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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 09.09.2026
Pronounced on: 30.09.2026
Uploaded on: 30.09.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010551352024
CRL.A. 807/2024
NAIM @MOHD. NAEEM
.....Appellant
Through: Mr.Rajat Kumar, Ms.Priya Vats
and Mr.Geet Kumar Dahariya,
Advs.
versus
NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY
.....Respondent
Through: Mr.Rahul Tyagi, SPP with
Ms.Priya
Rai,
Mr.Jatin,
Mr.Shubham
Goyal,
Mr.Avinash Kumar Singh and
Mr.Priyansh Raj Singh, Advs.
DSP Abhinav Kajla, CIO and
Insp. Lalit Sharma, AIO.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVINDER DUDEJA
JUDGMENT
NAVIN CHAWLA, J.
1.
This appeal has been filed under Section 21(4) of the National
Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as the „NIA
Act‟) challenging the rejection of the bail application of the appellant
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-03, Patiala House Courts,
New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the „Trial Court‟) vide order
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
dated 06.06.2024 passed in FIR No. RC-38/2018/NIA/DLI, PS NIA
HQ, New Delhi, titled NIA v. Mohd. Naeeem @ Naim, Etc.,
(hereinafter referred to as the „Impugned Order‟) registered under
Sections 120B, 121, 121A and 122 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(hereinafter referred to as „IPC‟) and Sections 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38 and
39 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter
referred to as the „UAPA‟) and Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive
Substances Act, 1908, and seeking grant of bail.
2.
The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant
was arrested in the above FIR on 03.01.2019 and has been in custody
for more than 7 years and 8 months. Charges against him were framed
on 30.08.2022 and, as on 07.01.2026, 42 out of 112 witnesses (total
from 168) have been examined. Placing reliance on the judgments in
Union of India v. KA Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Ashim v. National
Investigation Agency, (2022) 1 SCC 695; Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh
v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813; Sheikh Javed Iqbal v.
State of Uttar Pradesh, (2024) 8 SCC 293; Mukesh Salam v. State of
Chattisgarh & Anr., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4021; Manish Sisodia v.
Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1920; Vijay Nair
v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3597; Javed
Ali@ Javed v. National Investigation Agency, 2024 SCC OnLine Del
7874; In re: Manirul Islam@Doctor, CRM (DB) No. 667/2023, order
dated 20.03.2023 (Calcutta High Court); Padam Singhee v.
Directorate of Enforcement, 2024:AHC:178668; Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Dayamoy Mahato & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC
2775; Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, (2024) 10 SCC 574;
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
Kareem@Sadam v. State by National Investigation Agency, SLP
(Crl) No. 11626/2025, judgment dated 07.10.2025; Union of India v.
Saleem Khan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1754; Tapas Kumar Palit v.
State of Chattisgarh, 2025 INSC 222; Vernon v. State of
Maharashtra & Anr., (2023) 15 SCC 56; Niklesh Prakash Patil v.
The State of Maharashtra, 2025:BHC-AS:21761; Chandeep Singh v.
National Investigation Agency, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 6332;
Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine
SC 10; and, Arvind Dham v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2026 SCC
OnLine SC 30, he submits that, in view of the long period of
incarceration and the trial not likely to conclude any time soon, the
appellant is entitled to be released on bail.
3.
He submits that, even on merits, the appellant was not named in
the initial FIR; he has no criminal antecedents; and nothing
incriminating in the form of arms, ammunition, literature, or other
documents has been recovered from him. The only recovery from him
is of two mobile handsets, which do not contain any incriminating
material. He submits that the entire case of the prosecution against the
appellant rests on three planks, that is, the statements of 3 witnesses of
village Radhana Inayatpur, that is, PW-28/Israr, PW-29/Arif, and PW30/Matloob; the second being the appellant‟s alleged disclosure
statement dated 11.01.2019 (D-124) and the pointing-out memo dated
12.01.2019 (D-125); and the third being the CDR analysis, which
shows the movement of the phone recovered from the appellant to be
the same as that of accused No. 1, namely, Mufti Mohd. Suhail
(hereinafter referred to as „A-1‟).
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
4.
He submits that, as far as PW-28, PW-29, and PW-30 are
concerned, their statements have been recorded by the learned Trial
Court, and nothing incriminating has come against the appellant. He
submits that these witnesses are, in fact, self-confessed illegal arm
dealers and if their statements are to be taken at face value, they are
the accomplices whose evidence would attract the rule of caution
under Section 133 read with illustration „b‟ to Section 114 of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, requiring further corroboration. They,
except identifying the appellant, who is from their own village, did not
identify others, including A-1, who is supposed to have been supplied
the arms. Even the alleged weapons that were supplied and had been
recovered by the prosecution, were not shown to them or got
identified before the learned Trial Court. There is also no proof of any
transaction of money.
5.
