The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
43. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the initial arrest of the petitioners was declared non-est solely due to non- furnishing of written grounds of arrest and not due to insufficiency of material against them. Further, detailed and sufficient grounds of arrest were furnished to the petitioners at the time of re-arrest on 10.06.2025. This Court also concludes that there is no statutory or judicial bar on re-arrest of an accused after curing the procedural defects of a prior illegal arrest; and that the judicial precedents, including those of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and Bombay High Court (as discussed above) support the proposition that a subsequent arrest is permissible in law, provided procedural safeguards are followed.
8. Accordingly, the bail application is allowed and it is ordered that the petitioner, who has been arrested by the police, in case FIR No. 110 of 2024 dated 04.04.2024, registered at Police Station Sadar Chamba District Chamba H.P. for an offence punishable under Sections 21 & 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, shall be forthwith released on bail, subject to his furnishing personal bond to the tune of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac) with one Local surety in the like amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. This bail order is subject, however, to the following conditions:-. (i) Petitioner shall attend the trial Court on each and every date of hearing and if prevented by any reason to do so, seek exemption from appearance by filing appropriate application; (ii). Petitioner shall not tamper with the evidence or hamper the investigation in any manner whatsoever; (iii) Petitioner will not leave India without prior permission of the Court; (iv) Petitioner shall not make any inducement, threat or promise, directly or indirectly, to the victim and Investigating Officer or any person acquainted with the facts of the case to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the Court or any Police Officer; (v). Petitioner shall inform the Station House Officer of the concerned police station about his place of residence during bail and trial. Any change…
Full Judgment Text
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
Cr.MP(M) No. 2828 of 2025
Decided on 06.01.2026.
___________________________________________________
Naryan Singh
……….. petitioner
Versus
State of H.P.
……….respondent
____________________________________________________
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Bipin Chander Negi, Judge
Whether approved for reporting? 1
For the petitioner
:
For the respondent
:
Mr. Ankit Dhiman, Advocate.
Mr. Raj Kumar Negi, Additional
Advocate General.
____________________________________________________
Bipin Chander Negi, Judge (oral)
Status report stands filed and the same is taken on
record.
2.
The present bail petition has been filed under Section
483 of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) for
grant of regular bail, arising out of FIR No. 110 of 2024 dated
04.04.2024, registered at Police Station Sadar Chamba, District
Chamba, H.P., for an offence punishable under Sections 21 &
29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
3.
I have heard learned counsel for the parties and
perused the status report.
4.
In the case at hand, the quantity involved is
commercial quantity. The main ground raised by the petitioner for
1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
seeking release of bail in the case at hand is that the grounds of
arrest were not communicated to him. I have perused the status
report and the record which has been produced. From the same,
it is evident that respondent/state in order to justify the
communication of grounds of arrest to the bail petitioner in the
case at hand are relying upon the arrest memo. In this respect,
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has drawn
the attention of this Court to judgment passed by the Apex Court
in Vihaan Kumar vs. State of Haryana and another dated 6th
February 2025. Relevant extract whereof has been reproduced
hereinbelow for a ready reference:“26 The stand taken before the High Court was that the appellant's
wife was informed about the arrest. Information about the arrest is
completely different from the grounds of arrest. The grounds of arrest
are different from the arrest memo. The arrest memo incorporates
the name of the arrested person, his permanent address, present
address, particulars of FIR and Section applied, place of arrest, date
and time of arrest, the name of the officer arresting the accused and
name, address and phone number of the person to whom information
about arrest has been given. We have perused the arrest memo in
the present case. The same contains only the information stated
above and not the grounds of arrest. The information about the arrest
is completely different from information about the grounds of arrest.
Mere information of arrest will not amount to furnishing grounds of
arrest”.
5.
