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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Judgment reserved on: 02.07.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 24.08.2026
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RFA 458/2009
NAND LAL & ANR
Through:
.....Appellants
Mr. S.S. Tomar, Advocate.
versus
RAM CHAND
Through:
.....Respondent
Mr. J.K. Chawla, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
JUDGMENT
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1.
The present Regular First Appeal1, under Section 96 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 19082, has been preferred by the Appellants
assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 31.08.20093 passed by the
learned Additional District Judge, Delhi4, in Suit No. 122/2008 titled
Ram Chand v. Nand Lal & Anr.
2.
Though the Appeal, as originally instituted, assailed the
findings returned by the learned Trial Court on various issues,
however, during the course of oral arguments, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the Appellants confined the challenge solely to
the findings recorded on Issue No. 2.
Appeal
CPC
Impugned Judgment
Trial Court
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3.
Accordingly, the present Appeal is required to be examined
only in respect of Issue No. 2, namely, whether the learned Trial Court
was justified in holding that the Promissory Notes dated 09.11.1994
and 05.01.19955 (Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. PW-1/B) were neither forged
nor fabricated and constituted valid documents.
4.
For the sake of convenience and to avoid any ambiguity, the
parties shall hereinafter be referred to in accordance with their
nomenclature in the present Appeal.
BRIEF FACTS:
5.
The brief facts necessary for adjudication of the present Appeal
are set out hereinbelow:
a) The Respondent instituted a suit for recovery against the
Appellants, inter alia, alleging that Appellant No. 1, being in
need of financial assistance, had borrowed an amount of
Rs. 50,000/- on two occasions, on 09.11.1994 and 05.01.1995,
from the Respondent. It was averred that, in acknowledgement
and security of the said loans, Appellant No. 1 executed two
Promissory Notes, both of which were witnessed by Appellant
No. 2.
b) The Appellants contested the suit by disputing the execution and
genuineness of the aforesaid Promissory Notes. It was their
specific case that the Promissory Notes had not been executed in
favour of the Respondent but had earlier been handed over, in
blank, to one Shri Swaraj Kapoor in connection with a separate
financial transaction, and that the Respondent, in collusion with
the said person, subsequently filled up and misused the same.
Promissory Notes
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c) Upon completion of pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed
the necessary issues and, after recording the evidence adduced by
the parties, proceeded to decide the suit by the Impugned
Judgment.
d) While deciding Issue No. 2, the learned Trial Court rejected the
Appellants' plea that the Promissory Notes were forged or
fabricated and held the said documents to be genuine and valid.
Consequently, the issue was decided in favour of the Respondent
and against the Appellants.
e) Aggrieved by the findings returned by the learned Trial Court,
the Appellants preferred the present Appeal. As noticed
hereinabove, the challenge has been confined to the findings
recorded on Issue No. 2.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PARTIES:
6.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellants would
submit that the learned Trial Court has gravely erred in deciding Issue
No. 2 against the Appellants by failing to properly appreciate the
material discrepancies apparent on the face of the two Promissory
Notes. It would be contended that the contents of the Promissory
Notes themselves disclose that the names of the parties, the amounts
and other material particulars have been filled in different
handwritings and with different inks.
7.
He would further submit that while the Promissory Note dated
09.11.1994 was filled in Hindi, the subsequent Promissory Note was
filled in English despite both being printed in Hindi, thereby giving
rise to serious doubts regarding their genuineness, which the learned
Trial Court failed to adequately consider.
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8.
Learned counsel would further contend that the Respondent
failed to produce any contemporaneous documentary evidence to
establish the alleged advancement of the two loans of Rs. 50,000/each. It would be submitted that no books of account or ledger entries
were produced to corroborate the alleged cash transactions and, in the
absence of such evidence, the execution of the Promissory Notes by
itself could not have been treated as sufficient proof of the alleged
loans.
9.
It would be contended that the findings returned by the learned
Trial Court suffer from inherent inconsistency. Learned counsel would
submit that while deciding Issue No. 3, the learned Trial Court
disbelieved the genuineness of the cheque allegedly issued by the
Appellants in favour of the Respondent, yet, while adjudicating Issue
No. 2, it failed to examine the effect of such finding on the overall
conduct and credibility of the Respondent. According to the
Appellants, the learned Trial Court adopted contradictory standards in
appreciating the evidence led by the parties.
10.
Learned counsel would further submit that the Appellants had
caused a Legal Notice dated 16.09.1997 6 to be issued to the
Respondent, wherein the very allegations and assertions now forming
the subject matter of the present Appeal had been specifically set out.