He submits that the witnesses cited against the appellant have
themselves contradicted each other as the chargesheet mentions that
Matloob (PW-30) had handed over a pistol, a katta and twenty live
cartridges to A-1; however, he in his statements states that he had
given the said arms to one Qasim with only 5 live cartridges.
6.
He submits that, even otherwise, their statements would not
implicate the appellant in the aggravated offence under Section 23 of
the UAPA, as it is not shown that the appellant had any knowledge
that these arms were to be used for furthering the activity of a terrorist
organization. He submits that, therefore, at best, the allegation against
the appellant would be that he introduced A-1 to arm dealers in his
own village, which act alone cannot establish the intention to aid
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
terrorism or to further the activity of a terrorist organization. He
submits that Section 23 of the UAPA requires the contravention under
the Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as „Arms Act‟) to take
place with an intent to aid any terrorist or to further any terrorist
activity. He submits that there is not a single whisper about the
terrorist group involved or of jihad in the testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses, thereby eliminating any allegation of intent to
aid in the alleged terrorist activities.
7.
He submits that as far as the offences under the Arms Act are
concerned, the appellant has already suffered incarceration for a long
period, which would be commensurate when compared with the preamended provisions of the Arms Act.
8.
As far as the CDR analysis establishing the movement of the
appellant and that of A-1 together is concerned, he submits that this
alone cannot show the contact between the appellant and A-1, much
less prove any charge against the appellant. In support, he places
reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shoma Kanti Sen v.
State of Maharashtra & Anr., (2024) 6 SCC 591.
9.
He submits that, even as per the case of the prosecution, the
appellant was not a key functionary or a core member of the Pro-IS
module Harkat-UI-Harb-E-Islam. He further submits that there is no
allegation of the appellant attending any meeting of this group, in
relation to the ideology of ISIS, or of him being in contact with any of
its handlers. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi), 2026 SCC OnLine
SC 10, he submits that, therefore, again, the appellant is entitled to be
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
released on bail as he satisfies the triple test.
10.
On the other hand, the learned Special Public Prosecutor
(hereinafter referred to as „SPP‟) submits that though from the
appellant himself, no recovery except a mobile has been made, there is
a host of recoveries from the other co-accused, which clearly shows
the conspiracy to commit a terrorist act by the organization. He
submits that in this conspiracy, each member may have a different
role, however, such person cannot plead innocence or leniency by
drawing a distinction in such role. In support of his plea, he places
reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Bhagwan Swarup
Lal Bishan Lal & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 1963 SCC OnLine
SC 26 and in Mohd. Amin & Anr. v. CBI, (2008) 15 SCC 49.
11.
He submits that the appellant cannot plead ignorance of the
main object of the conspiracy, that is, to support terrorism, as the very
act of facilitating procurement of arms in such large quantity would
show his knowledge that the same would be used for terrorist
activities. In support, he places reliance on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa
& Ors., (1996) 4 SCC 659.
12.
Placing reliance on Gulfisha Fatima (supra), he submits that,
the appellant was not a peripheral member of the organization but was
its core member and played a very active part, disentitling him to bail
only on the ground of a prolonged period of incarceration.
13.
As far as the submissions of the learned counsel for the
appellant that PW-28, PW-29, and PW-30 are, in fact, by their own
statements, accomplices and their statements should not be accepted,
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
he places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Laxmipat
Choraria & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 30,
to contend that the statements of such witnesses are also entitled to
acceptance.
14.
He submits that the CDR analysis of the phone recovered from
the appellant and A-1, shows that they were moving together. This
corroborates the disclosure statement and the pointing-out memo, as
also the evidence of PW-28, PW-29, and PW-30. He submits that
there were, in fact, 59 calls between A-1 and the appellant, and
another 32 calls between A-1 and accused No. 5/Mohd. Saqib Iftekar,
which clearly show that the appellant was aware of the design of the
conspiracy and played an active part in the same. He submits that, for
the above reasons, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed.
15.
We have considered the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties and have also perused the record of the learned
Trial Court.
16.
We shall first take note of the allegations made against the
appellant in the Charge-Sheet. These are as under:
“
X.
A-11 (Non
accused
FIR
i) Name with Parentage
named
Naim @ Mohd. Naeem
@Nayeem Choudhary, age
22 yrs (DOB: 01.01. 1997)
Aadhar Card No: 5164
8969 1960 S/o Hafiz
Munqaad@Munkad,
(Hereinafter referred to as
A-11).