The arrest memo in the case at hand incorporates
the name of the arrested person, his permanent address,
particulars of FIR and sections invoked, place of arrest, date and
time of arrest, name of the officer effecting the arrest and the
name and address of the person to whom information regarding
the arrest has been given. In view of the authoritative
pronouncement of the Apex Court in Vihaan Kumar’s case, the
arrest memo in the case at hand only contains the information
stated and not the grounds of arrest hence, the present petition is
allowed. The arrest of the bail petitioner on 4.4.2024 in
connection with FIR No. 110/2024 registered at Police Station
Sadar Chamba District Chamba under Sections 21 & 29 of the
ND&PS Act stands vitiated. The bail petitioner shall be forthwith
released and set at liberty. It is clarified that the findings of this
Court that the arrest of the bail petitioner stands vitiated will not
affect the merits of the charge sheet and the pending case.
6.
At this juncture with respect to supplying grounds of
arrest to the bail petitioner (similarly situate individual), it would be
appropriate to refer to 1969 (1) SCC 292, titled as Madhu
Limaye And Ors. Vs. Unknown, decided on 18th December,
(Division Bench of three Hon’ble Judges). Relevant
paragraph whereof is being reproduced here-in-below:10. Article 22(1) embodies a rule which has always been
regarded as vital and fundamental for safeguarding personal
liberty in all legal systems where the rule of law prevails. For
example, the 6th amendment to the Constitution of the United
States of America contains similar provisions and so does
Article XXXIV of the Japanese Constitution of 1946. In England
whenever an arrest is made without a warrant, the arrested
person has a right to be informed not only that he is being
arrested but also of the reasons or grounds for the arrest. The
House of Lords in Christie & Another v. Leachinsky ((1947) 1
All EER 567) went into the origin and development of this rule.
In the words of Viscount Simon if a policeman who entertained
a reasonable suspicion that X had committed a felony were at
liberty to arrest him and march him off to a police station
without giving any explanation of why he was doing this, the
prima facie right of personal liberty would be gravely infringed.
Viscount Simon laid down several propositions which were not
meant to be exhaustive. For our purposes we may refer to the
first and the third :
"1. If a policeman arrests without warrant upon reasonable
suspicion of felony, or of other crime of a sort which does not
require a warrant, he must in ordinary circumstances inform
the person arrested of the true ground of arrest. He is not
entitled to keep the reason to himself or to give a reason which
is not the true reason. In other words, a citizen is entitled to
know on what charge or on suspicion of what crime he is
seized.
2. X X X X
3. The requirement that the person arrested should be
informed of the reason why he is seized naturally does not
exist if the circumstances are such that he must know the
general nature of the alleged offence for which he is detained."
Lord Simonds gave an illustration of the circumstances where
the accused must know why he is being arrested.
"There is no need to explain the reasons of arrest if the
arrested man is caught red-handed and the crime is patent to
high Heaven."
The two requirements of clause (1) of Article 22 are meant to
afford the earliest opportunity to the arrested person to remove
any mistake, misapprehension or misunderstanding in the
minds of the arresting authority and, also, to know exactly what
the accusation against him is so that he can exercise the
second right, namely, of consulting a legal practitioner of his
choice and to be defended by him. Clause (2) of Article
22 provides the next and most material safeguard that the
arrested person must be produced before a Magistrate within
24 hours of such arrest so that an independent authority
exercising judicial powers may without delay apply is mind to
his case. The Criminal Procedure Code contains analogous
provisions in Section 60 and 340 but out Constitution-makers
were anxious to make these safeguards an integral part of
fundamental rights. This is what Dr. B. R. Ambedkar said while
moving for insertion of Article 15-A (as numbered in the Draft
Bill of the Constitution) which corresponded to present Article
22 :
"Article 15-A merely lifts from the provisions of the Criminal
Procedure Code two of the most fundamental principles which
every civilised country follows as principles of international
justice. It is quite true that these two provisions contained in
clause (1) and clause (2) are already to be found in
the Criminal Procedure Code and thereby probably it might be
said that we are really not making any very fundamental
change. But we are, as I contend, making a fundamental
change because what we are doing by the introduction of
Article 15-A is to put a limitation upon the authority both of
Parliament as well as of the Provincial Legislature not to
abrogate the two provisions, because they are now introduced
in our Constitution itself."
