The court's order
The closing paragraphs of the judgment, in the court's own words. The reasons are in the full text below.
12. Accordingly, the present petition, along with all pending application(s), if any, is disposed of.
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*
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 23.01.2026
+
ARB.P. 1918/2025
MS. SUMITA BANU
Through:
.....Petitioner
Mr. N U Ahmed & Mr. Anil
Kumar Yadav, Advs.
versus
SMT LALITA RATHI
Through:
.....Respondent
Dr. Anurag Bhardwaj, Mr.
Prabhu Saxena & Ms. Devyani,
Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
1.
The present petition has been filed under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 [“the Act”], seeking the
appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the
parties arising out of the Service Agreement dated 11.03.2025
[“Agreement”].
2.
The said Agreement contains an Arbitration Clause, being
Clause 6, which reads as under:
“6. Dispute Resolution:
In the event of any dispute under this Agreement, the same shall be
amicably settled between the Parties. If any dispute is not settled
amicably, the same shall be referred to the sole arbitrator to be
appointed mutually by both the Parties. The award given by the
Arbitrator shall be final and binding on both the Parties. The
language of Arbitral Proceedings shall be English. This arbitration
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:30:47
ARB.P. 1918/2025
shall be governed by The Arbitration & Conciliation Act, I 996 and
the place of arbitration shall be at Delhi.”
3.
The material on record indicates that the Petitioner herein
invoked arbitration in terms of Section 21 of the Act vide legal notice
dated 01.09.2025.
4.
This Court is cognizant of the scope of interference at the stage
of a Petition under Section 11 of the Act. The law with respect to the
scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the
Act has been fairly well settled. A Coordinate bench of this Court, in
Pradhaan Air Express Pvt Ltd v. Air Works India Engineering Pvt
Ltd [2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022], has extensively dealt with the
scope of interference at the stage of Section 11. The Court held as
under:“9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, while considering all earlier
pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of
seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 & the
Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re has held that scope of inquiry at the
stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent of
prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing
else.
10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no.114 in the case
of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd that observations made in
Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., and adopted in NTPC
Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd., that the jurisdiction of the referral court
when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re:
Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no.114 in the case of SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd reads as under:“114. In view of the observations made by this Court
in In Re: Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of
enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:30:47
ARB.P. 1918/2025
limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the
arbitration agreement, and nothing else. For this
reason, we find it difficult to hold that the
observations made in Vidya Drolia (supra) and
adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that the
jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the
issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11
extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the
subsequent decision in In Re: Interplay (supra).”
11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have
been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is
equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the
case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P)
Ltd., however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11
must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time-consuming and
costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated
such as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim
through arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the
limited scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the
interest of the parties who might be constrained to participate in
the arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal
eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be
borne by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have
abused the process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to
the other parties to the arbitration.
12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the
adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent and
malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration
proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts of
Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:“20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 :
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 : 2024 INSC 532] ,
frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which the
referral court should not decide at the stage of Section
11 as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent
to adjudicate the same.
21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the
limited jurisdiction of the referral courts under
Section 11 must not be misused by parties in order to
force other parties to the arbitration agreement to
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:30:47
ARB.P. 1918/2025
participate in a time consuming and costly arbitration
process. This is possible in instances, including but
not limited to, where the claimant canvasses the
adjudication of non-existent and mala fide claims
through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of
judicial interference of the referral courts with the
interests of the parties who might be constrained to
participate in the arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral
Tribunal may direct that the costs of the arbitration
shall be borne by the party which the Tribunal
ultimately finds to have abused the process of law and
caused unnecessary harassment to the other party to
the arbitration. Having said that, it is clarified that the
aforesaid is not to be construed as a determination of
the merits of the matter before us, which the Arbitral
Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to determine.”
13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section 11
proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to the
extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of
the referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act
and further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally confined
to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural
safeguards but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the
arbitral process. Any transgression beyond this limited judicial
threshold would not only contravene the legislative intent
enshrined in Section 8 and Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk
undermining the sanctity and efficiency of arbitration as a
preferred mode of dispute resolution. The referral Court must,
therefore, exercise restraint and refrain from venturing into the
merits of the dispute or adjudicating issues that fall squarely within
the jurisdictional domain of the arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen
that the scope of enquiry at the referral stage is conservative in
nature. A similar view has also been expressed by the Supreme
Court in the case of Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S.
Patel”.
5.
Learned counsel appearing for the parties are ad idem that the
matter may be referred to arbitration. The learned counsel for the
parties are also ad idem that since the dispute is stated to be for an
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:30:47
ARB.P. 1918/2025
amount of Rs. 9,73,084/-, the matter be referred to an Advocate under
the aegis of the Delhi International Arbitration Centre [“DIAC”].
6.
Accordingly, this Court appoints Mr. Saurabh Seth, Advocate
(Mobile No.9811393402), who is empanelled with the DIAC, to
adjudicate the disputes as between the parties.
7.
The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the DIAC
and would abide by its rules and regulations. The learned Arbitrator
shall be entitled to fees as per the Schedule of Fees maintained by the
DIAC.
8.
The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite
disclosure under Section 12 (2) of the Act within a week of entering of
reference.
9.
The Registry is directed to send a receipt of this order to the
learned Arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through email.
10.
All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
11.
Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy
between the parties.
12.
Accordingly, the present petition, along with all pending
application(s), if any, is disposed of.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 23, 2026/ v/her/jk
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
14:30:47
ARB.P. 1918/2025
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