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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 28.09.2026
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CNR No. DLHC010467312026
+
RC.REV. 372/2026, CAV 472/2026 (U/S 148-A of the CPC.),
CM APPL. 67299/2026 (Stay) & CM APPL. 67300/2026 (Ex.)
MS NEW JANTA TRANSPORT COMPANY & ANR.
Through:
Mr.
Rajesh
Advocate.
.....Petitioners
Srivastava,
versus
MR. SANJAY SINGHAL & ANR.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Praful Jindal, Advocate for
Respondent No. 1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
%
1.
JUDGEMENT (Oral)
The present Revision Petition has been filed under the proviso
to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [“DRC Act”],
assailing the Order/Judgment dated 29.05.2026 [“Impugned Order”],
passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Central District, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi [“learned ARC”] in the Eviction Petition, being
ARC 412/2024, titled “Sanjay Singhal vs. Jawahar Singh Dua &
Ors.”.
2.
By way of the Impugned Order, the learned ARC has rejected
the Application seeking leave to defend and passed an eviction order
as against the Petitioner/tenant.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:00:58
RC.REV. 372/2026
3.
Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submits
that the Impugned Order suffers from material infirmities and that the
Application seeking leave to defend raised several triable issues which
have not been properly appreciated by the learned ARC. He has
confined his challenge to the Impugned Order on four principal
grounds.
4.
Firstly, learned counsel submits that the eviction petition itself
was barred by the provisions of Section 14(6) of the DRC Act. It is his
submission that the title documents relied upon by Respondent No.1
disclose acquisition of interests in the subject property in the years
2020 and 2021 and that the eviction petition, having been instituted in
July, 2024, was filed within the period of five years contemplated
under Section 14(6) of the DRC Act. It is, therefore, contended that
the learned ARC failed to appreciate the statutory bar operating
against the institution of the eviction proceedings.
5.
Secondly, learned counsel submits that the plea of bona fide
requirement was not made out. According to him, the requirement
pleaded by Respondent No.1 was essentially for his son, whereas the
material placed on record by the Petitioners demonstrated that the son
was already engaged in the business of grains and was carrying on
such business through existing business establishments. It is submitted
that the material in the form of printouts from social-media platforms
was placed before the learned ARC precisely to demonstrate that the
alleged requirement of commencing or expanding the business was
not genuine.
6.
Thirdly, learned counsel submits that the Respondent No.1 has
sufficient alternative accommodation available to him. He submits that
Respondent No.1 and the other co-owners have substantial portions of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:00:58
RC.REV. 372/2026
the same property and are already carrying on business therefrom. It is
further submitted that other portions/floors of the property are also
available and, according to the Petitioners, remain unutilised. The
contention, therefore, is that the requirement of the tenanted premises
cannot be regarded as bona fide when other accommodation is
available within the same property and could be utilised for the
alleged business requirement.
7.
Lastly, learned counsel points out a discrepancy between the
dimensions/area reflected in the title documents and those shown in
the site plan relied upon by Respondent No.1. It is submitted that
while the Sale Deed refers to an area of 210 square yards, the area of
the subject premises has been stated to be approximately 248 square
yards. According to the learned counsel, this discrepancy, coupled
with the manner in which the site plan has been prepared, raises a
serious issue regarding the identification and extent of the premises
forming the subject matter of the eviction proceedings.
8.
In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the
Petitioners places reliance upon M/S Geeta Press vs. Madhu Rastogi1
and submits that the principles governing the exercise of revisional
jurisdiction do not preclude this Court from interfering where the
learned ARC has failed to properly consider material contentions
which go to the root of the claim for eviction.
9.
Per Contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent
No. 1 supports the Impugned Order and submits that the present
proceedings are circumscribed by the limited revisional jurisdiction
permissible to this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the
DRC Act. He submits that this Court, while exercising the aforesaid
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BHATIA
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jurisdiction, is not required to re-appreciate the material on record or
undertake a fresh examination of the merits of the case as an appellate
court. It is submitted that unless the Impugned Order suffers from any
jurisdictional error, material irregularity, perversity or patent illegality,
in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, no interference is called for.
10.
This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length
and, with their able assistance, perused the relevant documents as also
the Impugned Order.
11.
Before proceeding to examine the grounds of challenge urged
on behalf of the Petitioner, it would be apposite to advert to the scope
and ambit of the revisional jurisdiction vested in this Court under the
proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.
12.
The contours of the aforesaid jurisdiction are well settled. The
Hon‟ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance
Co. Ltd.2, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar
Singh3, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua4, has
consistently held that the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
under the proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory
and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction.
13.
The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied
upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj
Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.5, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny
Grover6.
Civil Appeal No. 5591 of 2021 arising from Special Leave Petition (C) No. 13544 of 2021
(1998) 8 SCC 119
(2014) 9 SCC 78
(2022) 6 SCC 30
2024:DHC:9322
2025:DHC:11285
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BHATIA
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14.
In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while
elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25(B) of the
DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against
an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and
deliberate. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court is,
therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process,
including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the
High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent
Controller merely because another view on the material available on
record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court read as under:
“23. The proviso to Section 25-B(8) gives the High Court exclusive
power of revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller,
being in the nature of superintendence over an inferior court on the
decision-making process, inclusive of procedural compliance.