It would be contended that despite service of the said notice, the
Respondent chose not to furnish any reply thereto and such silence
constitutes a material circumstance warranting an adverse inference
against the Respondent.
Legal Notice
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11.
Reliance in this regard is placed upon the decision of this Court
in Kalu Ram v. Sita Ram 7 to contend that failure to respond to
material allegations contained in a legal notice may, in an appropriate
case, justify drawing an adverse inference. It would be submitted that
the learned Trial Court failed to accord due weight to the aforesaid
circumstance.
12.
In view of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the
Appellants would contend that the findings returned by the learned
Trial Court on Issue No. 2 are contrary to the pleadings and evidence
on record and suffer from material misappreciation of the evidence. It
would, accordingly, be submitted that the Impugned Judgment and
Decree, to the extent it decides Issue No. 2 against the Appellants, is
liable to be set aside and the present Appeal deserves to be allowed.
13.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Respondent would support the findings returned by the learned Trial
Court on Issue No. 2 and submit that the same are based upon a proper
appreciation of the pleadings, oral evidence and documentary material
available on record and, therefore, warrant no interference in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
14.
Learned counsel would contend that the learned Trial Court has
rightly rejected the Appellants' plea of forgery after noticing that the
Appellants had admitted the signatures appearing on the Promissory
Notes and had failed to substantiate their defence that the said
documents had been handed over to one Shri Swaraj Kapoor in
connection with an independent transaction. It would be submitted
that the non-examination of the said Shri Swaraj Kapoor, coupled with
the failure of Appellant No. 2, who was an attesting witness to the
1980 RLR (Note 44)
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Promissory Notes, to enter the witness box, rightly weighed with the
learned Trial Court while disbelieving the defence.
15.
Learned counsel would further submit that the discrepancies in
handwriting, language or ink relied upon by the Appellants do not, by
themselves, establish that the Promissory Notes were forged or
fabricated, particularly when the execution thereof stood admitted. It
would accordingly be submitted that the findings recorded by the
learned Trial Court are based upon a proper appreciation of the
evidence and do not call for interference in the present Appeal.
ANALYSIS:
16.
This Court has heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and carefully perused the pleadings, oral and documentary
evidence, and the entire record.
17.
As noticed hereinabove, the controversy involved in the present
adjudication lies within a narrow compass. The Appellants have
confined their challenge exclusively to the findings returned by the
learned Trial Court on Issue No. 2, whereby their plea that the
Promissory Notes dated 09.11.1994 and 05.01.1995 (Ex. PW-1/A and
Ex. PW-1/B) were forged and fabricated came to be rejected.
Consequently, the principal question which falls for consideration
before this Court is whether the finding so recorded suffers from any
perversity, illegality, or material misappreciation of the oral and
documentary evidence on record so as to warrant interference in the
exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the CPC.
18.
Before adverting to the rival submissions and examining the
evidence on record, it would be apposite to briefly recapitulate the
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nature and scope of the jurisdiction exercised by a First Appellate
Court under Section 96 of the CPC.
19.
It is well settled that a first appeal is a valuable statutory right.
Unless expressly curtailed by statute, the entire case, both on facts and
law, is open for reconsideration before the First Appellate Court. The
appellate court is not confined to examining errors of law alone but is
under a duty to independently assess the pleadings, appreciate the oral
and documentary evidence, consider the submissions advanced by the
parties, and arrive at its own findings supported by cogent reasons.
20.
At the same time, it is equally well settled that where the
findings recorded by the learned Trial Court are based upon a proper
appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, particularly after
evaluating the credibility and demeanour of witnesses who have
deposed before it, such findings ordinarily deserve due weight and
deference. Interference with such findings is justified only where they
are shown to be perverse, contrary to the evidence on record, based on
an erroneous application of law, or are such that no reasonable judicial
mind could have arrived at the conclusions reached by the Trial Court.
21.
The aforesaid principles have been consistently reiterated by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari8,
Madhukar v. Sangram 9 , H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith 10 ; and
several other decisions. These principles were comprehensively
restated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malluru Mallappa v.