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
ii) Address
Permanent)
(Present
and Resident of: Vill- Radhna
lnayatpur,
PS
Kithore
Kotwali,
District-Meerut,
Uttar Pradesh, PlN-250104
•A- 11 is a relative of Mufti
Saqib (A-5). It was Mufti
Saqib who introduced A1
and others to A-11 for
arrangement of weapons
through his known contacts
in
Radhna
lnayatpur,
Meerut.
iii) Role in Crime (in brief)
•The
investigation
has
established A- 11 was
instrumental in arranging
weapons for the group.
iv) Arrested/on bail/
arrested/ absconding
not Arrested: on 3rd of January,
2018. Presently in Judicial
Custody.
xxxx
“VIII. The investigation has substantiated that Mufti
Saqib (A-5) was instrumental in arranging for
weapons for the group. For this purpose he
contacted his relative Naim @ Nayeem
Chaudhary (A-11) of village Radhna
Inayatpur, Meerut. In the first instance, Naim
arranged one Pistol, one Katta and 20
cartridges of .32 mm and second time A-11
arranged three Pistols and 80/100 cartridges
from his village Radhana lnayatpur, through
three persons Matloob (PW-11), Aarif(PW58)and Israr(PW-57)all residents of the same
village. It has been revealed that Naim had the
knowledge about the intention of the group to
target innocent civilians for spreading terror
but nevertheless he provided the weapons and
involved himself in the conspiracy to wage war
against the Government of India.”
xxxxxxx
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
III. Procurement of Pistols from Meerut: (1st
Visit):
a) The initial investigation revealed that A-1,
A-2, A-3, A-4 & A-5 went to Meerut in the first
week of July, 2018 to procure pistols from
Radhana Inayatpur, Meerut, UP. Naim (A-11)
was instrumental in their procuring the
weapons.
b) The investigation revealed that during the
first week of July, 2018, Suhail (A-1) went to
Simbhaoli in western UP along with Anus
Younus (A-2), Zafar (A-4) and Zubair (A-3) by
a Maruti Swift Car white colour (belonging to
Zubair (A-3) and took Saqib (A-5) from Jama
Masjid Baksar, Hapur and reached at the tea
stall near bus stand of Radhna Inyatpur. Naim
(A-11) and Kasun (s/o Sh. Zafaryab) a resident
of this village was already therewhen Kasim
called Matloob (PW-11).
c) Matloob (PW-11) handed one Pistol and
one Katta and one packet (Cartridge) rounds
(20) to Mufti Suhail (A-1). In this transaction
A-5 introduced A-11 to the group who
promised them that weapons can be arranged
for a price.
d) Evidence gathered by Investigation to
substantiate the transactions in Meerut (First
Visit):
i. Witness Matloob (PW-11) in his statement
testified that during the transaction of
weapons dealings by Naim (A-11) and
Suhail (A-1) he witness the transaction of
arranging 01 country made pistol, 01
country made Katta and 20Nos.
ammunition on the direction of Naim (A-11)
and that these were handed over to A-1.
ii. Matloob (PW-11) also identified the arms
which were given to A-1 after seeing the
photographs of pistols at the time of
seizure.
iii. Voluntary Disclosure and Pointing out by
Naim (A-11): The investigation has also
corroborated the fact of this meeting from
the disclosure/pointing out on 12/01/2019
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
wherein A-11 pointed out the places where
A-11 met with A-1 and the place where
Pistols were purchased.During the visit A1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5 came at Village
Radhna Inyatpur and collected one country
made pistol, one country made pistol and a
packet of bullets from Matloob (PW- 11).
iv. After taking the said arms and ammunition
Mufti Suhail (A-1) and his team returned to
Delhi and dropped Saqib (A-5) and Kasim
at Simbhaoli (UP).
e) Corroboration of above from CDR
Analysis: CDR Analysis of Suhail (A-1),
Zubair (A-3) and Anas (A-2) was conducted to
corroborate the facts coming up from the
disclosures of accused and from statement of
witnesses. CDR Analysis confirms that Suhail
(A-1), Zubair (A-3) and Anas (A-2) (their
mobile numbers are 9910660673, 9811626865
& 8750150219) went to Meerut in the first
week of July 2018. The locations and
movements of phone numbers used by accused
persons as mentioned above are consistent
with the facts as come up in the evidence
discussed above. Details are attached in the
CDR Report (D-192).
IV. Procurement of Pistols from Meerut:
(2nd Visit):a) Investigation has established that during the
second week of August, 2018 Mufti Suhail (A1) along with Zafar (A-4) went to Vaishali
metro station by Baleno car of Zafar and took
Naim (A-11) (Naim was already present there)
and reached Radhana lnayatpur village in
Meerut, UP again. After reaching Radhana
lnayatpur, they took Aarif (PW-58) and Israr
(PW-57) who are locals of Radhna lnayatpur
village. Here, Mufti Suhail (A-1) purchased
three pistols and five packets of cartridge
(each packet contains 20 rounds) from Israr
(PW-57) (S/o Islam, Rio Village- Radhna
lnayatpur, PS- Kitore, Distt- Meerut,
UP).After collecting these arms and
ammunition Mufti Suhail (A-1) and Zafar (A-
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
4) returned to Delhi.
b) Witnesses Israr (PW-57) and Aarif (PW-58)
were examined by the investigation wherein
they testified in their statement that they were
present while arranging 03 country made
pistols and 100 Nos. ammunition, on the
direction of Naim (A-11) and the
weapons/ammunition were handed over to
Mufti Suhail (A-1).
c) The investigation has substantiated by
careful CDR Analysis of the phone numbers
used by the accused persons that show
commonality of location during the dates and
it clearly corroborates that Suhail (A-1),
Zubair (A-3), Anas (A-2) and Naim (A-11)
(their mobile numbers are 9354439023, 981
1626865, 8750 150219 & 8448302920) went
to Meerut in the second week of August 2018.