Thus, the High Court is not expected to substitute and supplant its
views with that of the trial court by exercising the appellate
jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the process adopted. The
scope of interference by the High Court is very restrictive and
except in cases where there is an error apparent on the face of the
record, which would only mean that in the absence of any
adjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb
such a decision. There is no need for holding a roving inquiry in
such matters which would otherwise amount to converting the
power of superintendence into that of a regular first appeal, an act,
totally forbidden by the legislature.”
15.
In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court,
upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra),
reiterated that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that
this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of
the learned ARC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the
decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned
Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an
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BHATIA
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absence of adjudication warranting interference.
16.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges
is that, while exercising jurisdiction under the proviso to Section
25B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to
undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to
arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute.
Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Order
suffers from a jurisdictional error, manifest illegality, material
irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the
learned ARC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous
premise of law. Equally, where a material plea has been left
unconsidered, or the decision-making process otherwise discloses an
error apparent on the face of the record, exercise of revisional
jurisdiction may be warranted.
17.
It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional
scrutiny that the grounds urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the
Petitioner against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.
18.
This Court now proceeds to examine the grounds of challenge
urged on behalf of the Petitioners. The first contention relates to the
applicability of Section 14(6) of the DRC Act. The Petitioners contend
that the ownership of the subject premises is traceable to documents of
the years 2020 and 2021 and, consequently, the eviction petition
instituted in July, 2024 was barred by the statutory embargo contained
in the said provision. The learned ARC, however, upon examination
of the title documents placed on record, has found that Respondent
No.1 had acquired an undivided share in the subject premises pursuant
to the registered Sale Deed dated 18.08.1998. The relevant portion of
the Impugned Order in relation to the aforesaid finding of the Learned
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:00:58
RC.REV. 372/2026
ARC is reproduced hereinbelow:
“I. Ownership of the petitioner over the tenanted
premises as well as existence of landlord-tenant
relationship between the petitioner and the
respondents.
12. Before going into facts, it is important to discuss the law
regarding concept of „ownership‟ under the DRC Act which is
different from the title suit under CPC. In case titled as Jiwan Lal
Vs. Gurdial Kaur & Ors. 1995 RLR 162 a Bench of Hon‟ble
High Court of Delhi while dealing with the concept of ownership
in a pending eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC
Act had noted as follows: “There is a tendency on the part of tenants to deny ownership in
cases under Section 14(1)(e). To test the substance of such a plea
on the part of the tenants the Courts have insisted that they should
state who else is the owner of the premises if not the petitioner. In
the present case it is not said as to who else is the owner. Further
these cases under Section 14(1)(e) are not title cases involving
disputes of title to the property. Ownership is not to be proved in
absolute terms. The respondent does not claim the owner of the
premises.”
13. In Ramesh Chand vs. Uganti Devi, 157 (2009) DLT 450, this
Court has specifically held that: “It is settled preposition of law that in order to consider the concept
of ownership under Delhi Rent Control Act, the Court has to see
the title and right of the landlord qua the tenant. The only thing to
be seen by the Court is that the landlord had been receiving rent for
his own benefit and not for and on behalf of someone else. If the
landlord was receiving rent for himself and not on behalf of
someone else, he is to be considered as the owner, howsoever
imperfect his title over the premises may be. The imperfection of
the title of the premises cannot stand in the way of an eviction
petition under Section 14 (1) (e) of the D.R.C. Act, neither the
tenant can be allowed to raise the plea of imperfect title or title not
vesting in the landlord and that too when the tenant has been
paying rent to the landlord. Section 116 of the Evidence Act
creates estoppel against such tenant. A tenant can challenge the
title of landlord only after vacating the premises and not when he is
occupying the premises. In fact, such a tenant who denies the title
of the landlord, qua the premises, to whom he is paying rent, acts
dishonestly. I, therefore, find that there was no infirmity in the
order of learned ARC in this respect.”
14. Further, in the case titled as Smt. Shanti Sharma & Ors. Vs.
Smt. Ved Prabha & Ors 1987 AIR 2028, the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court observed: “That the meaning of term „owner‟ is vis a vis the tenant i.e. the
owner should be something more than the tenant.
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:00:58
RC.REV. 372/2026
It is also well settled that the petitioner should be something more
than the tenant and the petitioner need not prove his ownership in
absolute terms. It is sufficient for the petitioner to prove or to show
that he is something more than a tenant.”
15. Hence, it is well-settled that for the purpose of seeking
eviction, the landlord/lady was only required to show that he was
enjoying rights in respect of the subject premises and held better
title than the tenant. In fact, vesting of absolute ownership is not a
pre-requisite for adjudication of an Eviction Petition under Section
14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. The landlord‟s ownership is good against
the world except the true owner.
16. Now reverting to facts of the instant petition, the case of
petitioner in brief is that petitioner along with Sh. Suresh Kumar
Bansal and late Sh. H.C Garg, jointly purchased the said premises,
i.e. ground floor of property bearing Nos. 4120, 4121 on front side
main road, and 4150 on the backside, [Plot No. 110 (old)] situated
at Baston Road, Naya Bazar, Delhi-110006, totally admeasuring
210 Sq. Yds. including built up area vide registered sale deed dated
18.08.1998. That after death of Late Sh. H.C Garg, who died
intestate on 19.05.2018, all the legal heirs of late Sh. H.C Garg
vide registered relinquishment deed dated 27.02.2020,
released/relinquished all their rights, title, interests and benefits in
respect of 1/3rd undivided share of in the said premises in favour
of Mr. Sharwan Kumar Garg (son of late Sh. H.C Garg).
