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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 24.07.2026
+
RC.REV. 637/2019 & CM APPL. 79218/2025 (For permitting
the respondent to file affidavit relating to subsequent
development)
NARESH KUMAR
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. Mayank Rustagi and Mr.
Hemant Dixit, Advocates.
versus
SHIV SHANKAR
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. N.D. Pancholi, Mr. Deepak
Mayur and Mr. Vishal
Pancholi, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGMENT (Oral)
The present Revision Petition has been filed under Section 25-B
(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 19581, challenging the Judgment
dated 04.06.20192 passed by the learned SCJ-cum-RC (Central), Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi3, in Eviction Petition bearing No.
E. 77988/20164.
2.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submits
that the learned RC has erred in granting leave to defend insofar as,
while doing so, he has not considered the bona fide requirement
evinced by the landlord, which was for the purpose of a store (storage
DRC Act
Impugned Judgment
learned RC
Eviction Petition
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 637/2019
space) for the shop that he was seeking to open in the connected
premises.
3.
He also submits that the discussion in the Impugned Judgment
is generic in nature without in any manner adverting to the bona fide
need that has been evinced by the Petitioner.
4.
He further submits that the grant of leave to defend without
taking into consideration the sole bona fide need and purely on generic
grounds is liable to be set aside and interfered with by this Court.
5.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent defends the Impugned judgment and submits that there is
no bona fide in filing of the eviction petition. He submits that the
petition itself came to be filed two and a half years after the filing of
the eviction petition pertaining to the connected shop and he relies
upon Paragraph 15 of the Impugned Judgment to support his
contention.
6.
This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material
available on record, including the Impugned Judgment.
7.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
8.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.5, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
(1998) 8 SCC 119
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RC.REV. 637/2019
Singh6, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua7, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
9.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.8, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover9.
10.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25B of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court
exclusive power of revision against an order of the learned Rent
Controller, being in the nature of superintendence over an
inferior court on the decision-making process, inclusive of
procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to
substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial court by
exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on
the process adopted. The scope of interference by the High
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
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Court is very restrictive and except in cases where there is an
error apparent on the face of the record, which would only mean
that in the absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court
should not venture to disturb such a decision. There is no need
for holding a roving inquiry in such matters which would
otherwise amount to converting the power of superintendence
into that of a regular first appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the
legislature.”
11.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
absence of adjudication warranting interference.
12.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned RC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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RC.REV. 637/2019
13.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioner against the
Impugned Order are required to be examined.
14.
Since the grievance of the Petitioner is principally directed
against the manner in which the learned RC has dealt with the plea of
bona fide requirement while granting leave to defend, it would be
apposite to extract the relevant findings recorded in the Impugned
Judgment:
“13. Reverting back to the facts of the present case, 1 find that
respondent has claimed that petitioner is in possession of second
and third floor of property no. 117, Moti Bazar, which is lying
vacant, Petitioner has refuted the same and has claimed that said
portions are being used as godown for the use of business of M/s.
Neeraj Sarees Centre. As such, there is no documentary proof in
this regard, filed on record. Such rival contention cannot be decided
based on rival affidavits. Same needs trial as the said portion
amounts to or does not amount to for the purpose of bonafide need
of petitioner. Similarly, portions in the property bearing no. 425556 and 4257 Gali Bharionwali, Jogiwada, Nai Sarak, Delhi, which
respondent has claimed to be lying vacant and which petitioner has
claimed to be used as godowns for the purpose of business of M/s.
Ganeshilal Omprakash again are such claims, which cannot be
decided without affording parties to lead their respective evidence.
It becomes a trial issue, as to whether those properties amount or
does not amount to, for the purpose of bonafide need of petitioner.
14.
Further, respondent has claimed that petitioner has not filed
relinquishment deed executed by his brother in his favour
pertaining to property in question. Petitioner has not replied the
same categorically in reply to the application for leave to defend. In
the light of said factual matrix and in the light of rent receipts relied
by petitioner, which indicate the landlord as M/s. Rakesh Kumar
Naresh Kumar, it becomes a triable issue, as to how petitioner
became the owner of premises in question.
15.
Lastly, Respondent has claimed that present petition was
filed by petitioner after 2½ years of filing of eviction petition
pertaining to shop no.4 in property in question, As per respondent,
petitioner had requirement of shop in question and shop no. 4, he
should have filed it simultaneously. The fact that petitioner had
filed this petition after a gap of 2½ years, indicated that it is an
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
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RC.REV. 637/2019
afterthought on the part of petitioner. In response to the same,
petitioner simply denied it. Fact of the matter remains that, this
petition was filed immediately after filing of eviction petition
pertaining to shop no. 4. So, bonafide need of petitioner is under
the scanner and it has to be appreciated, as to whether petitioner
has a bonafide need or has a mere desire.
16.
Coupled with the same, bills relied by respondent for
claiming that petitioner is running the business of retail sarees
independently, can only be appreciated during trial.
17.
So, aforesaid triable issues are raised by respondent. The
said issues were of such nature that in case, they are allowed, then
it will lead to dismissal of present eviction petition. Accordingly,
application for leave to defend stands allowed.”
15.
Examined in the light of the aforesaid findings, this Court finds
that the eviction petition was founded on a specific plea that the
tenanted premises were bona fide required for use as a store space
ancillary to the commercial premises from where the Petitioner
intended to carry on business. The said requirement constituted the
very foundation of the eviction petition.
16.
Once such a specific requirement had been pleaded, it was
incumbent upon the learned RC, while considering the application
seeking leave to defend, to examine whether the objections raised by
the Respondent disclosed any triable issue with respect to the said
pleaded requirement.
17.
A careful reading of the Impugned Judgment, however,
indicates that the learned RC has principally adverted to the alleged
availability of alternative accommodation, the Petitioner's ownership
of the premises and the timing of the institution of the eviction
petition. The Impugned Judgment, however, does not disclose any
consideration of the specific plea that the tenanted premises were
required to serve as a storage space for the adjoining shop.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:35:50
RC.REV. 637/2019
18.
The omission to advert to the principal ground on which the
eviction petition itself was founded renders the decision-making
process incomplete, erroneous and would constitute an error apparent
on the face of the record and is also perverse.
19.
Consequently, this Court is satisfied that the Impugned
Judgment suffers from material irregularity in the decision-making
process, warranting interference in exercise of the limited revisional
jurisdiction under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act.
20.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the Impugned Judgment is
set aside, and the matter is remanded to the learned RC for fresh
consideration in accordance with law.
21.
The parties shall appear before the learned RC on 03.08.2026.
22.
It is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the rival contentions and all questions are left open to be
decided by the learned RC.
23.
The present Petition, along with the pending application(s), if
any, stands disposed of in the above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JULY 24, 2026/tk/jk
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
15:35:50
RC.REV. 637/2019
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