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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
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Date of Decision: 07.09.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010418792026
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LPA 689/2026 & CM APPL. 59972/2026
MUMBAI RAILWAY VIKAS CORPORATION LIMITED &
ANR.
.....Appellants
Through:
Mr. V.S.R. Krishna, Adv.
versus
SH NAVEEN DUTT & ANR.
Through:
.....Respondents
Mr. Nipun Jain, Adv for R-2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TEJAS KARIA
TEJAS KARIA, J. (Oral)
CM APPL. 59971/2026 (Exemption)
1.
Exemption is allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2.
The Application stands disposed of.
LPA 689/2026
3.
The present intra court Appeal has been referred against the order
dated 09.07.2026 (“Impugned Order”) passed in CM APPL. 43087/2022
(“Application”) filed by Respondent No. 1 in the Appellants’ W.P.(C) No.
8425/2018 (“Writ Petition”) under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947 (“Act”) seeking payment of the wages last drawn filed under was
allowed.
4.
Respondent No. 1 was engaged by Appellant No. 1 on a fixed-term
contractual basis for the period from 01.07.2011 to 31.12.2011, pursuant to
LPA 689/2026
the contract dated 01.07.2011 read with the corrigendum dated 13.07.2011.
The contract expressly stipulated the duration of the engagement. Upon
expiry of the fixed term on 31.12.2011, the contract was not renewed.
5.
Respondent No. 1 approached learned Industrial Tribunal, contending
that the non-renewal of his fixed-term contract amounted to retrenchment.
By an award dated 12.03.2018 (“Award”), learned Industrial Tribunal
directed the reinstatement of Respondent No. 1 with full back wages.
6.
Aggrieved by the Award, the Appellants have instituted the Writ
Petition on 25.07.2018. By order dated 11.10.2018, learned Single Judge
directed the Appellant to pay ₹10,000/- to Respondent No. 1 towards
litigation expenses, which was made by the Appellant.
7.
On 23.09.2022, Respondent No. 1 filed the Application. By the
Impugned Order, learned Single Judge allowed the Application and directed
the Appellant to pay Respondent No. 1 the full last drawn wages with effect
from the date of the Award, within four weeks. Aggrieved by the Impugned
Order, the Appellants have preferred the present Appeal.
8.
Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that learned Single
Judge erred in directing payment of wages under Section 17-B of the Act
from the date of the Award, without duly considering the inordinate and
unexplained delay of nearly four years in filing the Application from the
filing of the Writ Petition.
9.
It was further submitted by learned Counsel for the Appellants that
Respondent No. 1 had entered appearance in the Writ Petition on
11.10.2018, filed his reply on 04.07.2019, and received ₹10,000/- towards
litigation expenses on 08.01.2019 and despite that, Respondent No. 1
invoked Section 17-B of the Act only on 23.09.2022, when the matter had
LPA 689/2026
reached an advanced stage of hearing. According to the Appellants, such
conduct indicated that Respondent No. 1 was gainfully employed and that
the Application had been filed as an afterthought to secure a lump-sum
payment, rather than on account of a genuine need for subsistence.
10.
Learned Counsel for the Appellants further submitted that learned
Single Judge failed to appreciate that the object of Section 17-B of the Act is
to secure subsistence for a workman during the pendency of proceedings,
and not to confer a windfall upon a party who files a belated application. It
was also submitted on behalf of the Appellants that the explanation offered
by Respondent No. 1 for the delay, namely the medical condition of his
father and daughter, was unconvincing, since a workman genuinely in need
of financial assistance would have approached the Court at an earlier stage.
11.
It was submitted that the reliance placed by learned Single Judge on
the decision in Regional Authority, Dena Bank & Anr. v. Ghanshyam, AIR
2001 SC 2270, was misplaced, as the said decision did not consider the issue
of delay in filing an application under Section 17-B of the Act.
12.
It was further submitted that the Impugned Order was contrary to the
binding decision of the Division Bench in Municipal Corporation of Delhi
v. Santosh Kumari, Neutral Citation: 2012:DHC:5201-DB, wherein it was
held that, in cases of unreasonable and unexplained delay in filing an
application under Section 17-B of the Act, payment of wages may be
restricted to the date of the application rather than the date of the award. It
was contended that, by failing to consider the decision in Santosh Kumari
(supra), learned Single Judge erred in mechanically granting wages from the
date of the Award.