Accordingly, Mr. Sharwan Kumar Garg became absolute owner of
1/3rd undivided share in the property. Further that on 30.12.2021,
other co-owner, Sh. Suresh Kumar Bansal pursuant to a family
partition/settlement, transferred his 1/3rd undivided share in the
property in favour of his nephew viz., Mr. Mukul Bansal, vide
registered gift deed dated 30.12.2021. Therefore, petitioner along
with Sh. Mukul Bansal and Sh. Sharwan Kumar Garg is the joint
and absolute owner of the said premises which includes tenanted
premises. It is submitted by petitioner that other co-owners, Mr.
Sharwan Kumar Garg and Mr. Mukul Bansal have no objection to
present eviction proceedings against the respondents.
17. At this juncture, it is observed that it is a matter of legal trite
that any co-owner can file the eviction petition. There is no need of
any written consent of other co-owners. In the case titled as M/s
Indian Umbrella Manufacturing Co. & Ors. vs. Bhagabandei
Agarwalla (Dead) by LRs Smt. Savitri Agarwalla & Ors., AIR
2004 1321; it was held that:
“The consent of other co-owners is assumed to be taken unless it is
shown that the other co-owners were not agreeable to the ejection
of the tenant and suit/petition for their eviction was filed despite
their dis-agreement.”
18. Petitioner has relied upon a site plan, a copy of registered sale
deed dated 18.08.1998, copy of registered relinquishment deed
dated 27.02.2020, copy of registered gift deed dated 30.12.2021
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BHATIA
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RC.REV. 372/2026
and copy of rent receipt dated 25.11.2010.
19. It is further argued on behalf of petitioner that respondents have
acknowledged the Petitioner as his landlord as the
respondents/tenants vide another letter dated 22.12.2011, submitted
a demand draft bearing 969863 dated 05.12.2011 for Rs. 1,000/drawn on OBC Bank toward monthly rentals from 01.04.2011 till
31.03.2012. In support of this contention, petitioner has placed on
record copy of letters dated 03.10.2011 and 22.10.2011.
20. It is pertinent to note that in the entire leave to defend affidavit
respondents have not denied the landlord tenant relationship
between the parties nor challenged the ownership of petitioner over
suit property.
21. In fact, in leave to defend affidavit, respondents have
categorically submitted that they have been in possession of
tenanted premises, i.e. premises no.4150 Naya Bazar, New Delhi
since 2003 after the death of their father, late Sh. Devender Singh.
Admittedly, Mr. Devender Singh had been running the business of
New Janta Transport Company at the subject property since before
1970. Hence, respondents have acquired tenancy by operation of
law after death of their father namely, Late Sh. Devender Singh.
Hence, it is trite that once a tenant is always a tenant. Therefore,
relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the
respondent is not in question in any manner.
22. Firstly, objection taken by respondents is that present
proceedings are bad in law for misjoinder of necessary and proper
parties and deserve to be dismissed as Sh. Devender Singh was
survived by the respondent no.1 and respondent no.2 and two
sisters namely Ms. Tejinder Kaur and Ms. Jagjeet Kaur. That other
legal heirs of late Sh. Devender Singh have not been arrayed as
parties in the present petition. Same is opposed by the opposite
party on the ground that it is not necessary to implead all the joint
tenants.
23. It is observed that the argument of respondent that present
petition is bad of non-joinder of other legal heirs of late Sh.
Devender Singh is devoid of any merit as the Hon‟ble Apex Court
in case titled „Mohd. Usman Vs. Surayya Begum‟, 199 (3) Delhi
Lawyer 163 and in Kanji Manji Vs. Trustees of Port of
Bombay, AIR 1963 SC 498 held that:
“On the death of a tenant, the legal heirs inherits the tenancy rights
as joint tenants and not as tenants in common. In joint tenancy two
or more tenants take identical interests simultaneously with each
other. The joint tenancy differs from tenancy in common. In joint
tenancy, incidents of tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by
original tenant and if one of the legal heirs is not made a party, the
other legal heirs who are joint tenants represents the tenancy”.
24. Further, the grey area, if there was any, in respect of
representation by legal heirs of deceased tenant and their
impleadment was put to rest by Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:00:58
RC.REV. 372/2026
Suresh Kumar Kohli Vs. Rakesh Jain (Civil Appeal No. 3996 of
2018 decided on 19.04.2018) wherein it has been held as under: “20. We are of the view that in the light of H.C. Pandey (supra),
the situation is very clear that when original tenant dies, the legal
heirs inherit the tenancy as joint tenants and occupation of one of
the tenant is occupation of all the joint tenants. It is not necessary
for landlord to implead all legal heirs of the deceased tenant,
whether they are occupying the property or not. It is sufficient for
the landlord to implead either of those persons who are occupying
the property, as party. There may be a case where landlord is not
aware of all the legal heirs of deceased tenant and impleading only
those heirs who are in occupation of the property is sufficient for
the purpose of filing of eviction petition. An eviction petition
against one of the joint tenants is sufficient against all the joint
tenants and all joint tenants are bound by the order of the Rent
Controller as joint tenancy is one tenancy and is not a tenancy split
into different legal heirs. Thus, the plea of the tenants on this count
must fail.”