They all met near Vaishali metro station and
went to village- radhna Inyatpur, Meerut.
Details are in CDR Report.
xxxx
17.7.20 Evidence Against :Md. Naim (A-11):
Substantiation through evidence against
accused Naim (A11) has been done under
following headings:I. A-11 arranged and provided weapons for the
group.
a. Disclosure/Pointing out by Naim (A-11)
dated 12/01/2019 corroborates the statement
of witnesses that he arranged arms &
ammunition for the group through Matoob
(PW-11), Israr (PW-57) & Aarif (PW-58).
b. Witness Matloob (PW-11)in his statement
testified that during the transaction of
weapons dealings by A-11 was present and
involved in arranging 01 country made pistol,
01 country made Katta and 20Nos.
ammunition which were handed over to A-1.
This is a reliable eye-witness testimony.
c. Statement of Prosecution Witnesses Israr
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
(PW-57) and Aarif (PW-58): they testified that
they were present when 03 country made
pistols and 100 Nos. ammunition, were
arranged on the direction of Naim (A-11) and
that the weapons/ammunition were handed
over to Mufti Suhail (A-1).
d. The investigation has substantiated by
careful CDR Analysis of the phone numbers
used by the accused persons that show
commonality of location during the dates ie in
the first week of July and 2nd week of August,
2018. This further corroborates the facts as
disclosed in the disclosure of Naim(11) and
statements of eye witnesses Matloob (PW-11),
Israr (PW-57) & Aarif (PW-58).
e. The evidence against him substantiates that
he was part of the conspiracy hatched by A-1,
A-2, A-3, A-4 & A-5 to procure weapons for
the group from Radhana Inayatpur, Meerut
UP.
xxxxxx
17.7 Evidence against each accused in
Tabular Format:
Mohd.
Naeem
11)
Testimonial Evidence:(A-
➢ Oral evidence of Israr S/o
Islam R/o Radhna, Inayatpur,
➢ A-11 is a Tehsil Mawana, PS-Kithore,
relative
of Meerut,
UP,
Arif
S/o
Mufti Saqib Farmuddin
R/o
Radhna,
(A-5).
Inayatpur, Tehsil Mawana,
PS-Kithore,
Meerut,
UP,
➢
A-5 recorded u/s 161 Cr. PC.
introduced A1 and others Documentary Evidence:to A-11 for
arrangement ➢ CDR analysis report.
of weapons
through his ➢ Forensic Examination
Report of Dr. V. S. Baswani,
known
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
contacts
in Scientific
Consultant
Radhna
(Explosive Expert) related to
Inayatpur,
the recoveries made during
Meerut.
searches on 26th Dec, 2018
says that the seized materials
➢
The were collected for fabrication
investigation of IEDs.
has
established A- Material Evidence:11
was ➢ Recovery of two mobile
instrumental
phones along with SIM Cards
in arranging seized from the possession of
weapons for the A-11.
the group.
”
17.
From the above narration of allegations against the appellant, it
would be evident that the primary case against the appellant is that he
had introduced Mufti Suhail (A-1) to Aarif (PW-29), Israr (PW-28)
and Matloob (PW-30), to facilitate procurement of arms and
ammunition, knowing fully well that the same shall be used for
spreading terror. The case against the appellant, apart from the
testimonies of PW-28, PW-29 and PW-30, is based on CDR analysis
which allegedly shows the commonality of location of the appellant
with A-1/Suhail, A-3/Zaheer and A-2/Anas. It is also alleged that
there were calls exchanged between the appellant, A-1 as also
Accused no.5/Mohd. Saqib Ifthekar.
18.
As far as the PW-28, PW-29 and PW-30 are concerned, they
already stand examined before the learned Trial Court. We have
perused their statements and for the reasons that any observation made
by us on the same may influence the trial, we refrain ourselves from
giving our detailed opinion on the same. Suffice it to say that the
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
statements of these witnesses do not persuade us to deny bail to the
appellant. In addition, once these witnesses have been examined, the
possibility of the appellant influencing the trial already stand reduced,
if not negated.
19.
As far as the CDR locations and the telephone connectivity are
concerned, the effect of the same shall be considered by the learned
Trial Court in the trial.
20.
