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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
+
O.M.P. (I) (COMM.) 373/2025 & I.A. 22577-78/2025
Between:NATASHA OBEROI
7 AVONBURRY COURT, BRIGHTON
3186, VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA
.....PETITIONER
(Through: Mr. Dayan Krishnan, Sr. Adv. with Ms. Amita Gupta
Katragadda, Ms. Surabhi Khattar, Ms. Ambika Mathur, Ms. Niharika
Chhabra and Mr. Shivansh Vishwakarma, Advs.)
versus
1. RAJARAMAN SHANKAR
19, RAJPUR ROAD, 302-B
DELHI – 110054
2. VIKRAMJIT SINGH OBEROI
OBEROI FARM, VILLAGE BIJWASAN,
NAJAFGARH ROAD, KAPASHERA,
DELHI - 110037
3. ARJUN SINGH OBEROI
OBEROI FARM, VILLAGE BIJWASAN,
NAJAFGARH ROAD, KAPASHERA,
DELHI - 110037
4. ANASTASIA MIRJANA JOJIC OBEROI
11 EATON TERRACE
LONDON SWI W 8EX, ENGLAND
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
5. OBEROI HOTELS PVT. LTD.
THROUGH ITS DIRECTORS
N-806-A, 8TH FLOOR,
DIAMOND HERITAGE BUILDING,
16, STRAND ROAD, FAIRLEY PLACE,
KOLKATTA G.P.O., KOLKATA,
WEST BENGAL - 700001
.....RESPONDENTS
(Through: Mr. Saurabh Kirpal, Sr. Adv. with Mr. Ankur Sood, Mr.
Dhaman Trivedi, Mr. Prajwal Suman and Ms. Romila Mandal, Advs. for R1.
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, Sr. Adv. and Mr. Aseem Chaturvedi, Mr.
Aakash Bajaj, Mr. Shivank Diddi, Ms. Prerona Banerjee and Ms. Sania
Abbasi and Mr. Priyansh Sharma, Advs. for R-2.
Mr. Akhil Sibal, Sr. Adv with Mr. Aseem Chaturvedi, Mr. Aakash Bajaj, Mr.
Shivank Diddi, Ms. Prerona Banerjee and Ms. Sania Abbasi and Mr.
Priyansh Sharma, Advs. for R-3.
Mr. Swapnil Gupta, Mr. Aadil Singh Boparai, Ms. Shivambika Sinha, Ms.
Nimita Kaul, Mr. Harshit Gupta, Mr. Abhishek Dubey, Mr. Tarun Mishra,
Ms. Prakruti Jain, Ms. Sajal Jain and Mr. Vaibhav Mendiratta, Advs. for R4.
Mr. Rajiv Nayar, Sr. Adv. and Mr. Rajshekhar Rao, Sr. Adv with Mr. Aman
Gupta, Mr. Anup Kashyap and Mr. Divyam Kandhari, Advs. for R-5)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------%
Reserved on:
16.12.2025
Pronounced on: 15.01.2026
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------JUDGMENT
INDEX
I. FACTUAL MATRIX ......................................................................................... 3
II. SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES ......................... 6
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
III. ANALYSIS ....................................................................................................... 8
A. THE CONDITION OF SIGNING THE DOCUMENT CONTAINING THE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT......................................................................... 9
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF BEING PARTY TO THE ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT................................................................................................... 15
C. THE INTENT TO ARBITRATE .................................................................. 23
IV. ORDER ........................................................................................................... 36
The present petition has been filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration
and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter ―Arbitration Act‖/―the Act‖)
seeking an interim stay on the operation of a resolution dated 06.06.2025,
passed by the board of directors of respondent no. 5, whereby, one Mr.
Tejaswi Dixit has been granted the authority, inter alia, to deal with legal
matters/cases relating to the estate of late Mr. P.R.S. Oberoi, including to
initiate and defend legal proceedings in relation thereto (hereinafter ―said
Resolution‖). Certain consequential reliefs, including the stay of respondent
nos. 1-3’s consent on the said Resolution, and restraining them from giving
effect to or acting upon such consent have also been sought.
I. FACTUAL MATRIX
2.
The factual history of the case at hand is not particularly relevant to
the controversy involved, however, it may be adverted to briefly. The
petitioner and respondent no. 4 are the two daughters of late Mr. P.R.S.
Oberoi (hereinafter ―Mr. Oberoi‖), who passed away on 14.11.2023.
Respondent nos. 2 and 3 are Mr. Oberoi’s son and nephew respectively. The
daughters are also the managing directors of respondent no. 5 i.e., Oberoi
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
Hotels Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter ―the Company‖), with the other members of
the board of directors of the Company (hereinafter ―the Board‖) being
respondent nos. 1-3.
3.
The petitioner contends that on 25.10.2021, Mr. Oberoi executed his
last and final will, which was amended vide a codicil dated 27.08.2022
(hereinafter collectively ―said Will‖), under which the petitioner and
respondent no. 4 were the primary legatees. On 13.06.2024, the Board
passed a resolution granting authority to respondent no. 1 to, inter alia, deal
with any legal matters/cases on behalf of the Company, and do all acts
incidental and necessary thereto. Thereafter, on 10.09.2024, respondent no.
4 filed a suit bearing CS (OS) No. 736/2024 before this Court seeking reliefs
of declaratory, mandatory and permanent injunctions in respect of the estate
of Mr. Oberoi (hereinafter ―Estate Suit‖). The defendants in the said suit,
included among others, the petitioner, respondent nos. 1-3 and 5. Further, in
the Estate Suit on 09.01.2025, a written statement signed by respondent no.
1, was filed on behalf of the Company, which purportedly supported the
stand taken by respondent no. 2 and 3 in the said suit (hereinafter ―said
WS‖).
4.
Subsequently, respondent no. 4 and the petitioner raised concerns
over the filing of the said WS, which according to them should have been
neutral, but instead had supported the version put forth by their brother and
cousin. Ultimately, the said Resolution came to be passed, with respondent
nos. 1, 2, 3 assenting to the same, and the petitioner and respondent no. 4
objecting to it. Citing certain actions already taken by Mr. Tejaswi Dixit in
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
exercise of powers conferred by the said Resolution, and apprehending
further steps being taken, the present Section 9 petition came to be filed.
5.
Learned counsel for the parties were heard on 15.10.2025,
10.11.2025,
13.11.2025,
24.11.2025,
03.12.2025,
08.12.2025,
and
16.12.2025. Mr. Dayan Krishnan, learned senior counsel’s written
submissions, his note on the non-applicability of Section 430 of the
Companies Act, 2013, and on the possibility of raising the present issues
before the Court hearing the Estate Suit, as also his rejoinder submission
note, and a final note containing his additional rejoinder submissions have
been perused. A six-volume judgement compilation submitted by the
petitioner, has also been considered. The notes of learned senior counsel Dr.
