaid award of interest is Clause 60.8 of the
COPA read with the Appendix to Bid, expressly stipulates interest at
10% per annum, compounded monthly. OSE specifically relies upon
the contracts and submits that the Tribunal was bound to give effect to
it. It also points out that NHAI has accepted the award of interest at the
same interest rate in respect of Claim No. 1 and cannot, having accepted
that part of the award, selectively challenge the application of the
interest provision to Claim No. 3.
145. In the aforesaid circumstances, and particularly in view of the
fact that the rate of interest @ 10% per annum compounded monthly is
traceable to the express contract, no independent ground for
interference under Claim No. 3 is made out. The 12% post-award
interest, being a discretionary statutory award, may likewise be
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interfered with only if the circumstances of the case demonstrate that
the Tribunal exercised that discretion in an arbitrary, unreasonable or
legally impermissible manner warranting interference. No such
infirmity is demonstrated merely by the fact that NHAI disputes the
rate.
146. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court finds that the majority
Tribunal’s determination under Claim No. 3 does not disclose or suffer
from any perversity, patent illegality or jurisdictional error warranting
interference under Section 34 of the Act. The Tribunal duly considered
the competing constructions advanced by the parties regarding the
7.75% rebate and, upon examining the bid documents, LOA and the
scheme governing price adjustment, concluded that the rebate offered
on the overall bid price could not be treated as a reduction of the BOQ
rates for the purposes of Clause 70. The view so adopted represents a
plausible construction and is, therefore, beyond the scope of
interference under Section 34.
CONCLUSION
147. In view of the above, the challenge to the impugned majority
Award dated 18.04.2016 succeeds only in part. The findings of the
Tribunal on Claim No. 2 cannot be sustained, as the interpretation
adopted therein is contrary to the law subsequently declared by the
Supreme Court in M/s Progressive-MVR (JV) (supra) with respect to
the very contract interpretation governing the computation of price
adjustment. Accordingly, the award under Claim No. 2, together with
the interest consequential thereto, is liable to be set aside.
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148. As to Claim No.3, the interpretation adopted by the majority
Tribunal regarding the applicability of the 7.75% rebate to the priceadjustment mechanism constitutes a possible, reasoned and legally
permissible construction of the contractual documents, according to me.
The dissenting view, though plausible, cannot furnish a basis for this
Court to substitute its own interpretation for that of the majority
Tribunal in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act.
149. Consequently, the award under Claim No. 3, including the
principal amount of Rs.7,87,76,490/- and the interest awarded thereon,
is upheld.
150. The petition under Section 34 is, therefore, partly allowed in the
aforesaid terms. The impugned Award dated 18.04.2016 is set aside
only to the extent of Claim No. 2 and the interest consequential thereto.
The award in respect of Claim No. 3 is sustained in its entirety.
151. There shall be no interference with the remaining findings and
directions contained in the impugned award.
152. The parties shall bear their own costs.
153. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J.
AUGUST 18, 2026/gunn
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