Kuruvathappa 11 , wherein the Court succinctly explained the scope
and ambit of a first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, the obligation
(2001) 3 SCC 179
(2001) 4 SCC 756
(2005) 10 SCC 243
(2020) 4 SCC 313
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of the appellate court to independently evaluate the evidence and
record reasons in compliance with Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC,
while simultaneously recognizing that where the appellate court
concurs with the appreciation of evidence by the Trial Court, it need
not unnecessarily restate the entire evidence or reiterate every reason
recorded by the Trial Court. The relevant observations as made in the
said Judgement read as under:
“10. Section 96 CPC provides for filing of an appeal from the
decree passed by any court exercising original jurisdiction to the
court authorised to hear the appeals from the decisions of such
courts. In the instant case, the appeal from the decree passed by the
trial court lies to the High Court. The expression “appeal” has not
been defined in CPC. Black's Law Dictionary (7th Edn.) defines an
appeal as “a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered
by bringing it to a higher authority”. It is a judicial examination of
the decision by a higher court of the decision of a subordinate court
to rectify any possible error in the order under appeal. The law
provides the remedy of an appeal because of the recognition that
those manning the judicial tiers too commit errors.
11. In Hari Shankarv. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963
SC 698 it was held that a right of appeal carries with it a right of
rehearing on law as well as on fact, unless the statute conferring a
right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as has been done
in second appeal arising under CPC.
12. In Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya
Bapat, (1969) 2 SCC 74 it was held thus: (SCC pp. 77-78, para 5)
“5. … In the well-known work of Story on
Constitution (of United States), Vol. 2, Article 1761, it is
stated that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is
that it revises and corrects the proceedings in a cause
already instituted and does not create that cause. The
appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in a variety of
forms and, indeed, in any form in which the legislature
may choose to prescribe. According to Article 1762, the
most usual modes of exercising appellate jurisdiction, at
least those which are most known in the United States, are
by a writ of error, or by an appeal, or by some process of
removal of a suit from an inferior tribunal. An appeal is a
process of civil law origin and removes a cause, entirely
subjecting the fact as well as the law, to a review and a
retrial.”
13. It is a settled position of law that an appeal is a continuation of
the proceedings of the original court. Ordinarily, the appellate
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jurisdiction involves a rehearing on law as well as on fact and is
invoked by an aggrieved person. The first appeal is a valuable right
of the appellant and therein all questions of fact and law decided by
the trial court are open for reconsideration. Therefore, the first
appellate court is required to address itself to all the issues and
decide the case by giving reasons. The court of first appeal must
record its findings only after dealing with all issues of law as well
as fact and with the evidence, oral as well as documentary, led by
the parties. The judgment of the first appellate court must display
conscious application of mind and record findings supported by
reasons on all issues and contentions [see: Santosh
Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari,
(2001)
SCC
179,
Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756, B.M. Narayana
Gowda v. Shanthamma, (2011) 15 SCC 476, H.K.N.
Swami v. Irshad Basith, (2005) 10 SCC 243 and Sri Raja
Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, (1980) 4 SCC
259.
14. A first appeal under Section 96CPC is entirely different from a
second appeal under Section 100. Section 100 expressly bars
second appeal unless a question of law is involved in a case and the
question of law so involved is substantial in nature.
15. Order 41 Rule 31CPC provides the guidelines for the appellate
court to decide the matter. For ready reference Order 41 Rule
31CPC is as under:
“31. Contents, date and signature of judgment. - The
judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and
shall state(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied,
the relief to which the appellant is entitled;
and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and
dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein.”
16. In Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar, (2015) 1 SCC 391 this Court
has reiterated the principles to be borne in mind while disposing of
a first appeal, as under: (SCC p. 395, para 15)
“15. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy,
(2010) 13 SCC 530, this Court taking note of all the
earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the
aforementioned principle with these words: (SCC pp. 53031, paras 3-4)
„3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed
of by the appellate court/High Court has been
considered by this Court in various decisions.
Order 41CPC deals with appeals from original
decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31
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mandates that the judgment of the appellate court
shall state:
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or
varied, the relief to which the appellant is
entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse
or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first
appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless
restricted by law, the whole case is therein open
for rehearing both on questions of fact and law.
The judgment of the appellate court must,
therefore, reflect its conscious application of
mind and record findings supported by reasons,
on all the issues arising along with the
contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties
for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a
court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High
Court
[H.V.
Sreenivasa
Murthy v. B.V.
Nagesha, 2008 SCC OnLine Kar 837] to deal
with all the issues and the evidence led by the
parties before recording its findings. The first
appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a
right to be heard both on questions of law and on
facts and the judgment in the first appeal must
address itself to all the issues of law and fact and
decide it by giving reasons in support of the
findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179, SCC p. 188, para 15
and Madhukar v. Sangram, (2001) 4 SCC 756,
SCC p. 758, para 5.)‟”
17. In Shasidhar v. Ashwini Uma Mathad, (2015) 11 SCC 269, it
was held as under: (SCC p. 277, para 21)
“21. Being the first appellate court, it was, therefore, the
duty of the High Court [Shasidhar v. Ashwini Uma
Mathad, 2012 SCC OnLine Kar 8774] to decide the first
appeal keeping in view the scope and powers conferred on
it under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 31 of the
Code mentioned above. It was unfortunately not done,
thereby, causing prejudice to the appellants whose
valuable right to prosecute the first appeal on facts and law
was adversely affected which, in turn, deprived them of a
hearing in the appeal in accordance with law.”