Singhvi, Mr. Kirpal, Mr. Sibal, Mr. Nayar, and Mr. Gupta, as also the
judgement compilations submitted by each of them have been examined.
6.
Upon careful consideration, the Court has arrived at the conclusion
that there does not exist an arbitration agreement, in terms of Section 7 of
the Arbitration Act, on the strength of which the petitioner could file the
instant Section 9 petition as — first, the document which contains the
purported arbitration clause, namely the Articles of Association of the
Company, is not signed by the petitioner; second, the petitioner is not a party
to the agreement/document containing the alleged arbitration clause; and
third, Clause 30A of the AoA, which the petitioner contends is an arbitration
clause, does not evince an intent to arbitrate. Before adverting to the
analysis, the submissions of the parties, material to the issue decided by the
Court may be considered.
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
II. SUBMISSIONS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES
7.
Mr. Krishnan contends that the Impugned Resolution violates Article
18 of the Articles of Association (hereinafter ―AoA‖) of the Company,
which is a mandatory provision intended to prohibit delegation of powers to
individuals who do not, as per the provisions of the Companies Act, 2013,
owe a fiduciary duty to the Company. A dispute pertaining to the same, Mr.
Krishnan contends, is to be adjudicated upon through the means of
arbitration as per Article 30A of the AoA, which according to him, is a valid
arbitration clause binding on the Company and its directors.
8.
Learned senior counsel further submits, that the reference to lawyers
and auditors of the Company as arbitrators, is a concern only qua the
mechanism to arbitrate, which can be severed and eschewed from the intent
to arbitrate. He claims that in any case, questions pertaining to arbitrability
and jurisdiction are better left to be decided by the arbitral tribunal.
9.
Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent no. 2, made various submissions, pertaining to, inter
alia, the said Resolution being in consonance with the settled principles of
corporate governance, including majority rule, and the same also being
recognized under Article 16.6 of the AoA. In passing, he also submitted that
the clause contained in Article 30A of the AoA is not really an arbitration
clause.
10.
Building from where Dr. Singhvi left off, Mr. Akhil Sibal, learned
senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 3, submitted that
despite the law allowing the procedure for arbitration to be severed from the
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
intent to arbitrate, Article 30A of the AoA contains sufficient indicia for it to
not qualify as an arbitration clause at all. Next, he argued that the petitioner
is not a party to the AoA, which is a contract between the Company and its
shareholders. The petitioner, a director, though is governed by the articles, is
not a signatory to the AoA, and therefore does not comply with the
requirements of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act. Further, he argued that
really speaking, the claim raised by the petitioner ought to have been
agitated by a shareholder, at whose pleasure the petitioner and other
directors serve.
11.
Mr. Saurabh Kirpal, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent no.1, argued that unlike English law, where, only shareholders
are bound by an AoA, in India, the articles bind both the company and its
shareholders. However, that does not, by any stretch, extend to a director
simplicitor. Mr. Kirpal analogized that similar to us being bound by the
Constitution of India without being a party to it, the director as well is
governed by the AoA, without being a signatory to it. Section 7 of the Act,
learned senior counsel stressed, requires a claimant to be a party to the
arbitration agreement/clause. Mr. Rajiv Nayyar and Mr. Rajshekhar Rao,
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 5, also, inter
alia, submitted that each of the prayers made in the petition concern the
Company, however, there is not even a whisper in the petition alleging any
wrongdoings on the part of the Company.
12.
Mr. Swapnil Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent no. 4, eloquently argued that the Resolution is confined only to
the Estate Suit, and the Court therein, can adjudicate on the issue as to
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
whether the said WS was filed with appropriate authorization, including
whether the authorization itself could have been given in law.
III. ANALYSIS
13.
The present petition seeking interim reliefs has been filed under
Section 9 of the Arbitration Act. Sub-section 1 of Section 9 provides, that it
is a ―party‖ who can apply for interim measures. The said provision is
reproduced as under:
―9. Interim measures, etc., by Court.
(1) A party may, before or during arbitral proceedings or at any time
after the making of the arbitral award but before it is enforced in
accordance with section 36, apply to a court—
…‖
(Emphasis supplied)
Section 2(1)(h) of the said Act, further, defines a ―party‖ in the following
words:
―2. Definitions.
(1) …
(h) “party” means a party to an arbitration agreement‖
14.
A perusal of the aforenoted provisions reveal that there are two
essentials that need to be satisfied before the merits of a Section 9 petition
can be touched. They are, that the petitioner must be a party to an arbitration
agreement, and naturally, flowing from it, that there must exist an arbitration
agreement between the parties. The meaning of an ―arbitration agreement‖
has been dealt with, in a detailed provision, under Section 7 of the Act,
which reads as under:
―7. Arbitration agreement.
(1) In this Part, “arbitration agreement” means an agreement by the
parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal
relationship, whether contractual or not.
(2) An arbitration agreement may be in the form of an arbitration
clause in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement.
(3) An arbitration agreement shall be in writing.
(4) An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in—
(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of
telecommunication including communication through electronic
means which provide a record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the
existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied
by the other.
(5) The reference in a contract to a document containing an
arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement if the contract
is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration
clause part of the contract.‖
15.
The ingredients of Section 7, for the purposes of the present
discussion, may be divided into three parts—first, the condition of signing
under Section 7(4)(a) of the Arbitration Act; second, the requirement of
being party to the arbitration agreement under Section 7(1) read with Section
2(1)(h) of the Act; and third, the existence of an intent to arbitrate under
Section 7(1) of the Act. The following analysis, shall be divided into these
three parts.
A.
THE
CONDITION
OF
SIGNING
THE
DOCUMENT
CONTAINING THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
16.
Section 7(3) of the Act requires the arbitration agreement to be ―in
writing‖. Section 7(4) then enumerates the situations wherein an arbitration
agreement could be said to be ―in writing‖. Section 7(4)(a), unlike subclause (b) and (c) of sub-section 4, explicitly records the requirement of
signing. Thus, in a case where the existence of an arbitration agreement is
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
sought to be proved through the means of a document, and not letters, telex,
telegrams or other means of telecommunication, the document must
necessarily be signed by the parties.
17.
