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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
WRIT PETITION (HABEAS CORPUS) NO.128 OF 2025
BETWEEN:
MRS. DEEPTHI RAMKUMAR REVANUR
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
DAUGHTER OF LATE T.S. NAGARAJ
RESIDING AT 961/28
FIRST FLOOR, 2ND MAIN ROAD
VIJAYANAGAR
BENGALURU-560 040
…PETITIONER
(BY SRI. KASHYAP N. NAIK, ADVOCATE)
AND:
Digitally
signed by
PAVITHRA N 1. UNION OF INDIA
Location:
REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE
High Court
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
of Karnataka
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT
NEW DELHI-110 011
2.
UNDER SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
SOUTH BLOCK
NEW DELHI-110 011
E-MAIL: SECYSOUTH@MEA.GOV.IN
3.
UNDER SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
NATIONAL PORTAL SECRETARIAT
A4B4, 3RD FLOOR
NATIONAL INFORMATICS CENTRE
A-BLOCK
CGO COMPLEX
LODHI ROAD
NEW DELHI-110 003
E-MAIL: GOI@DIRECTORY.NIC.IN
4.
UNDER SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF WOMEN AND CHILD PROTECTION
SHASTRI BHAWAN
DR. RAJENDRA PRASAD ROAD
NEW DELHI-110 001
E-MAIL:SECY.WCD@GOV.IN
5.
JOINT DIRECTOR BENGALURU
DEPARTMENT OF WELFARE AND CHILD
DEVELOPMENT EMPOWERMENT OF DIFFERENTLY
ABLED AND SENIOR CITIZENS (KARNATAKA)
1ST FLOOR
VISVESHWARAYA MINI TOWER
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001
EMAIL: ICPS.KAR@GMAIL.COM
6.
THE COMMISSIONER
BENGALURU CITY POLICE
OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
NO.1, INFANTRY ROAD
BENGALURU-560 001
7.
MR. RAMKUMAR REVANUR
AGED ABOUT 44 YEARS
SON OF RAGHU RAMAIAH REVANUR
PRESENTLY RESIDING AT NO.8 OUTWOODS CLOSE
WESTON STAFFORD
STAFFORDSHIRE
ST180JR
UNITED KINGDOM
EMAIL:RAMKUMAR.REVANUR@GMAIL.COM
HAVING PERMANENT RESIDENCE AT NO.1171
6TH BLOCK, HMT LAYOUT
VIDYARANYAPURA
BENGALURU-560 097
8.
SECRETARY
KARNATAKA STATE COMMISSION FOR PROTECTION
OF CHILD RIGHTS
KRISHI BHAVAN, HUDSON CIRCLE
NRUPATANGA ROAD
BANGALORE-560 002
9.
STATE OF KARNATAKA
REP. BY THE ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF HOME
M.S.BUILDING
DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD
AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU
KARNATAKA-560 001
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. ADITYA SINGH, ADV FOR R1 TO R4;
SRI. THEJESH P, HCGP FOR R5, R6, R8 & R9 - STATE;
SRI. RIDDHIMAN BAROOAH, ADV, FOR
SMT. ANNAPOORNA S., ADV, FOR R7)
THIS WP(HC) IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS OR ANY OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT, ORDER OR
DIRECTION COMMANDING ALL RESPONDENTS TO PHYSICALLY
PRODUCE THE MINOR - MS.SONAKSHI REVANUR, DAUGHTER OF
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NO.7 HEREIN, HOLDING INDIAN
PASSPORT NO.I0380308, AN INDIAN CITIZEN BY BIRTH, AGED
11 YEARS (DATE OF BIRTH 22.03.2014) BEFORE THIS COURT.
THIS WP(HC) HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGMENT
ON
15.06.2026
AND
COMING
ON
FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT THIS DAY, ANU SIVARAMAN
J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN
and
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VENKATESH NAIK T
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN)
This Writ Petition (Habeas Corpus) is filed seeking a
direction, commanding all respondents to physically produce
the minor daughter of the writ petitioner and respondent
No.7 herein, an Indian citizen by birth, before this Court.
2.
We have heard Shri. Kashyap N. Naik, learned
counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, Shri. Aditya Singh,
learned counsel appearing for respondents No.1 to 4, Shri.