18. It is clear from the above provisions and the decisions of this
Court that the judgment of the first appellate court has to set out
points for determination, record the decision thereon and give its
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own reasons. Even when the first appellate court affirms the
judgment of the trial court, it is required to comply with the
requirement of Order 41 Rule 31 and non-observance of this
requirement leads to infirmity in the judgment of the first appellate
court. No doubt, when the appellate court agrees with the views of
the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or
reiterate reasons given by the trial court. Expression of a general
agreement with the reasons given by the trial court would
ordinarily suffice.”
22.
Having noticed the scope of the present Appeal and the
principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, this Court
now proceeds to examine the challenge laid by the Appellants to the
findings recorded on Issue No. 2. Before undertaking such an
examination, it would be appropriate to first advert to the reasoning
which persuaded the learned Trial Court on the said issue. The
relevant findings recorded by the learned Trial Court on Issue No. 2
are reproduced hereunder:
“23.ISSUE NO. 2: Whether the alleged pronotes against which
the first loan dated 9* November, 1994 and the second loan
dated 5" January, 1995 each of worth Rs. 50,000/- were secured
or forged and fabricated as stated by the defendants in
preliminary objection no. 3 of the Written Statement? OPD
The plaintiff (PW-1) has testified in his examination-in-chief that
since the defendant no. 1 was in need of money he gave him the
first loan on 09.11.1994 and the second loan on 05.01.1995 each
for Rs. 50,000/- and to secure the same the defendant no. 1
executed two promissory notes on the said dates. These promissory
notes have been proved as Ex. PW1/A and Ex. PWI/B. He has
further testified that both Ex. PW1/A and Ex. PW1/B were
witnessed by defendant no. 2. He has identified the signatures of
defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2.
24.
The defendants in their written statement have alleged by
way of preliminary objections that the two promissory notes Ex,
PWI/A and Ex. PWI/B were forged. DW-1 has claimed in his
examination-in-chief that Ex. PW1/A and Ex. PW1/B were given
by him to one Sh. Swaraj Kapoor, a resident of Jungpura
Extension, New Delhi for liquidating his liability that and Sh.
Swaraj Kapoor had been collecting a sum of Rs. 250/- per month
from the plaintiff as per the instructions of defendant no.1 from the
license fees of Rs. 1000/- per day and Sh. Swaraj Kapoor had been
repaid the loan long back. DW-1 has further claimed that since Sh.
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Swaraj Kapoor was a friend of the plaintiff the latter has been able
to procure both the pronotes and had filled up the same in his
favour. It is further claimed that the forgery was evident from the
fact that in Ex. PWI/A the names of the plaintiff and defendant no.
1 are in different handwritings in Hindi. Also only the defendant
no. 2 is shown as a witness and no one else and the ink used is
different at different places. It is further claimed that forgery in the
case of Ex. PW1/B was evident from the fact that although the
pronote was printed in Hindi the language used to fill in the details
of the loan were in English unlike in Ex. PW1/A. Also the same
was filled in different inks by different persons.
25.
The two pronotes (Ex. PWI/A and Ex. PW1/B) have been
scrutinized by me. In Ex. PWI/A the names of the plaintiff and
defendant no. 1 are written in different handwritings in Hindi
however this alone would not go to prove that the same is forged.
Also just because in Ex. PW1/B the printed material is in Hindi and
the blanks regarding the details of the loan taken are in English
unlike in Ex. PWI/A does not make the former appear to be a
forged document.
26. DWI claims to have given Ex. PWI/A and Ex. PW1/B to Sh.
Swaraj Kapoor allegedly for a loan taken from him. It is also
claimed by him that the alleged loan was repaid long back.