Importantly, the requirement of signing a document, which forms part
of Section 7(4)(a) of the Act, was absent in the erstwhile Arbitration Act,
1940. The said Act, under Section 2(a) defined an ―arbitration agreement‖
as a written agreement to submit present and future differences to
arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not. Unlike Section
7(4) of the present Act, the erstwhile Act did not specifically enumerate the
circumstances wherein an agreement could be considered as being ―in
writing.‖ Further, there was no provision, in the earlier legislation, akin to
Section 7 of the present Act, specifically dealing with the requirements of an
arbitration agreement.
18.
Both the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards (hereinafter ―New York Convention‖) and the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Model Law
(hereinafter ―Model Law‖) seem to incorporate the requirement of signing
and for the arbitration agreement to be ―in writing‖.1 The New York
Convention requires contracting states, including India, to recognize an
agreement in writing, under which parties undertake to submit to arbitration
all or any differences which have arisen or may arise between them in
respect of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a
See Andrew Tweeddale and Keren Tweeddale, Arbitration of Commercial Disputes International and
English Law and Practice, Oxford University Press, Chapter 4 – The Arbitration Agreement and the
Parties, pg. 99-101.
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.2 Article II(2) of the New
York Convention then defines the term ―agreement in writing‖ and
provides:
―2. The term “agreement in writing” shall include an arbitral clause
in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
19.
There appears to have been some degree of judicial debate as to
whether the signing requirement is qua the arbitration clause in particular or
whether a signature on the contract containing the clause would also be
sufficient compliance with Article II(2).3 But, what has, however, remained
clear, is that signature itself on the contract is a sine qua non.4
20.
Further, the Model Law under Article 7(2) provides the requirement
of ―in writing‖ in the following words:
―(2) The arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An agreement is in
writing if it is contained in a document signed by the parties or in an
exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of
telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement, or in an
exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of
an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another. The
reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause
constitutes an arbitration agreement provided that the contract is in
writing and the reference is such as to make that clause part of the
contract.‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
Article 2 of the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
10th June 1958.
The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958 – Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation, Albert Jan
van den Berg, Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1984 reprint, II-2.3.2 Whether signatures are
necessary, pg. 192-193: ―In the case of the first alternative, there is no doubt that the signature of the
parties are required because the text of Article II(2) states so explicitly.‖
Ibid.
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
21.
Dr. Peter Binder’s commentary,5 while not explicitly stating,
presumably because the same is obvious, that the Model Law under Article
7(2) requires a document to be actually signed, presents an interesting
analysis as to whether digital signatures would be sufficient compliance of
the said article. Submitting in the negative, the learned author stated as
under:
―Accordingly, it is submitted that it was no the drafters‟ intention to
give “document signed by the parties” such a wide interpretation as
to include digitally signed electronic documents; rather, the
interpretation should take the New York Convention as the precedent,
which provides for a signed paper document only.‖6
22.
The English law through the Arbitration Act, 1996 also requires an
arbitration agreement to be in writing, however, a conscious departure seems
to have been made by making the requirement of signing optional. Section 5
of the said Act titled ―agreements to be in writing‖ reads as under:
“5. Agreements to be in writing.
(1) The provisions of this Part apply only where the arbitration
agreement is in writing, and any other agreement between the parties
as to any matter is effective for the purposes of this Part only if in
writing.
The expressions “agreement”, “agree” and “agreed” shall be
construed accordingly.
(2) There is an agreement in writing—
(a) if the agreement is made in writing (whether or not it is signed
by the parties),
(b) if the agreement is made by exchange of communications in
writing, or
(c) if the agreement is evidenced in writing.
…‖
(Emphasis Supplied)
Dr. Peter Binder, International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation in UNCITRAL Model Law
Jurisdictions, 3rd Ed., 2010, Sweet and Maxwell.
Ibid, para. 2-025, pg. 84.
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
23.
The Indian Arbitration Act, therefore, unlike its English counterpart,
requires, in case an arbitration agreement is a document or contained in a
document, an additional mandatory requirement of signing, for it to be ―in
writing‖. The rationale, seems to be, to require clear evidence of the consent
of a party that their right to approach courts is being closed by them
voluntarily by opting in favour of a private adjudicatory mechanism viz.
arbitration. Thus, the mere existence of a document, despite it containing an
arbitration clause, and persons, even if they are party to it, would not qualify
as an ―arbitration agreement‖ unless it is signed by the parties, including the
party seeking to invoke the clause as also the party against whom
enforcement is sought.
24.
Reliance may be placed on the decision of the Bombay High Court in
Pramod Chimanbai Patel v. Lalit Constructions and Anr.,7 where a
petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act was dismissed on the
ground, inter alia, that there was no arbitration agreement between the
parties, as the document containing the alleged arbitration clause, was not
signed by both the parties. The material portion of the judgement reads as
under:
―9. The only question relevant for deciding the controversy in the
present case is whether the arbitration agreement, if in writing, must
be signed by both the parties. I am of the view that it must be signed
by both the parties. The other categories of agreements in writing
contemplated by sub-section (4) i.e. letters, telex, telegrams or other
means of telecommunication which provide a record of the agreement,
or a statement of claim and defence clearly contemplate that such
documents would be arbitration agreements in writing only when they
are exchanged between the parties. The purpose is clear enough. The
2002 SCC OnLine Bom 546.
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
exchange signifies an active assent by both parties and a
demonstrable meeting of minds of both parties as to the arbitration
agreement. Having regard to this context, I am of view that in clause
(a) when Parliament says “document signed by the parties” it intends
a document signed by both the parties.
…
14. Therefore, the arbitration clause relied on by the petitioner
contained in the letter dated 21-5-1999 signed by the petitioner alone
is not a valid arbitration agreement. There is no merit in this petition
under section 9.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
25.
In O.P. Malhotra’s Commentary on The Law of Arbitration, it is
also, materially, noted that: ―…if it can be prima facie shown that the
parties are ad idem, then the mere fact of one party not having signed the
agreement, cannot absolve him from the liability under the agreement.‖8
However, the present case does not attract the aforenoted treatment. The
parties are, evidently, not ad idem on whether the petitioner is a party to the
agreement; the effect, rights and liabilities of the petitioner under the AoA;
and specifically, whether the petitioner can enforce the AoA against the
respondents. The petitioner has also not placed on record material that
would suggest a common consensus between the parties on the effect and
import of the agreement.
26.
In the instant case, the purported arbitration clause relied upon by the
petitioner is part of the Company’s AoA, in which she is a managing
director. The petitioner does not claim that the alleged arbitration agreement
is contained in an exchange of letters, telegrams or other means of
communication, nor is her case that it is part of an exchange of statements of
claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one
4th Ed., Volume 1, pg. 301.