Thejesh.
P,
learned
High
Court
Government
Pleader,
appearing for respondents No.5, 6, 8 and 9 and Shri.
Riddhiman
Barooah
and
Smt.
Annapoorna
S,
learned
counsel appearing for respondent No.7.
3.
The
marriage
between
the
petitioner
and
respondent No.7 was solemnised in accordance with Hindu
rites and customs on 01.06.2008 at Bengaluru. In the
wedlock, two children were born - daughter on 22.03.2014
and son on 14.09.2021. In the year 2016, respondent No.7
moved to the United Kingdom for the purpose of his
employment, and the petitioner and their minor daughter
relocated with him. During this period, the petitioner too
was gainfully employed in the United Kingdom. In the year
2017, the daughter came to be diagnosed as being on the
autism spectrum. The petitioner submits that for the welfare
of the child, she gave up her employment and resolved to
take care of their daughter full time.
4.
It is also submitted by the petitioner that the
marital relationship between her and respondent No.7
deteriorated, and that respondent No.7 forced her out of the
matrimonial
home
and
restricted
her
access
to
their
daughter. Consequently, the petitioner moved to India with
their son in April, 2023. It is contended that respondent
No.7 threatened to sever all contact with the petitioner
unless she signed a divorce petition on mutually agreed
terms. Although the petitioner signed the same, she
subsequently revoked her consent by an e-mail addressed to
respondent No.7's Advocate on 02.04.2025. It is further
contended that respondent No.7 filed a petition for divorce
under Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on
14.06.2025
before
the
Principal
Judge,
Family
Court,
Bangalore, without the knowledge, consent or presence of
the petitioner. The petitioner contended that her absence is
borne out by the immigration stamp, which evidences her
presence in the United Kingdom from
07.04.2025 to
18.06.2025, that is, as on the date of filing of the said
petition. It is further submitted that the petitioner only
learnt of the pendency of the case in October 2025, through
a text message from a lawyer. She returned to India with
her son on 18.06.2025 and was not allowed to see her
daughter after 09.06.2025.
5.
It
is
further
submitted
that
the
petitioner
contacted their daughter's former school and her current
Government-sponsored special-needs residential school and
discovered that the child had not attended a single day since
term began on 05.09.2025. Further, the caretaker who
previously looked after the child was reportedly forced out
by respondent No.7, leaving the child's care arrangements
unknown.
It
is
also
submitted
that
their
daughter's
whereabouts and wellbeing is unknown and given her
special-needs status, the petitioner has filed the current
petition.
6.
The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
contended that the unlawful denial of access to the minor
daughter by respondent No.7 is a violation of Articles 14, 21
and 21A of the Constitution of India. The daughter is a
special
needs
requirements
child
and
with
specific
unwarranted
educational
change
in
the
and
child's
environment may disrupt her progress. It is also contended
that the rights of this child are protected under the Persons
with Disability Act, 2016 and unexplained removal from
familiar surroundings is a violation of these rights.
7.
It is further contended that respondent No.7 has
failed to provide maintenance to the petitioner or the minor
son in India and has also forged the petitioner's signature to
renew the daughter's passport. Further, respondent No.7 by
denying access to their daughter, coerced the petitioner to
accept the divorce conditions, demonstrating his disregard
for the welfare of the child. It is further contended that the
rights of the minor daughter are protected under the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child to which both
the United Kingdom and India are parties. Therefore, the
treaty obligations pertaining to the protection of the child's
welfare ought to be complied with.
8.
The
learned
counsel
appearing
for
the
writ
petitioner has placed reliance on the following decisions:•
V. Ravichandran (DR.) v. Union of India &
others reported in (2010) 1 SCC 174;
•
Smt. Surinder Kaur Sandhu v. Harbax Singh
Sandhu and another reported in (1984) 3 SCC
698;
•
Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde reported in
(1998) 1 SCC 112;
•
State of U.P. v. Bhoora and others reported in
(1998) 1 SCC 128;
•
Tejaswini Gaud and others v. Shekhar Jagdish
Prasad Tewari and others reported in (2019) 7
SCC 42;
•
Nithya Anand Raghavan v. State (NCT of
Delhi) and another reported in (2017) 8 SCC
454; and
•
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union
Territory of Delhi and others reported in (1981)
1 SCC 608.
9.