LPA 689/2026
13.
We have heard learned Counsel for the Appellants and perused the
material placed on record.
14.
The only issue that arises for our consideration in the present Appeal
is whether wages payable under Section 17-B of the Act from the date of the
Award may be denied solely on account of delay in filing the Application.
15.
In the present case, the Appellants have contended that considering
the inordinate delay of four years filing the Application, the wages under
Section 17-B of the Act ought to have been granted from the date of
Application and not from the date of the Award. It was further submitted on
behalf of the Appellants that that the Application was filed as an
afterthought to secure a windfall.
16.
Section 17-B of the Act is a beneficial provision intended to sustain a
workman during the pendency of proceedings. A plain reading of Section
17-B of the Act indicates that, during the pendency of proceedings before
the High Court or the Supreme Court, the employer is required to pay the
workman the full wages last drawn, inclusive of any admissible maintenance
allowance, provided the Court is satisfied that that workman was not
employed in any establishment and did not receive adequate remuneration
during the such period or any part thereof.
17.
The express reference in Section 17-B of the Act to the term “during
the pendency of such proceedings”, coupled with the requirement to
consider whether the workman was gainfully employed “during any such
period or any part thereof”, makes it clear that Respondent No. 1 is entitled
to the wages last drawn by him for the entire duration of the pendency of the
proceedings of the Writ Petition.
LPA 689/2026
18.
The reliance placed by the Appellants on the decision in Santosh
Kumari (supra) in support of their contention that wages ought to have been
awarded from the date of the Application and not from the date of the
Award on account of inordinate delay in filing the Application, does not
advance their case in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
19.
The Coordinate Bench of this Court in Santosh Kumari (supra) held
that a workman would ordinarily be entitled to wages under Section 17-B of
the Act from the date of the award. However, while determining the period
for which such wages are payable, the Court may take into consideration any
delay in filing the application under Section 17-B of the Act. It is further
observed in Santosh Kumari (supra) that such an application should
ordinarily be filed along with the counter affidavit, the reply to an
application for interim relief, or within a reasonable period after the
workman enters appearance in the proceedings, however, where the
application is filed after a prolonged and unexplained delay, the Court has
the discretion to direct payment of wages from the date of the application.
20.
Accordingly, it is the discretion of the Court while considering an
application under Section 17-B of the Act to determine the date from which
the wages are to be awarded, i.e., either the date of the award or the date of
the application, having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case.
21.
In the facts of the present case, learned Single Judge found the
explanation furnished by Respondent No. 1 for the delay in filing the
Application acceptable and, while exercising the discretion as stipulated in
Santosh Kumari (supra), directed payment of wages from the date of the
Award. The Impugned Order records the satisfaction of learned Single Judge
with the justification offered by Respondent No. 1 for not approaching the
LPA 689/2026
Court earlier for relief under Section 17-B of the Act owing to the medical
condition of his ailing father and the attendant difficult circumstances. It
further records that the Appellants had placed no material on record either to
controvert the said explanation or to dispute the assertions made by
Respondent No. 1.
22.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion
that learned Single Judge correctly exercised the discretion to allow the
prayer to grant wages from the date of the Award after duly considering the
explanation furnished by Respondent No. 1 for delay in the filing the
Application. Mere delay in filing the Application, particularly where the
explanation offered for such delay has been found acceptable by learned
Single Judge, cannot disentitle Respondent No. 1 to wages from the date of
the Award. In the absence of any cogent material controverting the
explanation offered by Respondent No. 1, we do not find any ground to
disturb the discretion exercised by learned Single Judge and to restrict the
payment of wages from the date of the Application.
23.
We, therefore, find no infirmity in the Impugned Order dated
09.07.2026 warranting interference in the present Appeal. The Appeal is,
accordingly, dismissed. The pending Application also stands disposed of.
There shall be no order as to costs.
TEJAS KARIA, J
DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ
SEPTEMBER 07, 2026/N
LPA 689/2026
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