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
party and not denied by the other. Thus, the petitioner, in order to satisfy the
―in writing‖ requirement per Section 7(4) of the Arbitration Act, and in turn
fulfil the condition pre-requisite for an ―arbitration agreement‖ under
Section 7 of the Act, needs to point to a document, containing the arbitration
clause, that is signed by the parties to the instant petition.
27.
The AoA, however, admittedly, is not signed by the petitioner, let
alone the other parties. The document which contains the purported written
arbitration clause, on the strength of which interim reliefs are prayed for by
the petitioner, therefore, falls foul of Section 7(4) of the Arbitration Act.
Thus, it could safely be concluded that there exists no arbitration agreement
between the parties in the manner required by the Act. The petition, on this
ground alone, deserves to be dismissed. However, there are additional
reasons, which are alluded to in order to appreciate the other arguments
canvassed by Mr. Krishnan.
B.
THE
REQUIREMENT
OF
BEING
PARTY
TO
THE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
28.
Independent of the signing requirement mandated by Section 7(4)(a)
of the Act. Another requirement of Section 7 may be analysed. As was noted
in paras 13-14 of this judgement, Section 7(1) read with Section 2(1)(h) of
the Act requires a person relying on an arbitration clause/agreement to be
privy/party to the said contract. The alleged arbitration clause relied upon by
the petitioner is contained in the AoA of the Company, and thus binds the
company and its members. Section 10(1) of the Companies Act, 2013
creates this deeming fiction in the following words:
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
―10. Effect of memorandum and articles.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the memorandum and articles
shall, when registered, bind the company and the members thereof to
the same extent as if they respectively had been signed by the company
and by each member, and contained covenants on its and his part to
observe all the provisions of the memorandum and of the articles.‖
29.
A bare perusal of the aforenoted provision reveals that it is only the
members and the Company itself who can be considered parties to the AoA,
by virtue of a deemed signature, and covenants on their part, to observe all
provisions of the founding documents. A director/managing director
simplicitor who is not a ―member‖ as defined under Section 2(55) of the
Companies Act, 2013, cannot be termed as a party to the AoA, especially
not for the purposes of Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.
30.
Reliance may be placed on C. Duraiswami Iyangar v. United India
Life Assurance Co. Ltd.9 in which a Division Bench of the Madras High
Court held as under:
―Nor can the policyholders take advantage of the articles of
association, to which they were not parties. It is now well established
that, though the articles constitute a contract between the company
and a member in respect of his rights as a member, the articles do not
constitute a contract between the company and third persons, a third
person who purports to have rights against the company would be
precluded from relying on the articles as the basis of his claim and
must prove a special contract. This question was the subject of an
authoritative pronouncement of the House of Lords in Southern
Foundries Ld. v. Shirlaw¹. Reference may also be made to Browne v.
La Trinidad², where the proposition was affirmed that the articles are
merely a contract between the shareholders inter se, and that, though
a person, in whose favour a stipulation is made in the articles, may
afterwards have shares allotted to him, he is not, by that means, in the
same position as if he had entered into a contract with the company.
Similarly, in Baily v. British Equitable Assurance Co.³, it was pointed
out that the rights of a shareholder in respect of his shares, except so
SCC OnLine Mad 243.
Signed
By:PURUSHAINDRA
KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
10:08:14
far as they may be protected by the memorandum of association or by
statute, may be liable to be altered by special resolution. But the case
of a contract between an outsider and the company is entirely
different, and even a shareholder must be regarded as an outsider in
so far as he contracts with the company otherwise than in respect of
his shares.‖
31.
The learned authors of Buckley on the Companies Acts note that ―all
the authorities as to whether the articles constitute a contract as between the
company and its members were reviewed by Astbury J. in the case of in the
case of Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep Breeders Association
and Anr.,10 who decided … that though the articles can neither constitute a
contract between the company and an outsider nor give any individual
member of the company special contractual rights beyond those of the
members…generally, they do in fact constitute a contract between a
company and its members in respect of their ordinary rights as members.‖11
32.
In Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep Breeders Association
and Anr. (supra) (hereinafter ―Hickman‖) the Chancery Division was to
decide on a stay sought against proceedings brought about by a member of
the defendant-company on grounds that there existed an arbitration clause in
the AoA, with which the plaintiff-member therein was bound. The Court
after discussing a catena of authorities, concluded:
―In all these last-mentioned cases the respective articles sought to be
enforced related to the rights and obligations of the members
generally as such, and not to rights of the character dealt with in the
four authorities first above referred to. It is difficult to reconcile these
two classes of decisions and the judicial opinions therein expressed,
but I think this much is clear - first, that no article can constitute a
contract between the company and a third person; secondly, that no
right merely purported to be given by an article to a person, whether
(1914-15) All ER Rep 900 : (1915) 1 Ch 881.
14th Ed., Volume 1, London Butterworths, 1981, pg. 66.
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a member or not, in a capacity other than that of a member, as, for
instance, as solicitor, promoter, or director, can be enforced against
the company;…‖
(Emphasis supplied)
On articles specifically, Buckley on Companies Act notes that ―in Beattie v
Beattie, it was decided that an article referring to arbitration any dispute
between the company and any member did not constitute a submission
applicable to a dispute between the company and one of its directors as
such, notwithstanding that the director was a member of the company‖.12
33.
The decision of the Court of Appeals in London Sack & Bag Co. Ltd.
v. Dixon & Lugton Ltd.,13 is also rather interesting. In the said case the
respondent-buyer company paid £500 for the purchase of certain goods and
upon complaining that the goods were not satisfactory, filed a claim seeking
their money back with interest and damages. The sellers-appellant company
sought to stay the proceedings on the grounds that an arbitration agreement
existed between the parties. This was sought to be pleaded by the appellant,
in Scott LJ’s words, ―by a devious route‖.
34.
First the respondent relied on Section 20 of the English Companies
Act, 1929 which is pari materia to Section 10 of the Companies Act, 2013
to emphasise that members are bound by the Memorandum of Association
(hereinafter ―MoA‖) as if they had signed the said document; next reliance
was placed on the rules framed under the MoA, where Rule 1 of the same
provided for an arbitration clause; next to argue that it is a ―member‖,
reliance was placed on the articles of the AoA which noted that ―companies
Ibid., pg. 67. Also see Russel on Arbitration, 24th Ed., Sweet and Maxwell, para. 2-053, pg. 55-56.
(1943) 2 All ER 763.
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may be admitted‖, and they must be represented by one or more of their
directors whose names must be submitted to the association.
35.