We are also mindful of the fact that the allegation against the
appellant is that he helped A-1 procure only one pistol and one katta
and one packet cartridge containing 20 rounds in the first instance, and
three pistols and 3 packets of cartridge each containing 20 rounds in
the second. The learned SPP appearing for the respondent has
submitted that this itself shows the knowledge of the appellant that
these arms and ammunition were to be used in terrorist activities. In
support, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Som Nath Thapa (supra). Though this will be a matter to be
considered by the learned Trial Court, Som Nath Thapa (supra) was a
case of supply of RDX/Bombs, due to which special presumption was
drawn by the Supreme Court. Given the arms and ammunition alleged
to be supplied in this case at the instance of the appellant, whether
such presumption of knowledge that they would be used in terrorist
activity and not other crime, will be a decision to be made by the
learned Trial Court at the conclusion of the trial.
21.
The learned SPP has further submitted that this being a case of
conspiracy, the act committed by the appellant should not be seen in
isolation. This submission, though correct in law, on facts the
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
prosecution would still have to show that the appellant was acting in
furtherance of a “common intention” and therefore, had knowledge of
such common goal or purpose.
22.
As far as A-5/Mohd. Saqib @ Saqib Iftekar is concerned, he has
already been enlarged on bail by us vide judgment dated 14.09.2026
passed in Crl.A. 676/2024. We had placed reliance in the said
judgment on our earlier judgment in Khuram Parvez v. National
Investigation
Agency,
2026:DHC:5092-DB,
wherein
we
had
considered the law relating to the effect of delay in the trial on the
Fundamental Rights of the accused under Article 21 of the
Constitution of India, and balance to be achieved between this right
and the restrictions on bail contained in Section 43D(5) of the UAPA.
We would quote from the said judgment as under:
“52. In K.A. Najeeb (supra), the Supreme
Court considering the balance to be achieved
between the Fundamental Right of an accused
for a speedy trial vis-à-vis the restrictions
imposed under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA on
release of the accused on bail, held that these
restrictions do not oust the ability of the
constitutional courts to grant bail on grounds
of violation of Part III of the Constitution. It
held that whereas at the commencement of
proceedings, the courts are expected to
appreciate the legislative policy against grant
of bail, however, these restrictions will melt
down where there is no likelihood of the trial
being completed within a reasonable time and
the period of incarceration already undergone
has exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. It was further held that
Section 43D(5) of UAPA is comparatively less
stringent than Section 37 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985,
where the court needs to be satisfied that
Digitally Signed
CRL.A. 807/2024
By:REYMON VASHIST
17:45:50
prima facie the accused is not guilty and that
he is unlikely to commit another offence while
on bail. Instead, Section 43D(5) of the UAPA
merely provides another possible ground for
the court to refuse bail, in addition to the wellsettled considerations like gravity of offence,
etc.. We quote from the judgment as under:
“17. It is thus clear to us that the
presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA per se does
not oust the ability of the constitutional
courts to grant bail on grounds of
violation of Part III of the Constitution.
Indeed, both the restrictions under a
statute as well as the powers exercisable
under constitutional jurisdiction can be
well
harmonised.
Whereas
at
commencement of proceedings, the
courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigours of such provisions will
melt down where there is no likelihood
of trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. Such an approach
would safeguard against the possibility
of provisions like Section 43-D(5) of the
UAPA being used as the sole metric for
denial of bail or for wholesale breach of
constitutional right to speedy trial.
18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are
conscious of the fact that the charges
levelled against the respondent are
grave and a serious threat to societal
harmony. Had it been a case at the
threshold, we would have outrightly
turned down the respondent's prayer.
However, keeping in mind the length of
the period spent by him in custody and
the unlikelihood of the trial being
completed anytime soon, the High Court
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appears to have been left with no other
option except to grant bail. An attempt
has been made to strike a balance
between the appellant's right to lead
evidence of its choice and establish the
charges beyond any doubt and
simultaneously the respondent's rights
guaranteed under Part III of our
Constitution have been well protected.
19. Yet another reason which persuades
us to enlarge the respondent on bail is
that Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA is
comparatively less stringent than Section
37 of the NDPS Act. Unlike the NDPS
Act where the competent court needs to
be satisfied that prima facie the accused
is not guilty and that he is unlikely to
commit another offence while on bail;
there is no such precondition under
UAPA. Instead, Section 43-D(5) of the
UAPA merely provides another possible
ground for the competent court to refuse
bail, in addition to the well-settled
considerations like gravity of the
offence, possibility of tampering with
evidence, influencing the witnesses or
chance of the accused evading the trial
by absconsion, etc.”
53. The above judgment and various others of
the Supreme Court were considered by the
Supreme Court in Gulfisha (supra), and the
Supreme Court framed the question to be
considered as “in prosecution under the
UAPA,
when
delay
and
prolonged
incarceration are invoked as grounds for bail,
what is the principled approach by which a
constitutional court is to examine such a
plea.”