Admittedly the signatures on the said pronotes are those of
defendant nos. 1 and 2. The best person to prove this claim of the
defendants would have been Sh. Swaraj Kapoor himself. The
defendants not having produced him as a witness makes their
version unworthy of credit. Admittedly the said pronotes have been
witnessed by the defendant no. 2, the wife of defendant no. 1
however she did not appear as a witness to support the claim of
DW-1 that the pronotes are forged. Also going by the claim of the
defendants themselves if the loan to Sh. Swaraj Kapoor stood
satisfied there was no reason for these two pronotes to be in his
possession. As a matter of normal practice if the loan had been
repaid as alleged the same would have been returned to the
defendant no. 1. The fact that the pronotes were in the possession
of the plaintiff and Sh. Swaraj Kapoor was never produced as a
witness makes the version of the defendants difficult to believe.
27. The attempt on the part of DW-1 to shield the truth from the
Court is evident from the manner in which in his cross examination
he has contradicted himself by, at the first instance denying that his
wife signed the pronotes as a witness and then subsequently
admitting that his wife had signed as a witness. It cannot be lost
sight of that in their written statement the defendants have admitted
being under a financial crises.
28.
In view of the above observations it is held that the alleged
pronotes against which the first loan dated 9" November, 1994 and
the second loan dated 5" January, 1995 each of Rs. 50,000/- were
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secured were not forged and fabricated and were valid. This issue is
decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.”
23.
From the perusal of the aforesaid finding, it is observed that the
learned Trial Court had discerned that although the Appellants sought
to rely upon the fact that different handwritings and different inks
appeared on the Promissory Notes, such circumstances, by
themselves, did not establish that the documents were forged or
fabricated. The learned Trial Court further noticed that while the
defence projected by Appellant No. 1 was that the signed blank
Promissory Notes had been handed over to one Shri Swaraj Kapoor,
the said person was never examined. Equally, Appellant No. 1, who
admittedly figured as an attesting witness on the Promissory Notes,
also did not step into the witness box.
24.
The learned Trial Court further found the defence to be
inherently improbable since, had the alleged loan from Shri Swaraj
Kapoor already been discharged, there existed no plausible
explanation as to how the signed Promissory Notes continued to
remain in circulation and ultimately came into the possession of the
Respondent.
25.
It was upon the cumulative appreciation of these circumstances
that the learned Trial Court concluded that the Promissory Notes could
not be characterized as forged or fabricated and consequently decided
Issue No. 2 in favour of the Respondent.
26.
Upon examining the rival submissions, the evidence on record,
and the other material placed before this Court, certain significant
aspects emerge which cast serious doubt on the challenge raised by
the Appellants.
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27.
The foremost and most material circumstance is that the
defence set up by the Appellants has never been one of a complete
denial of the execution of the impugned Promissory Notes. On the
contrary, the consistent stand of Appellant No. 1 has been that the
signatures appearing on the Promissory Notes (Ex. PW-1/A and Ex.
PW-1/B) are admittedly his own, as well as those of Appellant No. 2.
28.
According to the Appellants, however, the said promissory
notes had been signed and handed over in blank to one Shri Swaraj
Kapoor in connection with an independent financial transaction, and
were subsequently procured and misused by the Respondent. Thus,
the dispute is not with respect to the authenticity of the signatures on
the promissory notes, but with regard to the manner in which the
signed documents allegedly came to be filled up and relied upon by
the Respondent.
29.
This Court takes note of the fact that the Respondent entered the
witness box as PW-1 and in his examination-in-chief, deposed that
Appellant No.1 had approached him seeking financial assistance and
that he had advanced two separate loans of Rs. 50,000/- each on
09.11.1994 and 05.01.1995, respectively. According to him,
contemporaneously with the advancement of the aforesaid loans,
Appellant No.1 executed the Promissory Notes (Ex. PW-1/A and Ex.
PW-1/B), which were witnessed by Appellant No.2. Respondent
identified the signatures appearing on both the Promissory Notes and
asserted that they represented genuine transactions.
30.
During his cross-examination, the Respondent admitted that he
had neither maintained nor produced any books of account or receipts
evidencing the payment of interest or reflecting the advancement of
the loans to the Appellants. He, however, consistently maintained that
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the loans had in fact been advanced to Appellant No. 1 and also
denied the suggestion that the Promissory Notes had been fabricated
or that no such loan transactions had ever taken place. The relevant
portion of the Respondent's testimony reads as under:
“…..However, it is correct that my averments in the affidavit
regarding interest payment was not based on any books of
accounts/diary. It is wrong to sug. that the Nand lal/deft, neither
took any loan from me not he ever gave me any interest, for the
alleged loan….”
31.