Scott LJ rejected the application for stay on multiple grounds, one of
which, importantly was:
―…The two companies parties to this litigation are not ordinary
members of the company at all; they are only members in the same
sense that members of a proprietary club who have no shares in the
company owning the club, are given certain rights of members, eg, to
frequent the club for meals, or golf, or reading. I cannot think that the
principle of the cases cited to us can be extended to such members as
these two companies are. Their directors are required to hold a share
in order to represent them, but no trusts are recognised by the
articles; and I do not think the cases in question have any bearing on
the issue we have to decide. I am not satisfied that it is possible to
spell a written submission out of the memorandum and articles of
association and the rules, even with the help of the Companies Act
1929, s 20.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
Even if the respondent in the said case were an individual director, the last
sentence emphasized in the extracted portion above, would have still applied
with full force. Mackinnon LJ in his separate concurring opinion, also,
importantly, held as under:
―It is asserted that the plaintiff company and the defendant company
have been “admitted to the association,” being represented by a
director or directors holding a share. No doubt articles of association
may create a contract between the member-shareholders. Indeed, it
is so provided by the Companies Act 1929, s 20. But I think it is
impossible to contend that, by reason of these articles, the plaintiff
company and the defendant company have made a contract to
submit disputes to arbitration because each has a director who is a
shareholder and the companies have been admitted to the
association—whatever that may mean.‖
(Emphasis supplied)
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36.
Before concluding the discussion on this issue, the reliance by Mr.
Krishnan on Biswanath Rungta v. Oriental Industrial Engineering Co. Pvt.
Ltd.14 may be considered in a bit more detail. The material portion of the
judgement reads as under:
“2. That there was such an article containing the aforesaid term is
undisputed. It was contended, firstly, that the disputes in this case
were covered by the said arbitration clause inasmuch as these
disputes were those arising between the company and the directors
relating to their dues or privileges or otherwise. Read in proper
perspective the disputes raised in the suit were those that were within
the ambit of the arbitration clause covered by the article. In support of
the proposition reliance was placed on Section 36 of the Companies
Act, 1956, which unlike Section 20 of the English Companies Act,
1948, makes the Articles of Association binding on the company in
specific terms. Reliance was also placed in aid of the arguments that
the Articles of Association bound the directors as well as the
company on the decision in the case of Hickman v. Kent or Romney
Marsh Sheep Breeders' Association, reported in (1915) 1 Ch D 881
at p. 902 and also on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Hanuman Prasad Gupta v. Hiralal, reported in (1970) 1 SCC 437
: AIR 1971 SC 206. The facts that the directors as well as the
company are bound by the Articles of Association and the
arbitration clause in the instant case was quite enough to cover the
disputes raised in this case between the company and its directors
are not seriously disputed. …‖
(Emphasis supplied)
37.
The issue as to whether the AoA bound the directors and the company
was not, as the judgement records, ―seriously disputed‖ by the parties
therein. Observations made by a court, on the basis of parties’ admission, do
not, it is trite law, create binding precedents. Also then, it is apposite to
clarify that the true issue is not whether a director non-member is merely
bound by the AoA, certainly he is bound/governed in the sense that he
cannot act contrary to the articles, but that neither makes him a party to the
1974 SCC OnLine Cal 74, para. 2.
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AoA, nor allows him to enforce the articles against a member or the
company concerned.
38.
The decision of Hickman (supra) cited by the Calcutta High Court
does not stand for the authority that a director simplicitor who is not a
member can invoke an arbitration clause in the AoA. The facts of the said
case narrate that the party seeking a referral for arbitration was indeed a
―member‖, and therefore a party to the AoA. Astbury J. succinctly stated as
such in the following words:
―In the present case the plaintiff‟s action is, in substance, to enforce
rights as a member under the articles against the company.‖
39.
Insofar as the reliance placed by the Calcutta High Court on
Hanuman Prasad Gupta (supra) is concerned, this was a case concerning
appeals from complaints filed under Section 207 of the Companies Act,
1956 on an allegation of failure on the part of the appellant therein, to pay
him dividends on shares held by him. The said judgement is not at all
germane to the issue at hand. This Court is, therefore, not persuaded to adopt
the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court.
40.
Next, the petitioner in its rejoinder submission note dated 16.12.2025,
made an interesting argument, which for accuracy is being reproduced as
under:
―7. Without prejudice to the above, the Petitioner submits that the
directors do not need to be in a contractual relationship in order to
fulfil the requirements of a valid arbitration agreement under Section
7 of Arbitration Act. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Cox & Kings Ltd.
v. SAP India (P) Ltd., (2024) 4 SCC 1, while discussing Vidya Drolia
v. Durga Trading Corpn., (2021) 2 SCC 1, observed that “a legal
Id. (No. 10) at 911.
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relationship means a relationship which gives rise to legal obligations
and duties, and confers a right. Such a right may be contractual or
non-contractual. In case of a non-contractual legal relationship, the
cause of action arises in tort, restitution, breach of statutory duty, or
some other non-contractual cause of action. Thus, the legislative
intent underlying Section 7 suggests that any legal relationship,
including relationships where there is no contract between the
persons or entities, but whose actions or conduct has given rise to a
relationship, could form a subject-matter of an arbitration agreement
under Section 7.‖
The petitioners are in the context of this submission, plainly wrong. The
reference to a ―legal relationship‖ in Cox & Kings (supra) was in the
context of Section 7(1) of the Act, and dealt with the issue concerning the
kinds of claims that can be referred for arbitration by the parties. These
claims may be, in the words of the Supreme Court, contractual or noncontractual, and in the latter category of cases, the cause of action may arise
in tort, restitution, breach of statutory duty etc. The said judgement is not an
authority for waiving off the requirement of an arbitration agreement to be a
contract. It is but obvious that such a declaration would lie at the teeth of the
statute itself.
41.
From the discussion above, it could safely be concluded that the
petitioner is not a party to the purported arbitration agreement/agreement
containing the arbitration clause viz. the AoA. The petitioner not being a
party to the AoA, is precluded from relying upon the same, owing to
Section 7(1) read with Section 2(1)(h) of the Arbitration Act. There,
therefore, does not exist an arbitration agreement between the parties, and,
resultantly, the present Section 9 petition is not maintainable.
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42.
However, even if it is assumed, for the purposes of analysing the lis
further, that the petitioner is a party to the document containing the
arbitration clause, and furthermore that the signing requirement can be
waived in the facts of this case, it needs to be seen whether Clause 30A
relied upon by the petitioner actually evinces an intent to arbitrate.
C. THE INTENT TO ARBITRATE
43.