25. Hence, present petition filed against two of the legal heirs of
late Sh. Devender Singh cannot be said to be non-maintainable.
26. Another ground raised by respondents is that present petition is
hit by section 14(6) of DRC Act. It is contended that Mr. Sharwan
Kumar Garg has become a co-owner of the subject property vide
document dated 27.02.2020, and that Mr. Mukul Bansal has
become the co-owner of the subject property by way of acquiring
document dated 31.12.2021. Thus, the petition has been filed on
19.07.2024, which is within the period of 5 years from acquisition
and hence, barred by section 14(6) of DRC Act.
27. Per contra, it is argued on behalf of petitioner that it is not the
case that petitioner became the owner in the year 2020 or 2021.
28. It is observed that petitioner has relied upon copy of registered
sale deed dated 18.08.1998 whereby petitioner along with Sh.
Suresh Kumar Bansal and late Sh. H.C Garg, jointly purchased the
said premises, i.e. ground floor of property bearing Nos. 4120,
4121 on front side main road, and 4150 on the backside, Plot No.
110 (old) situated at Baston Road, Naya Bazar, Delhi-110006,
totally admeasuring 210 Sq. Yds. including built up area (which
includes tenanted premises herein). Hence, petitioner became
owner of 1/3rd undivided share of said premises in the year 1998
itself and present petition cannot be said to be barred by section
14(6) of DRC Act.”
19.
On a consideration of the material placed on record, this Court
finds no infirmity in the aforesaid finding. The documents being the
relinquishment deed dated 27.02.2020 and the gift deed dated
30.12.2021, whereby the interests of the other co-owners came to be
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BHATIA
11:00:58
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transferred, do not establish that Respondent No.1 himself acquired
his interest in the subject premises only under the said documents. On
the contrary, the registered Sale Deed dated 18.08.1998 records the
acquisition of an undivided share in the premises, including the
tenanted portion, by Respondent No.1. The subsequent acquisition of
interests by other co-owners cannot, by itself, alter the date on which
Respondent No.1 acquired his own interest in the property. The
challenge founded on Section 14(6) of the DRC Act, therefore,
proceeds on a premise which is not borne out from the record.
20.
It is also trite law that a co-owner can maintain eviction
proceedings without the necessity of the other co-owners being parties
in the Petition. The Petitioners have not placed any material to
demonstrate that the eviction proceedings have been instituted in
opposition to the interest of the other co-owners or that the latter
object to the institution of the present proceedings. The objection on
this count, therefore, does not disclose any triable issue.
21.
Even otherwise, the learned ARC also examined the question of
ownership and the existence of the landlord-tenant relationship
between the parties in the backdrop of the settled position that, for the
purposes of an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC
Act, the landlord is not required to establish an absolute or perfect title
as in a title suit, but only a title or interest superior to that of the
tenant. In the present case, Respondent No.1 has placed on record the
registered Sale Deed dated 18.08.1998, the subsequent relinquishment
and gift deeds, as also rent receipts and other material evidencing the
landlord-tenant relationship. Significantly, the Petitioners, in their
leave to defend application, have not disputed the landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties or challenged the ownership of
Digitally Signed
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:00:58
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Respondent No.1 over the subject premises. Rather, their case
proceeds on the basis of their occupation of the tenanted premises as
tenants. In these circumstances, the challenge to the status of
Respondent No.1 as landlord cannot be sustained merely by raising an
objection regarding the manner in which the subsequent interests of
the co-owners came to be acquired.
22.
The second contention relates to the bona fide requirement
pleaded by Respondent No.1 for the purposes of his son's business.
The Petitioners contend that the son of Respondent No.1 was already
engaged in the business of grains and that material in the form of
social-media printouts had been placed before the learned ARC to
demonstrate the same. It is further contended that the son is already
carrying on the said business from other premises and has access to
additional accommodation, including the first floor of property
bearing No. 4121, Naya Bazar, New Delhi. It is thus urged that the
alleged requirement of the tenanted premises is not genuine.
23.
The learned ARC has considered this aspect in detail and has
also taken note of the material relied upon by the Petitioners in
support of the said objection. The relevant portion of the Impugned
Order in relation to the aforesaid finding of the Learned ARC is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“33. The petitioner has stated in the petition that tenanted premises
is bonafidely required for son of petitioner who has joined
petitioner‟s business and wants to expand the same. It is submitted
that petitioner is running a whole-sale trading business of pulses in
the name and style of M/s. Mangat Ram Bhagwat Swarup from the
property bearing no. 4121 (front side), ground floor, which is on
the front side of the tenanted premises. Now the son of the
petitioner, i.e. Mr. Shivank Singhal, after completion of his
graduation and masters (B.A LLB and LLM), has joined hands
with his father with aim to expand to whole sale business of other
grains\pulses being sold by them. It is submitted that the space
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:00:58
RC.REV. 372/2026
available right now is highly insufficient as he cannot store the
sample of goods for sale purposes and does not have space for
office/staff and for expansion of business operations by the
petitioner, additional space is required.