As stated in Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi & Ors. this
court has often reiterated that those who feel called upon to
deprive other persons of liberty in the discharge of what they
conceive to be their duty must, strictly and scrupulously,
observe the forms and rules of law. Whenever that is not done
the petitioner would be entitled to a writ of Habeas Corpus
directing his release.
7.
The aforesaid release of the bail petitioner in the
case at hand does not preclude the respondent from re-arresting
the accused after the rectifying procedural defects of prior illegal
arrest. There is no statutory or judicial bar on re-arrest. In this
respect, it would be appropriate to refer to the pronouncement of
the Delhi High Court in judgment delivered on 15.7.2025 titled as
Anwar Khan @ Chacha and others vs. The State of NCT of
Delhi. Relevant extract whereof is being reproduced hereinbelow
for a reference:36.
This issue also raises a more complex question: what
happens when the arrest of an accused in a serious offence is
declared illegal Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2045/2025 28 of
34 or non-est purely on technical grounds? Can the State, after
rectifying the procedural irregularity, not arrest the said
accused again, even if cogent grounds exist? The learned
counsel for the petitioners contended that once the arrest is
held to be non-est, the petitioners cannot be re-arrested. This
Court is unable to accept such a proposition of law. Let us test
this argument in a hypothetical but plausible situation: suppose
a police officer, either due to oversight or deliberately, does not
communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, and therefore the
arrest is declared illegal by the Court, however, at the same
time clarifying that such declaration was solely on technical
ground and the investigating agency was at liberty to rectify
such lapse, it would necessarily lead to a conclusion that there
was no immunity or bar in future to arrest the accused qua the
same offence. Assume further that the case in question
involves grave allegations - say, charges of organized crime,
murders, etc. Should the procedural lapse committed by one
officer, however serious, be allowed to permanently shield the
accused from arrest, even after the defect has been remedied?
The answer, in this Court‟s view, must be in the negative.
37. This question assumes even greater significance in the
context of the present case, where the petitioners are not firsttime offenders but individuals with a long list of criminal
antecedents. As per the material placed on record, some of the
petitioners are involved in as many as 10, 15, or even 26
criminal cases, including offences such as robbery, extortion,
attempt to murder, and even murder. The Digitally Signed
W.P.(CRL) 2045/2025 29 of 34 provisions of MCOCA have
been invoked in this case, and the prosecution‟s allegations, at
least prima facie point towards the existence of a structured
organised criminal syndicate. In such a context, the argument
that an illegal or non-est arrest should completely shield the
accused persons from future arrest, after complying with all
procedural safeguards, cannot be accepted by this Court.
38. The view that re-arrest is not impermissible in such
circumstances has also received judicial recognition. In Kavita
Manikikar of Mumbai v. CBI: 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1095, the
Bombay High Court held that while the initial arrest of the
petitioner therein was declared illegal due to violation
of Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C. (arrest of a woman after sunset), it
was clarified that the police was not barred from affecting a
subsequent arrest after rectifying the procedural irregularity.
The relevant observations in this regard are as under:
"34. In result, of the aforesaid discussion, the writ petition is
allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) and it is held that the
arrest of the petitioner is illegal and contrary to the provisions
of Section 46(4) of the Code of Criminal Proce-dure. However,
the CBI is not precluded to arrest the petitioner if investigation
warrants so, by following the due procedure of law."
39. Similarly, in Vicky Bharat Kalyani v. State of
Maharashtra (supra), the Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court clearly observed in paragraph 58 of the judgment that
there was no legal bar on re-arresting an accused who had
been released earlier due to Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL)
2045/2025 30 of 34 failure to furnish written grounds of arrest.