Separate from the requirement of signing the document containing the
arbitration clause, as also of being a party to that agreement, it may now be
seen whether, substantively, there is an arbitration agreement in consonance
with the Arbitration Act. Since this discussion will turn on the actual
wording of the clause, it is at this stage, found appropriate to reproduce the
same:
―30A In case of any dispute between the shareholders‟ interest as
Directors or any Director on the one hand and the Managing Director
on the other or the Shareholders on the one hand and the Company on
the other, the same shall be in the first instance referred to the joint
arbitration of the auditors and the lawyers of the Company.‖
44.
The essential ingredients of an arbitration agreement have been
declared by the Supreme Court in KK Modi v. KN Modi and Ors.,16 which
read as under:
―17. Among the attributes which must be present for an agreement to
be considered as an arbitration agreement are:
(1) The arbitration agreement must contemplate that the decision
of the tribunal will be binding on the parties to the agreement,
(2) that the jurisdiction of the tribunal to decide the rights of
parties must derive either from the consent of the parties or from
an order of the court or from a statute, the terms of which make it
clear that the process is to be an arbitration,
(1998) 3 SCC 573.
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(3) the agreement must contemplate that substantive rights of
parties will be determined by the agreed tribunal,
(4) that the tribunal will determine the rights of the parties in an
impartial and judicial manner with the tribunal owing an equal
obligation of fairness towards both sides,
(5) that the agreement of the parties to refer their disputes to the
decision of the tribunal must be intended to be enforceable in law
and lastly,
(6) the agreement must contemplate that the tribunal will make a
decision upon a dispute which is already formulated at the time
when a reference is made to the tribunal.
18. The other factors which are relevant include, whether the
agreement contemplates that the tribunal will receive evidence from
both sides and hear their contentions or at least give the parties an
opportunity to put them forward; whether the wording of the
agreement is consistent or inconsistent with the view that the process
was intended to be an arbitration, and whether the agreement
requires the tribunal to decide the dispute according to law.
…
20. The authorities thus seem to agree that while there are no
conclusive tests, by and large, one can follow a set of guidelines in
deciding whether the agreement is to refer an issue to an expert or
whether the parties have agreed to resolve disputes through
arbitration.
21. Therefore our courts have laid emphasis on (1) existence of
disputes as against intention to avoid future disputes; (2) the tribunal
or forum so chosen is intended to act judicially after taking into
account relevant evidence before it and the submissions made by the
parties before it; and (3) the decision is intended to bind the parties.
Nomenclature used by the parties may not be conclusive. One must
examine the true intent and purport of the agreement…‖
45.
More recently, the Supreme Court in South Delhi Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. SMS Ltd.,17 after relying upon KK Modi (supra),
and analysing the global position on the validity of arbitration agreements
detailed the following, as necessary ingredients of a valid arbitration
agreement:
―D.1.3. The Necessary Ingredients of a Valid Arbitration Agreement
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1138.
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30. Considering the global position on the validity of arbitration
agreements in tandem with the settled law that holds the field in India,
we find that the existence of an arbitration agreement necessarily
postulates the presence of the following ingredients:
i. Clear Intent to Arbitrate
The agreement must reflect a definitive and mutual intention to refer
disputes to arbitration, excluding the jurisdiction of civil courts in
respect of such matters. Consensus ad-idem or „meeting of the minds‟
of the respective parties towards settling any disputes that may arise
between them through the process of arbitration must be made out
from the form and substance of the legal agreement or contract. This
ideally entails the parties reducing their intention of entering into an
arbitration agreement into some tangible medium.
ii. Binding Adjudicatory Process
The arbitration agreement must contemplate a binding and
enforceable resolution of disputes. The process must culminate in a
final and conclusive award, not a non-binding recommendation or
mediation outcome. In essence, the result of the arbitral process
should be final and binding on both the parties.
iii. Compliance with Arbitration Norms
While the statutory minimums do not universally require specification
of seat, venue, or applicable procedural rules, best practices and
several foreign jurisdictions encourage clarity in these respects to
ensure legal certainty. The agreement should allow for party
autonomy in the appointment of arbitrators and procedural conduct,
subject to statutory safeguards. The adversarial process, which
inheres in the institution of arbitration, must also be given due
credence via provision for an impartial adjudicatory body, whose
decisions involve deference to the principles of natural justice.‖
46.
There is no requirement to express, in novel terms, what the essentials
of an arbitration agreement are. The authorities cited above are sufficiently
detailed and clear. What is more important, however, is to analyse the
grounds on the basis of which the validity of arbitration clauses have been
assailed. This discussion is less concerned about the exact wording of the
clauses, and more about the principled inferences which courts have drawn,
on the basis of the broad setting of a clause.
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47.
In Bharat Bhushan Bansal v. U.P. Small Industries Corpn. Ltd.,18
the Supreme Court interpreted an arbitration clause in a contract between the
parties under which the appellant had undertaken the work of construction of
a factory and allied buildings of the respondent therein. The clause in their
agreement provided that the decision of the Managing Director of the
respondent-corporation shall be final. This was found to be in the nature of
an expert determination, intended to avoid a dispute rather than to decide
formulated disputes in a quasi-judicial manner.
48.
The issue of interested parties being named as arbitrators, and the
intent of the parties as reflected therefrom was further considered by the
Supreme Court in Alchemist Hospitals Ltd. v. ICT Health Technology
Services India (P) Ltd.,19 where the clause in issue provided the arbitrators
to be the respective Chairmen of the parties themselves. It was held that
while the arbitrators so named are disqualified under Section 12(5) of the
Act, and to that extent this part of the clause may be ―waived‖, the parties
choosing the Chairmen to conduct adjudication is an important indicium to
decipher the intent of the parties. Ultimately, it was found that the clause
suggested an attempt at amicable resolution inter se rather than a definitive
submission to arbitration.
49.
On similar lines, this Court in Super Ads v. All India Radio
(Akashvani) and Ors.,20 dealt with an arbitration clause between the parties,
where the Director General of the respondent was made the adjudicator of
(1999) 2 SCC 166.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2345.
2023 SCC OnLine Del 1837.
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disputes. It was held that the clause did not amount to an arbitration
agreement but was an in-house escalation/dispute resolution mechanism.
50.
The discussion above would safely lead to the conclusion that the
naming of an interested party as an adjudicator between the parties, may be
an indication of the clause not intending to be a binding process to decide
their substantive rights and liabilities, but an in-house, pre-escalation,
resolution-oriented mechanism.
51.
The decision of South Delhi Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra),
further provides guidance on inferences which could be drawn from the
general and broad wording of a clause. The material principles, as deduced
from para 38 of the judgement are firstly, the subject-clause is a useful
indication of the intent of the parties; secondly, similar to the case-law
discussed above, the naming of an interested party is indicative of the
process being an internal dispute resolution mechanism; and thirdly, the fact
that the appointment of the decision-maker is entirely within the control of
one party, further indicates that it was not intended to be an arbitration as
meant under the Arbitration Act.