34. On the other hand, respondents have denied the alleged
Bonafide need of petitioner. It is contended by respondents that
there is no Bonafide requirement of petitioner and his son as they
have come to know that son of petitioner Sh. Shivank Singhal has
been in business of grains for past 12 years and he is running the
business through a company namely Mangat Ram Dal Mills
Private Limited which is in directorship of the petitioner and his
family and he is conducting online business by way of website
www.mangatramonline.com with its office at M-16,, Badli
Industrial Estate Delhi-110092. Respondents have relied upon
screenshot of the social media platform of Mr. Shivank Singhal.
That the said company has been functioning since the past 26 years
and is also in possession of the entire first floor of property bearing
no. 4121 Naya Bazar New Delhi. Further that there is another
company bearing the name Sarnamal Rajkumar traders Pvt Ltd.
having its directors as Sneh Singhal and Naresh Kumar Singhal
(relatives of the petitioner) was registered at 4150 Naya Bazar New
Delhi-110006. That there is another company by the name of
Vinay Food Processors Pvt Ltd‟ having its directors as Vinay
Singhal, Ajay Kumar Singhal, the petitioner and Angoori Devi,
with its registered office at 4121 Naya Bazar, New Delhi-110006.
The said company is also conducting the same online sales
business that is being alleged as the bonafide requirement of the
son of the petitioner.
35. Firstly, it is observed averments of respondents are vague and
they not file any substantive document other that copy of social
media profile of son of petitioner in support of above said
contention. Even for the sake of arguments, if the contention of
respondents is presumed to be correct still it is trite law that no one
can be expected to sit idle in order to make successful his claim for
eviction for bonafide need. Reliance is placed upon case titled as
Raghunath G. Panhale Vs. M/s Chaganlal Sundarji & Co., AIR
1999 SC 3864, wherein it was observed that: “……A landlord need not lose existing job nor resign it
nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must
get possession of his premises for establishing a business”
“One cannot imagine that a landlord who is in service
should first resign his job and wait for the un-foreseen and
uncertain result of a long-drawn litigation. If he resigned
his job, he might indeed end up in utter poverty,
joblessness is not a condition precedent for seeking to get
back one‟s premises…….”
36. Further the aforementioned apprehensions of respondents are
already taken care of in the DRC Act itself by our legislative
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By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
11:00:58
RC.REV. 372/2026
forefathers while enacting the laws who have already considered
possibility of misuse in the hands of unscrupulous landlords and
thereby inserted Section 19 of DRC Act which reads as follows: “Where a landlord recovers possession of any premises
and the premises are not occupied by the landlord or by
the person for whose benefit the premises are held, within
two months of obtaining such possession, or the premises
having been so occupied are, at any time within three
years from the date of obtaining possession, relet to any
person than the evicted tenant without obtaining the
permission of the Controller such tenant can be put back to
the premises or be paid such compensation as the
Controller thinks fit.”
37. Hence, if the requirement of landlord is not bonafide and if a
landlord abuses the process of the court, obtain an order of
eviction, subsequently lets out the property or sells the same, the
tenant can always apply for restitution under section 19 of the DRC
Act.
38. It is further observed that the law is very well settled that the
requirement of the landlord is to be presumed as genuine and, in
this regard, reference can be also made to the judgment of Hon‟ble
Supreme Court titled as Abid-Ur-Islam Vs Indersen Dua dated
07.04.2022, wherein it was observed as follows: “…….when a landlord asserts that he requires his building
for his own occupation, the Rent Controller shall not
proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not
bonafide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied
and when the landlord shows a prima facie case, it is open
to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that
requirement of the landlord is bonafide…….”
39. Further at this juncture, the law regarding the bonafide need has
been made clear by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case titled as
Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. reported as
AIR 1999 Supreme Court 100, whereby it was held that:
“….. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of
Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the
landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be
bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his
building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall
not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not
bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are
satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it
is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that
the requirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said
by Courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the
landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without
getting possession of the tenanted premises. While
deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of
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the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour
as to how else the landlord could have adjusted
himself…..”
40. Now in view of this legal position and present facts and
circumstances, the presumption of genuineness of requirement has
to be drawn in favor of petitioner only. Thus, respondents have
failed to raise any triable issue qua the bonafide requirement of the
petitioner.”
24.
This Court is unable to accept that the material relied upon by
the Petitioners, even if taken at its highest, necessarily displaces the
case set up by Respondent No.1. The case pleaded by the landlord is
not that his son is presently without any occupation or business, but
that, having joined the existing business, he requires the premises for
the purpose of wholesale business of other pulses and grains as also
for storing samples of products and for space for office/staff. The
mere circumstance that a person is already carrying on a business
cannot, by itself, lead to the conclusion that requirement of space for
the purposes as set out is inherently lacking in bona fides. In any
event, admittedly it is not the Petitioner‟s contention that the present
case is of additional accommodation.
25.
In Ranjit Singh Sethi v. Gurmeet Singh Chawla7, this Court
dealt with a similar situation where the landlord was already carrying
on a bakery business from an adjoining shop and sought the tenanted
premises for expansion of the existing business. The Court recognised
that the fact that a business is already being carried on does not, by
itself, negate the bona fide requirement for additional space,
particularly where the premises sought are considered suitable for
expansion. Applying the said principle, the mere fact that the son of
Respondent No.1 is already carrying on business elsewhere would not,
2012 SCC OnLine Del 320
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in itself, defeat the pleaded requirement for additional space for
expansion of the existing business. The relevant portion of the
aforesaid Judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:
“8. The Supreme Court has time and again said that the landlord is
the best Judge of his requirement and it is neither open to the tenant
nor to the Court to dictate the landlord on this aspect both with
respect of his requirement for a residential or commercial premises.