In response thereto, Appellant No. 1 has consistently asserted
that the Promissory Notes were never executed in favour of the
Respondent. According to him, the signed blank Promissory Notes
had been handed over to one Shri Swaraj Kapoor in connection with
an independent loan transaction and, upon repayment of the said loan,
the Respondent, acting in collusion with the said Shri Swaraj Kapoor,
wrongfully procured the said signed instruments, filled in the
particulars therein and sought to misuse the same by projecting them
as evidencing the loan transactions in question.The relevant portion of
the Appellant No. 1 testimony is reproduced herein:
“……It is wrong to suggest that in the year 1994 I approached the
plaintiff for financial help and requested a loan of Rs.1 lac (Rs.one
lac) from him. It is wrong to suggest that in November 1994
plaintiff had given a loan of Rs.50.000/- to me. It is wrong to
suggest that I executed any Promissory Note in favour of the
plaintiff. It is further wrong to suggest that my wife signed on the
alleged Promissory Note as a witness. It is correct that Ex.PW1/A
& PWI/B bears my signature at point X and signature of my
wife at point Y. Voltd. Ex.PWI/A & PW1/B were given to Mr.
Swaraj Kapoor blank as had taken a loan of Rs.1 lac from him. But
plaintiff had procured the blank pronote, which bears the signature
of mine and my wife fraudulently with the connivance of Mr.
Swaraj Kapoor and thereafter plaintiff filled up the same to create a
false evidence against me. …..”
32.
A careful reading of the testimony of both witnesses reveals that
the foundational facts are substantially undisputed. The Respondent
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has consistently maintained that the Promissory Notes were executed
contemporaneously with the advancement of the loans, whereas the
Appellant No.1 does not dispute the signatures appearing thereon. The
controversy, therefore, is not one relating to the execution of the
signatures but to the explanation subsequently furnished by the
Appellants to avoid the legal consequences flowing therefrom.
33.
Thus, upon an independent appreciation of the evidence, this
Court finds that the defence projected by the Appellants proceeds on
an admission of execution coupled with an explanation of subsequent
misuse. The evidentiary enquiry, therefore, necessarily shifts from
proving the signatures to testing the credibility and probability of the
explanation offered.
34.
It is in the aforesaid factual backdrop that the defence projected
by the Appellants falls for consideration. The burden of proving such
defence squarely rested upon the Appellants. The entire edifice of the
defence rests upon the assertion that the signed blank Promissory
Notes had been handed over to one Shri Swaraj Kapoor in connection
with an independent loan transaction and that, despite repayment
thereof, the said documents came to be misused by the Respondent in
collusion with him. Significantly, Shri Swaraj Kapoor, who alone
could have explained the circumstances in which the documents were
allegedly executed, retained and thereafter came into the possession of
the Respondent, was never examined.
35.
Another circumstance which assumes considerable significance
is that Appellant No. 2, who admittedly signed the Promissory Notes
as an attesting witness, chose not to enter the witness box. Once the
Appellants pleaded that the documents had been signed in blank and
subsequently misused, the burden lay upon them to substantiate the
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said plea by cogent evidence. Appellant No. 2, being an attesting
witness to the execution of the Promissory Notes, was a material
witness whose testimony could have directly corroborated the
defence. Her non-examination, therefore, cannot be treated as a mere
omission. Being an attesting witness to the execution of the
promissory notes, she was one of the best available witnesses to
substantiate the defence pleaded by the Appellants. The failure to
examine her, therefore, assumes considerable significance and
warrants the drawing of an appropriate adverse inference.
36.
The legal position regarding the withholding of the best
available evidence is well settled. Section 114 of the Indian Evidence
Act, 187212, particularly Illustration (g) appended thereto, empowers
the Court to draw an adverse inference against a party who fails to
produce evidence which could reasonably be expected to be within its
power and which would have thrown light on the controversy.
37.
The underlying principle is that where the best evidence is
withheld without any plausible explanation, the Court may
legitimately presume that, if produced, such evidence would have
been unfavourable to the party withholding it. In Gopal Krishnaji
Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif 13 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court
authoritatively held that where a party withholds the best evidence in
its possession without sufficient cause, the Court is entitled to draw an
appropriate adverse inference against such party.
38.
The aforesaid principle squarely applies to the facts of the
present case. The Appellants failed to examine the most material
witness, i.e., Appellant No. 2, whose testimony was crucial to
IEA, 1872
AIR 1968 SC 1413
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substantiate their specific defence that the Promissory Notes had been
signed in blank and were subsequently misused.
39.
At this stage it is also relevant to note that the Appellants also
chosenot to examine Shri Swaraj Kapoor, who was the central figure
in their defence. According to the Appellants themselves, the
impugned Promissory Notes had been handed over to him in
connection with an independent financial transaction and were
thereafter allegedly misused by the Respondent.