52.
Before delving into Article 30A of the AoA, the decisions relied upon
by the petitioner may be considered. In Offshore Infrastructures Ltd. v.
Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.,21 the Supreme Court was considering an
appeal against a judgement of the High Court,22 whereby an application filed
for the appointment of an arbitrator under Section 11 of the Act was rejected
on the sole ground that it was time barred. A review petition assailing the
2025 SCC OnLine SC 2147.
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said decision was again rejected, with no other arguments being made apart
from limitation.23 Before the Supreme Court, an argument was made that
independent of limitation, since the arbitration clause contained in the
General Conditions of the Contract provides for arbitration to be conducted
by the managing director of one of the parties or an officer appointed by
him, the same is bad in law.
53.
This submission was rejected by the Supreme Court, and the appeal
was allowed. While the exact clause has not been reproduced in the
judgement, two aspects of this decision may be noted — first, at para 20 it
was found that the ―core part of the contract‖ was the referring of dispute
for arbitration; and second, since the procedure for arbitration could be
effectively severed from the intent to arbitrate, relying on Perkins Eastman
Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd.24 an independent arbitrator can be
appointed under Section 11 of the Act.
54.
Next in SK Engineering and Construction Company India v. Bharat
Heavy Electricals Ltd.25 a coordinate bench of this Court analysed an
exceedingly detailed arbitration clause contained in a work order which
fructified into a contract. The issue therein was restricted to whether the
following stipulation in the clause poisons the entirety of the arbitration
agreement, and prevents a court from appointing an arbitrator under Section
11(6) of the Act:
―It is also a term of this contract that no person other than a person
Arbitration Case No. 23/2022, Order Dt. 19.12.2023, High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.
Review Petition No. 76/2024, Order Dt. 10.04.2024, High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur.
(2020) 20 SCC 760.
2023 SCC OnLine Del 7575.
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appointed by such Head TBG as aforesaid should act as arbitrator
and if for any reason that is not possible the matter is not to be
referred to arbitration at all‖
Upon finding there to be an agreement to refer disputes for arbitration, the
aforenoted stipulation was found to be a mere expression of procedure, and
resultantly severable from the remaining part of the arbitration agreement,
which, was found to have evinced an intent to arbitrate.
55.
In both these decisions, it was found that at the core of the
clause/agreement in issue, there was an underlying intent for referring
disputes to arbitration. It is only when the intent to arbitrate is established,
that a Court can venture into an analysis of what the procedure for
arbitration is, and whether it can be severed from the ―core‖ part of the
contract, to uphold the intent of the parties. The analysis as to whether there
exists an intent to arbitrate, naturally, precedes the inquiry on whether the
named arbitrators disqualified under Section 12(5) of the Act can be
replaced with neutral arbitrators, by eschewing the mechanism from the
substantive will of the parties.
56.
Importantly, as was observed above, a stipulation naming persons
disqualified under Section 12(5) of the Act to act as arbitrators, is material to
conclude whether there exists an arbitration clause between the parties or
not. If the clause/agreement in issue itself does not contemplate arbitration,
the applicability of Perkins never becomes a consideration.
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57.
In Babanrao Rajaram Pund v. Samarth Builders and Developers
and Anr.,26 the Supreme Court considered an arbitration clause, which by a
bare perusal, would be found to be markedly different from Article 30A of
the AoA. Additionally, unlike the present case, in that case there was an
explicit recital to the effect that the arbitration shall be governed by the
Arbitration Act. Evidently, the facts of the present dispute lie on a different
footing. The reliance placed on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander27 also
does not really assist the petitioner. The material paragraph relied upon by
Mr. Krishnan reads as under:
―(iii) Where the clause provides that in the event of disputes arising
between the parties, the disputes shall be referred to arbitration, it is
an arbitration agreement. Where there is a specific and direct
expression of intent to have the disputes settled by arbitration, it is
not necessary to set out the attributes of an arbitration agreement to
make it an arbitration agreement. But where the clause relating to
settlement of disputes, contains words which specifically exclude any
of the attributes of an arbitration agreement or contains anything
that detracts from an arbitration agreement, it will not be an
arbitration agreement. For example, where an agreement requires or
permits an authority to decide a claim or dispute without hearing, or
requires the authority to act in the interests of only one of the parties,
or provides that the decision of the authority will not be final and
binding on the parties, or that if either party is not satisfied with the
decision of the authority, he may file a civil suit seeking relief, it
cannot be termed as an arbitration agreement.‖
58.
The petitioner while stressing upon the first sentence of para. 8(iii),
contends that since Article 30A effectively provides that disputes are to be
referred for arbitration, the inquiry ends. However, the Court cannot lose
sight of the fact that the mere mention of the word ―arbitration‖ would not
be conclusive of the parties’ intention. As the second sentence notes, where
(2022) 9 SCC 691.
(2007) 5 SCC 719.
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there is a specific and direct expression of intent to have the disputes settled
by arbitration, it is not necessary to set out the attributes of an arbitration
agreement. However, in the instant case, as the analysis below shall reveal,
there is — firstly, no such clear expression of intent; and secondly, sufficient
textual indications that detract from Article 30A of the AoA being
considered as an arbitration agreement.
59.
Article 30A of the AoA, itself, may now be dissected. At the outset it
may be seen that it forms part of the heading titled ―Indemnity‖. The
argument of Mr. Krishnan that Article 30A is in no way related to Article
30, does not inspire confidence. The entire AoA is divided into the
following
headings—―private
company‖,
―shares‖,
―registration
of
members‖, ―proceedings at general meeting‖, ―directors‖, ―the seal‖,
―reserves and capitalization of reserves‖, ―dividend‖, ―accounts‖,
―indemnity‖ and ―winding up‖. Each of these headings has various articles
underneath them, or if the AoA was to be simply looked at as a numbered
list, between every two headings there are various articles. Upon perusing
the AoA, it appears that without a single exception every article is relatable
to the heading which precedes that article or set of articles.
60.
It seems rather unusual to accept the claim that the AoA, which has a
separate heading for the sole article dealing with the ―company seal‖, will
not have some degree of categorization for the dispute resolution clause,
assuming the clause was intended to be as such. The exercise of drafting a
contract, takes within its sweep the assumption, that what appears to be
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excluded has been excluded consciously,28 more so when the document
specifically addresses all material aspects. In such cases, omission becomes
an expression of interest.
61.