9. In Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. v. Vimalabai
Prabhulal, (2005) 8 SCC 252; the Court observed as under:
“It is always the prerogative of the landlord that if he
requires the premises in question for his bona fide use for
expansion of business this is no ground to say that the
landlords are already having their business at Chennai
and Hyderabad therefore, it is not genuine need. It is not
the tenant who can dictate the terms to the landlord and
advise him what he should do and what he should not. It is
always the privilege of the landlord to choose the nature
of the business and the place of business.”
10. In Sudesh Kumar Soni v. Prabha Khanna, 2008 SCC OnLine
Del 1128 : (2008) 153 DLT 652, the Court observed as under:
“It is not for tenant to dictate terms to landlord as to how
else he can adjust himself without getting possession of
tenanted premises-suitability has to be seen for
convenience of landlord and his family members and on
the basis of circumstances including their profession,
vocation, style of living, habit and background.”
26.
More importantly, the learned ARC has considered the very
material relied upon by the Petitioners and has found that apart from
the social-media material, no substantive material had been placed to
establish that the existing business arrangements rendered the
requirement pleaded by the landlord false or inherently improbable.
This finding is one which was available to the learned ARC on the
material before it and cannot be said to be perverse merely because
another view of the same material may be suggested by the
Petitioners.
27.
It is also material that the requirement pleaded by Respondent
No.1 is for setting up of a wholesale business as also for storage of
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samples and to provide space for office and staff. Thus, the
requirement cannot be examined in isolation by merely asking
whether some business activity is already being undertaken. The
relevant enquiry is whether the landlord has demonstrated a genuine
requirement for the particular premises for the purpose pleaded by
him. The learned ARC, upon consideration of the pleadings and
material placed before it, answered that question in favour of
Respondent No.1. In the absence of any material demonstrating that
such finding is founded upon an erroneous legal principle, ignores a
material piece of evidence, or is so unreasonable as to warrant
revisional interference, this Court would not be justified in
substituting its own assessment of the factual material.
28.
The Petitioners next contend that Respondent No.1 has
sufficient alternative accommodation and that, in particular,
portions/floors of the same property are available to him. It is
submitted that the Respondent No.1 already owns and utilises a
substantial portion of the property for carrying on his business and
that other portions are lying vacant. Learned counsel for Respondent
No.1 disputes that the alleged premises constitute suitable alternative
accommodation and submits that the Petitioners have not established
either their availability for immediate use by Respondent No.1 or their
suitability for the specific business requirement pleaded in the eviction
petition.
29.
The objection regarding alternative accommodation has to be
examined not merely from the standpoint of the existence of some
other space but from the standpoint of whether such space is
reasonably suitable for the requirement asserted by the landlord. The
mere identification of another portion of a property, without
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demonstrating its availability, possession, accessibility and suitability
for the particular purpose for which possession is sought, cannot by
itself constitute a triable issue.
30.
The learned ARC has noticed that the Respondent No.1 was
already carrying on his wholesale business from the ground floor of
the adjoining premises and had specifically pleaded the need for
additional space for setting up wholesale business of other
pulses/grains as also for storage of samples and for the purpose of
office and staff. The Petitioners, on the other hand, have not been able
to demonstrate from the material on record that any particular
alternative accommodation identified by them was, in fact, available
to Respondent No.1 and was reasonably suitable for the same
requirement.
31.
At this stage, it is also necessary to bear in mind that the Court
is not required to undertake an exercise of substituting the landlord's
assessment of his business requirements with its own. The principle
that the landlord is ordinarily the best judge of his requirement does
not, however, dispense with the requirement of examining whether the
alleged alternative accommodation is actually available and suitable.
In the present case, the learned ARC has undertaken that exercise and
has found the objections of the Petitioners to be vague and
unsupported by sufficient material. The finding, therefore, cannot be
characterised as one arrived at without consideration of the Petitioners'
case. The mere assertion that other portions of the property exist,
without establishing their suitability for the pleaded requirement, does
not furnish a ground for revisional interference. The relevant portion
of the Impugned Order in relation to the aforesaid finding of the
Learned ARC is reproduced hereinbelow:
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“41. It is submitted on behalf of petitioner that the petitioner has no
suitable alternative accommodation at his disposal to expand the
business activity as contemplated by the son of the petitioner who
is dependent upon the petitioner for the purpose of availability of
space to continue running the business of the petitioner.
42. On the other hand, it is contended by respondents that as per
the title documents that have been filed by the petitioner, the
petitioner and his co-owners do not own just 50 Sq. Yds as have
been mentioned by them, but they own three buildings which are
building no. 4120 and 4121 on one side and 4150 on the backside
of the main road of Naya Bazar New Delhi-110006. Per contra, in
reply it is submitted by petitioner that registered sale deed along
with site plan makes it clear that it is one single plot which has
three numbers.
43. In view of the court, all the contentions of respondents are
vague and unsubstantiated. Further in petition itself, petitioner has
disclosed that petitioner is running a whole-sale trading business of
pulses in the name and style of M/s. Mangat Ram Bhagwat Swarup
from the property bearing no. 4121 (front side), ground floor,
which is on the front side of the tenanted premises.