The learned counsel appearing for respondent
No.7 would contend that the protective orders have been
obtained from the Court in the United Kingdom where the
child is ordinarily a resident, only to see that the child is not
taken out of the School, where she is presently enrolled. It
is further contended that the mother along with the younger
child are permitted regular access to the child and that there
is no question of denial of access to the mother. It is stated
that it is always open to the mother to join the child in the
United Kingdom and all other aspects of the matter can be
worked out in the jurisdiction where the child is ordinarily a
resident.
10.
Further, respondent No.7 has placed on record
documents evidencing the care provided by him to his
daughter. Respondent No.7 has produced a letter dated
08.12.2025 from her former School, which evidences the
child's regular attendance and the care taken by respondent
No.7. Further, a letter dated 02.07.2025 from the child's
Specialist School has been produced, which states that the
child ought not to be removed from her established routine,
as any such disruption may hamper her progress.
11.
We have considered the contentions advanced.
The question that arises for consideration is whether the
custody of the minor daughter with respondent No.7, being
her father can be said to be illegal detention so as to
warrant the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. In this
regard, the following decisions of the Apex Court are relied
upon:(i)
The Apex Court in Tejaswini Gaud's case (supra),
held that the writ of habeas corpus is an extraordinary
remedy and that in matters of the custody of a minor
the power to grant the writ is confined to cases in
which the minor is detained by a person not entitled to
his or her legal custody:"14. Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative
process for securing the liberty of the subject by
affording an effective means of immediate release from
an illegal or improper detention. The writ also extends
its influence to restore the custody of a minor to his
guardian when wrongfully deprived of it. The detention
of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal
custody is treated as equivalent to illegal detention for
the purpose of granting writ, directing custody of the
minor child. For restoration of the custody of a minor
from a person who according to the personal law, is not
his legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the
writ court has jurisdiction.
19.
Habeas corpus proceedings is not to justify
or examine the legality of the custody. Habeas corpus
proceedings is a medium through which the custody of
the child is addressed to the discretion of the Court.
Habeas corpus is a prerogative writ which is an
extraordinary remedy and the writ is issued where in
the circumstances of the particular case, ordinary
remedy provided by the law is either not available or is
ineffective; otherwise a writ will not be issued. In child
custody matters, the power of the High Court in
granting the writ is qualified only in cases where the
detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to
his legal custody. In view of the pronouncement on the
issue in question by the Supreme Court and the High
Courts, in our view, in child custody matters, the writ of
habeas corpus is maintainable where it is proved that
the detention of a minor child by a parent or others was
illegal and without any authority of law."
(ii)
This decision has since been reaffirmed by the
Apex Court in the case of Nirmala v. Kulwant Singh
reported in (2024) 10 SCC 595. Paragraph No.23 of the
judgment reads as follows:"23. It can thus be seen that this Court in Tejaswini
Gaud case has held that the habeas corpus is a prerogative
writ which is an extraordinary remedy. It has been held that
recourse to such a remedy should not be permitted unless the
ordinary remedy provided by the law is either not available or
is ineffective. It has been held that in child custody matters,
the power of the High Court in granting the writ is qualified
only in cases where the detention of a minor by a person who
is not entitled to his legal custody. It has further been held
that in child custody matters, the writ of habeas corpus is
maintainable where it is proved that the detention of a minor
child by a parent or others was illegal and without any
authority of law."
(iii)
In the case of Syed Saleemuddin v. Dr.
Rukhsana reported in (2001) 5 SCC 247, the Apex Court
held that in a habeas corpus petition for custody of a minor,
the Court's principal consideration is to ascertain whether
the present custody is unlawful and whether the child's
welfare requires that it be changed. Paragraph No.11 of the
judgment reads as follows:"11.