40.
In the considered opinion of this Court, Shri Swaraj Kapoor was
the material witness in support of the defence set up by the
Appellants. He could have deposed regarding the circumstances under
which the Promissory Notes were allegedly signed and handed over,
the purpose for which they were retained, and the manner in which
they ultimately came into the possession of the Respondent. His
examination was, therefore, indispensable to substantiate the defence
that the Promissory Notes had been signed in blank and were
subsequently misused. The Appellants' failure to examine him thus
assumes significance and substantially undermines the credibility of
their defence.
41.
Learned counsel for the Appellants has laid considerable
emphasis on the circumstance that the names of the parties, the
amounts, and certain other particulars contained in the impugned
Promissory Notes appear to have been filled in different handwritings
and with different inks. It has also been contended that while one of
the Promissory Notes contains entries in Hindi, the other has been
filled in English. According to the Appellants, these features are
indicative of interpolation and lend support to their plea that the
documents were subsequently fabricated.
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42.
This Court is, however, unable to accept the aforesaid
submission as determinative of the controversy for more than one
reason. In the first place, the two Promissory Notes were admittedly
executed on different dates, namely, 09.11.1994 and 05.01.1995. In
such circumstances, no inference adverse to the Respondent can be
drawn merely because the particulars on the two documents were
filled in different handwritings, with different inks, or in different
languages. To expect complete uniformity in the handwriting, ink, or
language employed in documents executed nearly two months apart
would be wholly unrealistic and unsupported by any settled principle
of law.
43.
More importantly, it is now well settled that the mere fact that a
negotiable instrument or any written document contains entries in
different handwritings or inks does not, by itself, render the document
forged, fabricated, or otherwise invalid. What is of significance is
whether the execution of the document is admitted and whether there
is any cogent evidence establishing that the document was
subsequently altered or materially interpolated without the consent or
authority of the executant. The existence of different handwritings or
inks, in the absence of such evidence, is by itself insufficient to
invalidate the document.
44.
In Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar14, while dealing with a similar
contention, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the mere filling in of
particulars by a person other than the executant does not invalidate a
negotiable instrument, provided its execution is admitted. Although
the said decision arose in proceedings under the Negotiable
(2019) 4 SCC 197
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Instruments Act, 1881 15 , the principle enunciated therein is of
general application and is equally relevant while appreciating the
evidentiary value of a promissory note whose execution is not in
dispute.
45.
This Court also cannot lose sight of the statutory presumption
embodied in Section 118 of the NI Act, which raises, inter alia, a
presumption that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for
consideration and was duly executed, unless the contrary is proved.
Once the execution of the Promissory Notes stands admitted, the
burden shifts upon the Appellants to rebut the statutory presumption
by leading cogent, credible, and legally admissible evidence. In the
present case, apart from making a bald assertion that the documents
were signed in blank and were subsequently misused, the Appellants
have failed to produce any convincing evidence to establish forgery,
fabrication, or unauthorised interpolation. The defence set up by them,
therefore, falls far short of the standard required to rebut the statutory
presumption operating in favour of the Respondent.
46.
Consequently, the mere existence of different handwritings,
different inks, or the use of different languages in the impugned
Promissory Notes, in the absence of any cogent evidence establishing
fabrication, interpolation, or misuse, cannot by itself discredit the
genuineness or evidentiary value of the Promissory Notes (Ex. PW1/A and Ex. PW-1/B). Rather, when viewed in conjunction with the
admitted execution of the documents and the unrebutted statutory
presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act, such circumstances are
wholly insufficient to invalidate the Promissory Notes or to warrant
interference with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court.
NI Act
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47.
Turning to the submission regarding absence of books of
account, this Court notes that during the course of cross-examination,
the Respondent did admit that he had not produced any books of
account or diary entries reflecting the alleged loans or the receipt of
interest thereon. However, the said omission cannot be viewed in
isolation or divorced from the entirety of the evidence brought on
record.
48.
It is also noted that Section 34 of the IEA, 1872 itself
recognizes that entries in books of account, though relevant, are not by
themselves sufficient to fasten liability upon a person. The converse
equally holds true, namely, that the absence of such entries cannot
invariably defeat a claim otherwise supported by reliable oral and
documentary evidence.
49.
In the present case, the Respondent entered the witness box,
proved the execution of the Promissory Notes and identified the
signatures appearing thereon, which signatures were themselves
admitted by Appellant No. 1.
50.