44. Even otherwise, it is trite that tenant cannot dictate the landlord
as to what is adequate and landlord is the best judge of his
requirements. At this juncture, it is also pertinent to mention that in
case titled as “Balwant Singh @ Bant Singh & Anr. v.
Sudarshan Kumar & Anr.” in case bearing Civil Appeal Nos.
231-232 of 2021 decided on 27.01.2021 the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has observed that:
“It is not for the tenant to dictate how much space is
adequate for the proposed business venture or to suggest
that the available space with the landlord will be adequate.
It is further been observed that the genuine need of the
appellant to secure vacant possession of the premises for
the proposed business is found to be established. The
adequacy or otherwise of the space available with the
landlord for the business in mind is not for the tenant to
dictate”
45. It is trite that tenant cannot dictate the landlord as to what is
adequate and landlord is the best judge of his requirements. It is a
settled law that mere availability of other alternate accommodation
is itself not the decisive factor for denial of eviction proceedings by
the landlord, more so, since there are various factors like the size,
location, access, purpose, viability, safety concerns, footfall, and/or
like, amongst others which have/ are to be taken into consideration
while dealing with the aspect of availability of alternate suitable
accommodation. Reliance is placed upon case titled as Shiv Sarup
Gupta v Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6 SCC 222].
46. The contention of respondents that petitioner has many other
properties which he has not disclosed is vague and bald. Further, in
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the eviction petition, the landlord need not disclose the alternate
properties available to him if he is of the view that the alternate
properties are unsuitable for him. The eviction petition is not a
declaration or disclosure of all the immovable assets of the
landlord and then and the exercise of sifting through the ones‟
which are or could be deemed to be suitable as alternate
accommodation. For any property to be considered alternately
available, it has first to be available, i.e. in possession of the
landlord and capable of being put to immediate use; thereafter only
the issue of its suitability for the bona fide need arises. The
landlord‟s discretion and prerogative in this regard cannot be
questioned, except insofar as it is not whimsical, ex facie or
shockingly unreasonable. Reliance is placed upon Babu Lal vs
Atul Kumar & Anr. CRP No.147 of 2012 passed by the Hon‟ble
High Court of Delhi.
47. Even otherwise, it can be observed that it is not for the tenant to
dictate to the landlord that how he should meet or fulfill his
requirement. In this regard reference can be also made to the
judgment of Hon‟ble High Court of Delhi titled as Sudesh Kumar
Soni & Ors. Vs. Prabha Khanna & Ors. [153 (2008) DLT 652]
it was observed that:“24. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to
dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust
himself without getting possession of the tenanted
premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the
requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make
an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have
adjusted himself.
25. Suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the
landlord and his family members and on the basis of the
circumstances including their profession, vocation, style of
living, habits and background. Landlord is the best judge
of his residential requirement.”
*****
50. In Praveen and Another vs Mulak Raj and Others (2023)
SCC OnLine Del 7721, it has been held by the Hon‟ble High
Court that the Courts are not to sit in the armchair of the landlord
and dictate as to how the available property of the landlord is to be
best utilized by him. The landlord is the absolute owner of his
property and is the best person to decide which property is to be
utilized in what way.
51. In view of the settled legal position, it is not for the respondent
to dictate to the petitioner that it should use some other
accommodation for its business, even if it is indeed available with
the petitioner. The tenanted premises belong to the petitioner and it
is for the petitioner to see whether it is suitable for its requirement
or not. It is the right of the petitioner to choose a property which is
going to be more profitable and convenient for his business. If the
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tenanted premises is suitable as per his needs, the petitioner has
every right to possess the said premises and the respondent cannot
contend that the petitioner should manage his affairs otherwise.
While deciding the question of bonafide requirement of the
landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how
else the landlord could have adjusted. In view of the above
discussion, the allegation of the respondents that the petitioner has
alternative suitable accommodations does not give rise to any
triable issue.
52. Accordingly, I am duly satisfied that the petitioner needs the
tenanted premises in question for purpose of setting up/expansion
of his business along with his son and I am further satisfied that the
petitioner does not have any other alternate property available with
him to fulfill the said requirement.
53. After analysis of the present factual situation in backdrop of the
law discussed above, this Court is of the considered opinion that
respondents have failed to raise any triable issue in respect of
bonafide need of petitioner and alternate accommodation available
with the petitioner.”
32.
The last factual objection concerns the alleged discrepancy in
the area of the subject premises. It is contended that whereas the Sale
Deed refers to an area of 210 square yards, the tenanted premises is
stated to measure approximately 248 square yards, and that the site
plan filed by Respondent No.1 consequently does not correspond with
the title documents. The learned ARC has considered this objection
along with the related objection concerning the dimensions reflected
in the site plan and has held that such discrepancy does not affect the
landlord-tenant relationship or the identification of the subject
premises.
33.
In the opinion of this Court, no material prejudice is shown to
have been caused to the Petitioners on account of the alleged
discrepancy. The question before the learned ARC was whether
Respondent No.1 had established his status as landlord of the premises
in question and whether the premises forming the subject matter of the
eviction proceedings could be identified. Once the landlord-tenant
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relationship and identity of the tenanted premises are otherwise
established, a discrepancy in the dimensions or measurement reflected
in the site plan would not, by itself, create a triable issue unless the
Petitioners are able to demonstrate that the discrepancy renders the
very identity of the premises uncertain or materially affects the claim
for eviction. No such consequence is demonstrated in the present case.