Though the Division Bench referred six questions, including
the issue of re-arrest, to a Larger Bench, it nevertheless
recorded a clear and reasoned view in favour of permissibility
of re-arrest in paragraph 58, and no contrary opinion was
expressed anywhere in the said judgment. The relevant
observations in this regard are as under:
"58. In this context, we have seriously considered the
arguments advanced by learned Advocate General about rearrest of the accused who is released with or without bail
bonds on the ground of alleged non-compliance of the
provisions of Section 50 of Cr.P.C. for not giving the grounds
of arrest in writing. In this context, Shri Bhuta could not point
out any embargo or bar upon such re-arrest. Shri Amit Desai,
however, submitted that once the accused is released on that
ground, re- arrest would violate the protection of the accused
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The State should
not be given a second chance. In this connection, we are
inclined to agree with the learned Advocate General that there
is no bar in re-arresting the persons who are released for nonfurnishing the grounds of arrest in writing. What the accused
are claiming in this situation, is that, they were arrested in
violation to the provisions of Cr.P.C. and it infringes their
constitutional right under Article 21 but if they are released on
that ground and thereafter if the grounds of arrest are supplied
to them, they cannot have any grievance. The purpose behind
these provisions is to make the accused aware as to why he
was arrested and thereafter enable him to defend himself.
Leaving aside the issue whether such ground should be
communicated orally or should be given in writing for the time
being; if on the ground of non-communication they are
released and if thereafter the grounds are furnished as per the
requirement; then the accused cannot have any grievance,
that they were not aware as to why they were arrested. From
that point onward, the procedure for remand can be followed
and the shortcoming of non-compliance of the provision is
wiped out. In that context, reference can be made to the case
of Kavita Manikikar. In that case, the Petitioner before the
Court was a lady. She was released because she was Digitally
Signed W.P.(CRL) 2045/2025 31 of 34 arrested after sun-set
for breach of Section 46(4) of Cr.P.C. Having held her arrest
illegal, the Division Bench of this Court went on to observe that
considering the seriousness of the allegations, she could be
re- arrested after following due procedure of law. The same
course can be adopted in the cases where the investigating
agency wants to re-arrest the accused if they are released for
non-compliance of Section 50 of Cr.P.C."
(Emphasis added)
40. On the other hand, reliance on decision in Vihaan Kumar v.
State of Haryana & Anr. (supra) can be of no help to the
petitioners, inasmuch as the said judgment does not decide
the question of whether re-arrest is legally permissible after an
initial arrest is declared illegal. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
that case expressly noted that it was not necessary to
adjudicate on that issue in the given set of facts of that case.
Thus, no proposition of law was laid down in the said decision
on the permissibility of re-arrest. The relevant observations in
this regard are as under:
"22. Another argument canvassed on behalf of the
respondents is that even if the appellant is released on the
grounds of violating Article 22, the first respondent can arrest
him again. At this stage, it is not necessary to decide the
issue."
41. However, this Court‟s attention was drawn to the judgment
of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam (supra) by the State
wherein while releasing the petitioner on default bail, on the
ground that chargesheet had not been filed within a period of
60 days, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court had clarified that the
release of petitioner shall not prohibit or otherwise prevent the
arrest or rearrest of the Digitally Signed W.P.(CRL) 2045/2025
32 of 34 petitioner on cogent grounds in respect of the subject
charge. The relevant observations in this regard are as under:
"49. The petitioner is held entitled to the grant of "default
bail"on the facts and in the circumstances of this case. The
Trial Judge should release the petitioner on "default bail" on
such terms and conditions as may be reasonable. However,
we make it clear that this does not prohibit or otherwise
prevent the arrest or re-arrest of the petitioner on cogent
grounds in respect of the subject charge and upon arrest or rearrest, the petitioner is entitled to petition for grant of regular
bail which application should be considered on its own merit.
We also make it clear that this will not impact on the arrest of
the petitioner in any other case."