Learned counsel for the Appellants also sought to contend that
the learned Trial Court ignored the effect of the legal notice issued by
the Appellants wherein allegations substantially similar to those urged
in the present proceedings had been levelled against the Respondent,
and that the Respondent's failure to reply thereto warranted an adverse
inference in terms of the decision of this Court in Kalu Ram (supra).
51.
There can be no cavil with the proposition that, in an
appropriate case, failure to respond to a legal notice may constitute a
relevant circumstance while appreciating the evidence. However, such
omission is neither conclusive nor does it dispense with the obligation
of the Court to independently examine the evidence led by the parties.
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The evidentiary burden resting upon the Appellants could not stand
discharged merely because the Respondent did not choose to respond
to the notice. At the highest, it constituted one circumstance requiring
consideration along with the entirety of the material available on
record.
52.
Viewed thus, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
non-reply to the aforesaid legal notice does not materially affect the
credibility of the Respondent's case, particularly when the execution
of the signatures on the Promissory Notes stands admitted, and the
defence projected by the Appellants has remained unsubstantiated.
53.
Equally untenable is the submission founded upon the findings
returned by the learned Trial Court while deciding Issue No. 3. As
civil proceedings are decided issue-wise upon the evidence relevant to
each issue framed. The failure of a party to establish one transaction
or one document does not inexorably result in the failure of every
other claim advanced by that party. The evidentiary foundation of the
Cheque (Ex. PW-1/C), which formed the subject matter of Issue No.
3, was entirely distinct from that pertaining to the Promissory Notes
(Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. PW-1/B).
54.
Therefore, the evidence led in relation to the Promissory Notes
(Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. PW-1/B) is sufficient to establish the execution
and the underlying transactions, notwithstanding the failure of the
Respondent to prove the transaction relating to the cheque (Ex. PW1/C), as decided in Issue No. 3.
55.
At this juncture, this Court also finds considerable force in the
reasoning of the learned Trial Court that the defence projected by the
Appellants does not inspire confidence when tested on the anvil of
probabilities. The Appellants' own case is that the impugned
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Promissory Notes were handed over in blank to Shri Swaraj Kapoor in
connection with an independent loan transaction, which transaction
admittedly stood concluded. If that were indeed the position, no
satisfactory explanation has been offered as to how the said signed
instruments continued to remain in circulation or eventually found
their way into the possession of the Respondent. The absence of any
cogent evidence in this regard also assumes significance, particularly
when viewed alongside the admitted non-examination of Shri Swaraj
Kapoor. The learned Trial Court rightly regarded this as a
circumstance rendering the defence inherently improbable.
56.
The appreciation of evidence undertaken by the learned Trial
Court is also fortified by the admissions elicited during the crossexamination of Appellant No. 1. While denying that he had executed
any Promissory Notes in favour of the Respondent, Appellant No. 1
unequivocally admitted that the Promissory Notes (Ex. PW-1/A and
Ex. PW-1/B) bore his signatures as well as those of Appellant No. 2.
The explanation furnished thereafter, namely, that the documents had
been signed blank and subsequently misused, remained wholly
unsupported by independent evidence. The learned Trial Court, which
had the distinct advantage of recording the testimony of the witnesses
and observing their demeanour during examination, found the said
explanation to be unworthy of acceptance. This Court, upon an
independent re-appreciation of the evidence, finds no reason to take a
different view.
CONCLUSION:
57.
Upon an independent re-appreciation of the entire material on
record, including the Promissory Notes (Ex. PW-1/A and Ex. PWSignature Not Verified
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1/B), the oral and documentary evidence, the admissions elicited
during the cross-examination of the witnesses, and the attendant
circumstances emerging from the record, this Court is satisfied that
the Appellants have failed to discharge the burden of establishing their
plea that the Promissory Notes were forged or fabricated.
58.
The defence advanced by the Appellants that the Promissory
Notes had been signed in blank and were subsequently misused has
remained wholly unsubstantiated. The same is unsupported by any
cogent or reliable evidence and does not inspire confidence when
tested on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and the
overall evidence on record.
59.
Consequently, this Court finds no infirmity in the findings
recorded by the learned Trial Court on Issue No. 2. The impugned
findings neither suffer from perversity, illegality, nor any material
misappreciation or misreading of the evidence so as to warrant
interference in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 96
of the CPC. The Appellants have failed to make out any ground
justifying reversal of the findings returned by the learned Trial Court.
Accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed, and the judgment and
decree passed by the learned Trial Court, insofar as they are the
subject matter of challenge in the present appeal, are affirmed.
60.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of
accordingly.
61.
No Order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
AUGUST 24, 2026/jk
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