From
the
principles
laid
down
in
the
aforementioned cases it is clear that in an application seeking
a writ of habeas corpus for custody of minor children the
principal consideration for the court is to ascertain whether
the custody of the children can be said to be unlawful or
illegal and whether the welfare of the children requires that
the present custody should be changed and the children
should be left in the care and custody of somebody else. The
principle is well settled that in a matter of custody of a child
the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration for the
court. Unfortunately, the judgment of the High Court does not
show that the Court has paid any attention to these important
and relevant questions. The High Court has not considered
whether the custody of the children with their father can, in
the facts and circumstances, be said to be unlawful. The Court
has also not adverted to the question whether for the welfare
of the children they should be taken out of the custody of
their father and left in the care of their mother. However, it is
not necessary for us to consider this question further in view
of the fair concession made by Shri M.N. Rao that the
appellant has no objection if the children remain in the
custody of the mother with the right of the father to visit
them as noted in the judgment of the High Court, till the
Family Court disposes of the petition filed by the appellant for
custody of his children."
(iv) In Nithya Anand Raghavan's case (supra), the
Apex Court that the custody of a minor with a natural
guardian is to be presumed lawful, and that it is only in an
exceptionable situation that such custody will be disturbed in
the exercise of the writ jurisdiction while the other parent is
ordinarily relegated to the substantive remedy. The relevant
paragraph of the judgment is extracted below:"47. In a habeas corpus petition as aforesaid, the High
Court must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in
lawful
or
unlawful
custody
of
another
person
(private
respondent named in the writ petition). For considering that
issue, in a case such as the present one, it is enough to note
that the private respondent was none other than the natural
guardian of the minor being her biological mother. Once that
fact is ascertained, it can be presumed that the custody of the
minor with his/her mother is lawful. In such a case, only in
exceptionable situation, the custody of the minor (girl child)
may be ordered to be taken away from her mother for being
given to any other person including the husband (father of the
child), in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Instead, the other
parent can be asked to resort to a substantive prescribed
remedy for getting custody of the child."
12.
Even where the petition is maintainable, the
jurisdiction exercised by the writ Court is summary in nature
and is to be distinguished from the enquiry contemplated by
the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Where the welfare of
the child calls for a detailed enquiry, the Court may decline
to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and relegate the
parties to the Civil Court. The Apex Court in Tejaswini
Gaud’s case (supra), has held the following on this aspect:"20. In child custody matters, the ordinary remedy
lies only under the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act or the
Guardians and Wards Act as the case may be. In cases arising
out of the proceedings under the Guardians and Wards Act,
the jurisdiction of the court is determined by whether the
minor ordinarily resides within the area on which the court
exercises such jurisdiction. There are significant differences
between the enquiry under the Guardians and Wards Act and
the exercise of powers by a writ court which is summary in
nature. What is important is the welfare of the child. In the
writ court, rights are determined only on the basis of
affidavits. Where the court is of the view that a detailed
enquiry is required, the court may decline to exercise the
extraordinary jurisdiction and direct the parties to approach
the civil court. It is only in exceptional cases, the rights of the
parties to the custody of the minor will be determined in
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction on a petition for habeas
corpus."
13.
We have considered the contentions advanced.
The instant case is one where as at present, there are no
proceedings pending between the parties, either in the
United Kingdom, where the child in question is a resident, or
in any competent Family Court in India.
As such, the
custody of the child with her father, who is admittedly her
natural guardian, cannot be held to be an illegal detention,
warranting an interference of this Court or the issue of a
writ in the nature of Habeas Corpus.
Further, there is
nothing on record to show that the girl child is not being
properly looked after by her father or that there is any
emergent need for the change of the custody from the legal
custody of the father.
14.
We are of the opinion that it is for the parties to
work out their remedies in appropriate proceedings. Though,
it is vehemently contended that the best interest of the child
must be the primary consideration in any matter involving a
minor, including a petition seeking a writ of Habeas Corpus,
we are of the opinion that in the nature of adjudication
which is possible in Habeas Corpus Writ Petition, the
question of best interest of the child cannot be adjudicated
in a case where the child is not under illegal detention.
15.
In the above view of the matter, the Writ Petition
(Habeas Corpus) is closed.
The contentions of the parties are left open to be
decided in appropriate proceedings.
All pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall
stand disposed of.
Sd/(ANU SIVARAMAN)
JUDGE
Sd/(VENKATESH NAIK T)
JUDGE
cp*
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