54. In answer to the above question, the
Supreme Court held as under:
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“30. Article 21 occupies a central place
in the constitutional scheme. The right to
life and personal liberty, and the
insistence that any deprivation must
conform to procedure established by
law, are foundational guarantees. The
right to a speedy trial has been
recognised as an important facet of this
guarantee. It follows that pre-trial
incarceration cannot, by the mere
passage of time, be permitted to assume
the character of punishment.
31. At the same time, Article 21 has
never been understood as operating in
isolation from law. The constitutional
promise is not that liberty will be
unregulated, but that deprivations of
liberty
will
not
be
arbitrary,
unconscionable,
or
unfair.
The
expression “procedure established by
law” reflects that balance. The UAPA,
as a special statute enacted to address
offences alleged to affect the security of
the State and the stability of civic life,
represents a legislative judgment as to
the conditions under which bail may be
granted at the pre-trial stage. Section
43D(5) of UAPA embodies the exercise
of that judgment.
32. In Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb,
this Court recognised a constitutional
safeguard that cannot be ignored:
statutory restrictions cannot be applied
so as to render the guarantee of personal
liberty illusory. It was held that where
the trial is not likely to commence or
conclude within a reasonable period,
constitutional
courts
retain
the
jurisdiction
to
grant
bail
notwithstanding statutory restraints. The
decision thus operates as a protection
against unconscionable detention and
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there can be no second opinion on the
said principle.
33. The same decision, however, does
not indicate as laying down a
mechanical rule under which the mere
passage of time becomes determinative
in every case arising under a special
statute. The jurisprudence of this Court
does not support a construction whereby
delay simpliciter eclipses a statutory
regime enacted by Parliament to address
offences of a special category.
34. The constitutional inquiry into delay
is not an inquiry into guilt. It is an
inquiry into whether continued detention
remains constitutionally permissible in
the circumstances of the case. That
inquiry is necessarily contextual.
Context includes the nature of the
allegation, the statutory field, the stage
of the proceedings, the realistic
trajectory of the trial, the causes
contributing to delay, and the risks
attendant upon release. Delay cannot be
detached from these considerations and
treated as a solitary determinant.
35. The proper constitutional question,
therefore, is not whether Article 21 is
superior to Section 43D (5). The proper
question is how Article 21 is to be
applied where Parliament has expressly
conditioned the grant of bail in relation
to offences alleged to implicate national
security. The law does not contemplate
an either-or approach. Nor does it
contemplate an unstructured blending of
statutory
and
constitutional
considerations. What is required is
disciplined judicial scrutiny that gives
due regard to both.
xxx
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101. It is well recognised that Article 21
rights, though not absolute, require the
State and the Court to justify continued
custody with reference to the specific
individual before it. Treating all accused
identically irrespective of their roles
would risk transforming pre-trial
detention into a punitive mechanism
divorced from individual circumstances.
The constitutional mandate demands a
differentiated inquiry: where prolonged
custody disproportionately burdens
those whose roles are limited, the
balance between individual liberty and
collective security may call for
conditional release, while the same
balance may tilt differently for those
alleged to have orchestrated the
offence.”
55. The Supreme Court also examined the
principles governing the scope of judicial
inquiry under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA at
the bail stage, and held as under:
“80. From the foregoing discussion,
certain propositions governing the
application of Section 43D(5) emerge
with clarity. First, the provision
embodies a deliberate legislative
departure
from
ordinary
bail
jurisprudence, premised upon the
distinctive nature of offences under
Chapters IV and VI of the Act. Second,
the expression “prima facie true”
mandates a threshold judicial inquiry
which is neither perfunctory nor
adjudicatory, requiring the Court to
examine whether the prosecution
material, taken at face value, discloses
the essential statutory ingredients of the
alleged offence. Third, the inquiry is
necessarily accused-specific, directed to
the role and attribution qua the
individual, and does not admit of
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collective or undifferentiated treatment
merely because allegations arise from a
common
transaction
or
conspiracy. Fourth, the bail stage under
Section 43D(5) is not a forum for
evaluating defences, weighing evidence,
or conducting a mini-trial; judicial
restraint at this stage is not an
abdication of duty but a fulfilment of the
statutory mandate. These propositions,
read together, define the contours of
judicial power and responsibility under
the provision.
81. The correct application of Section
43D(5), therefore, requires the Court to
undertake a structured inquiry confined
to the following:
i. whether the prosecution material,
accepted as it stands, discloses a
prima facie case satisfying the
statutory ingredients of the offence
alleged;
ii. whether the role attributed to the
accused reflects a real and
meaningful nexus to the unlawful
activity
or
terrorist
activity
proscribed under the Act, as
distinguished from mere association
or peripheral presence; and
iii. whether the statutory threshold is
crossed qua the individual accused,
without
embarking
upon
an
assessment reserved after full-fledged
trial.
82. Where these requirements are met,
the statutory restraint on the grant of
bail must operate with full force; where
they are not, the embargo stands lifted.