The relevant portion of the Impugned Order in relation to the aforesaid
finding of the Learned ARC is reproduced hereinbelow:
“26. Another ground raised by respondents is that present petition
is hit by section 14(6) of DRC Act. It is contended that Mr.
Sharwan Kumar Garg has become a co-owner of the subject
property vide document dated 27.02.2020, and that Mr. Mukul
Bansal has become the co-owner of the subject property by way of
acquiring document dated 31.12.2021. Thus, the petition has been
filed on 19.07.2024, which is within the period of 5 years from
acquisition and hence, barred by section 14(6) of DRC Act.
27. Per contra, it is argued on behalf of petitioner that it is not the
case that petitioner became the owner in the year 2020 or 2021.
28. It is observed that petitioner has relied upon copy of registered
sale deed dated 18.08.1998 whereby petitioner along with Sh.
Suresh Kumar Bansal and late Sh. H.C Garg, jointly purchased the
said premises, i.e. ground floor of property bearing Nos. 4120,
4121 on front side main road, and 4150 on the backside, Plot No.
110 (old) situated at Baston Road, Naya Bazar, Delhi-110006,
totally admeasuring 210 Sq. Yds. including built up area (which
includes tenanted premises herein). Hence, petitioner became
owner of 1/3rd undivided share of said premises in the year 1998
itself and present petition cannot be said to be barred by section
14(6) of DRC Act.
29. Another contention of respondents is that the site plan filed by
the petitioner is wrong and false as same does not co-relate with
sale deeds relied upon by petitioner. It is argued that sale deeds
identify the plot size to be 31 ft X 72 ft however, the petitioner
shows that the site map is 28.6 ft in breadth and intentionally
withholds the length of the entire plot.
30. However, it is a settled law that issue of minor discrepancies in
site plan has no significance if it is proved that petitioner is the
landlord of the subject property. Reliance is placed upon a case
titled as Rajender Kumar Pahuja vs Anup Narain Gaur RC
REV 391/2024, CM APPL. 75295/2024, wherein the Hon‟ble
High Court of Delhi has held as under:
“15. In any event, it must be borne in mind that the
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respondent was required to identify the subject premises as
also give a Site Plan, but it was not incumbent upon him to
give the exact Site Plan under such circumstances. Once it
was established that the respondent was the landlord of the
subject premises, of which he was admittedly not in
possession, the issue of minor consistencies in the Site
Plan, if any, fades into significance. More so, as held in
Shakuntala Devi v. Mohan Das, even the non-filing of site
plan may not be fatal to the case of a landlord, depending
on the facts and circumstances of the case.”
31. Therefore, the said issue qua the Site Plan filed by petitioner is
discarded. Further the argument that the petitioner is playing fraud
as he has placed on record a rent receipt dated 25.11.2010 which
seems to be issued in the name of respondents‟ father late Sh.
Devender Singh, however, their father passed away on 05.11.2003
is not tenable when landlord tenant relationship has been duly
established between the parties. Further in reply to leave affidavit,
petitioner has submitted that fact of demise of father of respondents
till such time, i.e. on the date of issuance of rent receipt dated
25.11.2010 was never informed by respondents to petitioner and as
original tenancy was in name of father of respondents, receipt was
issued in his name only.
32. Thus, there is no triable issue with respect to ownership of
petitioner and landlord-tenant relationship between petitioner and
respondents.”
34.
This Court may also deal with the submission of learned
counsel for the Petitioners founded upon M/s Geeta Press (supra).
The Judgment relied upon by the Petitioners cannot be read in
isolation from the factual and evidentiary circumstances in which the
principles therein were applied. The Petitioners have not demonstrated
that the said decision lays down any proposition which would displace
the findings returned by the learned ARC on the specific issues arising
in the present case. More importantly, the present proceedings are at
the stage of revisional scrutiny under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of
the DRC Act. The question before this Court is not whether another
view of the material is conceivable, but whether the decision-making
process adopted by the learned ARC suffers from any jurisdictional
error, material irregularity, perversity or manifest illegality. The
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judgment relied upon, therefore, does not advance the case of the
Petitioners to that extent.
35.
On a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid aspects, this
Court finds that the learned ARC has considered each of the
objections raised by the Petitioners in the leave to defend application,
including the plea under Section 14(6), the challenge to the bona fide
requirement, the plea of alternative accommodation and the objections
concerning the site plan and measurement of the subject premises. The
findings returned by the learned ARC are based on the material placed
before it and are supported by the legal principles governing the grant
of leave to defend in proceedings under Section 14(1)(e) read with
Section 25-B of the DRC Act.
36.
The jurisdiction of this Court under the proviso to Section 25-
B(8) of the DRC Act is not that of an appellate court. Having regard to
the findings recorded hereinabove, this Court does not find the
Impugned Order to suffer from any jurisdictional error, material
irregularity, perversity or manifest illegality warranting exercise of
revisional jurisdiction. The Petitioners have essentially sought a reappreciation of the material which was already considered by the
learned ARC, which exercise is impermissible within the limited
scope of the present proceedings.
37.
In view of the foregoing discussion, the present Revision
Petition, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.
38.
Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), stands disposed of in the above terms.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
SEPTEMBER 28, 2026/nd/ma
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