Thus, Article 30A does indeed relate to Article 30 which provides:
―
INDEMNITY
30. The Directors, Auditors, Secretary, and other officers for the time
being acting in relation to any of the affairs of the Company and their
heirs, executors and administrators respectively shall be indemnified
out of the assets of the Company from and against all suits,
proceedings, costs, charges, loss, damages and expenses which they
or any of them shall or may incur or sustain by reason of any act done
or omitted in or about the execution of their duty in their respective
offices or trust except such (if any) as they shall incur or sustain by or
through their own wilful neglect or default respectively and no such
Director, Auditor, Secretary, Officer or trustee shall be answerable
for the acts, receipts, neglects, or defaults of any other officer or
trustee or for joining in any receipts for the sake of conformity or for
the solvency or honesty of any bankers or other persons with whom
any money or effects belonging to the Company may be lodged or
deposited for safe custody or for any insufficiency or any security
upon which any monies of the Company shall be invested or for any
other loss or damage due to any such cause as aforesaid or which
may happen in or about the execution of his office or trust unless the
same shall happen through the wilful neglect or default of such officer
or trustee.‖
62.
Article 30A, therefore, is meant to deal with ―any dispute‖ which may
arise between the parties, in relation to the indemnity extended to them. The
word ―any‖, must necessarily be interpreted in light of Article 30, and, thus,
it would refer to the variety of disputes which may arise pertaining to
indemnity. If ―any dispute‖, however, was not constrained by Article 30 of
the AoA, it would also seem to take into account those disputes which arise
dehors the individuals’ association with the company. It would then, at first
See also Sir Kim Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 7 th Ed., Sweet and Maxwell, para. 7.54, pg.
430.
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KUMAR KAURAV
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SHARMA
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blush, also apply to a dispute between two directors pertaining to a loan
given by one to another, without any reference to the Company. This cannot,
possibly, be the intention of the parties.
63.
Further, under the clause in issue, ―joint arbitration‖ is to be
conducted by the auditors and lawyers of the Company. If Mr. Krishnan’s
submission is to be accepted, the auditors and lawyers of the Company were
intended to act as adjudicators, even when a dispute, in a given case, arises
between the Company and its shareholders. Meaning thereby, that
individuals who, in all likelihood would be litigating against a given party,
were to be adjudicators determining the substantive lis between the parties,
relating to, again if Mr. Krishnan’s argument is accepted, ―any dispute‖
between them.
64.
Additionally, there is also the usage of the words ―in the first
instance‖ in Article 30A, which indicates that a step is to be taken by the
parties after this ―joint arbitration‖ is conducted. Learned senior counsel for
the petitioner contends that arbitration would naturally be in the first
instance, post which the Act takes over. However, it would be unwise to
interpret the said words as being redundant and superfluous. Upon reading
the clause as a whole, the intent behind the expression ―in the first instance‖
appears to be to further clarify that the adjudication by the lawyers and
auditors is an in-house redressal mechanism and not a final determination of
their rights and liabilities.
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KUMAR KAURAV
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65.
The Supreme Court’s decision in P. Dasaratharama Reddy Complex
v. Government of Karnataka and Anr.29 was canvassed as an authority on
the point that ―in the first instance‖ is conclusive indication of a clause not
being an arbitration agreement. While it does appear to be the case that the
ultimate decision in the said case was premised on the expression ―in the
first place‖,30 it is also true that the clause therein is not really similar to
Article 30A. It is important to clarify that it is not merely owing to the
expression ―in the first instance‖ that the Court has arrived at its conclusion
as to the intent to arbitrate, not to say that it could not have, but a holistic
reading of the AoA and Article 30A, has led to the conclusion reached.
66.
Lastly, the decisions in A. Ayyasamy v. A. Paramasivam,31 Enercon
Indi v. Enercon GmBh,32 MTNL v. Canara Bank,33 and Govind Rubber
Ltd. v. Louids Dreyfus Commodities Asia (P) Ltd.,34 cited by the petitioner
are authorities for Courts being required to read agreements, including
arbitration clauses, not in a pedantic fashion, but in manner that gives effect
to the parties intention, accounts for business efficacy and commercial
wisdom.
67.
In this context it may be seen that directors as per Article 16(3) of the
AoA can be appointed, may be dismissed, or removed with or without cause
by an ordinary resolution of the Company in the General Meeting.
Accepting Mr. Krishnan’s argument would lead to a situation where the
(2014) 2 SCC 201.
Ibid., para. 27.
(2016) 10 SCC 386.
(2014) 5 SCC 1.
(2020) 12 SCC 767.
(2015) 13 SCC 477.
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individuals to whom Article 30A applies can fluctuate without the consent
of the other parties. Meaning thereby that a director who today agitates ―any
dispute‖ against other identified directors before an arbitrator, would
tomorrow be forced to refer his disputes for arbitration with another new and
changed director, which was appointed in the General Meeting, without the
consent of the erstwhile director. In the instant case as well, respondent no. 3
for instance, who has been a director of the Company since 1992 is now
being forced into arbitration with the petitioner who became a director of the
company on 31.08.2021. Accepting such a clause as referring parties to
binding arbitration under the Act would lie ill of business efficacy, as also
the parties’ intent.
68.
Before concluding, it may be observed that while construing a
contract, the Court proceeds with the sole objective of discovering the intent
of the parties. The merits or demerits of the contract, or the wisdom of the
parties are not questions of concern or relevance. While interpreting the
intent to arbitrate, certain degree of circumspection is warranted, as an
incorrect or sweeping finding on the intent to arbitrate could effectively
deprive the un-intending party from redressing its grievance before the
primary judicial fora of the country and would, further, relegate such a party
to a private adjudicatory mechanism which it may not have agreed to. Thus,
the intent must be clearly made out, either from explicit terms, or from an
unavoidable, inescapable and principled inference from the terms of the
contract.
69.
In light of the discussion above, it is clear that the document
purportedly containing the arbitration clause, is not signed by the petitioner
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and, therefore, falls foul of Section 7(4)(a) of the Act. Further, the petitioner
being a mere managing director, without being a member of the Company,
in any case, is not a party to the AoA, which contains the alleged arbitration
clause, and thus the requirement of Section 7(1) read with Section 2(1)(h) of
the Act is also not satisfied. Also then, Clause 30A of the AoA, does not
evince an intention to arbitrate as per the provisions of the Arbitration Act.
There is, therefore, no ―arbitration agreement‖ in terms of Section 7 of the
Arbitration Act, on the basis of which, interim reliefs can be sought by the
petitioner under Section 9 of the Act. Resultantly, the present petition under
Section 9 of the Act is found to not be maintainable.
IV. ORDER
70.
The present petition is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, stand
disposed of.
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J
JANUARY 15, 2026
aks
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KUMAR KAURAV
Signed By:AMIT KUMAR
SHARMA
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