This approach preserves the legislative
purpose of the Act, and ensures that the
exceptional nature of the bail regime
under Section 43D(5) is neither diluted
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by overreach nor distorted
mechanical application.”
by
56. The correctness of the above judgment,
insofar as interplay between Article 21 of the
Constitution of India and Section 43D(5) of
the UAPA is concerned, has been doubted by
the Supreme Court in Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v.
National Investigation Agency, Jammu, 2026
INSC 503. It explained K.A. Najeeb (supra),
as under:
“31. In K.A. Najeeb, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court was clear and
unequivocal in holding that once it is
obvious that a timely trial would not be
possible and the accused has suffered
incarceration for a significant period of
time, the courts would ordinarily be
obligated to enlarge the accused on bail.
We have already extracted supra
paragraph 17 of the said judgment
where it has been clearly stated that the
presence of statutory restrictions like
Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act per se
does not oust the ability of the
constitutional courts to grant bail on
grounds of violation of Part III of the
Constitution.
Whereas
at
the
commencement of the proceedings, the
courts are expected to appreciate the
legislative policy against grant of bail
but the rigors of such provisions will
„melt down‟ where there is no likelihood
of the trial being completed within a
reasonable time and the period of
incarceration already undergone has
exceeded a substantial part of the
prescribed sentence. In the facts of that
case, this Court observed that it was
conscious of the fact that the charges
levelled against the accused were grave
and a serious threat to societal harmony
and had it been the case at the threshold,
perhaps the Court would have outrightly
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rejected such a prayer. However,
keeping in mind the duration of
incarceration and the unlikelihood of the
trial being completed in the near future,
the accused had to be enlarged on bail.
xxx
35. The often invoked phrase „bail is the
rule and jail is the exception‟ is not
merely an empty statutory slogan
flowing from the CrPC as Gurwinder
has stated. It is a constitutional principle
flowing from Articles 21 and 22 of the
Constitution and the presumption of
innocence which is the cornerstone of
any civilised society governed by the
rule of law. Statutes may undoubtedly
calibrate the manner in which that
principle is applied, particularly in cases
involving national security or terrorist
offences for which the UAP Act is meant,
but those cannot altogether invert the
constitutional relationship between
liberty and detention. The statutory
embargo of Section 43-D(5) must remain
a circumscribed restriction that operates
subject to the guarantee of Articles 21
and 22 of the Constitution. Therefore, we
have no manner of doubt in stating that
even under the UAP Act, „bail is the rule
and jail is the exception‟; of course, in
an appropriate case, bail can be denied
having regard to the facts of that
particular case.”
57. Further, while highlighting the low
conviction rate in UAPA, the Supreme Court
opined that:“42.3. Thus, from the aforesaid figures,
it is evident that the country-wide
percentage of conviction under the UAP
Act for the five years comprising the
period 2019-23 hovers between 2% to
6%. In other words, there is 94% to 98%
possibility of acquittal in such cases in
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the country. When it comes to the Union
Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the
percentage of conviction is abysmal, to
say the least. For the aforesaid period,
the annual rate of conviction is always
less than 1%. It means that at the end of
the trial, there is 99% possibility of
acquittal in such cases. With these kind
of statistics staring at our face, the
question is, should we continue the
detention of the appellant or defer the
consideration to a later stage, simply
because the charges are serious?”
58. We must also note that this issue
concerning the interplay between Article 21 of
the Constitution and Section 43D(5) of the
UAPA Act, has now been referred to a larger
Bench in Tasleem Ahmed v. State Govt. of
NCT of Delhi (order dated 22.05.2026 passed
by the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.)
2867/2026). In the said order, the Supreme
Court has observed that delay cannot be the
sole ground for releasing the accused on bail
and that the inquiry into delay is contextual
and must take into account the nature of the
allegations, the statutory field, the stage of the
proceedings, the realistic trajectory of the
trial, the causes contributing to the delay, the
role attributed to the accused, the prima facie
material, the availability of intermediate
safeguards, and the risks attendant upon
release. It has further observed as under: “20. We are also conscious that an
unqualified reading of the proposition
that lapse of time by itself must compel
bail in every case under the UAPA may
have serious consequences. Such an
approach may leave little room for
courts to examine the nature of
allegations, centrality of role, protected
witnesses,
risk
of
intimidation,
possibility of reactivation of networks,
nature of delay and whether such delay
is attributable to the accused
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himself/herself, public order concerns
and national security implications. On
the other hand, an equally unqualified
insistence on Section 43D(5) without
regard to prolonged incarceration would
imperil Article 21. The Constitution does
not command either extreme. It is this
precise issue that may warrant attention
of the appropriate bench dealing with
the issues.
21. The question, therefore, is not
whether Article 21 survives Section
43D(5). It undoubtedly does. The true
question is how Article 21 is to be
applied in a statutory field where
Parliament has consciously imposed
restrictions on bail in respect of offences
alleged to affect the security of the State
and the stability of civic life.