42. Thus, in the considered view of this Court, there is merit in
the argument advanced on behalf of the State that when an
accused is released or his arrest is declared illegal solely on
technical or procedural grounds - such as in the cases
of Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam (supra), Kavita
Manikikar v. CBI (supra), or Vicky Bharat Kalyani v. State of
Maharashtra (supra) - the State cannot be precluded from
taking steps to re-arrest such a person, provided the
subsequent arrest is affected strictly in accordance with the
procedure established by law. The mere fact that the earlier
arrest was vitiated on account of procedural lapses does not,
by itself, create any blanket immunity from future arrest,
especially where the investigating agency continues to be in
possession of material implicating the accused and there has
been no adjudication on the merits of such material by the
court declaring the arrest illegal.
43. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds that the
initial arrest of the petitioners was declared non-est solely due
to non- furnishing of written grounds of arrest and not due to
insufficiency of material against them. Further, detailed and
sufficient grounds of arrest were furnished to the petitioners at
the time of re-arrest on 10.06.2025. This Court also concludes
that there is no statutory or judicial bar on re-arrest of an
accused after curing the procedural defects of a prior illegal
arrest; and that the judicial precedents, including those of the
Hon‟ble Supreme Court and Bombay High Court (as discussed
above) support the proposition that a subsequent arrest is
permissible in law, provided procedural safeguards are
followed.
8.
Accordingly, the bail application is allowed and it is
ordered that the petitioner, who has been arrested by the police,
in case FIR No. 110 of 2024 dated 04.04.2024, registered at
Police Station Sadar Chamba District Chamba H.P. for an offence
punishable under Sections 21 & 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, shall be forthwith released
on bail, subject to his furnishing personal bond to the tune of Rs.
1,00,000/- (Rupees one lac) with one Local surety in the like
amount, to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. This bail order is
subject, however, to the following conditions:-.
(i)
Petitioner shall attend the trial Court on each
and every date of hearing and if prevented by
any reason to do so, seek exemption from
appearance by filing appropriate application;
(ii). Petitioner shall not tamper with the evidence
or hamper the investigation in any manner
whatsoever;
(iii) Petitioner will not leave India without prior
permission of the Court;
(iv) Petitioner shall not make any inducement,
threat or promise, directly or indirectly, to
the victim and Investigating Officer or any
person acquainted with the facts of the case
to dissuade him/her from disclosing such
facts to the Court or any Police Officer;
(v). Petitioner shall inform the Station House
Officer of the concerned police station about
his place of residence during bail and trial.
Any change in the same
shall
also
be
communicated within two weeks thereafter.
Petitioner shall furnish details of his Aadhar
Cards, Telephone Numbers, Email, PAN
Cards, Bank Account Numbers, if any; &
(vi). It is made clear that in case petitioner is
arraigned as accused, in future, in any FIR,
then his bail is liable to be cancelled. It is
open for the Investigating Agency to move
appropriate application in that regard.
9.
Be it stated that any expression of opinion given in
this order does not mean an expression of opinion on the merits
of the case and the trial Court will not be influenced by any
observations made therein.
10.
The Registry is directed to forward a soft copy of the
bail order to the Superintendent, District Jail, Chamba H.P.,
through email, with a direction to enter the date of passing of the
present judgment in the e-prison software.
11.
The petition accordingly stands disposed of. A copy
of this order be sent to the Superintendent, District Jail, Chamba
H.P., and the learned trial Court by FASTER.
12.
A downloaded copy of this order shall be accepted
by the learned Trial Court while accepting the bail bonds from the
petitioner and in case, said Court intends to ascertain the veracity
of the downloaded copy of the order presented to it, same may be
ascertained from the official website of this Court.
06th January, 2026
Gaurav Rawat
GAURAV
SINGH
DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL
PRADESH SHIMLA,
Phone=b615aae6b839bd7695619d205a064
9faa3f10ee78fd5fc7d356ef93266e0ead9,
PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh,
SERIALNUMBER=97f5851e94d1ce4a9d9b2
419311e660ac9051e6298a507d8e42c11fe7
7a95002, CN=GAURAV SINGH
Reason: I am the author of this document
Location:
Date: 2026-01-06 18:24:48
(Bipin Chander Negi)
Judge
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