22. We clarify that nothing in this order
is intended to whittle down, dilute, read
narrowly, or detract from the authority
of K.A. Najeeb. ...”
59. In the said order, after having referred the
issue to the larger Bench, the Supreme Court
still went on to consider the case of the
appellant therein for bail and, taking into
account the substantial period of incarceration
already undergone by the appellant therein,
released the appellant on interim bail for a
period of 6 months.
60. In Union Territory of Ladakh and Ors. v.
Jammu and Kashmir National Conference
and Anr., (2024) 18 SCC 643, the Supreme
Court has also held that merely because a
question of law is referred to a larger Bench,
the High Court must not refrain from
considering the matter before it in accordance
with the law binding on it. It has opined as
under:
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“35. We are seeing before us judgments and
orders by High Courts not deciding cases on
the ground that the leading judgment of this
Court on this subject is either referred to a
larger Bench or a review petition relating
thereto is pending. We have also come across
examples of High Courts refusing deference to
judgments of this Court on the score that a
later coordinate Bench has doubted its
correctness. In this regard, we lay down the
position in law. We make it absolutely clear
that the High Courts will proceed to decide
matters on the basis of the law as it stands. It
is not open, unless specifically directed by this
Court, to await an outcome of a reference or a
review petition, as the case may be. It is also
not open to a High Court to refuse to follow a
judgment by stating that it has been doubted
by a later coordinate Bench. In any case, when
faced with conflicting judgments by Benches of
equal strength of this Court, it is the earlier
one which is to be followed by the High
Courts, as held by a 5-Judge Bench
in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay
Sethi. The High Courts, of course, will do so
with careful regard to the facts and
circumstances of the case before it.”
23.
In the present appeal as well, though the appellant has been in
custody since 03.01.2019, that is, for a period of more than 7 ½ years,
in the trial only 42 witnesses out of 112 have been examined. There is
no possibility of the trial concluding any time soon.
24.
Given the nature of the evidence and the delay in conclusion of
the trial, we are of the opinion that the appellant has been able to make
out a case for being released on bail.
25.
Accordingly, we direct that the appellant be released on bail,
subject to the following conditions:a. The appellant shall execute a personal bond in the sum of
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Rs.50,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the learned Trial Court;
b. The appellant shall surrender his passport, if any, before
the learned Trial Court. If he does not hold a passport, an
affidavit to that effect shall be filed before the learned Trial
Court;
c. The appellant shall not leave the country without prior
permission of the learned Trial Court. Any application
seeking permission to travel shall disclose the destination,
duration, purpose of travel and complete contact details
during such travel;
d. The appellant shall not leave his native place i.e., District
Meerut, except to travel to Delhi to attend his Trial or to
report at the NIA Office as part of his bail conditions;
e. The appellant shall only use one mobile phone and/or
landline number during the course of the trial, which shall
always be kept in the switch-on mode;
f. The appellant shall furnish his current residential address,
the mobile/landline number and his e-mail address to the
Investigating Officer and to the learned Trial Court. He shall
not change his residence or contact particulars without
giving at least seven days‟ prior intimation to the
Investigating Officer and the learned Trial Court;
g. The appellant shall appear before the learned Trial Court
on each date of hearing, unless exempted by the learned
Trial Court from such appearance;
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h. The appellant shall not exhibit any conduct that has the
effect of delaying the proceedings;
i. The appellant shall not directly or indirectly contact,
influence, threaten or communicate with any prosecution
witness, protected witness, complainant, person acquainted
with the facts of the case or the co-accused or their family
members;
j. The appellant shall not tamper with evidence, electronic
material, records, devices or documents relating to the case;
k. The appellant shall not make any public statement,
including through print, electronic media or social media,
touching upon the merits of the case, the evidence, the
witnesses or the pending trial;
l. The appellant shall not participate in any activity which
may prejudice public order or the integrity of the trial;
m. The appellant shall not upload/share/disseminate or
circulate any anti-national material on any social media
platform or otherwise;
n. The appellant shall report to the concerned NIA
BRANCH OFFICE, once every fortnight, or at such interval
as may be directed by the learned Trial Court. The Branch
Office shall maintain a separate register of attendance with
respect to the appellant;
26.
In the event of breach of any condition, it shall be open to the
prosecution to seek cancellation of bail before the appropriate court.
27.
The impugned order rejecting the appellant's bail application is,
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accordingly, set aside. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.
28.
It is made clear that the observations made herein shall not be
construed as an observation on the merits of the case, as the same have
been made only for the purpose of consideration of bail.
29.
A copy of this judgment be sent to the learned Trial Court as
also to the concerned Jail Superintendent for information and
necessary compliance.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
RAVINDER DUDEJA, J
SEPTEMBER 30, 2026/rv/as
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